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''The greatest benefactor is the pioneer, the man who turns the 
waste places of the earth, which had previously been useless to the 
human race into fruitful fields •.••• and raising the level of that 
population by intercourse with a set of men more civilized and 
better educated than itself. All this I claim the planter both of 
North and South India has done." 
G. L. Acworth, Planting Member, 
Madras Legislative Council, 1903. 
"I consider such legislation especially undesirable in this 
country, where ignorance of the language on the part of the master 
often leads t::o· seeming disobedience on the part of the servant; 
where a dominant race of masters is from its circumstances 
encouraged to exercise arbitrary power over servants, where the 
servant can expect but little protection from the effect of public 
opinion in controlling his master • s conduct and where, among the 
lower grades of society there are masters who have not been 
accustomed from their youth to fulfil the duties entailed by that 
relationship." 
Sir Charles Turner, Chief Justice, 
Madras High Court, 1884. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis examines the evolution of contractual relations 
• 
on British owned tea plantations in the Nilgiri hills of southern 
India during the colonial period. The introduction of intensive tea 
cultivation in the Nilgiri hills began in the mid-nineteenth 
century and proved to be the most important economic transformation 
to take place in the region prior to independence. By the turn of 
the twentieth century Nilgiri District had emerged as the leading 
centre of tea production in the south. As in other areas of 
plantation agriculture, local labour supplies in the Nilgiris were 
insufficient to meet the demands of tea producers who required a 
large, unskilled work force to be readily available at relatively 
little cost. Consequently, Nilgiri tea planters stimulated the 
growth of an annually migrating stream of plains' labour to the 
hills to satisfy their economic needs. 
The development of colonial plantation enterprise in southern 
India has attracted scant academic interest to date. Percival 
Griffiths' The History of the Indian Tea Industry 1 is the classic 
study in this field and provides a comprehensive coverage of the 
1. Percival Griffiths, The History of the Indian Tea 
Industry, London, 1967. 
X 
growth of tea cultivation in colonial India. With regard to south 
India, Griffiths includes chapters on labour and on the development 
of planters' organizations, particularly the United Planters' 
Association of Southern India (U.P.A.S.I.). Griffiths' war« has 
been supplemented by K. J. Tanna in Plantations in the Nilqiris -A 
Synoptic History 2 However, the purpose underlying these works 
differs from that of the current study. Both Griffiths and Tanna 
have been primarily concerned with detailing the advancement of tea 
cultivation in the region and the production problems faced by the 
early planters. With regard to labour, both these works as well as 
the jubilee history commissioned by the U.P.A.S.I. in 1953 3 and 
Raymond Renford' s more recent and briefer coverage 4 , are written 
squarely from the planters' point of view. They are largely 
concerned with the various proposals advanced by planters to solve 
the problem of inadequate labour supply. The most tangible and best 
documented outcome of planters' attempts to redress their labour 
problems was the enactment of the Madras Planters' Labour Law 
(Act I of 1903). The efforts expended by southern planters to win 
2. K. J. Tanna, Plantations in the Nilgiris- A Synoptic 
History, Wellington, 1969. 
3. s. G. Speer, (Ed.), U.P.A.s.r. 1893-1953, Coonoor, 1953. 
4. Raymond K. Renford, The Non-Official British in India 
to 1920, New Delhi, 1987, pp 77 104. 
xi 
enhanced legal control over labour have also been briefly surveyed 
by R. K. Das 5 , and by Bipan Chandra 6 . 
However, none of these studies has atte~pted to trace the 
formation and evolution of contractual and social relations.on tea 
plantations. This thesis attempts to redress these shortcomings. 
Chapter One outlines the conditions under which the tea industry 
developed in the Nilgiri hills and the demands that this 
development imposed on labour supply. Chapter Two provides a 
detailed account of the ethnic, caste, age and sexual composition 
of the plantation labour force and describes the mechanisms used to 
recruit and retain plantation labour. The relationships between 
planters, labour contractors and migrating workers are also 
established here. Additionally, this chapter tests a number of 
contentions which were often advanced by tea planters: that family 
migration was encouraged, that wages were sufficiently high to pull 
labour into plantation employment and that plantation employment 
promoted emancipation of bonded, agrarian labour. The planters • 
failure to recruit a labour force commensurate with their needs led 
directly to the their campaign to strengthen the established law of 
5. R. K. Das, Plantation Labour in India, Calcutta, n.d., 
probably 1932, pp 34-42, 93; R. K. Das, History of Indian 
Labour Legislation, Calcutta, 1941, pp 28 32. 
6. Bipan Chandra, Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in 
India, Economic Policies of Indian National Leadership, 
1880-1905, New Delhi, 1966, pp 375-380. 
xii 
penal contract. Chapter Three examines this protracted campaign and 
the responses it provoked from the Government of India, the 
Government of Madras and local officials. This material has 
provided the opportunity to assess the degree to which the ~rious 
levels of government regarded laws of penal contract as a means of 
bolstering colonial enterprise. Chapter Four provides a detailed 
coverage of the findings of the South of India Planters• Enquiry 
Committee and the subsequent enactment of Act I by the Government 
of Madras in 1903. This chapter also examines the conflict between 
the economic demands of tea growers and the humanitarian concerns 
expressed by, firstly, the Government of India, and then by Indian 
nationalists; "Chapter Five is clearly focused on the. result-s of 
Act I's operation in Nilgiri District and the Wynaad ~ of 
Malabar between 1904 and 1927. A comprehensive attempt is made here 
to explain the varying intensity with which the Act was applied to 
plantation labour. The chapter concludes by weighing the planters' 
success in retaining labour under Act I against forces which 
promoted greater competition in the rapidly expanding south Indian 
plantation labour market. Chapter Six analyses Act I' s impact on 
plantation relations and the planters' attempts to exploit these 
novel relations in order to bond contracted labourers to their 
estates. These attempts promoted the emergence of labour 
contractors as a newly independent, professional class on Nilgiri 
xiii 
' 
estates. This chapter explores the results of this development both 
on plantations and in labour's home villages. Chapter Seven begins 
with the repeal of Act I in 1927. The impact of the Act's repeal is 
assessed through a detailed examination of changes in plaatation 
practices and conditions over the following two decades. The 
chapter closes by evaluating the roles played by the Indian 
National Congress and trade unionism in plantation relations in the 
period immediately preceding independence. 
The findings presented in this case study not only add to the 
history of a small district within Madras Presidency. More 
significantly, they also contribute to understandi~g of a number of 
broader issues 'which are relevant to the overall study of colonial 
industrialization in British India. These issues include: the 
_relationship between colonial enterprise and British a<;).ministration 
at the local, provincial and national levels; the relative 
contributions made by colonial labour laws and pre-capitalist 
culture to the formation of industrial relations in colonial India; 
the role of the Indian National congress in labour relations, 
particularly in the period between 1937 and 1939; the impact of 
colonial industrialization upon the pre-industrial social order; 
the origins and evolution of systems of labour contracting in 
colonial industry; the relationship between industrial and agrarian 
labour markets. The .results of this study, in relation to these 
xiv 
issues, are discussed at length in the Conclusion. 
The history of plantation agriculture in the Nilgiri hills 
can only be constructed from a wide variety of source materials. In 
examining the growth of the planting conununity and its relfttions 
with government I have relied largely on the U.P.A.S.I. •a annual 
proceedings, periodicals, year books and planting directories which 
were consulted in the U.P.A.S.I. •s offices in Coonoor. Official 
publications such as district gazetteers and their statistical 
appendices, and non-official accounts by planters and travellers 
also proved useful. The roles played by the Governments of India 
and Madras have been traced primaiily through official sources held 
at the India· ·office Library. The Madras. Judicial Proceedings and 
the annual departmental papers of the Public and Judicial 
Department have proved most valuable in completing this task. While 
the activities of planters and administrators have been relatively 
well documented, plantation labourers have left no accounts of 
their experiences on tea plantations. Although the reports of 
various government committees and commissions provide a fairly 
comprehensive, official view of labour•s living and working 
conditions in the twentieth century, the same is not true of the 
nineteenth century. Neither have the systems of labour recruiting 
employed in the Nilgiris nor the conditions under which labour was 
contracted been recorded in a comprehensive and accessible form. 
XV 
Rather, evidence on these topics is scattered and fragmentary. 
While many of the developments covered in this thesis relate to 
plantation labour, their role in events could only be ascertained 
by piecing together brief references from planters' records, 
• 
newspapers, census reports, union records and other non-official 
and official sources consulted in London, Coonoar, Coimbatore and 
Madras. Nevertheless, some gaps in evidence remain and, as a 
result, a number of arguments concerning the origins of labour 
recruitment systems employed in the Nilgiris are presented in a 
more tentative fashion than I would have preferred. 
No thesis can be completed without the assistance of others. 
I would like to record my thanks to B. Sivaram, Secretary of the 
U.P.A.S.I., for granting me access to the Association~s records and 
for assisting me to locate materials. The help provided by P. s. 
Sundar of U.P.A.S.I. deserves a special mention, particularly as he 
was able to arrange plantation visits, interviews and introductions 
which would otherwise have been impossible. I am also indebted to 
Dr. P. H. Daniel of the Estates Staffs' Union in Coirnbatore, 
P. L. Perumal of the Nilgiri District Estate Workers~ Union in 
Coonoor, C. Sankaranarayanan of the Planters~ Association of Tamil 
Nadu and to the Ootacarnund Planters' Club for opening their library 
to me. In London I owe a debt of thanks to Professor Kenneth 
Ballhatchet for his supervision of this project. Thanks are also 
xvi 
due to Dr. Richard Bingle of the India Office Library and to Dr. 
Lionel Carter at the Centre for South Asian Studies, Cambridge. 
Finally and most importantly, I would like to thank my supervisor 
at the University of Sydney, Dr. Geoff Oddie, for his constructive 
• 
criticism and for his unending enthusiasm and encouragement. 
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CHAPTER 1 
EARLY TEA CULTIVATION AND THE PROBLEM OF LABOUR SUPPLY• 
The development of the Nilgiri district as a region of 
plantation agriculture began in the mid-nineteenth century. Large 
tracts of virgin forest and sparsely populated grasslands were 
cleared by British planters and cultivated with coffee trees. 
Although coffee remained the dominant commerci'al crop of the 
district until the twentieth century, the introduction and rapid 
expansion of tea cultivation from about 1860 was fundamental in 
shaping plantation labour relations in the area. Tea production was 
ffiore labour intensive than coffee, and unlike coffee it required a 
year-round labour force. These factors, combined with the growth of 
tea estates and the intensive replanting of unprofitable coffee 
fields with tea after 1880, led to a rapid increase in the demand 
for labour. At the same time, the labour sources on which the early 
coffee planters had relied, that is local tribal labour and 
imported agricultural workers from. Mysore, now proved inadequate. 
As a result, Nilgiri planters were forced further afield to locate 
suitable labour pools from which the new tea plantation work force 
could be moulded. 
* * * * * * * * 
2 
Throughout the period under study the Nilgiri district of 
Madras Presidency primarily encompassed a small elevated plateau at 
the junction of the Eastern and Western Ghats. This plateau rose 
dramatically to a height of approximately 8, 000 feet above • the 
surrounding lowlands of Coimbatore district and Mysore state (See 
Map 2). As a result, the area, although ceded to the BritfSh on the 
defeat of Tipu Sultan, remained geographically remote and protected 
from early European penetration. British exploration of the region 
did not begin until 1812 1 , while the first bridle path allowing 
access to the summit of the plateau from Mettupalaiyam in the south 
.was completed in 1823 2 (See Map 3). 
Prior to European acquisition of land in the Nilgiri the 
country was occupied and utilized by the indigenous tribes 3 of 
the region: the Todas, the Kotas, the Kurumbas, the Irulas and the 
1. W. Francis, The Nilqiris, Madras, 1908, p 107. 
2. Ibid. p 109. 
3. Although use of the term tribal is subject to historical 
debate, the term had been used throughout the text to 
refer to the inhabitants of the Nilgiri hills at the time 
of European settlement. These people demonstrated many of 
the characteristics identified by s. c. Dube as being 
encompassed by the term tribal: they were hill dwellers, 
they lived in relative isolation, their sense of their 
own history was short, they possessed a low level of 
socio-economic development, and they were readily 
distinguishable from the surrounding population. 
(S. C. Dube, Tribal Heritage of India, New Delhi, 1977, 
Vol.l, p 2.) 
3 
Badagas. The Irulas and Kurumbas, who practiced swidden agriculture 
and gathered forest produce, were ·scattered about the slopes of the 
Nilgiri, while the Badagas who were more settled cultivators 
occupied the whole middle area of the plateau. The Tecta who 
supported themselves by their grazing herds of buffalos were 
concentrated in the north and north-east of the plateau and_ around 
Coonoor. Additionally, at least six scattered villages were 
reported in 1880 as being occupied by Kotas, the artisans of the 
. 4 
reg1.on 
Initially Europeans recognized the region more for its 
potential as a recuperative post than for its agricultural 
capacities. ~aily observers were keen to relate both the beauties 
of the landscape and the benefits of the climate, frequently by 
comparing the region's attributes with those of the mother country. 
Dr Robert Baikie, the government's chief medical officer for the 
Nilgiris in the early 1830s, claimed that "the change from the low 
country to the mountain air of the Neelgherries, is nearly 
equivalent to that of a return to Great Britain" Sa Proof "of the 
perfect adaption of the climate to our constitution" was said to be 
4. H. B. Grigg, A Manual of the Nilagiri District in the 
Madras Presidency, Madras, 1880, p 182. 
5. R. Baikie, Observations on the Neilqherries, Calcutta, 
1834, p 52. 
4 
found in the faces of European children in the hills "whose rosy 
chubby cheeks, sparkling eyes, and buoyant spiritS, form a pleasing 
contrast with the pale, languid, irritable-looking wretches one is 
so often doomed to see dying by inches in the 6 low country" •. The 
writings of Baikie and other enthusiasts 7 did much to promote the 
region's reputation as an area of inordinate beauty, blessed with a 
temperate European climate though under Indian skies. 
The development of plantation agriculture in the region dates 
from the late 1830s. Both the hills proper and the area to the 
north.;..west of them, known 8 as the Wynaad , were opened at this 
time 9 (See Map 3). The production of coffee for the European 
market was the dominant economic activity of the early planters. In 
1847 the coffee acreage was estimated at not 
6. Ibid. p 50. 
10 less than 580 
1. See for example James Hough, Letters on the Climate, 
Inhabitants. Productions. etc., of the Neilgherries or 
Blue Mountains of Coimbatore, south India, London, 1829. 
Hough's letters were originally published in the Bengal 
Harkaru under the pen name Philanthropus. 
8. The Wynaad region and the Ouchterlony valley were 
included in Malabar until 1877. In that year the Wynaad 
was divided between Malabar and Nilgiri districts. In 
some texts that area of the Wynaad included in Nilgiri 
district is referred to as the south-east Wynaad, or 
Nilgiri-Wynaad, in order to distinguish it from the 
Malabar-Wynaad. 
9. Francis, op. cit., p 171. 
10. J Ouchterlony, "A Geographical and Statistical Memoir of 
a Survey of the Neilgherry Mountains", p 29, in 
(continued over) 
5 
and continued to expand steadily, particularly in the Ouchterlony 
Valley in the district's south-west. By the 1880s approximately 
25,000 acres had been planted with coffee trees 11 
Although experimental plots of tea were successfully 
• 
cultivated prior to 1860 they were of little commercial importance. 
Initially, attempts were made in 1835 by the Government of India 
under Lord Bentinck to introduce tea plants imported from China to 
various parts of India including the Nilgiri hills. Although this 
experiment failed, tea was later produced from some of these plants 
at the government's experimental farm in the Nilgiris at Keti (See 
Map 3). Samples of made tea from the farm were sent by John 
Sullivan, the first _European settler on the plateau, to the Madras 
Agri-Horticultural Society in 1840 and were judged to be of fair 
_quality 12 . The first successful commercial cultivation of a tea 
estate was conducted by a Mr Mann of Coonoor. In 1856 tea from his 
estate was sent to London where it was favourably commented upon by 
tea brokers. Mann eventually abandoned his tea enterprise as he 
J. Shortt, An Account of Tribes on the Neilgherries, 
Madras, 1868. Note that the figure includes land where 
coffee and mulberry trees were intermixed. 
11. Manual of the Administration of Madras Presidency, 
Madras, 1885, Vol.II, p 207. See also Grigg, op. cit., 
Appendix 7A, p xii. It is impossible to accurately state 
acreage figures. Different sources use different 
criteria in classifying the total acreage taken up, 
though not necessarily cultivated, by coffee planters. 
12. Francis, op. cit., p 178. 
6 
found it impossible to acquire suitable forest land from the 
13 government Dr Cleghorn, then the Conservator of Forests for 
the region, made a representation requesting government to assist 
the growth of tea cultivation, but this was rejected in 1859 b~ the 
Governor of Madras, Sir Charles Trevelyan. Trevelyan described such 
measures of government aid as "torpid and wasteful", and likely to 
. 14 
encourage "moral paralysis" within the commun~ty 
Nevertheless, the industry continued to develop slowly without 
direct government support. In the late 1850s a Mr Rae of Ootacamund 
was, after much difficulty, given a grant of land for tea 
cultivation ne-ar Kalhatti. Shortly afterwards another estate was 
founded at Kotagiri, and in 1863 an estate named Belmont was begun 
near Ootacamund 15 However, it is only in the years succeeding 
1863 that three events - the alteration of regulations governing 
land sales and revenue assessment, the blight of the "coffee bug" 
Hemileia vastatrix, and the short lived Wynaad gold rush - promoted 
the rapid expansion of tea plantations. 
A supply of suitable and unencumbered land was a necessary 
precondition for the growth of planting in the Nilgiris. However, 
13. Grigg, op. cit., p 511. 
14. Ibid., p 512. 
15. Ibid., pp 512-513. 
7 
both the practice of shifting agriculture and the British failure 
to conduct an accurate land survey now combined to thwart the 
planters~ attempts to own land. Due to the traditional practices of 
shifting cultivation and rotational grazing the colonial state 
• 
recognized three types of puttadars, all of whom were able to claim 
more land than they .utilized at any one time. Firstly, ·the bhurty 
system of "shifting" puttas allowed cultivators to claim up to ten 
times the area of land under cultivation. Hence a puttadar who 
cultivated 10 acres could also claim that these 10 acres were but 
part of 100 acres which he farmed periodically. These lands could 
be widely dispersed in separate parcels and as these lots were 
never properly surveyed or identified, "the potentiality of 
possession really depended on the will of the headman and the 
connivance of the lower revenue officials" 16 This system was 
further complicated by joint family holdings. TWo other types of 
puttas were also prevalent in the Nilgiri: Ain (grass) puttas 
allowed the cultivator to hold up to one fifth of his holdings as 
fallow at one quarter of the normal assessment, and grazing puttas 
applied to inferior lands which could be retained at one quarter 
the ordinary assessment until they were required. All three types 
of puttas allowed a cultivator to virtually claim any part of his 
16. Ibid., p 316. 
8 
holding as fallow and thus defeat a selectore 
Pressure on the government increased in the 1860s to allow 
for more liberal sales of land. In 1862 the planters• demand for 
land gave rise to much correspondence between the Collector. the 
. 17 Revenue Board, the Government and the Secretary of State 
Planters, had previously been able to purchase land from both the 
forest tribes, whose puttas were freely alienable because of 
defects in revenue administration 18 , and from the Todas, whose 
land rights had been lost forever in 1849 19 • However, it now 
became clear that in order to meet the planters' growing demand for 
land the bhurty system would have to be abolished. 
In reviewing the system of land titles the Board of Revenue 
reasoned that the Government "in justice to the general community" 
could not continue to uphold the bhurty system 20 They argued 
17. Francis, op. cit., p 269. 
18. Grigg, op. cit., p 326. 
19. Ibid., pp 341-342. In 1849 the Madras Board of Revenue 
formulated new land regulations for the Nilgiris which 
denied the Todas any proprietorial rights to their 
traditional grazing lands. While the government formally 
recognized the Todas• pasturage rights, these were 
denied in practice since these lands could be put to 
public auction by the state if they were required by any 
agriculturalist. Where grazing lands were sold, the Toda 
received compensation in the form of an annual payment 
which the government calculated as being equal in value 
to the original pasturage rights. 
20. Ibid., p 317. 
that: 
"land required on the Hills by European settlers for 
agricultural purposes is invariably sold at auction, subject 
to an unvarying annual assessment of Rupees 1 per acre, while 
the Burgher (Badagas) can at any time take up a proportion a• 
rates of assessment generally below that sum, there is 
clearly no reas2~ why any further concession should be made 
to the latter" • 
9 
With regard to grazing puttas, the Board of Revenue did not wish to 
restrict the use made of the land by the tribal inhabitants under 
these titles. However, it was also keen to prevent impediments to 
Europeans taking up land. Therefore, while the Board recommended 
the abolition of the bhurty system, they also believed that grazing 
land should remain in the puttadar's possession. Nevertheless, they 
recommended that no reduction in assessment should now be allowed 
except on one fifth of the acreage allowed under ain puttas. 
Hereafter the puttadar would pay full assessment on all grazing 
lands claimed, rather than one quarter of the assessment on land 
claimed as fallow. The Board stated that it was attempting to 
preserve the rights of the indigenous inhabitants, but this could 
only be done if they could pay their land revenue in full. Plainly, 
shifting agriculture and grazing did not maximise the collection of 
land revenue. 
21. Ibid., p 318. 
10 
The Board's recommendations were sanctioned by the Secretary 
of State, Sir Charles Wood, on 24th April, 1863 and were put into 
effect in Fasli 1272 ( 1862-1863). By way of compensation revenue 
assessments were reduced by about 25% on average 22 a• The 
Government felt that this was adequate compensation, but the Badaga 
clearly did not. They continued to cultivate lands within their 
village ayacuts and continued to utilize jungle land when their own 
fields became exhausted 23 • In effect the bhurty system was 
maintained clandestinely. This was only possible because no 
accurate land survey had been undertaken. 
In the most southerly area of the district, the Kundahs, new 
rates of reven~e were fixed to replace the old system of plough and 
hoe tax. However, in the absence of any reliable survey the old 
system of shifting agriculture was, in reality, still practiced as 
the puttas issued here indicated nothing beyond the area in which 
the land was held 24 . 
Of the three kinds of land available to potential tea 
plantation owners in the Nilgiri: that is grass, fern, and forest 
22. Francis, op. cit., p 269. 
23. Grigg, op. cit., p 321. 
24. Ibid., p 323. 
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land, the last was most highly valued 25 Forest lands were 
richer since they contained a higher humus content which produced 
higher yields of tea. James McPherson, an experienced tea planter 
in the district, also recommended that potential tea planters •ake 
up fern lands, but cornmented that these appeared to have been 
monopolised by the Badaga 26 
The introduction of the Waste Land Rules of 1863 assisted 
planters in acquiring suitable land. Under the Waste Land Rules all 
lands were declared to be waste "in which no rights of private 
proprietorship or exclusive occupancy exist" 27 and were made 
liable to sale at public auction. This did away with the villages• 
traditional claims to lands within their ancient boundaries. In 
1880 Grigg commented that as a result of the new regulations "a 
Badaga now clings to his land though he may derive little profit 
from it, because he fears it may be alienated forever under the 
Waste Land Rules if it comes to the hammer for arrears of 
revenue" 
28 
25. James McPherson, The Neilgherry Tea Planter, Madras, 
1870, p 10. 
26. Ibid., p 12. 
27. Francis, op. cit., p 273. 
28. Grigg, op. cit., p 325. 
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The Waste Land Rules disadvantaged many of the native 
inhabitants of the hills. Unlike areas of northern Coimbatore, 
forest lands in the Nilgiri were not rented out by the British even 
though Badagas, and to a greater extent Irulas and Kur~as, 
exploited them for firewood, honey, wax and resin. Under the Waste 
Land Rules the indigenous inhabitants had to purchase waste lands 
in the same manner as Europeans. This restriction was virtually 
ignored until 1880 when an accurate survey of the district brought 
an end to many irregular agricultural practices. 
In 1869 the depressed state of the planting industry prompted 
a government investigation which resulted in reductions in land 
revenue assessment which were highly beneficial to the tea planting 
industry. In 1871 the rate of assessment on grass lands was reduced 
to 8 annas per acre and the assessment on forest land was remitted 
for the first five years in the Nilgiris, and also for the first 
five years in the Wynaad where coffee yielded its first crop 
earlier. These concessions were retrospective and were made because 
the government recognized "the political and other incidental 
advantages to be derived from an influx of Europeans and European 
capital into India" 29 Henceforth, planters would not be liable 
for land revenue payments until their crops were in bearing. The 
29. Ibid., p 358. 
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tax-free period was further extended to grass lands in August, 
1874, and this measure was especially intended to promote tea 
estates 30 . 
In the western area of the Ouchterlony Valley, as J..i> the 
Wynaad, the charge of Rs 2 per acre on land cultivated with coffee 
was made. However it was only in 1889 that uncultivated lands in 
the OUchterlony Valley were assessed at 6 pies per acre having 
previously been held free of charge. This had allowed plantation 
owners to expand their holdings at no extra charge and had been 
very popular. When the government introduced the new rate the 
Ouchterlony Trust, the largest landowner in the Valley, threatened 
to appeal to the Secretary of state 31 
The concessions on land revenue assessment gave special 
impetus to the tea industry in the eastern and central taluks of 
Nilgiri district. At the end of 1869 there were probably only two 
or three hundred acres of tea in the hills 32 • By late 1879 4,200 
acres had been taken up for tea cultivation, of which 2,550 acres 
were mature 33 
30. Ibid. 
31. Francis, op. cit., p 282. 
32. Ibid., p 513. 
33. Ibid., p 514. 
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In 1880 an accurate survey of the district was completed and 
was followed by a land revenue settlement. As a result of the 
survey unallotted lands were granted to those who applied for them 
at much cheaper rates than those which prevailed under the ~aste 
Land Rules. Owners of estates were granted land to round off their 
boundaries at Rs. 2 per acre so long as it did not contain 
forest 34 • The settlement also resulted in more than 18,000 acres 
being made available under the Waste Land Rules. Native puttadars 
too were able to obtain land grants and their rate of land revenue 
was reduced to just over six annas an acre; however they could no 
longer escape payment on fallow land. The bhurty system could no 
longer be surreptitiously practiced as the settlement made 
ownership clear and public; maps showing the lots were sold for a 
few -annas. 
In the period from 1863 to the close of the nineteenth 
century it is apparent that planters in Nilgiri district were able 
to purchase suitable land for tea and coffee cultivation relatively 
cheaply. By comparison, in Ceylon, in the decade between 1869-1879 
35 
an acre of forest land fetched as much as 28 pounds In the 
same period the average price for waste land at auction in the 
34. Ibid., p 277. 
35. John Ferguson, Ceylon in 1903, Colombo, 1903, p 60. 
15 
Nilgiri was under Rs. 11 or one guinea per acre 36 Although in 
the Nilgiri planters had to pay land revenue on their estates, the 
amount of capital needed to establish a plantation in the Nilgiri 
was a fraction of that required for comparable land in Ceyl.n in 
this period. As a result of a deliberate government policy of 
encouraging planting in the Nilgiri, planters also received the 
benefit of considerable reductions in their land revenue 
assessments from 1871. These factors made the Nilgiri highly 
attractive to potential planters. 
The second factor which promoted the rapid growth of the tea 
industry in the Nilgiri was the appearance of the "coffee bug", 
Hemileia vastatrix. This disease of coffee eventually brought to an 
end the era of widespread and highly profitable cultivation of 
coffee which had prevailed since 1851 both in Ceylon, and in 
southern India. The effects of coffee leaf disease and the 
subsequent depression in the coffee industry in Ceylon have been 
thoroughly investigated elsewhere 37 However, the resulting 
36. Grigg, op. cit., pp 359-360. 
37. See for example: Bertram Bastianpillai, "From Coffee to 
Tea in Ceylon", ceylon Journal of Historical and Social 
Studies, Vol.7, 1964, pp 43-66; D. M. Forrest, A Hundred 
Years of Ceylon Tea, London, 1967; E. F. C. Ludowyk, The 
Modern History of Ceylon, London, 1966; Lennox A. Mills, 
Ceylon under British Rule, 1795-1932, London, 1964; 
s. Rajaratnam, "The Growth of Plantation Agriculture in 
Ceylon, 1886-1931", Ceylon Journal of Historical and 
Social Studies, Vo1.4, 1961, pp 1-20; 
L. A. Wickremeratne, "The Establishment of the Tea 
Industry in Ceylon: The First Phase, c. 1870 to 
c. 1900", Ceylon Journal of Historical and Social 
(continued over) 
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emigration of some British planters to parts of southern India, and 
their adoption of tea culture on their new plantations has not been 
documented~ The resettlement of British planters from Ceylon in the 
Nilgiri hills can probably be largely attributed to the J'eady 
availability and cheapness of fresh lands in the latter location. 
The decline of coffee cultivation in Ceylon was ~a gradual 
one. Coffee leaf disease in Ceylon was first noted in 1868 but the 
progress of the disease fluctuated according to the seasons. 
Planters attempted to combat the disease with various preventative 
measures which appeared effective for a time. Some coffee growers 
replanted their delicate Arabica trees with the more robust 
Liberian variety of coffee in the mistaken belief that it would 
prove immune to the disease. For a while land at higher altitudes 
appeared to be free of the disease. Coffee cultivation was not 
abandoned readily by planters, many of whom had pioneered the 
establishment of estates and now had considerable capital invested 
in their trees. 
Prevailing high market prices for coffee disguised the effect 
of the disease for some time. Despite declining yields coffee 
planters continued to make handsome profits. As a result, new lands 
were opened for coffee culture after 1868 and land prices soared. 
Stud~es, Vol.!!, No.2, 1912, pp 131 ISS. 
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Coffee planting was extended from 4, 500 feet above sea level, its 
supposed natural limit, to 5, 000 feet 38 Between 1869 and 1879 
400,000 acres of crown land were sold and 100,000 acres of it were 
brought 39 under coffee . Competition for land was SO keen .that 
prime forest land which a decade before had sold for less than a 
pound an acre commonly fetched fifteen and twenty times that 
sum 
40 Jenkins, an experienced contemporary coffee planter 
commented that, "These high values were iil a great measure due to 
the old Ceylon men themselves, in not only refusing to sell, but 
actually competing with the newcomers in buying estates and land at 
the highest prices" 41 
The demand for fresh land could not be easily satisfied. 
Forest land, which was most highly valued by planters for its high 
humus content, became increasingly scarce. In 1874 Birch, the 
Government Agent in Central Provinces noted that all but the 
highest forest lands had been stripped of their cover 42 
38. Mills, op. cit., p 245. 
39. John Ferguson, Ceylon in 1884: The Leading Crown Colony 
in the Empire, London, 1884, p 60. 
40. Ibid., p 60. 
41. R. w. Jenkins, Ceylon in the Fifties and Eighties, 
Colombo, 1886, p 56. 
42. Ludowyk, op. cit., pp 87-88. 
The 
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shortage of elevated land was probably aggravated by a new 
government policy dating from 1874 which emphasised the 
conservation of tropical forests 43 . Although the policy did not 
prove effective in the long term, it did restrict the supply • of 
land in a period when demand was high. 
While planters in 1878 conunonly believed that coffee would 
recover, their confidence had evaporated by the early 1880s. The 
spread of coffee leaf disease to Uva, which had previously been 
thought inunune 44 , was disconcerting. But by 1882 the Governor of 
Ceylon reported that the disease had now spread over the whole 
island 45 . From about this period coffee growers began to abandon 
coffee cultivation and even their estates. Economic depression in 
Europe helped to -bring about a shortage of credit in Ceylon, and in 
Ceylon seasons were wet and unfavourable 46 . Cheaper coffee from 
Brazil began to exclude the more expensive Ceylonese product from 
the British market 47 . By 1880 many planters were attempting to 
sell their estates but there were few buyers. Mortgages were 
43. Bastainpillai, op. cit., p 51. 
44. Ludowyk, op. cit., p 89. 
45. Mills, op. cit., p 247. 
46. Ibid. 
47. Bastainpillai, op. cit., p 56. 
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foreclosed, and as some banks had given credit against coffee 
crops, they too were affected. In 1884 the Oriental Bank 
Corporation had to close its doors 48 • As loans were difficult to 
obtain 49 credit was presumably rationed by the operatiQO of 
high interest rates. 
It was not always possible for a plantation owner to switch 
from coffee to tea cultivation even if he could afford to do so. 
Some coffee estates were not suitable for tea cultivation 50 • Tea 
and coffee flourished in different soil types and on differing 
slopes 51 . Additionally, the finest tea was believed to be grown 
on highly elevated lands - lands which in Ceylon had already been 
largely sold or were protected by the new forest conservation 
policy. For some planters who could not make the change from coffee 
to tea on their current estates, Ceylon offered few opportunities 
to purchase appropriate land. 
Of the 1700 European planters in Ceylon at the time of the 
48. Forrest, op. cit., p 980. 
49. s. Rajaratnam, .. The Growth of Plantation Agriculture in 
Ceylon, 1886-1931", op. cit., p 5. 
50. Heidrun Marby, Tea in Ceylon, Weisbaden, 1972, p 29. 
51. John Ferguson, Ceylon in 1903, op. cit., p 72. 
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coffee crisis about 400 were said to have left the island 52 In 
addition, about one quarter of the planting superintendents left 
for jobs elsewhere in the Empire 53 . Of these some probably found 
new estates and new jobs in the Nilgiri district of south ljldia. 
John Ferguson, who served the British community in Ceylon as 
newspaper editor of the Ceylon Observer and as a renowned· writer of 
works dealing with tropical agriculture, was well acquainted with 
the details of Ceylon • s plantation economy throughout his long 
working life. In 1884 Ferguson commented: 
"Since the depression of 1879 many Ceylon plantation managers 
and assistant superintendents have had to seek their fortunes 
elsewhere; and indeed the planting districts of southern 
India ma~4be said to be the off-shoot settlements from Ceylon" . 
In south India the coffee growing regions were generally less 
dramatically affected by Hemileia vastatrix than their counterparts 
in Ceylon. Whereas in Ceylon coffee had been planted exclusively 
over hundreds of square miles, in India this was not the case. 
Coffee estates were frequently separated by forest and grassland, 
52. Frederick Lewis, Sixty-Four Years in Ceylon, Colombo, 
1926, pp 56-128, in Mills, op. cit., p 247. 
53. Forrest, op. cit., p 99. 
54. John Ferguson, Ceylon in 1884, op. cit., p 100. 
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and by grain and vegetable crops. This helped to delay the spread 
of the disease. Robert Elliot, a British coffee planter resident in 
Mysore from 1855, noted in 1894 that while coffee in Ceylon had 
been "ruined by leaf disease . . . shade grown coffee in Mysore and 
55 Coorg (was) as yet unaffected" 
• 
In Ni1giri district and the Wynaad (then part of Malabar) the 
effects of Hemileia vastatrix were more noteworthy since they 
followed closely upon another recent blight of coffee. The borer 
Xylotrechus auadrupes was considered the most troublesome pest of 
coffee in south India, and in 1865-1866 had destroyed complete 
estates in Coorg and the Wynaad 56 Infestation of the new 
"coffee bug•• occurred throughout the Nilgiri hills and few 
plantations escaped it completely. In the Wynaad the effect was 
more 57 severe There the ravages of disease and a short lived 
gold rush undermined the sway of "King Coffee" forever. 
Although alluvial gold deposita had been worked by the tribal 
Kurumbaa in the Wynaad 58 , gold in commercial quantities was not 
55. Robert H. Elliot, Gold, sport and Coffee Planting in 
Myaore, London, 1894, p 309. 
56. Francis, op. cit., p 175. 
57. c. G Warnford Lock, (Ed.), Coffee: Its Culture and 
Commerce in all countries, London, 1888, p 84. 
58. M. A. Handley, Roughing it in South India, London, 1911, 
p 164. 
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found until 1879. Gold fever followed its discovery. Numerous, 
recently formed gold companies proceeded to buy up coffee estates 
at grossly inflated prices. Some 24,000 acres were said to have 
been purchased at a cost of 70 to 2,600 pounds per acre 
• 
59 
Coffee planters showed little reluctance in disposing of their 
ailing estates, but the boom collapsed quickly and in mid-1883 it 
was all over. The result for the coffee industry in the Wynaad was 
devastating. E. G. Windle, a prominent south Indian coffee grower, 
later recalled a landscape of abandoned and neglected coffee 
plantations rapidly overgrown by lantana "while here and there 
solitary estates, mostly in Indian hands and much reduced in size, 
struggled for existence" 60 . The gold craze was a blow from which 
coffee in the Wynaad never recovered. Although fresh coffee estates 
were opened in the central and eastern parts of the district, total 
coffee plantings continued to decline from a peak expanse of 25,000 
acres which had been reached in 1879 61 • In the 1890s low yields, 
59. Rhodes Morgan, "The Wynaad", p 69, in John Shortt, 
(Ed.), The Hill Ranges of Southern India, Part 4, 
Madras, 1870. 
60. E. G. Windle, Modern Coffee Planting, London, n.d. 
probably 1933, p 112. 
61. Francis, op. cit., p 172. Francis' figure of 26,000 
acres for 1908 includes a large number of abandoned 
estates. 
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low world prices for coffee, and unfavourable rates of foreign 
exchange, combined to harass the coffee industry. 
In the Nilgiri hills the expansion of tea planting was 
facilitated by the ready availability of low cost land and an 
• 
influx of experienced planters and plantation managers. The various 
problems of coffee growing encouraged the search for an alternative 
crop. At first, cinchona 62 was profitably grown, but over-
production in Ceylon and Java led to rapidly declining world 
prices. Consequently, cinchona production declined in the Nilgiris 
from about 1888 63 A few planters experimented with rubber 
growing. However, environmental problems, general ignorance of 
tapping methods, and variable yields destroyed enthusiasm for 
rubber production 64 In contrast, tea was already an established 
crop in the Nilgiris. It was less susceptible to disease and pests 
than coffee, it could be grown over a wide range of altitudes and 
micro-climates, and unlike rubber it presented few technical 
production problems. Above all it was remunerative. 
62. The bark of cinchona trees was processed to yield 
quinine. 
63. Francis, op. cit., p 186. Note that government owned 
cinchona plantations in the Nilgiris were maintained. 
The government used the quinine derived from these 
plantations to supply the Army, and continued to make 
••pice packet .. sales of quinine available to the public 
at post offices. 
64. IQ19., p 191. 
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Tea planting expanded rapidly. Between 1876 and 1880 the area 
taken up for tea cultivation doubled. By the later date over 4,200 
acres had been actually planted with tea 65 Five years later 
almost 12,000 acres had been appropriated by tea planters 66 . Not 
• 
only fresh lands were cleared for tea bushes but "in many cases it 
has been planted on estates in which coffee has prayed a 
failure" 67 
As tea was a more labour intensive crop than coffee an 
increase in tea planting required an even more dramatic increase in 
plantation labour. Tea simply required more attention than coffee, 
and whereas coffee estates largely employed seasonal labour at 
harvest time, tea required year-round labour. It has been estimated 
that in this period tea cultivation required two field labourers 
per acre whereas an acre of coffee could be worked with less than 
one 
68 Tea factories were also more labour intensive than their 
65. Grigg, op. cit., p 514. 
66. Manual of the Administration of the Madras Presidency, 
op. cit., Vol.II, p 207. 
67. Francis, op. cit., p 178. 
68. Wickremeratne, op. cit., p 142-143. Wickremeratne 
estimates that coffee estates needed 0.75 of a field 
labourer per acre plus factory workers. These estimates 
should be considered as minimums, especially where 
production processes continued to be manual rather than 
mechanised. 
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coffee counterparts. Additionally, the tasks of clearing forest, 
removing old coffee trees, and replanting with tea, dramatically 
increased labour requirements. This increased demand for labour 
came at a time when the labour supply, already insufficient to meet 
• 
demand, began to contract even further. 
In establishing and cultivating their estates it is ~pparent 
that planters were initially able to secure local labour to meet 
their needs. Of all the tribal peoples resident in the region the 
Badaga appeared to be the most willing, and from the planters' 
standpoint, the most reliable plantation workers. Hockings• 
research on the Badaga indicates that as early as the 1850s Badaga 
men were responding to the call of plantation 69 employment 
though Badaga women, who were afraid to be near jungle, did 
not 70 In 1869 McPherson commented that there was no need for 
new tea planters to hurriedly construct labour lines "if there 
happens to be a Badagha village in the neighbourhood of the estate, 
little difficulty will be experienced in procuring contract 
labour" 71 These people were employed to fell and burn 
69. Paul Hockings, Ancient Hindu Refugees, Badaga Social 
History 1550-1975, The Hague, 1980, p 149. 
70. Ibid., p 152. 
71. McPherson, op. cit., p 15. 
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forest 72 , and on grasslands they dug in the turf in preparation 
for planting 7 3 . By 1880 Badaga men were said to be "constantly 
leaving their villages to work in the nearest coffee 
1 t . 74 p anta 1.ons" In the same year, Dr Cornish, the Sanij:ary 
Commissioner for Nilgiri district, noted that their women and 
children were now earning money on the tea and coffee estates 75 
While many British sources praise the Badagas for their 
industrious and progressive nature 76 , it should not be forgotten 
that one of the chief results of British rule in the Nilgiris was 
the monetisation of the economy. Land revenue had to be paid in 
cash (at least after it was no longer acceptable to pay it in 
opium). In the latter half on the nineteenth century increasing 
regularisation of land titles and more accurate surveying made it 
more difficult to avoid payment. As the only settled, indigenous 
agriculturalists of the Nilgiris it is possible that Badagas worked 
on pla~tations to raise the cash to pay their taxes 77 The 
72. Ibid., p 21. 
73. Ibid., p 24. 
74. Grigg, op. cit., p 222. 
75. Quoted in Ibid., p 34. 
76. See for example Ibid., p 222. 
77. Hockings, op. cit., pp 138-139. 
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diligence with which many Badaga applied themselves to plantation 
employment may indicate little about any inherent nature they were 
said to possess as a people, but a great deal about their desire to 
retain their lands. 
• 
Despite the planters• preference for "diligent" Badaga 
labour 78 
' 
other tribal workers were also employed on 
plantations. A few Todas initially put themselves forward to work 
on estates but where they were employed Grigg commented that 
"neither they nor their employers appear to have been much pleased 
by the experiment" 79 • Prior to 1868 Kurumbas were found working 
on the Government cinchona plantation at Neddiwuttum, while others 
weeded and pruned various coffee estates near Kotagiri and 
80 Gudalur Kurumbas were also noted in 1880 81 and 1883 82 
to "OCcasionally take work on coffee plantations. Irulas too worked 
78. Ibid., p 149. 
79. Grigg, op. cit., p 188. 
80. J. Shortt, An Account of the Tribes on the Neilgherries, 
Madras, 1868, p 53. The first cinchona plantation was 
opened before 1867. (Steen Falke, "Evolution of 
Plantations, Migration and Population Growth in Nilgiris 
and Coorg", Geografisk Tidsskrift, 1966, p 206.) 
81. Grigg, op. cit., p 211. 
82. w. Stokes, "Mission Work amongst the Badaga and other 
Hill Tribes on the Nilagiris", Harvest Field, Vol.III, 
No. 6, Dec. 1882, p 171. 
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on plantations. Their employment as estate labourers was recorded 
in the 1860s 83 while the Nilgiri District Gazetteers of 1880 
and 1908 both make reference to their working for wages on tea and 
coffee plantations 84 In the Wynaad too tribes such as the 
• 
Irawar provided labour, and on some small estates production was 
said to be carried on by their efforts alone 85 
However, as in most areas of colonial plantation agriculture 
local population numbers were insufficient to meet planters' labour 
needs. The existence of vast areas of forest indicated a low 
population density. As early as 1857 John ouchterlony, a government 
engineer familiar with the Nilgiri planting industry, gave evidence 
before the Select Committee on Colonization and Settlement that the 
expansion of plantation agriculture in the region would require the 
importation of labour 86 
It is also debatable whether local labour, had it been 
available in sufficient numbers, would have proved satisfactory to 
83. J. Shortt, An Account of the Tribes of the Neilqherries, 
op. cit., p 63. 
84. Grigg, op. cit., p 216. 
Francis, op. cit., p 152. 
85. E. c. P. Hull, Coffee Planting in Southern India and 
Ceylon, Second Edition, London, 1877, pp 73-74. 
86. Third Report from the Select Committee on Colonization 
and Settlement <India) with the Minutes of Evidence 
taken before them, Sessional Papers of the British House 
of Commons, 1857-58 Session, Vol.vii, Part I, p 380. 
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planters in any case. On Wynaad coffee estates local labour was 
said to be "desultory and uncertain" 87 , and plantation wages 
were thought sufficiently high to encourage a native 
"disinclination to work" 88 . The uncertainty of local labour 
• 
supplies may be attributed in part to the agricultural ties which 
bound the non-tribal local labourer in the Wynaad. Only when 
agricultural obligations were fulfilled at home did they offer 
their services to the planter 89 • Clearly plantation work was of 
secondary importance. Moreover, as Roberts' research on Ceylonese 
plantations has shown, the planters' conception of local Sinhalese 
as lazy disguised labour's objection to regular work hours and 
rough supervision on estates 90 
In the Nilgiri, Badaga labour like their Sinhalese 
counterparts, showed a marked preference for contract work on 
plantations 91 . Contracts were frequently made for the physically 
87. Hull, op. cit. 
88. Ibid., p 65. 
89. Ibid., pp 73-74. 
90. M. w. _Roberts, "Indian Estate Labour in Ceylon during 
the Coffee Period (1830-1880)", Part I, Indian Economic 
and Social History Review, Vol.III, No.1, March, 1966, 
p 2. 
91. McPherson, op. cit., p 15. 
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demanding tasks of felling timber and digging in grassland. In 
comparison with Ceylon, contracts in the Nilgiri were often more 
formally executed and an advance made in part payment 92 • A 
contract to work implied a degree of equality between the two 
• 
contracting parties, and removed the worker from the planter's 
direct supervision and from routine work conditions and scheQules. 
Similarly, local field labour, which did not reside in labour lines 
on the estates, was beyond the planter's control at the end of the 
working day. Overall, suitable local labour even if it had been 
available in sufficient numbers, was still too independent of the 
planter and the plantation to constitute a permanent work force. 
Local labour was often bound by other forms of agricultural 
production (both pre-colonial agriculture, and modern cash cropping 
of vegetables as practiced by the Badaga), and by local kinship, 
tribal and village ties. The call of the family land holding 
prevented many local labourers from being moulded to modern 
industrial work practices, and to the strict social and racial 
hierarchy of the tea plantation. 
As local labour supply was always insufficient to meet 
plantation needs, planters relied on imported labour. From 1846 
coffee planters in the Wynaad were dependent upon labourers from 
92. Hull, op. cit., p 70. 
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the Ernaad taluk of Malabar, from Coimbatore and Salem districts, 
and from Mysore state to open their estates 93 In 1847 John 
Ouchterlony noted that around Ootacamund, the chief town of the 
Nilgiri hills, planters employed migrants from "the plains of 
• 
Canara, Malabar and Coimbatore, or from the Mysore territory", and 
of these, workers originating in South Canara and Mysore were said 
to be the most numerous 94 • By 1865 the Collector of the Nilgiris 
reported that approximately 80\ of the estate labour in the 
district emanated from Mysore state 95 overall, it is likely 
that Mysoreans were the predominant migrant workers on Nilgiri 
plantations until at least 1876. 
This migration of plantation labour was seasonal rather than 
permanent. Having planted their crops at the time of the first 
monsoon, labour left the plains to work on coffee estates in the 
Nilgiri hills until harvest time in the home village. The timing of 
these migratory flows altered from region to region, while the 
length of an individual labourer• stay on the plantation could vary 
from a few weeks to the full season. Coffee planters were able to 
93. Planting Opinion, 21st Nov., 1896, p 14. See also 
Morgan, op. cit., pp 60-61. 
94. Ouchterlony, op. cit., 1868, p 39. 
95. Report of the South of India Planters' Enquiry 
committee, Madras, 1896, p io. 
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readily accommodate these variations since coffee did not require 
the same degree of attention throughout the whole year, and because 
the peak season for coffee extended from November to March when 
grain harvests in the plains had already been reaped. 
• 
In the decades following the great famine of 1876 the 
migration of Mysorean labour to the Nilgiri hills declined. The 
famine itself was partly responsible since it greatly reduced the 
pool of available labour. As a result of the general shortage of 
labour within Mysore state, agricultural wages there rose 
dramatically. High wages allowed many a plantation labourer to 
become a small landholder 96 , especially as uncultivated land was 
more readily available in Mysore after the famine 97 • Beleaguered 
by disease and falling prices, Nilgiri coffee growers found it 
increasingly difficult to match increases in agricultural wages. 
Additionally, the development of the Kolar gold fields after 1881 
attracted a proletarian work force which was well paid 98 By 
1891 census officials stated that the demand for labour on the 
Kolar gold fields and on coffee estates located within Mysore 
96. J. Daniel Moore, Plantation Development and Labour 
Response in Nineteenth Century Mysore, Ann Arbor, 1983, 
MS, p 282. 
97. Ibid., pp 58-59. 
98. Elliot, op. cit., pp 198-204. 
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itself, had been responsible for an overall reduction in emigration 
from the state 99 . Similarly, in 1901 the Marikaname irrigation 
project employed large numbers of Mysorean labourers thereby 
increasing the state's capacity to utilise its own labour 100 
• 
The decline in migration of plantation labour from Mysore to 
the Nilgiri is evident in the Indian census statistics. While 
plantation employment was not the sole reason for Indian migration 
to the Nilgiri, the reports of successive census officials indicate 
that it was of paramount importance. Table 1 illustrates the 
origin of all Indian migrants to the Nilgiri according to their 
district or region of birth for the period between 1881 and 1921. 
99. Census of India, 1891, Vol. XIII, Madras, 1893, 
pp 202ff. 
100. Census of India. 1901, Vol. XV, Madras, 1902, p 284 
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TABLE 1 ORIGIN OF INDIAN MIGRANTS TO NILGIRI DISTRICT BY BIRTH 
DISTRICT 1881-1921 (BY NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE! 
' 
• I I 
101 
DISTRICT YEAR 
OR AREA 
1881 1891 1901 1911 12ll 
No. No. No. No. No. 
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) • 
MY SORE 21234 13954 10104 11138 8407 
(55) (35) (23) (29) (22) 
COIMBATORE 7524 10585 14289 11604 12607 
(19) (26) (32) (31) (33) 
TRICHINOPOLY 2329 2106 2216 1819 1697 
( 6) ( 5) ( 5) (5) (4) 
MADRAS CITY 2006 2375 2570 2508 2055 
( 5) ( 6) (6) (7) (5) 
MALABAR 1416 4791 8289 4266 6626 
(4) ( 12) (19) (11) (17) 
NTH. ARCOT 920 1339 1958 1154 1206 
( 2) (3) (4) (3) (3) 
SALEM 663 1071 1069 993 1170 
( 2) ( 3) ( 2) (3) (3) 
REST OF 
MADRAS PRES. 1920 2520 2831 2355 3027 
( 5 ) (6) (6) (6) (8) 
REST OF 
INDIA 642' 1166 1133 1619 1758 
( 2) ( 3) (2) (4) ( 5) 
~ 38654 39907 44459 37416 38537 (100) (99) (99) (99) (100) 
In Table 1 the districts are listed in order of their 
importance as sources of migrants in 1881. Unfortunately, as 
district of birth information was not collected in 1871, the 
probable decline in Mysorean labour over the previous decade cannot 
be traced here. Additionally, the numbers of immigrants shown are 
101. Imperial Census of India, 1881, Vol.II, Madras, 1886, 
Tables X,XI, p 173; Census of India, 1891, Vol.XIV, 
op. cit., Table XI, p 150; Census of India, 1901, 
Vol.XV-A, op. cit., Table XI, p 123; Census of India, 
1911, Vol.XII, Madras, 1912, Table XI, p 94; Census of 
India, 1921, Vo1.XIII, Madras, 1922, Table XI, p 94. 
Note- As the census enumerates all people by place of 
birth the term Indian here would also include Eurasians 
born within India. All percentages are rounded to the 
closest whole number. 
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probably underestimations of the actual migratory flow because of 
the time of year when each census was conducted. In particular, tea 
estate workers were l-ikely to be under-enumerated since they 
commonly worked in the hills for nine to ten months, and returned 
• 
to their home villages in January or February. From 1881 all census 
surveys were conducted when many tea workers were likely to be 
absent. Despite this shortcoming, the data collected in 1881, 1891 
and 1901 clearly shows the rapid and continuing decline of Mysorean 
migrants as a proportion of the total migrant population of Nilgiri 
district during these decades. Furthermore, this trend is lent 
additional credibility by the findings of the South of India 
Planters' Enqu~ry Committee which calculated that Mysorean labour 
comprised only 38\ of Nilgiri plantation labour in 1896 102 
This decline of a longstanding labour source was of crucial 
importance to Nilgiri planters, and particularly affected tea 
growers. Economical tea cropping required labour's constant 
attention. Whereas work on coffee estates could be allowed to fall 
into arrears when labour was not available, on tea estates such 
delays reduced overall annual output. Tea crops, and hence profits, 
were most readily maximized by the employment of a sufficiently 
large, stable labour force. Neither local tribespeople nor Mysorean 
102. Report of the South of India Planters~ Enquiry 
Committee, op. cit., Appendix IX, p 94. 
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labourers were suitable sources of the new tea plantation work 
force since they were often primarily committed to agricultural 
production in their home villages. Most importantly, they could not 
be obtained in sufficient numbers. In an attempt to satisfx_ the 
rising demand for relatively permanent plantation labour in the 
Nilgiri hills, tea planters reoriented their recruitment drives to 
the populous Tamil speaking plains of Madras Presidency. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CREATING THE TEA PLANTATION LABOUR FORCE 
• 
In their quest to create a large-scale labour force Nilgiri 
planters increasingly turned their attentions eastward to the 
plains of Coimbatore and adjacent districts. Planters focused their 
labour drive upon agricultural workers, and in particular upon the 
debt bonded labourer. By utilizing a maistri (labour contractor 1 ) 
planters were able to recruit labour by locking into the existing 
relations between landlords and the agrestic poor. These relations 
were transposed to the planting sector by the maistri system of 
recruitment. Rising rural distress assisted the recruitment of a 
work force which was r~markably homogeneous. By the turn of the 
century tea planters were heavily reliant upon an annually 
migrating labour force characterised by poverty, low caste status 
1. Although the term maistri is commonly translated as 
labour contractor, this definition is far too narrow. 
Aside from recruiting labour, it was usual for a maistri 
to assume responsibility for both the supervision of his 
workers on an estate and for their welfare needs. 
Planters made a clear distinction between maistris and 
professional labour contractors who merely delivered 
workers to estates. While the ~erma kanganni and maistri 
were used interchangeably on Nilgiri plantations until 
the 1930s, the latter term was more frequently employed 
in South India and it is for this reason that it is used 
here throughout the text. 
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and an abiding tie to the home village. Despite the success of the 
maistri system of recruitment, labour supply never matched the 
demands of plantation employment in the Nilgirithills. In addition, 
the problem of absconding labourers; whether due to inferior 
• 
conditions of work, insufficient earnings, or a simple intention to 
defraud the planter; plagued most tea planters. The failure to 
establish an adequate and stable work force was the catalyst which 
encouraged planters to form a political lobby group seeking legal 
sanction for the coercion of their workers • 
• • • • • • • • • 
The rapid decline in Mysorean agricultural labour in the 
aftermath of the great famine of 1876 was instrumental in 
redirecting the recruitment drives of Nilgiri planters to the Tamil 
regions of Madras Presidency. In particular, planters sought 
agricultural labourers from the plains of Coimbatore. The planters• 
success is reflected in the fact that after 1881 Coimbatore 
district provided an increasing proportion of all migrant people 
enumerated in the Nilgiri, and by the turn of the century it had 
overtaken Mysore as the leading source of immigrants. 
The severe famine years of the 1870s may have originally 
prompted the flow of migrating peoples from Coimbatore, then a 
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district hard-hit by famine, to the Nilgiri hills. Although no 
district of birth figures are available for 1871 it is possible to 
demonstrate that migrants enumerated in the Nilgiri in 1881 were 
more commonly from famine areas than non-famine ones. The 1~1 
census shows that 16\ of males and 13\ of females in the Nilgiri 
were born in famine districts. In contrast only 11% of the 
district's male population and 9% of the district's female 
population originated in non-famine districts 2 . This breakdown of 
Nilgiri immigrants according to their origin in famine and non-
famine regions clearly shows that Nilgiri district must be excepted 
from the statement contained in the Madras Census Report of 1881 
claiming that no significant migration from famine districts to 
non-fart:~_ine ones had occurred 3 . In addition, the presence of 
migrants from the famine districts of Salem, and especially from 
North Arcot which is relatively remote from the Nilgiris, may also 
be significant evidence that famine promoted pathways of out-
migration which continued to be utilized long after the threat of 
famine ceased to be imminent. 
By 1891 Mysoreans and Tamils were present in Nilgiri district 
in similar numbers. Perusal of the planters• journal, 
2. Imperial Census of 1881, Vol.!, Madras, 1883, p 130. 
3. Ibid. 
40 
Planting Opinion, indicates that in 1896 plantation clerks literate 
in Tamil were as commonly sought by estate owners as those literate 
in Kannada 4 . However, by 1901 Tamils were the major ethnic group 
on Nilgiri plantations. The preponderance of Tamil field labour. in 
the twentieth century was clearly demonstrated in the results of an 
independent labour survey conducted in December, 1928 by the United 
Planters Association of Southern India (U.P.A.S.I.) 5 . 
While Tamils were employed throughout Nilgiri District, 
Mysoreans, who continued to labour in the district in large 
numbers, journeyed to the coffee estates located at lower altitudes 
in the Ouchterlony valley and in Wynaad ~ 6 (See Map 4). 
These, largely coffee, estates had been the original destination of 
most Mysorean labour. The work was familiar, the harvest season 
timely, and labourers travelling from Mysore by the main route had 
to pass relatively close to Gudalur estates before reaching 
Ootacarnund. Similarly, Malayali labour which increased rapidly over 
this twenty year period, had to pass through Gudalur en route from 
Malabar to the Nilgiri hills. In consequence Malayali workers were 
4. Planting Opinion, July-Dec., 1896. 
5. Royal Commission on Labour in India, Evidence, Vol.VII, 
London, 1931, Part I, p 161. 
6. Ibid. 
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largely employed in the Nilgiri-Wynaad 7 Plantation employment 
for Malayalis and Mysoreans was therefore concentrated respectively 
in those areas of the Nilgiris which were adjacent to Malabar 
district and Mysore state. In contrast with their counterparts in 
• 
the tea districts of North India, the vast majority of migrating 
labourers in the Nilgiri, irrespective of their ethnic origin, 
remained relatively close to home. 
As in other colonial enterprises 8 , an increased demand for 
plantation labour promoted greater ethnic diversity within labour's 
ranks, but the tea plantation work force was decidedly homogeneous 
in other respects. An examination of the age and caste structures 
of the immigrant population of Nilgiri District reveals a work 
force which was youthful, was unencumbered by aged or immature 
family -members, and was of low social status. These characteristic 
features of the new plantation labour force indicate that planters 
deliberately drew upon workers who possessed the greatest capacity 
for work and, given their social origins, the least capacity for 
complaint. As tea cultivation was particularly labour intensive, 
profits could be maximised where the work force was both productive 
7. lhi9· 
8. Ranajit Oas Gupta, "Factory Labour in Eastern India: 
Sources of Supply, 1855-1946, Some Preliminary Findings", 
Indian Economic and Social History Review, Vol.XIII, 
No.3, p 278. 
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and compliant. 
The age structures of both the male and female populations of 
Nilgiri District are compared with their counterpart populations in 
the whole of Madras Presidency for the years 1891, 1901, and 1931 
in Figures 1. 2 and 3. 
FIGURE 1 COMPARISON OF AGE STRUCTURES OF MALE AND FEMALE 
POPULATIONS IN NILGIRI DISTRICT AND MADRAS PRESIDENCY, 
IN 1891. 9 
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9. Census of India, 1891, Vol.XIV, op. cit., Table XIII. 
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FIGURE 3 OOMPARISON OF AGE STRUCTURES OF MALE AND FEMALE 
POPULATIONS IN NILGIRI DISTRICT AND MADRAS PRESIDENCY, 
IN 1931. 11 
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These figures clearly demonstrate that the age structure of 
the Nilgiri District population was, over at least four decades, 
skewed by the inclusion of large numbers of people, predominantly 
male, who were aged between 10 and 40 years. On the other haild 
there was a dearth of children, both male and female, and also of 
aged men and women in the Nilgiris. 
The predominance of people in their prime working years in 
the Nilgiris reflects the importance of in-migration in swelling 
the District • s population 12 More importantly, it reflects the 
planters' success in composing a diligent and healthy work force. 
Planters often declared that their policy was to encourage family 
migration. However, such a policy was at odds with their desire to 
create the .most productive labour force possible. In reality, non-
working dependents, such as grandparents and infant children, were 
frequently left at home. As a result, plantation workers were 
largely drawn from that sector of the population with the least 
12. From 1881 to 1931 migrants comprised between 30% 'and 42% 
of the Indian population enumerated in Nilgiri District 
by census officials. Such high rates of in-migration 
were unknown in other districts of the Presidency. In 
1881 95% of the Presidency's population lived within the 
district of its birth. In 1931, the comparable figure 
remained high at 96%. 
(Imperial Census of 1881, Vol.!, op. cit., p 11; 
Vol.II, op. cit., Tables X & XI; Census of India. 1891, 
Vol.XIII, op. cit., p 202; Census of India. 1901, 
Vol.XV, op. cit., p 27; Vol.XVA, op. cit., Table XI; 
Census of India. 1911, Vol.XII, op. cit., Table XI; 
Census of India, 1921, Vol.XIII, op. cit., p 46, 
& Table XI; Census of India. 1931, Vol.XIV, op. cit., 
pp 74, 76, 403 & Table VI.) 
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largely drawn from that sector of the population with the least 
potential for ill-health. Moreover, plantation workers were also 
largely relieved of their familial obligation to provide time-
consuming care of the old, the infirm or the very young. In short, 
• 
they ~ere remarkably free to work. 
At the same time the new labour force was largely composed of 
those castes which ranked lowest in the social order. Although 
there are inherent difficulties in the census statistics concerning 
13 
caste it is, nevertheless, possible to calculate the 
proportion of outcaste people in the Nilgiri population for the 
years 1871·, 1881, 1891 and 1901 14 
13. The data contains in-built errors because of numerous 
problems with nomenclature and the de_sire of some 
peoples to upgrade their caste status. Additionally, the 
strength of non-Brahmanism in Madras Presidency in the 
1920s led to the widespread use of terms such as 
Adi-Dravida in place of caste names in census returns. 
For this reason any detailed analysis of caste origin 
after the 1911 Census is precluded. 
14. In 1871 the census report showed Chakkili, Mala, Madaga, 
Pariah, Pulayan and Valluvan peoples grouped under the 
category of Pariahs. In the 1881 census the castes 
grouped under the heading Pariah were not given. In 
order to aid direct comparison, the functional grouping 
of castes employed in 1891 has been applied to the 1901 
census. As a result, more than 99% of outcastes 
enumerated in Nilgiri district in both 1891 and 1901 
were drawn from the Holeya, Cheruman, Pallan, Pariah, 
and Panniyan castes, and (erroneously) from the Palli 
caste. However, it should be noted that the 1901 total 
outcaste numbers only included those castes whose 
membership amounted to more than 200. Therefore the 
percentages of outcastes appearing in Table 2 against 
1901 should be considered minimum figures. 
TABLE 2 OUTCASTES AS A PROPORTION OF POPULATION IN NILGIRI 
DISTRICT, 1871-1901, 15 
YEAR OUTCASTES AS % OUTCASTES AS % 
OF HINDU AND OF HINDU POPULATION 
TRIBAL POPULATION ONLY 
I 
1871 22.5 46.5 
1881 25.8 39.1 
1891 30.3 53.0 
1901 27.1 49.7 
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• 
From Table 2 it is readily apparent that outcastes formed a 
significant proportion of the Hindu population in Nilgiri District. 
That proportion, varying from 39% to 53%, is unusually high. A 
direct comparison with the whole of Madras Presidency is afforded 
by the 1881 census which concluded that the average proportion of 
outcastes in the total population of the Presidency was only 
15.6% 16 While it is impossible to distinguish the caste 
15. Report on the Census of the Madras Presidency, Vol.I, 
Madras, 1874, p 328; Imperial Census of 1881, Vol.I, 
op. cit., Table V, p 305; Census of India; 1891, 
Vol. XIII, op. cit., Table XVI-A, pp 358-377; Census of 
India, 1901, Vol.XV-A, op. cit., Part II, Table XIII; 
Madras District Gazetteers, Statistical Appendix for the 
Nilgiri District, Madras, 1905, p 5. 
Note that the tribal peoples referred to here include 
the Badaga, Toda, Irula and Kota peoples who were the 
pre-colonial inhabitants of the tableland. In the 1901 
census the Kota and Toda people were excluded from the 
tribal figure. As the census indicates the number of 
Kota and Toda speakers as 2105 it would be reasonable to 
subtract this number from what has been calculated as 
the Hindu population. If this is done then the 
proportion of Pariahs in the Hindu population rises to 
51.7%. 
16. ImPerial Census of 1881, Vol.!, op. cit., p 305. 
Note that this proportion may have been slightly lower 
than normal for it was also reported by census officials 
that famine in the 1870s fell more heavily on 
(continued over) 
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composition of the immigrant population of the Nilgiri from that of 
the district-born population on the basis of the quantitative data 
available in the censuses, the information contained in the census 
reports indicates that these outcaste people provided the bul~ of 
plantation workers in the Nilgiri Hills. In 1921 when the number of 
Pariahs was found to be everywhere on the rise except in the 
Nilgiri, the Census Report attributed this to the fact that there 
had been "less recruiting on the tea estates" 17 • In 1931, census 
officials concluded that "practically all the labour recruited for 
these estates is drawn from the depressed classes" 18 . The 
poverty of the depressed classes, their illiteracy, low social 
standing and exclusion from positions of authority, all helped to 
ensure that they would become a relatively passive and powerless 
industrial labour force. 
The newly created plantation labour force was also marked by 
a relative scarcity of females. The ratio of women to men 
the lower castes. However, if this proportion remained 
even roughly constant, then the high proportion of 
outcastes in the Nilgiri must be seen as a peculiarly 
distinctive feature of the district's population. 
17. Census of India, 1921, Vo1.XIII, op. cit., pp 158-159. 
18. Census of India, 1931, Vo1.XIV, Madras, 1932, p 81. The 
economic term "depressed classes" was often used by the 
British to indicate both outcastes and castes which 
ranked immediately above them who also suffered from a 
number of social disabilities. 
(M. s. A. Rao [Ed.], Social Movements and Social 
Transformation, New Delhi, 1979, Vol.!, p 4, Note 2). 
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enumerated in Nilgiri district was considerably lower than the 
average for Madras Presidency throughout the period 1881-1921. That 
this was largely due to the effect of migration to the district can 
be seen in Table 3 where the female to male ratio of the population 
• 
born in the district is compared with the group born outside the 
district. 
TABLE 3 COMPARISON OF FEMALE TO MALE RATIOS OF NILGIRI 
YEAR 
1881 
1891 
1901 
1911 
1921 
1931 
POPULATIONS BORN INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE DISTRICT, 
1881-1931. 19 
NILGIRI POP. BORN 
IN NILGIRI DISTRICT. 
939 Females:lOOO Males 
965 " :1000 " 
989 " :1000 " 
990 " :1000 " 
973 " :1000 " 
983 " :1000 " 
NILGIRI POP. BORN 
OUTSIDE NILGIRI DISTRICT. 
627 Females:lOOO Males 
560 " :1000 " 
662 " :1000 " 
658 " :1000 " 
730 " :1000 " 
681 " :1000 " 
The Census report of 1881 opined that the unusually low 
proportion of female immigrants in the Nilgiris "was probably due 
to influx of coolie labour for tea, cinchona and coffee 
plantations" 20 In 1911 the Census Commission went further in 
stating that the sexual imbalance was due to "the large immigration 
19. Imperial Census of 1881, Vol.II, op. cit., Tables X, XI; 
Census of India, 1891, Vol.XIV, op. cit., Table XI; 
Census of India, 1901, Vol.XVA, op. cit., Table XI; 
Census of India, 1911, Vol.XII, op. cit., Table XI; 
Census of India, 1921, Vol.XIII, op. cit., Table XI; 
Census of India. 1931, Vol.XIV, op. cit., Table VI. 
Note that the figures for immigrants refer to all 
persons irrespective of their racial origins. 
20. Imperial Census of 1881, Vol.!, op. cit., p 63. 
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of male labourers to 21 coffee and tea estates" , while in 1931 
the comparable report recorded the peculiar nature of the district 
"with its plantations and inunigrant labour . . . predominantly this 
labour is male" 22 . 
• 
The relative scarcity of female labour may well reflect 
conditions and decisions beyond the control of European employers. 
Periodic and regional shortages of labour plagued planters in the 
Nilgiri throughout the period under study. There is no evidence to 
indicate that planters, either of coffee or tea, preferred male to 
female labour. On the contrary, in the tea fields female pluckers 
were considered superior as their fingers were said to more nimble 
and dexterous than their male counterparts. Plucking was a constant 
task on tea plantations and by 1931 tea production dominated the 
Nilgiri economy. In an attempt to satisfy the need for pluckers, 
(and perhaps also to redress the sexual imbalance among labourers), 
23 planters were known to deliberately recruit widows • In the tea 
fields the real earnings of pluckers often exceeded those of other 
field labourers 24 Additionally, planters frequently proclaimed 
21. Census of India, 1911, Vol.XII, op. cit., p 84. 
22. Census of India, 1931, Vol.XIV, op. cit., p 78. 
23. Royal Commission on Labour in India, Evidence, Vol.VII, 
op. cit., Part II, p 313. 
24. Report on an Enquiry into Conditions of Labour in 
Plantations in India, Delhi, 1946, p 146. 
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the benefits of family migration and their desire to promote it. In 
short, there is ample evidence that female workers were in demand 
both for industrial and social reasons. It is therefore rather 
surprising that males continued to dominate the migratory flow at 
• 
this late stage. In part, the answer to this question lies in the 
planters' preference for labour which was free to permanently 
commit itself to long hours in the fields. On the other hand, an 
examination of the wide variation in sexual ratios among the 
various outcaste groups enumerated in the Nilgiris indicates an 
additional reason for this imbalance. The sexual composition of the 
various outcaste groups is illustrated in Table 4. 
TABLE 4 RATIO OF FEMALES TO MALES AMONGST OUTCASTES IN NILGIRI 
DISTRICT, 1901. 25 
mill NUMBER OF 
OUTCASTES FEMALES 
Pariah 9259 
Pallan 248 
WEST COAST 
OUTCASTES 
Panniyan 106 
Cheruman 2 
Holey a 776 
TOTAL 10391 
NUMBER OF RATIO OF 
MALES FEMALES 
TO MALES. 
10170) 
354 ) = 903 Females:lOOO Males 
2117 
267 
1243 
14151 
= 244 Females:1000 Males 
In Table 4 the outcastes have been grouped according to 
25. census of India. 1901, Vol.XV-A, op. cit., Part II, 
Table XIII. 
53 
their geographic origin. The Pariahs and Pallans are Tamil people, 
the latter residing chiefly in Tanjore, Tinnevelly, Madura and 
Trichinopoly, and to a lesser extent in Salem and Coimbatore. The 
Panniyan, Cheruman and Holeya castes were all found on the west 
• 
coast- of Madras Presidency. Panniyans were found chiefly in Malabar 
in the eastern taluks of Wynaad and Kottayam. Cherumans were found 
largely in southern Malabar 1 while Holey as resided principally in 
South Canara. As a result of the geographic division employed here, 
a pronounced contrast is evident in the female to male ratios of 
the two groups. The proportion of females among those outcastes 
originating in the plains east of the Nilgiri approaches the ratio 
of females amongst the Nilgiri born population, as illustrated in 
Table 3. In contrast, the proportion of female immigrants is 
remarkably low amongst those outcastes whose origin lay to the west 
of the Nilgiri hills. 
Such significantly low proportions of females amongst migrant 
Malayali labour haVe been documented elsewhere. In a study focusing 
on the caste composition of inunigrant labour in Ceylon, Jayaraman 
noted that south Indian male and female plantation workers were 
present in approximately equal numbers. However, amongst Malayali 
26 labour less than 5% were female 
26. R. Jayaraman, Caste Continuities in Ceylon, Bombay, 
1975, p 40. 
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The reason why so few female outcastes migrated from Malabar 
and South Canara is most probably found in the continuance of these 
outc'astes• severe socio-economic disabilities, including the 
widespread practice among landlords of keeping the women in their 
• 
home villages in order to secure the return of male labourers 
seeking temporary employment elsewhere. Although Cherumans, Holeyas 
and other agrestic slaves in British India were legally emancipated 
in 1843, the low proportion of women amongst these castes in 
Nilgiri District in 1901 is important evidence that their 
emancipation was less than complete or universal. Edgar Thurston, 
writing some fifty years after the initial settlement of coffee 
planters in the Wynaad, stated that European planters who 
originally purchased land on the plateau simultaneously acquired 
the Panniyans who were attached to it 27 . In 1895 Wynaad estates 
were reported to be drawing their labour supply largely from among 
the Cherumans of Malabar whom one leading planter characterised as 
"nothing more than praedial slaves" 28 • As late as 1903 G. L. 
Acworth, a prominent planter and member of the Madras legislature, 
described these labourers as "the slaves of the landowners on the 
West Coast" who between planting and harvesting were permitted to 
27. Edgar Thurston, Ethnographic Notes in Southern India, 
Madras, 1906, p 447. 
28. U.P.A.S.I. Annual Proceedings, 1895, p 35. 
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work on hill estates, "the masters keeping their women as hostages" 
to guarantee their return 29 These labourers were also reported 
to have originated in Walluvanad taluk, and also in Calicut 
taluk 30 where Francis Buchanan had earlier indicated the 
• 
concentration of slaves amongst the non-slave population exceeded 
other areas of Malabar 31 The unfree nature of their emp~oyment 
in Nilgiri district is also reflected in the fact that they worked 
for the same planters from year to year, and arrived "without the 
intervention of a maistri or recruiter" 32 to serve labour's 
interests, or even his own, in obtaining the highest wages or best 
conditions. Their isolation from the mainstream of migrating labour 
extended even to their accommodation, for they lived in temporary 
29. Proceedings of the Council of the Governor of Fort St 
George, 27th Feb., 1903, p 35. 
30. Ibid., p 36. 
31. Francis Buchanan Hamilton, A Journey from Madras through 
the Countries of Mysore, Canara, and Malabar, London, 
1807, Vol.II, pp 361 62, 441 442, 483, 508, 562, in 
Benedicte Hjejle, "Slavery and Agricultural Bondage in 
South India in the Nineteenth Century", The Scandinavian 
Economic History Review, Vol.XV, 1967, p 89. 
Note that Hjejle has collated Buchanan's estimates. 
324 Proceedings of the Council of the Governor of Fort 
StGeorge, 27th Feb., 1903, p 36. 
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huts which they constructed themselves rather than in the 
plantation labour lines 33 • 
Acworth's assessment of these labourers as slaves is in 
accord with the description provided in the Malabar District Manual 
• 
of 1887. The author, William Logan, a former district magistrate in 
Malabar and a keen antiquarian, argued that the "chief obstacle" 
preventing the complete release of Cherumans was that: 
"the women must have dwellings of some sort somewhere, 
and the masters provide the women with huts and allow 
the men to go to work on plantations on condition that 
they return in good time for the rice cultivation and 
hand. over4 a considerable portion of their 
earn1ngs" • 
In Logan's. opinion real freedom for the Cheruman could only come 
about when they had acquired "indefensible rights" to their house 
sites 35 
While Benedicte Hjejle has proposed that paid employment 
offered by Wynaad plantations helped to reduce the high degree of 
debt slavery that lingered in Malabar after the abolition Act 36 
33. Ibid. 
34. William Logan, Malabar, Madras, 1887, p 148. 
35. Ibid., p 151. 
36. Hjejle, op. cit., p 125. 
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emancipation is clearly not complete by 1903. For abolition to have 
any real substance, as Kooiman has argued 37 alternative 
employment opportunities had to be available to newly freed 
workers, but the low rate of female, Malayali emigration to the 
• 
Nilgiri some sixty years after plantations were established there 
must undermine the importance often accredited to plantation_ wages 
in promoting widespread and full emancipation. 
The creation of a circularly migrating, agro-industrial 38 
work force which was youthful, of low caste origin and 
predominantly male was not accidental. To some degree the 
composition of the new work force reflected the planters• ambition 
to obtain maximum productivity, but it also reflected the wider 
socio-economic order of rural south India and the forces of change 
that were operating upon it. While it is readily apparent that the 
growth of plantation employment in the hills was itself one of 
those forces, plantation recruitment was assisted by the 
commercialisation and alienation of traditional landholdings on the 
37. Dick Kooiman, Conversion and Social Equality in India: 
The London Missionary Society in South Travancore in the 
19th Century, Columbia, 1989, p 135. 
38. The term agro-industrial work force is used here 
to highlight the fact that the characteristics of 
plantation production had little in common with 
traditional agriculture. A strictly hierarchical 
management structure, mass production for export rather 
than for subsistence, accurate measurement of productive 
output and a complex network of agents and brokers were 
typical features of the planting industry. 
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plains and the consequent increase in the number of landless 
labourers. Moreover, to account for the composition of the new 
plantation work force it is necessary to look beyond the general 
provision of employment opportunities by the planter, to the means 
• 
by which labour was recruited and the interaction of this 
recruitment system with the circumstances in which potential 
workers were already immersed. 
The major factor which determined the composition of the 
Nilgiri tea plantation work force was the planters• employment of 
the maistri system of labour recruitment. This system was near 
universal in the Nilgiri for the recruitment of non-local labour 
and had operated from the earliest days in which tea was grown as a 
commercial crop. 
~he use of the maistri system was not confined to the Nilgiri 
nor did it originate there. In Ceylon the system had been used to 
obtain south Indian plantation labour from about 1820 39 , while 
J. Daniel Moore in his study of the Mysorean coffee industry has 
reported that the system operated long before the British 
introduced plantation cash cropping in the late 1820s 40 Moore 
39. R. Jayaraman, "Indian Emigration to Ceylon: Some Aspects 
of the Historical and Social Background of the 
Emigrants", Indian Economic and Social History Review, 
Vol.IV, No.4, Dec., 1967, pp 320 321. 
40. Moore, op. cit., p 216. 
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asserts that the maistri' s original position was as the 
acknowledged leader of a migrating agricultural labour gang. The 
maistri•s function was to negotiate with employers, mediate between 
members of the gang and safeguard their welfare. Moore designates 
• 
this type of labour foreman an "old" maistri, adding that he was 
usually a man of some importance in his village though not. a caste 
leader. His gang would frequently include his relatives and 
acquaintances. Moore asserts that "old" maistris dominated 
plantation labour supplies in Mysore until about 1875 41 
In the Nilgiri there is scant evidence concerning the 
pioneering planters• employment of the maistri system. 
A. A. Wright, who was engaged in 1845 and 1846 to establish coffee 
fields in the south east Wynaad, later recalled that gangs of 
workers were imported with "great trouble and expense", their 
maistris being paid monthly salaries and no commission 42 • The 
fact that Wright expressed surprise that the members of such gangs 
would "bolt away without the knowledge of even their maistry" 
indicates that a personal tie commonly bound gang members to their 
41. Ibid. 
42. A. A. Wright, "Sketches of the Planting Districts of 
South India", Part III, in Planting Opinion, 19th 
Dec., 1896, p 22. 
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"old" maistri 43 • However, it would be easy here to make too much 
of a flimsy record of evidence. On many estates it was commonplace 
in the pioneering days for planters to expect their clerical staff 
to provide them with a "labour connection" 44 On smaller 
• 
plantations, office clerks continued to share the supervision of 
field workers with maistris 45 , whose coercion of their workers 
is implied in their early description as men nOt only of superior 
intelligence and influence, but also of superior "physique to the 
average run of coaly" 46 These facts would appear to seriously 
undermine the notion advanced by Moore that "old" maistris 
originally functioned as labour spokesmen rather than as labour 
foremen on the early coffee estates. Moreover, Moore's assertion 
that the maistri system "was in existence long before the British 
introduced new cash plantation crops" 47 is unsubstantiated and 
doubtful in any case. Francis Buchanan who took a particular and 
detailed interest in agriculture whilst traversing much of south 
India at the turn of the nineteenth century, makes no mention of 
43. Ibid. 
44. Planting Opinion, 26th Sept., 1896, p 6. 
45. Planters• Chronicle, 1st Sept., 1945, p 274. 
46. Planting Opinion, 1st April, 1899, p 240. 
47. Moore, op. cit., p 216. 
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maistris 48 In truth, the hierarchical administrative and 
supervisory structure of the larger Nilgiri estates grew to mirror 
those of Ceylon coffee plantations where many south India tea 
planters had gained their initial experience of l . 49 p ant~ng 
Rather than accept Moore's explanation, it is more likely that the 
maistri's position, and by association other plantation practices, 
were legitimized by the construction of a false tradition of 
agricultural custom. With this in place, planters could 
subsequently claim that their handling of labour was in line with 
long standing Indian conventions 50 . Although the origins of the 
maistri system are uncertain, it is evident that planters 
48. Buchanan, op. cit. 
49. This extended even to the transfer of occupational 
titles. For instance, "K.P." (kanaka pillai) was the 
term commonly used for field conductors both in Ceylon 
and in south India. However, the origins of the term 
itself pre-date commercial coffee culture in Ceylon. 
s. Arasaratnam has reported the growth of kanaka pillais 
as subsidiary functionaries to European cloth merchants 
operating in the Coromandel in the seventeenth century. 
As there is no evidence that K.P.s were drawn from 
higher castes than common labourers on tea estates, the 
caste titular "pillai" may have been used by planters to 
convey to labourers the field conductor's dominion over 
them. (S. Arasaratnam, "Indian Commercial Groups and 
European Traders, 1600-1800: Changing Relationships in 
Southeastern India", South Asia, Vol.I, No.2, Sept.1978, 
p 48.) 
50. Lalita Chakravarty has noted that owners of colonial 
enterprises often quoted village and caste traditions in 
order to resist attempts to curb the power of maistris, 
daffadars, sardars and other labour contractors. 
(Lalita Chakravarty, "Emergence of an Industrial Labour 
Force in a Dual Economy -British India, 1880-1920", 
Indian Economic and Social History Review, Vol.XV, No.3, 
p 283, note 48.) 
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transformed the maistri's position to meet their own ends. In doing 
so any resemblance to an ancient labour spokesman was subsumed. 
According to Moore the recruitment of coffee plantation 
labour in Mysore after 1875 was increasingly undertaken by j'en 
promoted by planters from the plantations• permanent labour 
ranks 51 These "new" maistris were selected for their long 
service and loyalty to planters, and in their position as labour 
foremen were expected to serve planters' interests rather those of 
the labour gangs. Similarly, Roberts reports that in Ceylon by the 
18505 the maistri had become merely a planter's agent 52 
The operation of the "new" maistri in the Nilgiri was 
probably accelerated by the rapid increase in demand for labour 
which accompanied the changeover to tea production. By the 1880s 
the "new" system was firmly entrenched 53 In 1896 the South of 
India Planters• Enquiry Committee found Nilgiri planters to be 
heavily reliant on annually migrating labour recruited by maietris 
and concluded "that the employment of maistries for recruiting 
plantation labour is absolutely necessary" 54 Each maistri was 
51. Moore, op. cit., pp 216-217. 
52. M. W. Roberts, "Indian Estate Labour in Ceylon during 
the Coffee Period, (1830-1880)", Part I, op. cit., p 12. 
53. Lock, op. cit., p 209. 
54. Report of the South of India Planters' Enquiry 
Committee, op. cit., p 13. 
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said to have recruited between 100 and 250 labourers who would 
often arrive at estates in gangs of 20 to 40 under the control of 
the maistri himself or a headman termed a cole-maistri 55 • 
However, the composition of the gang appears to have been little 
• 
different from Moore's description of the gang under an "old" 
maistri: the members would be drawn from a single village or at 
most several villages, they would often be accompanied by close 
relatives and by their own caste members 56 • If the "new" maistri 
drew heavily upon those labourers "who knew little or nothing about 
him" 57 it is not readily apparent in the Nilgiri by 1896. 
It is only in 1930 that evidence is available to show that 
the composition of the maistri•s gang had become less tightly knit. 
In that year planters • representatives informed the Royal 
Commission on Labour that in south India, "Under the kangani system 
as originally understood you would have a head kangani who· is 
practically the father of the estate " but "things have changed now 
and we find a Tamil maistri recruiting a Kanarese coolie or a 
55. Ibid., p 12. 
56. Ibid., p 14. 
57. Moore, op. cit., p 218. 
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Telugu coolie in whom he can have no interest" 58 • Additionally, 
planters had by this time begun to appoint as maistris those 
labourers "who have proved to be good coolies" and who were thought 
to be capable of bringing in labour, possibly through a family 
• 
connection 59 • 
Under the "new" maistri system the personal tie be~ween the 
gang members and their leader was replaced by an economic bond. The 
"new" maistri bound his labourers by an advance of money prior to 
their commencing work on the estate. That the new debt-bond came to 
utterly supersede a personal tie to the maistri was evident in the 
words of one "new" maistri before the 1930 Commission who declared 
"unless I give them (labourers) an advance I will have no hold on 
them" 60 Despite the diverse ethnic origins of labour gangs in 
1930, planters declared that a competent maistri would only advance 
money to labourers he knew thoroughly 61 In the "new" maistri 
system the maistri and his labourers had separate economic 
interests, and it was the maistri•s knowledge of his workers which 
58. Royal Commission on Labour in India, Evidence, Vol.VII, 
op. cit., Part 2, p 388. 
59. Ibid., p 355. 
60. Ibid., p 336. 
61. Ibid., p 195. 
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now protected him from being defrauded. 
The feature which most read~ly distinguished "new" maistris 
from "old", and simultaneously signalled a step in their conversion 
to the side of capital, was their receipt of a commission. Both the 
• 
south of India Planters' Enquiry Committee 62 and A. A. 
Wright 63 noted in 1896 that maistris now commonly received 10% 
of their coolies• wages as commission. Commissions in reality 
reduced the earnings of labourers. This, irrespective of whether 
the maistri arose from within the gang or was promoted from the 
estate work force, exemplified that the "new" maistri and the 
planter had a common interest in ensuring that the maximum number 
of workers turned out to labour in the fields each day. In order to 
extract t.he largest commission the "new" maistri assisted the 
planter in extracting the maximum profit from labour. 
The linchpin of the "new" maistri system was the monetary 
advance made to the labourer. An advance was almost invariably made 
to migrating labour and was considered by most planters to be 
indispensible in attracting labour 64 By 1902 G. s. Stokes, a 
62. Report of the South of India Planters• Enquiry 
Committee, op. cit., p 12. 
63. A. A. Wright, "Sketches of the Planting Districts of 
South India", Part III, in Planting Opinion, 19th 
Dec., 1896, p 22. 
64. Reoort of the South of India Planters• Enouiry 
Committee, op. cit., p 19. 
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veteran civil servant in the Madras Presidency and a member of the 
Madras Legislative Council, described the advance system as "so 
universal and so deeply seated in the habits of the labourers that 
it is impossible either to ignore it or overthrow it" •65 • 
The size of the advance proffered by the maistri varied. In 
1896 in the Nilgiri a planter might advance between Rs 2 and Rs 20 
66 for each worker . Trusted workers were often advanced more than 
new recruits, while the largest advances were reportedly paid to 
Mysorean labour which was highly sought after 67 • When labour was 
scarce, as when the grain harvest had been abundant or when there 
was increased competition for labour from landlords, public works 
projects or overseas labour recruiters, the size of the advance 
rose 
68 Since the advance made to the labourer was recoverable 
from his earnings on the estate, the cost to the planter of rising 
advances was minimal in comparison with rising wage rates. As long 
as the labourer did not abscond, and either cash or credit could be 
65. Proceedings of the Council of the Governor of Fort St 
George, 15th Dec., 1902, p 208. 
66. Report of the South of India Planters' Enquiry 
Committee, op. cit., p 17. 
67. Ibid. 
68. I.O.L.R., Madras Judicial Proceedings, 1884, 
No.1911-1912, Assisting Magistrate of Nilgiris to Chief 
Secretary to Government, 20th May, 1884, p 11. 
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found to fund the advances, the system was economically beneficial 
to the planter. 
The advance system was employed by Nilgiri planters 
throughout the Tamil speaking regions to mobilize primarily low and 
• 
outcaste peoples. Many of these castes such as Pallia, Pariahs and 
Pallans, were traditionally employed in agricultural work; as 
casual day labourers, as share-croppers, as debt-bonded workers and 
even as agrestic slaves. The planters' organization, the 
U.P.A.S.I., considered the wet districts of Madras Presidency 
"where the labourer has no land of his own" to be their best 
recruitment ground, superior to dryer regions where "the labourer 
works for the, most part on his own land" 69 However, labour 
recruitment campaigns which were conducted by U.P.A.S.I from about 
1914 drew labour for Nilgiri plantations largely from eastern 
Caimbatore, and to lesser extent from southern Salem and western 
Trichinopoly, rather than from the more intensively cropped 
wetlands of the Cauvery region 70 
As early as 1887 the pariahs of Coirnbatore were identified 
in the district's manual as readily emigrating to Nilgiri 
69. Royal Commission on Labour in India, Evidence, Vol.VII, 
op. cit., Part II, p 194. 
70. Census of India. 1931, Vol.XIV, op. cit., Part I, p 81. 
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estates 71 . In the 1920s the President of the Coimbatore Labour 
Union, N. S. Ramaswamy Ayyangar, observed that amongst the factors 
contributing to plantation migration failure of rain, bad 
seasons, and rural poverty - was the "degrading treatment affor~d 
to Adi-Drivadas in the villages• 72 In stark contrast "the 
Vellala Gounders, Naickers and other caste Hindus who are the bulk 
of the population do not care to serve on plantations". 
Ayyangar concluded that these caste Hindus were "better off in 
their own villages", in spite of the fact that they too were 
subject to poor seasons and economic distress 73 • Rather than 
take up plantation employment, insolvent Gounder cultivators 
preferred to seek employment in the cotton mills of Coimbatore 74 
where the sudden influx of labour allowed mill owners to pay very 
71. F. A. Nicholson, Manual of the Coimbatore District in 
the Presidency of Madras, Madras, 1887, p 63. 
Nicholson was to become a notable expert on agrarian 
conditions in the Presidency. Towards the latter part 
of his career his efforts were instrumental in 
establishing agricultural banks in the region. 
72. Royal Commission on Labour in India, Evidence, Vol.VII, 
op. cit., Part I, p 251. 
73. Ibid. 
74. David Arnold, "The Gounders and the Congress: Political 
Recruitment in South India, 1920-1937", South Asia, 
No.4, Oct., 1974, p 4. 
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low wages 75 • The plantation maistri' a labour drive most commonly 
attracted agricultural labour which was both of the lowest economic 
class and of either low caste or outcaste origin. 
There can be little doubt that a maistri's advance was of~en 
directed at labourers who were already indebted. Existing 
indebtedness and agrestic bondage amongst recruits were cited by 
planters as factors which made advances essential 76 • The Acting 
Head Magistrate of Nilgiri district, Mr F. A. Wedderburn, wrote in 
1884 that he "often questioned coolies why they took the original 
advance" and found "the invariable answer is we had debts" 77 • 
Even where the labourer held land of his own he was not Lmmune to 
the maistri' s a~Vance.. An increase in the size of the family, a 
rise in rent, the desire of a landlord to increase his own 
cultivation, and most commonly a poor harvest, created fresh 
recruits. In the latter half of the nineteenth century revised land 
revenue settlements and a number of severe famines in many Tamil 
areas sorely aggravated rural distress, particularly amongst the 
75. Eamon Murphy, Unions in Conflict, A Comparative Study 
of Four South Indian Textile Centres, 1918 1939, New 
Delhi, 1981, p 27. 
76. Report of the South of India Planters' Enquiry 
Committee, op.cit., p 19. 
77. I.O.L.R., Madras Judicial Proceedings, 1884, 
No.1911-1912, Report of the Acting Head Magistrate of 
Nilgiri District, 9th April, 1884, p 14. 
78 poorest classes . 
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In Coimbatore district an erratic and unreliable rainfall 
pattern contributed to rural suffering. In 1865 the Collector of 
the district tabulated the previous 62 seasons as having been 2 
• 
79 good, 11 fair, 40 unfavourable and 9 really bad . In the latter 
decades of the century the plight of poor cultivators in the 
district worsened. In addition to widespread rack-renting landlords 
began to "evince an inclination to turn out their customary tenants 
for casual bidders who offer higher rents" 80 By 1887 the 
position of the common agricultural labourer was judged "very 
precarious; his ranks are increased not merely by multiplication 
from within, but by additions from the ryot class above" 81 
Increasing misfortune and rising debt amongst the agricultural 
labourers and small cultivators of Coimbatore made the district an 
ideal recruiting ground for Nilgiri planters whose traditional 
labour source in Mysore was simultaneously evaporating. The 
planter's advance could dissolve the labourer's financial 
78. Dharma Kumar, "Agrarian Relations-South India", in 
Dharma Kumar (Ed.) The Cambridge Economic History of 
India, Cambridge, 1983, Vol.2, Part 4, Ch. 2, 
pp 229-233. 
79. Nicholson, op. cit., p 13. 
80. Ibid., p 267. 
81. Ibid., p 270. 
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obligation to his landlord or village moneylender but the debt was 
simply transferred to a foreign and unknown landowner4 All the new 
labourer could learn of his obligations as a member of a new, 
industrially organized work force, and of the conditions Ulllder 
which he would work and live, he would have gleaned from the 
maistri who was eager to recruit him. 
In accepting the advance the labourer bound himself both to 
the maistri and to the planter. In place of the landlord the new 
recruit found he had -two masters to serve. Both the planter, who 
was chronically short of labour, and the maistri, who derived 
profit from the labourer•s earnings, found their economic interests 
best served by retaining the labourer on the plantation. In an 
attempt to effect this it was customary on Nilgiri tea plantations 
to make a fresh advance to a labourer at the end of the season 
irrespective of his financial position, and prior to his leaving 
for his village. In this way planters attempted to ensure the 
labourer• s return. This practice prevailed throughout the period 
under examination 82 , and was also beneficial to the maistri. Mr 
J. Ryan, a Nilgiri planter whose opinions on the maistri system 
were solicited by F. A. Wedderburn, concluded that "a maistri does 
82. See for example A. A. Wright, "Sketches of the Planting 
Districts of south India", Part III, in Planting 
Opinion, 19th Dec., 1896, p 22 and Royal Commission 
on Labour in India, Evidence, Vol.VII, op. cit., Part 2, 
p 214. 
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all in his power to prevent a coaly under advance from clearing 
himself entirely" 83 On occasions when the labourer was able to 
repay the advance it was Wedderburn•s experience that "coolies have 
pleaded before me that return of the advance was tendered b¥t 
refused by the maistry" 84 Acceptance of the maistri' s advances 
plainly compromised the labourer'•s free exit from the new labour 
market. 
The maistri's advance also bridged the cultural divide 
between the pre-capitalist world of the rural village and the 
capitalist realm of the plantation. Recruits to Nilgiri estates 
were often debt-bonded agricultural labourers who, in accepting 
plantation advances, were provided with a continuity of experience 
in relation to their terms of employment. Moreover, recruits simply 
transposed village mores regarding debt to the maistri's advances. 
The degree to which this process took place can be gauged from the 
promotional pamphlet of one foreign labour recruiter, who advised 
field workers on Shevaroy estates to rid themselves of their 
maistris' grip and; 
83. I.O.L.R., Madras Judicial Proceedings, 1884, 
No.l911-1912, Report of the Acting Head Magistrate of 
Nilgiri District, 9th April, 1884, p 15. 
84 . .!.hl9· 
"Go to Ceylon gentlemen .••• with the chit of 
Goodfellow .. . As soon as the labourers arrive on our 
estates they will be given free, two cloths, a woollen 
blanket and a cooking vessel .... (and) a present of 
Rs. 2 to each man and woman ... They are not ~nd to 
clear the debts of their parents and ancestors" . 
73 
• 
There is no evidence to suggest that maistris in the Nilgiris ever 
attempted to disspell labour's belief that their new debts were 
heritable. On the contrary, maistris relied not only on the 
efficacy of the law of penal contract to protect their advances, 
but also on labour's traditional acceptance of the binding power of 
debt. 
The labourer remained a member of his village despite his 
entry into the new agro-industrial work force. As early as 1870, 
Mysorean, Tamil, and west coast plantation workers in the Wynaad 
who accumulated savings were reported to be returning home and 
investing it in land 86 In Mysore this process, regardless of 
whether the estate wages were earned in the state itself or in the 
Nilgiris, reduced the plantation labour pool and stimulated a new 
87 
source of labour in South Canara • Other labourers who already 
held, however tenuously, plots of land prior to their recruitment 
85. U.P.A.S.I. Annual Proceedings, 1912, pp 76-77. 
86. Morgan, op. cit., pp 60-61. 
87. Moore, op. cit., p 282. 
74 
by the maistri used part of the cash wages they received to 
maintain their claims 88 • The managers of Nonsuch Tea Estate and 
Ibex Lodge Estate in the Nilgiris who employed about 1,000 workers 
between them, attested before the Royal Commission on Labour that; 
• 
"all these coolies have got interests in the country 
down below; they are all agriculturalists. They have to 
pay government .k.i!s.tl and have to buy seeds. A great 
deal of the money we advance to them is sent straight 
down to the country ••••• If he is going down to his 
country he takes it w~ him and buys his seed and pays 
his Government kisti" • 
Aside from his tie to land, the labourer was frequently bound 
to the village by the presence of his kin there. Labourers often 
left children, parents and even wives in the villages. 
Additionally, women employed on the plantations commonly migrated 
home for the birth of a child 90 • despite a rising standard of 
medical treatment on the plantations, and in some cases, the 
provision of maternity benefits. In general, workers who became 
seriously ill preferred to return to their villages rather than 
88. Dharma Kumar reports that in the dry Tamil regions such 
as Coimbatore District where intensive agriculture was 
not worthwhile, some Paraiyans and Pallans were 
owner-cultivators on small lots. (Dharma Kumar, 
"Agrarian Relations -South India", op. cit., p 212.) 
89. Royal Commission on Labour in India, Evidence, Vol.VII, 
op. cit., Part II, p 313. 
90. Ibid., p 320. 
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remain on their estates 91 
The widespread retention of familial village ties and the 
skewed age structure of Nilgiri migrants lucidly illustrate that 
plantation employment did not engender true family migration. Whire 
women and youths migrated they generally did so as workers, and not 
as the dependents of a working male. Although planters 9ften 
believed that they would be better served by a resident work force, 
plantation wages we.r:e insufficient to support non-working 
dependents. In 1904 a government enquiry into conditions on tea 
estates in Madras Presidency accepted that the food expenses of an 
adult male estate worker were approximately Rs 4 per month 92 . At 
the same time t~e maximum male wage per month would probably never 
have exce~ded Rs 6 14 ann as 93 and as it was customary for 
planters to make deductions for lateness, short work and other 
91. Report of the South of India Planters• Enquiry 
Committee, op. cit., p 15. 
92. Report on the Conditions of Tea Garden Labour in the 
Duars of Bengal. in Madras and in Ceylon, Shillong, 
1904, p 12. 
93. IQig. The figure has been calculated by taking the 
maximum daily rate of pay for 22 working days per month. 
Although labourers were expected to work for six or even 
seven days each week, an individual worked on average 
20-22 days per month. (Report on an Enquiry into 
Conditions of Labour in Plantations in India, op. cit., 
p 146). Many planters regularly made deductions from 
their labourers' wages, but these have not been taken 
into account here. On Nilgiri estates it was not 
customary for labourers to earn supplementary 
pay.(Report on the Conditions of Tea Garden labour in 
the Ouars of Bengal, in Madras and in Ceylon, op. cit., 
p 12.) 
76 
misdemeanours, real earnings were very commonly a great deal less 
than stated wage rates and probably hovered around Rs 3 per 
month 94 Even where planters made rent-free land available, 
workers proved unwilling to settle permanently near 
• 
plantations 95 . The lack of a true family wage characterised 
employment on tea plantations throughout the period. As a result, 
the non-working population of dependent family members, the aged 
and the infirm, remained at home and were maintained on the whole 
by small family plots of land and alternative sources of income. 
Thus the real cost of reproducing the labour force was borne in the 
home village and not on the tea plantation. 
In summary, the growth of tea planting in the Nilgiri had 
engendered an increased flow of migrants to the district 
particularly from Malabar and the Tamil speaking districts of 
Madras Presidency. The predominance of youth, and of youthful males 
in particular, among that migratory stream is indicative of 
migration for unskilled labour 96 rather than migration for 
94. Planting Opinion, 24th Oct., 1896, p 10. 
95. Report of the South of India Planters• Enguiry 
Committee, op. cit., p 11. In the mid-1940s less than 
10% of plantation workers in south India were estimated 
to be permanently resident on their estates. (Report on 
an Enquiry into Conditions of Labour in Plantations in 
India, op. cit., p 119.) 
96. Chakravarty, op. cit., p 289. 
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settlementa The lack of true family migration to the Nilgiri, and 
the retention of agricultural and village ties by immigrant workers 
indicate that plantation employment was regarded by recruited 
workers as impermanent. The burgeoning tea plantations to which 
• 
they were despatched were a clear example of colonial capitalist 
penetration of the Indian economy. However, tea planters in 
attempting to create a large and permanent agro-industrial work 
force, found it simplest to use the pre-colonial mechanism of debt-
bonding as the basis of their labour recruitment system. This 
system, the maistri system, had already been sufficiently modified 
some decades before, most notably in Ceylon, to serve planters' 
interests. In south India, as in Ceylon, the maistri served as the 
planter's agent and in tendering an advance locked the new 
relationship between capital and wage labour into existing agrarian 
relations. Worsening rural economic conditions pushed those 
villagers with the greatest socio-economic disabilities into 
plantation employment. On tea estates low wages and high advances 
continued a familiar round of exploitation. In the new capitalist 
mode of production the planter and the maistri merely replaced the 
landlord and the money lender as patrons; as a client the "coolie" 
stood in place of the debt-bonded and the indebted agrestic 
labourer. Capitalist development in the form of tea plantations 
worked to preserve, rather than to transform, existing relations of 
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agrarian exploitation. 
The failure of Nilgiri planters to raise a work force 
commensurate with their needs was in part due to a concurrent 
increase in demand for Indian labour overseas. In Ceylon, as in the 
• 
Nilgiri, the changeover from coffee to tea cultivation created an 
increased demand for plantation workers 97 • This, coupled with an 
acceleration in public works programmes in Ceylon 98 , affected 
both Tamil and, to a lesser extent, Malayali labour catchment 
areas. Between 1871 and 1861 the annual net emigration of Tamils to 
Ceylon rose from approximately 123,000 persons to 206,000 99 . By 
1901 it stood at over 440' 000 100. South Indian emigrants to 
Ceylon were predominantly drawn from the same lowly, agricultural 
castes targeted by Nilgiri planters 101 In the twentieth 
century, Trichinopoly and the surrounding districts of Salem, 
Tanjore, Ramnad and Madura, provided the bulk of emigrants to 
97. R. Jayaraman, "Indian Emigration to Ceylon: Some Aspects 
of the Historical and Social Background of the 
Emigrants", op. cit., p 326. 
98. Ibid. 
99. Ibid., p 325. 
100. Ibid. 
101. Hugh Tinker, A New system of Slavery, The Export of 
Indian Labour overseas, London, 1974, p 59. 
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Ceylon 102 By 1902 keen competition for estate labour led 
recruiters in these districts to offer advances ranging between 
Rs 50 and Rs 90 per person 103 Coimbatore district, which was 
rapidly becoming the major supplier of labour to the Nilgiri, 
• 
supplied only small numbers of recruits for Ceylon estates 104 
Direct competition between Nilgiri and ceylon planters for estate 
labour in Coimbatore was minimal. However, recruitment for ceylon 
from districts immediately east of Coimbatore very probably 
restricted the attempts of Nilgiri planters to draw in labour from 
further afield. Prior to 1931 south Indian planters conducted 
recruitment drives in eastern COimbatore, western Trichinopoly, 
southern Sale~, and northern Madura 105 While this resulted in 
a flow of labour to Anamalai estates in southern Coimbatore, it 
produced only small numbers of recruits for the Nilgiri from 
districts east of Coimbatore 106 Where migrating Tamil labour 
102. R. Jayaraman, "Indian Emigration to Ceylon: Some 
Aspects of the Historical and Social Background of the 
Emigrants•, op. cit., pp 333-334. 
103. U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1902, pp 44-45. 
104. R. Jayaraman, "Indian Emigration to ceylon: Some 
Aspects of the Historical and Social Background of the 
Emigrants", op. cit., p 333. 
• 
105. Census of India, 1931, Vol.XIV, op. cit., Part I, p 81. 
106. Ibid. see also Table 1 above . 
• 
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had the choice between long range destinations such as ceylon (and 
after 1900 107 Malaya ) , and the Nilgiri hills it clearly 
preferred the former. 
On the west coast of south India the development of the tea 
• 
industry in Ceylon also led to the increasingly permanent migration 
of labour from Malabar 108 . Rates of emigration among low caste 
Cherumans appear to have been highest in the mountainous taluks of 
Malabar Walluvanad, Palghat, and Wynaad 109 whose close 
proximity made them convenient recruiting grounds for planters in 
Nilgiri district. 
Competition for labour from overseas colonies was sorely felt 
by Nilgiri pla_nters, even in the nineteenth century. As early as 
1874 planters in the Wynaad complained to the Governor of Madras, 
Lord Hobart, that, 
"though suffering from an increased want of labor (sic), we 
are unable to compete with settlers in other more favoured 
countries, who are attracting our own coolies from the very 
districts which should supply us, and are, moreover, able to 
107. Although South Indian labour emigrated to Malaya well 
before this date, it is only after 1900 that the number 
of emigrants increased dramatically. (Kernial Singh 
Sandhu, Indians in Malaya, Some Aspects of their 
Immigration and Settlement, ( 1786-1957 !, Cambridge, 
1969, Appendix 1, pp 304 305.) 
108. Hjejle, op. cit., p 103. 
109. Ibid., pp 111-112. 
110 
and are, moreover, able to keep them". 
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Similarly the Report of the South of India Planters' Enquiry 
Committee claimed that an overall reduction in the labour J?OOl 
available to planters was in part attributable to labour migration 
abroad 111 Emigration, particularly to Ceylon, appeared to 
Offer greater rewards than emigration to the tea estates of the 
Nilgiri hills. 
To the potential plantation labourer, emigration to Ceylon 
appeared more lucrative than migration to a Nilgiri tea estate. 
Daily wage rates on Ceylon plantations exceeded those offered to 
tea labourers in the Nilgiri hills. In 1887 the daily wage of adult 
male estate workers in Ceylon was 6 annas 112 Although no 
comparable figure is available for that year in the Nilgiri it is 
highly probable that the most common daily wage rate was either 4 
or 4 113 1/2 annas per day By 1894 wage rates in Ceylon were 
110. I.O.L.R., Madras Judicial Proceedings, 1875, Nos.31-36, 
Wynaad Planters' Association Memorial to Lord Hobart, 
9th January, 1874. 
111. Report of the South of India Planters' Enquiry 
Committee, op. cit., p 11. 
112. John Ferguson, Cevlon in the Jubilee Year, London, 
1887, in Wickremeratne, op. cit., p 144. 
113. In 1877 H. B. Grigg reported a daily wage rate for 
adult males of S annas (Grigg, op. cit., p xl,). 
In 1896 A. A. Wright, indicated that a daily wage rate 
of 4 annas had been current for a long period (Wright, 
(continued over) 
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calculated by south Indian planters to annually exceed those of 
Nilgiri district by an average of Rs 20 per adult male 114 
Significantly, the cost of living in Ceylon was also dramatically 
higher 115 However, the information required to make such 
• 
calculations, subject as they were to large local variations, would 
not have been· available to the freshly recruited labourer. A simple 
statement of wage rates, rather than actual earnings, coupled with 
a high advance often proved sufficient inducement for emigration. 
That Ceylon tea estates were able to retain their labour may be 
more attributable to the impact of labour laws on the island 116 
than to superior conditions of labour. 
op. cit., 4th July, 1896, p 17). In the s. E. Wynaad 
where poorer conditions of labour forced planters to 
pay more than their counterparts in the Nilgiri Hills 
proper, A. A. Wright states that wages varied between 4 
and 5 annas. (Wright, 1£ig., 19th Dec., 1896, p 22). 
Similarly, J. c. Arbuthnott who led a government 
enquiry into plantation labour conditions in 1904 found 
that Nilgiri wages had remained static since 1896 at a 
maximum of 5 annas per diem in the most unhealthy 
tracts.(Report on the Conditions of Tea Garden Labour 
in the Duars of Bengal, in Madras and ·in Ceylon, 
op. cit., p 12) As Grigg's wage rate relates to 1876, 
a severe famine year when continuing high grain prices 
resulted in pressure to increase plantation wages, it 
is highly probable that Wright's estimates are more 
indicative of wage rates in 1887 than are Grigg's. 
114. U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1894, p 4. 
115. Ibid., p 5. 
116. A comprehensive coverage of labour law pertaining to 
Ceylon plantations is contained in Vijaya Samaraweera, 
"Masters and Servants in Sri Lankan Plantations: Labour 
Laws and Labour Control in an Emergent Export Economy", 
Indian Economic and Social History Review, 
Vol.XVlll, No.2, pp 123-158. 
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In a labour market relatively free of effective legal 
coercion Nilgiri tea planters found it impossible to form a stable, 
annually migrating work force. Labourers commonly deserted 
plantations in mid-season without notice to their employers and 
• 
many· estate owners found that they were able to retain only 20 or 
30% of their work force from year to year 117 The physical 
environment of Nilgiri tea plantations, the standard of living on 
plantations, and the competition between Nilgiri planters to obtain 
workers in a labour market already chronically undersupplied, were 
all responsible. 
Early attempts to retain migrating labour in the Nilgiris 
were often thwarted by environmental conditions. The climate of the 
Nilg,:!..ris was commonly recognized as "too cold and wet for the 
natives of the low countries" 118 . In attempting to explain 
labour's disinclination to work in the hills other planters 
portrayed Indian workers as superstitious. They related labour's 
"nameless dread of the hills as a place over which all sorts of 
intangible horrors hang" 119 and their fear of the "silent and 
117. Report of the South of India Planters• Enquiry 
committee, op. cit., p 16. 
118. Hull, op. cit.; p 25. 
119. Proceedings of the Council of the Governor of Fort St 
George, 3rd March, 1903, p 92. 
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sombre jungle, which is peopled with all sorts of bad and malicious 
spirits and demons in their imaginations .. 120 Aside from bitter 
cold and a prolonged, severe monsoonal season to which they were 
unaccustomed, plains labOur feared attacks by wild animals such as 
• 
tigers as well as disease. 
Malaria was particular prevalent on tea estates, especially 
in the Wynaad. European residents and visitors to the Wynaad 
commonly claimed that the area was infested with fever 121 With 
the growth of tea cultivation malaria probably became more common. 
The malarial "season" began soon after the onset of the first 
rains. Tea estate labour was present in the hills at this time, 
whereas the majority of coffee workers were usually absent until 
June or July. This fact alone may account for the extraordinary 
rise in deaths due to fever in Gudalur taluk in the early part of 
the twentieth century. Statistical records for the district 
indicate that between 1898 and 1902 fever in Gudalur caused 20 
deaths per one thousand head of population 122 In the 
quinquennium 1908-1912 this rate accelerated to an average 76 
120. Edwin Lester Arnold, On the Indian Hills; or, Coffee 
Planting in Southern India, Vol.!, London, 1881, p 319. 
121. See for example Handley, op. cit., p 155. 
122. Madras District Gazetteers, Statistical Appendix for 
the Nilgiri District, op. cit., 1905, p 4. 
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deaths 123 per one thousand In this period the prevalence of 
fever in the Wynaad was the major cause of Gudalur taluk' s high 
death rate which ran at approximately twice the rate recorded in 
124 
ootacamund and Coonoor taluks . 
• 
In the late nineteenth century the standard of living 
prevailing amongst plantation labour fell in Nilgiri district. In 
this period daily wage rates remained static but grain prices rose 
concurrently. This phenomenon is illustrated in Table 5. 
TABLE 5 AVERAGE GRAIN PRICES IN NILGIRI DISTRICT, 1896-1903, 
!IN SEERS PER RUPEE!. 125 
1896 
1897 
1898 
1899 
1900 
1901 
1902 
1903 
Seers of Ragi 
per Rupee 
17.3 
19.3 
20.0 
17.2 
14.7 
14.7 
13.9 
12.6 
Seers of Rice 
(Second Sort) 
per Rupee 
8.9 
9.5 
9.7 
8.8 
7.8 
8.5 
8.7 
7.7 
It should be remembered that both 1896 and 1897 were years 
marked by dire food shortages in south India; not until 1898 did 
123. Madras District Gazetteers, statistical Appendix for 
the Nilqiri District, Madras, 1915, p B. 
124. Ibid. 
125. Ibid., 1905, p 15. 
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average grain prices in the Nilgiri return to normal• On 
plantations ragi was the major grain consumed by both 
Mysorean 126 and Tamil labour 127 . By 1903 workers on fixed 
wages were only able to purchase 63% of the quantity of ragi they 
• 
had been able to buy in 1898. Similarly, their capacity to purchase 
rice had also been reduced to around 80% of the 1898 figure. By 
1903 workers clearly had less purchasing power with regard to food 
grains than they had on average both in 1898 in the famine year of 
1896. While Dharma Kumar has documented a corresponding fall in 
agricultural wages, it is apparent that the purchasing power of 
plantation wages was declining at a much faster rate 128• This 
relatively rapid decline in the purchasing power of plantation 
wages fu~ther detracted from the appeal of plantation employment. 
While the use of average district rice prices reveals the 
long term decline in the purchasing power of plantation labourers, 
it simultaneously conceals both periods and pockets of severe 
distress. In 1896 the district average price of ragi is given at 
17. 3 seers to the rupee, but perusal of the planters' periodical, 
126. Report on Conditions of Tea Garden Labour in the Duars 
of Bengal, in Madras and in Ceylon, op. cit., p 12. 
127. Planting Opinion, 26th June, 1897, p 389. 
128. Dharma Kumar, Land and Caste in South India, Cambridge, 
1965, pp 163-165. 
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Planting Opinion, indicates that over a period of three months the 
price of ragi ranged from a low of 30 seers per rupee 129 to a 
high 11 seers to the rupee 130 With individual monthly 
consumption of estimated at 36 seers 131 a labourer in 1903 
would have required approximately Rs 3 per month simply to purchase 
grain at the average annual price. In 1896, when daily wage rates 
equalled those of 1903, the actual monthly earnings of labour were 
reported to be no more than Rs 3 "at the outside" 132 Where 
earnings were equal to immediate expenditure on a staple food it is 
obvious that any increase in the price of ragi above the annual 
average was a critical blow to labour. 
In a similar fashion, local variations in grain prices are 
disguised· by the use of district averages. The 1900 average 
district price for raqi at 14.7 seers per rupee fails to show that 
in Gudalur taluk the average annual price was as low as 17.6 seers 
per rupee while the comparable price in coonoor taluk was 12.8 
129. Planting Opinion, 24th Oct., 1896, p 6. 
130. Ibid., 21st Nov., 1896, p 6. 
131. Report on Conditions of Tea Garden Labour in the Ouars 
of Bengal, in Madras and in Ceylon, op. cit., p 12. 
132. Planting Opinion, 24th Oct., 1896, p 10. 
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seers per rupee 133 Large differences in grain prices have also 
been recorded between small settlements located within a dozen 
miles of each other. Thus in December, 1896 a labourer purchasing 
ragi in Nellakotta would have received 30% more grain for ,.each 
rupee expended than his counterpart in Pykara 134 similarly, on 
isolated estates where grain was supplied by only a few merchants, 
prices could be easily inflated. such wide regional variations in 
grain prices may well have encouraged labourers to change estates, 
particularly as employment was at most times readily available 
throughout the whole region. 
There can be no doubt that labour abscondence was a common 
occurrence in the Nilgiri prior to 1903. Labourers were most likely 
to desert estates during harvest time in the plains 135 At this 
time landlords in the plains offered the highest wages for casual 
agricultural labour. It is likely that these wages were well in 
excess of plantation earnings, although the data available allows 
for only a rudimentary comparison. In Coimbatore District between 
1898 and 1900 government officials estimated that permanent 
133. Madras District Gazetteers, Statistical Appendix for 
the Nilqiri District, op. cit., 1905, p 15. 
134. Planting Opinion, 19th Dec., 1896, p 6. 
135. I.O.L.R., Madras Judicial Proceedings, 1876, No.26, 
secretary Wynaad Planters• Association to Chief 
secretary to Government, 6th March, 1876. 
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agricultural labourers received on average Rs 4 per month which was 
paid in second sort rice 136 In the Nilgiri, plantation wages 
were probably roughly equivalent, but the purchasing power of those 
wages in terms of grain was probably much lower. This • was 
particularly the case with rice rather than with ragi since the 
former could not be produced locally, and its transportation_ from 
the plains added to its price. As the earnings of casual, 
agricultural labour were higher than those of permanent workers it 
is clear that absconding tea plantation workers could earn more in 
the plains at harvest time than in the hills. Additionally, where 
wages at harvest time were paid in grain, many Tamil labourers had 
the opportunity to consume rice which they preferred to ragi. A 
sudden loSs of labour was particularly costly for tea growers. 
Unlike coffee "where the work can be allowed to fall into arrears 
if only the labour is forthcoming eventually", tea fields required 
labour to be "at hand at the hour required, or the whole yield for 
the whole year is ruined" 137 
The labour force of a tea plantation could also be reduced by 
labourer deserting one estate for another. 6esertion of this kind 
usually occurred when a labourer or maistri had already arranged 
136. Dharma Kumar, Land and Caste in South India, op. cit., 
pp 163-164. 
137. U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1898, p 9. 
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alternative employment. The prcictice of enticing away a planter 1 s 
labourers by offering higher advances or a pay rise was termed 
"crimping". It was widely regarded by tea planters as an unfair 
practice and an ungentlemanly act. As a result, planters did ,.pot 
comment publicly on it, although they frequently suggested measures 
to government aimed at eradicating the practice 138 The social 
stigma attached to crimping in British planting circles probably 
influenced the 1896 Committee of Enquiry to conclude; 
"We have no reason to believe that deliberate 
enticement from one estate to another • . . is at all 
common among planters belonging to the various 
Associations, but there are thousands of sma1:t391ative planters who do not belong to any Association" . 
Although 'British planting society was content to accept the 
Committee's racist opinions on crimping, there is no accessible 
evidence which supports them. On the contrary, crimping was 
widespread simply because it was an economical and relatively 
simple method of acquiring labour in a labour market which was 
chronically undersupplied. The planter who lost his labour more 
138. See for example I.O.L.R., Madras Judicial Proceedings, 
1879, No.1583, Secretary, Wynaad Planters' Association, 
to Acting Chief Secretary to Government, 29th June, 
1879. 
139. Report of the South of India Planters• Enquiry 
Commission, op. cit., p 51. 
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often than not had to bear also the loss of irrecoverable advances. 
For the estate labourer, crimping was a mechanism which to some 
extent preserved his freedom to sell his labour where he chose at 
the market price. 
• 
Absconding by labourers has been described as a form of 
labour resistance to intolerable working conditions, in studies of 
labour relations in the planting regions of both Assam 140 and 
Sumatra 141 In the Nilgiri scant evidence of conditions 
prevailing on tea plantations in the nineteenth century does not 
warrant a similar conclusion. Nevertheless, it is important to note 
that a few instances of collective violence against planters 
occurred in this period. The most significant case involved 200 
labourers on an estate in the Ouchterlony valley at the turn of the 
century. The labourers struck work in protest at an estate 
superintendent who had reduced the wage of one labourer for short 
work. They assembled outside the superintendent's house "and on his 
attempting to mount his horse he was struck on the side with an axe 
140. Rana Pratap Behal, "Forms of Labour Protest in Assam 
Valley Tea Plantations, 1900-1930", Economic and 
Political Weekly, Supplement, 20 (4), 26th Jan., 1985, 
pp 19-26. 
141. Ann Laura Stoler, "Plantation Politics and Protest on 
Sumatra's East Coast", Journal of Peasant Studies, 
Vol. 13, No.2, Jan., 1986, pp 124-139. 
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and assaulted with sticks 142 and stones" . In the same year two 
other separate instances took place in which planters were 
assaulted by their employees 143 • These events may indicate that 
working conditions and practices on Nilgiri tea plantations w~e 
unsatisfactory to labour, but if this was the case then individual 
flight was the simple, commonplace solution. Labourers ~n the 
Nilgiri were frequently within a hundred miles of ·their home 
villages and individual desertion required none of the 
organizational skills essential for collective action. 
The readiness with which tea plantation labour deserted the 
Nilgiri hills, particularly during the plains' harvest season, 
further indicates that labourers were largely pushed rather than 
pulled into plantation employment. When alternative employment was 
available in the plains, tea estate labour frequently absconded. 
Similarly, planters experienced increased difficulty in recruiting 
labour in years when the plains' harvest had been abundant. If 
conditions of labour and real earnings in the tea fields had been 
sufficiently attractive to pull agricultural labourers out of their 
home villages, then the plantation labour supply would have been 
more constant and absconding labour less commonplace. 
142. Report on the Conditions of Tea Garden Labour in the 
Duars of Bengal, in Madras and in Ceylon, op. cit., 
p 14. 
143. Ibid. 
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For Nilgiri tea estates absconding labour was a perpetual and 
costly problem which undermined the creation of a stable, annually 
migrating work force. Planters had already expended considerable 
capital and effort in acquiring land, the technical knowledge to 
• 
cultivate it and the maistris to staff it. Yet despite their 
ability to locate and exploit alternative sources of -labour, 
planters remained frustrated in their desire to maximise profits 
through the constant employment of cheap, reliable wage labour. In 
Assam, and particularly in Ceylon, the retention of plantation work 
forces was already aided by state legislation. Throughout the 
latter half of the nineteenth century south Indian planters 
increasingly combined to control the market for plantation labour. 
In particular, they conducted a prolonged campaign aimed at winning 
governmental assistance in coercing estate labour through the 
enactment of labour laws. To a lesser extent they also attempted to 
present a united front as employers so as to control the price 
which labour could command. Their success was to create an unfree 
market for estate wage labour. 
CHAPTER 3 
PLANTERS AS LOBBYISTS: THE CAMPAIGN FOR A PLANTATION 
·• 
LABOUR LAW 
Between 1865 and 1896 planters in southern India conducted a 
protracted campaign to secure increased legal control over 
plantation labour. Planters' labour problems were twofold and 
interrelated. Firstly, and most importantly, absconding labourers 
and maistris undercut planters' attempts to build a reliable and 
productive labour force. Secondly, absconding labourers and 
rnaistris also caused planters heavy financial losses through 
unrecovered advances. The existing law of penal contract, the 
Workman • s Breach of Contract Act of 1859, could be employed by 
planters in redressing these difficulties but it was neither 
consistently effective nor effecient. As the supply of plantation 
labour became increasingly inadequate to meet the demands of an 
expanding planting sector 1 planters came to regard plantation 
labour law as an essential instrument whereby workers could be 
retained on their estates. Planters sought to persuade the colonial 
state to assist the creation, articulation and retention of a 
1. Supra., p 24ff. 
95 
modern, wage-labour work force through the enactment of an enhanced 
labour law. Primarily planters envisaged legal reforms which would 
increase the utility of the Breach of Contract Act by ensuring 
efficient legal proceedings and the execution of sentences. These 
• 
proposals also encompassed a radical alteration to the existing 
balance of judicial equity in the planters' favour. 
At the same time planters also attempted to exert control 
over the labour market by implementing schemes for the compulsory 
registration of maistris and by imposing maximum daily wage rates. 
The successful implementation of these measures and the effective 
lobbying of government required a high degree of co-operation and 
coordination within the planting corrununity which is best 
illustrated by the unification of the various district planting 
associations under one central organization, the United Planters' 
Association of Southern India (U.P.A.S.I.), in 1894. Throughout the 
period neither the administration in Madras nor the authorities in 
Calcutta evinced support for the planters • proposals for reform. 
However, in 1896 economic downturn in the tea industry and the 
emergence of a newly united and vociferous planting community were 
instrumental in persuading both governments to abandon a position 
of laissez faire in favour of judicious intervention in the 
plantation labour market of Madras Presidency. 
* * * * * * * * * 
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From 1859 to 1903 the contractual relationship between 
planter and plantation labourer within Madras Presidency was 
subject to the provisions of the Workman's Breach of Contract Act 
(commonly known as Act XIII of 1859). Act XIII came to be applied 
• 
to plantation labour cases in Madras Presidency more by default 
than by design. The Act had been originally passed to satisfy the 
urgent demands of the Calcutta Trades Association 2 and had been 
drafted to protect employers in the Presidency towns from being 
defrauded of monetary advances they made to "Artificers, Workmen 
and Labourers" 3 as part of a contract to work. Where a workman 
failed to complete the tasks which he had been contracted to 
perform, the Act _provided that a magistrate could order the workman 
to complet~ the contracted work or refund the outstanding advance. 
Only when a workman failed to comply with the magistrate• s order 
could he be imprisoned 4 The enactment of penal legislation was 
considered necessary since the poverty of workmen effectively 
precluded employers from recovering damages for breach of contract 
offences through civil proceedings. As has been noted elsewhere, in 
2. R. K. Das, History of Indian Labour Legislation, 
op. cit., p 25. 
3. Workman's Breach of Contract Act, (Act XIII of 1859), in 
U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1894, p 121, Preamble. 
4. Ibid., Clause 2. 
97 
penal legislation of this kind "the fear of punishment", rather 
than financial loss, "operating on the mind of the servant, is 
given to the master" to act as a deterrent against misconduct 5 
In this fashion the Act granted planters a degree of formal contr~l 
over plantation labour which complemented the informal authority 
they already exerted over their employees through the maistri 
system of recruitment. At the request of the Madras government the 
operation of the Act was rapidly extended beyond Madras city to the 
mofussil. However, the Act in an unmodified form could not 
satisfactorily meet the different circumstances to which it was now 
applied. 
In southern India, dissatisfaction in planting circles with 
the operation of Act XIII arose soon after the Act's inception. In 
1865 planters from both the North and South Wynaad presented 
memorials to the Government of Madras in which they complained that 
the Act .could not be worked efficiently to recover advances, and 
that this made them subject to a heavy financial burden 6 • In the 
following year a spokesman for planting interests voiced concern in 
the Governor's Council in Madras at the lack of effective legal 
5. Comments of Chief Justice Marshall in a breach of 
contract case in Colombo, 1835, cited in Samaraweera, 
op. cit., p 142. 
6. Report of the South of India Planters' Enquiry Committee, 
op. cit., p 34. 
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dealing with absconding labour 7 
Planters claimed that their interests required that a new and 
separate act be framed to regulate contracts between themselves and 
their field labourers, and cited the Ceylon Labour Ordinance No .• 11 
of 1865 as an appropriate model 8 . It is noteworthy that under the 
1865 Ordinance planters in Ceylon continued to secure local rulings 
which compelled labourers convicted of desertion to return to their 
estates to complete contracts rather than to face imprisonment 9 
Additionally, both desertion and disobedience were treated as 
criminal rather than civil offences, all contracts were deemed 
monthly hirings, and contracts executed in south India had full 
legal standing, in Ceylon's courts. The legal and quasi-legal 
control which British planters in Ceylon could thereby wield over 
their workers was far greater than that accorded to planters in 
south India under Act XIII. In securing the specific performance of 
contracts after desertion had occurred, planters in Ceylon were 
also greatly advantaged by the geographic barriers which separated 
the immigrant Indian labourer from his homeland. In south India 
where the migrating labourer remained relatively close to his home 
7. Proceedings of the Council of the Governor of Fort st 
George, 3rd July, 1866, p 21. 
8. Ibid. 
9. Samaraweera, op. cit., pp 143-144. 
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village, permanent desertion of the plantation was more easily 
effected. 
In rejecting the planters • case the Governor of Madras, Sir 
William Denison, argued that planters had failed to show ahe 
necessity for fresh legislation in Madras Presidency. No instance 
had been presented to the Governor • s Council where desertion of 
labour had prevented planters from harvesting their crops, and 
enquiries made of district magistrates had led the government to 
conclude that there "was no emergent necessity for 
legislation" 10 • Denison also claimed that there was evidence 
that the planters treated their labourers well, and that this good 
treatment was an effective means of ensuring a steady labour 
supply 11 . However, as the government possessed no legal right to 
inspect plantations, Denison was reliant on the opinion of only one 
senior official for information on plantation conditions 12 
Although the Government of Madras was largely ignorant of the 
labour conditions prevailing on plantations within the Presidency, 
it was obvious that Denison would not entertain increasing 
government regulation of the plantation labour market so long as 
10. Proceedings of the Council of the Governor of Fort st 
George, 3rd July, 1866, p 19. 
11. Ibid., p 24. 
12. Ibid., p 20. 
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planters continued to draw profits without the aid of a more 
appropriate, and readily applicable labour law. 
Sounding a broader argument, Denison also claimed that the 
government's legislative role must be just to the whole community . 
• 
In Ceylon, where planting was the predominant enterprise, Denison 
believed that planting interests were well served by the 
government, even at the possible expense of the whole community. In 
Madras Presidency, where planters were a "subordinate" interest, 
similar legislation was regarded by the Governor as 
inappropriate 13 
The balance of interests which Denison believed should be 
incorporated in labour law was amply demonstrated in other 
legislation concurrently before the Madras legislature. Act V of 
1866 was drafted in response to the abuses enacted upon Madrasi 
labour recruited for the tea fields of North India by unscrupulous 
labour agents in the previous year 14 This legislation may be 
viewed simultaneously as an enactment to protect migrant labour, 
since it prohibited unlicensed recruiting for destinations outside 
the confines of Madras Presidency, and an enactment to facilitate 
colonial enterprise, since it permitted the mobilisation of a 
13. Ibid., p 22. 
14. Ibid., 16th Aug., 1866, p 31. 
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igrant work force under specific circumstances. In the debate 
hich followed the Select Committee's report on Act V, the Madras 
administration made clear that it was only prepared to regulate 
internal labour migration where labour travelled over long 
• 
distances, where labour was contracted for substantial periods of 
time, and where evidence of deception already existed 15 . On 
south Indian estates labour contracts were of relatively short 
duration, and unlike the tea regions of North India, southern 
plantation districts were bordered by densely populated regions in 
which estate labour should have been easily obtainable. As the 
Madras authorities knew of no case of mistreatment of south Indian 
plantation workers, the government declined to interfere in the 
gen~ral freeqom of contracting on labour's behalf. 
The Madras government's stance on labour legislation in 1866 
was consistent with its adherence to an economic policy of laissez 
faire moderated by judicious interference. As has been amply 
demonstrated by Sabyasachi Bhattacharya, the application of Western 
principles of economic liberalism in India was considerably 
modified by the belief that British entrepreneurial capital was 
essential for the development of Indian resources 16 As 
15. Ibid. 
16. Sabyasachi Bhattacharya, "Laissez Faire in India", 
Indian Economic and Social History Review, Vol.II, No.1, 
pp 2 22. 
a 
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result, the British administration in India took upon itself the 
responsibility of facilitating private enterprise through the 
provision of an adequate infrastructure of roads, railways, and 
irrigation projects 17 Similarly, the remodelling of some land 
• 
tenure provisions removed one disincentive to the investment of 
British capital 18 In the Nilgiri hills, as in the rest of 
British India, the execution of the Waste Land Rules in 1863 
predominantly benefitted foreign planters rather than native 
cultivators 19 • Planters in Nilgiri District derived additional 
economic benefit from the Madras government's deliberate policy of 
revising land revenue assessment in favour of an ailing plantation 
sector in 1871 and 1874 20 . However, there were limits to 
government intervention - the British administration in India was 
no doubt willing to assist merchants and planters but it was wary 
of adopting the entrepreneurial role itself. So too in the realm of 
labour law the Government of Madras preferred not to impinge upon 
the process of labour contracting so long as that policy permitted 
the British planter to take his profit, and so long as no public 
17. Ibid., pp 9-12, 14. 
18. Ibid., pp 7-9. 
19. Supra., pp 11-12. 
20. Supra., pp 12-13. 
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and large scale abuse of labour took place. 
It was a stance with which the Government of India conCurred. 
Just as the Madras Government had legislated in response to the 
maltreatment of migrant Madrasi plantation labour in 1866, so too 
• 
the Government of India enacted the first Inland Emigration Act 
governing the emigration of plantation workers to Assam in .1863 in 
response to the exposure of extraordinary death rates amongst 
transported 21 labourers . As a result, Bengal Act III of 1863 
provided that all recruiters should be licenced, that every 
intending emigrant should be medically examined and declared fit, 
and that his contract of service should be explained to him before 
a district magistrate 22 • These measures were clearly designed to 
protect the labourer against inhumane exploitation, and in drafting 
them the Government of India may well have been influenced by the 
tide of industrial legislation in Britain which had already 
instigated reform of working conditions in mines and factories to 
meet current humanitarian standards. However, it should not be 
forgotten that government regulation of the Assam plantation labour 
trade was also undertaken on behalf of the planter, and it 
established the legal guidelines within which the supply of tea 
21. Percival Griffiths, The History of the Indian Tea 
Industry, London, 1967, p 269. 
22. Ibid. 
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field workers might be facilitated. The balance of conunercial and 
humanitarian interests which the Government of India sought to 
strike in plantation labour law was lucidly illustrated in Bengal 
Act VI of 
Government 
necessary 
labourer" 23 
1865. In their statement of objects and reasons the 
• 
declared that their "interference appears to be 
in the interests of the employer as of the 
Protection was afforded to the labourer by the 
prescription of minimum wages, the limitation of working hours and 
the length of his contract, as well as by the establishment of 
estate hospitals. On the other hand, a labourer who persistently 
refused to work or absented himself for more than seven days could 
be imprisoned, and to facilitate the ready application of the Act, 
planters were also empowered to arrest absconding labourers without 
a warrant. These provisions attempted to protect the planter's 
profitability by ensuring the recruitment and retention of an 
industrious and healthy work force at minimum cost. 
In 1866 south Indian planters rejected outright the notion 
that labour law in British India should protect employer and 
employee alike. Planters bluntly declared that they were unwilling 
to accept legislation akin to Bengal Act VI of 1865 which they 
claimed imposed "onerous conditions" upon planters. Such conditions 
23. Statement of Objects and Reasons, Bengal Act VI, 1865, 
in Griffiths, op. cit., p 270. 
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were claimed to be particularly unwarranted where labour contracts 
were of shorter duration as in the Nilgiris and the Wynaad 24 . 
Planters were unwilling to accept regulation of their work 
practices as a result of the mistreatment of plantation labour \P a 
distant and distinctly separate region of British India. On the 
contrary, southern planters maintained a fundamental belief that it 
was the government's object and duty to foster colonial enterprise 
in India. This belief was evident in their attempt in 1866 to 
persuade the Government of Madras to enact a labour ordinance 
similar to that prevailing in ceylon on the grounds that such a law 
would promote the expansion of plantation agriculture within Madras 
Presidency 25 
_Despite the rapid expansion of British plantation agriculture 
in southern India from the mid-1870s, planting always remained a 
minor rural undertaking in comparison with other forms of 
agricultural production. Planting never lost the "subordinate" 
position accorded to it by Denison, but in their attempt to win 
legislative reform planters became increasingly unified and 
vociferous allowing them to wield a political influence far in 
excess of their actual numbers. The combination of low wages and 
24. Proceedings of the Council of the Governor of Fort St 
George, 3rd July, 1866, p 20. 
25. Ibid., p 21. 
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high advances in an increasingly tight labour market encouraged 
plantation labour to abscond and this ensured financial losses, 
both through the cost to production of an irregular labour supply 
and through unrecovered advances. The failure to establish an 
' . 
adequate and regular work force on south Indian plantations was 
instrumental in the planters' drive to win more comprehensive legal 
control over labour, as it had been for their counterparts in 
Ceylon during the heyday of coffee cultivation 26 
In the years following the great famine of 1876 south Indian 
planters stepped up their campaign to secure greater legal control 
over labour. The shortage of plantation labour which the famine had 
27 
exacerbated and the fear that future labour supplies might 
contract further, motivated planters to intensify their efforts. 
From 1876 memorials presented by the Wynaad Planters • Association 
to the Madras Government increasingly emphasised the unstable 
nature of the plantation labour supply. In 1876 the Secretary of 
the Wynaad Plant~rs' Association, in addressing Madrasi officials, 
indicated that the news that good rains had fallen in the home 
districts of estate labourers would be sufficient inducement to 
26. Samaraweera, op. cit., p 125. 
27. Supra., pp 32-33. 
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desertion of the plantation at harvest time 28 • similarly in 1878 
the same Association urgently requested that government modify Act 
XIII before "the returning prosperity of the neighbouring 
districts, make it optional with our labourers to evade, or carry 
• 
out, any contract they may have made for working on the 
estates" 29 • As a result, planters now concerned themselves more 
with winning a means of compelling labourers to complete the 
contracted work than with recovering lost advances. 
There is no doubt that planters and maistris who were 
chronically short of labour preferred magistrates to impose an 
order that the contract be performed rather than that the advance 
be repaid. Under Act XIII a magistrate, in sentencing a ·convicted 
workman, ~aS required to refer to the wishes of the 
complainant 30 • In the Nilgiri courts in 1664 it was the usual 
practice for magistrates in sentencing a defaulting labourer to 
consult with the maistri who had instituted the case. As maistris 
commonly indicated that they did not desire repayment of the 
28. I.O.L.R., Madras Judicial Proceedings, 1876, No.26, 
w. V. Huddleston, Secretary, Wynaad Planters' 
Association to Chief Secretary to Government, 6th March, 
1876. 
29. Ibid., 1879, No.98, H. B. Winterbottom, Secretary, 
Wynaad Planters' Association to Chief Secretary to 
Government, 14th June, 1878. 
30. Workman's Breach of Contract Act (Act XIII of 1659), 
op. cit., Clause 2. 
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outstanding advance, an order to complete the contracted work was 
frequently made 31 . The return of the labourer to the plantation 
benefitted maistri and planter alike: the maistri continued to draw 
a proportion of the labourer's wage in the form of a commiss~on 
while the planter retained the defaulting labourer as a member of 
his work force. Additionally, an order to specifically perform the 
contract effectively embraced an order to repay the advance since 
any outstanding debt could be recovered from future wages. 
However, an order to work was easily and frequently evaded. 
There is no evidence to indicate that a convicted offender was 
handed over to the successful complainant at the c~nclusion of a 
case, and for many labourers the home village could be reached 
within a few days. A second desertion might be effected as easily 
as the- first and the planter's only recourse was to repeat the 
legal process by which he had originally brought the labourer to 
trial. The outcome of the labourer • s second trial could only be 
less than satisfactory for the planter since the penalty for 
failing to comply with the court's original work order was either 
repayment of the advance or imprisonment. At this stage the Act 
made no provision for reordering the defendant to complete the 
contract. 
31. I.O.L.R., Madras Judicial Proceedings, 1884, 
Nos. 1911 1912, Report of the Acting Head Magistrate of 
N~lgiri District, Mr F. A. Wedderburn, 9th April, 1884. 
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This whole legal process was considered by planters to be 
highly inefficient and ineffective. In 1876 Wynaad planters 
described the issuing of a summons for the arrest of a labourer as 
little more than "a hint to the coaly to abscond" 32 , and claimed 
• 
tha~ only one quarter of the total number of warrants issued in the 
area resulted in convictions 33 . It is highly probable that low 
conviction rates continued to characterise cases instituted under 
Act XIII for in the 1890s less than 30% of those tried for breach 
of contract offences in Nilgiri District courts were 
sentenced 34 . It is quite clear that in practice an order for the 
specific performance of a contract could neither be readily 
obtained nor readily enforced under Act XIII. The importance which 
planters attached to the completion of contracted work can be 
gauged by their failure to exploit an alternative avenue of legal 
redress which was open to them. Under Section 492 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code planters could prosecute defaulting workmen, but as 
the Code did not allow for an order of specific performance to be 
32. Ibid., 1876, No.26, W. V. Huddleston, Secretary, Wynaad 
Planters• Association to Chief Secretary to Government, 
6th March, 1876. 
33. Ibid. 
34. I.O.L.R., Public and Judicial Department, 
Annual Departmental Papers, 1897, No.637, p 92. 
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made, it was very rarely resorted to 35 . 
The increased importance which planters now accorded to 
' winning enhanced legal control over plantation labour is evident in 
their willingness to act as a united body and 
proposals for reform whiCh they presented 
in the detailed 
• 
to the Madras 
administration. The development of the planting enterpri~e had 
given rise to regional planting as_sociations in the 1860s and 
1870s, chiefly in Mysore, Malabar and the Wynaad. Although these 
associations had no governing mother body, by 1877 rising concern 
over the application of Act XIII to plantation labour cases 
motivated planters to organize a planters' conference at Manantoddy 
which attracted- ·delegates from the various planting regions. As a 
result of that gathering, planters memorialised the Madras 
government to reform Act XIII by increasing the scale of 
punishments, by appointing honorary magistrates and increasing the 
powers of existing magistrates, by recognizing second offences as 
more heinous and therefore liable to.more severe punishment, and by 
presuming that a person who had committed a breach of contract 
either to supply other labourers or to personally undertake work 
had prima facie done so willingly 36 The memorial represented a 
35. Report of the South of India Planters' Enquiry 
Committee, op. cit., p 57. 
36. I.O.L.R., Madras Judicial Proceedings, 1879, No.l583, 
G. L. Yonge, Secretary, Wynaad Planters' Association to 
Chief Secretary to Government, 29th June, 1879. 
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new approach by planters to the issue of reforming Act XIII: rather 
than simply requesting reform they now specifically directed 
government on the measures which they, as a united body, believed 
it should take. 
• 
In addition to the modification of Act XIII, planters also 
sought government assistance in instituting legal coritrol over 
labour prior· to its arrival on the plantation. In July, 1877 the 
Secretary of the Wynaad Planters• Association requested government 
to consider a system of compulsory registration of all maistris, 
who recruited labour for plantations, and of all contracts for 
plantation work. The Association envisaged the establishment of a 
network of registration offices manned by honorary magistrates 
throughout Mysore and 37 Malabar , where the majority of estate 
labour originated. The planters' scheme was aimed at ensuring that 
labour contracted in the villages under the advance system was 
delivered to the plantation. However, the Government of Madras had 
yet to be convinced that the circumstances of the planting industry 
now warranted official interference. 
In appealing to the Madras government for additional 
legislative protection, planters in southern India highlighted the 
37. Ibid., 1879, No.98, G. L. Yonge, Secretary, Wynaad 
Planters' Association to Collector of Malabar, 13th 
Dec., 1878. 
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financial contribution made by planting to the economy of Madras 
Presidency, and emphasised the threat which defaulting labour now 
posed to the industry's prosperity. Planters portrayed their 
development of unproductive tracts of land and their investment of 
• 
large capital sums as ultimately providing a means of livlihood for 
masses of Indian labour 38 • Similarly, planters drew atten~ion to 
the contributions they made to the government treasury, not only 
through export earnings but also through the payment of land 
revenue taxes on land which, prior to their occupation, had yielded 
little or no tax 39. The capacity of the industry to pay was 
dependent upon its profitability. Planters now claimed that the 
economic viability of the industry was being undermined by the 
state of the law which permitted a planter to be "deserted by his 
coolies at the time of year when he most requires their 
services" 40 • 
Planters clearly believed in the government'~ continuing 
responsibility to support those colonial enterprises which had 
originally taken root with its encouragement. They argued that the 
38. Ibid., 1876, No. 26, W. V. Huddleston, Secretary, Wynaad 
Planters' Association to Chief Secretary to Government, 
6th March, 1876. 
39. Ibid. 
40. Ibid., 1877, No.1692, W.Logan, Collector of Malabar, to 
Chief Secretary to Government, 12th Oct., 1876. 
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development of plantations in southern India had been "fostered all 
these years by the Government of Madras" 41 , and it was now 
incumbent upon that administration to protect the industry's 
interests by framing a labour law which would complement ~e 
economic incentives they had already received. In presenting their 
case to government, planters solicited the support of the DiStrict 
Collector of Malabar, William Logan. Between 1876 and 1878 
correspondence directed at Madras by the planters was invariably 
accompanied by letters from the District Collector. There can be no 
doubt that planters felt that the weight of local official opinion 
strengthened their case, especially as Logan possessed an expert 
knowledge of his district and the impact of British rule upon 
•t 42 J. • In 1876 Logan bluntly informed the Madras authorities 
that; 
"it must never be forgotten that it has been the policy of 
Government throughout to encourage this industry in a 
locality where one of the most essential elements of success 
is wanting, viz. a permanent and sufficient supply of labour 
41. Ibid., 1881, No.89, Secretary, Wynaad Planters' 
Association to Chief Secretary to Government, Madras, 
19th Feb., 1881. 
42. Following his term as Collector of Malabar, William 
Logan was variously appointed a fellow of the University 
of Madras in 1881, an Acting Member of the Madras Board 
of Revenue and special CommisSioner to the Malabar Land 
Tenures Enquiry in 1882, and Acting Resident of 
Travancore and Cochin in 1883. His published works 
included an historical treatise on British affairs in 
Malabar and a District Manual of the area in 1887. 
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it behoves the Government to come to the assistance of 
those who would not but for such encouragemeft have embarked 
their capital in such a doubtful enterprise" . 
In Logan • s view the government was morally bound to relieve a 
situation which its previous policies had engendered. Howev~, 
Logan's idea of the proper course of legislative reform ran 
somewhat differently from that of the planting community. Although 
Logan supported many of the planters' proposals to enhance the 
provisions of Act XIII he also advised the authorities in Madras 
that the government should take upon itself the power to inspect 
plantation conditions, particularly those relating to health and 
sanitation 44 • Logan conceived that judicial equity in plantation 
labour law could be achieved by balancing the additional legal 
rights afforded to planters, with legal protection of labour's 
working conditions. Neither the Government of Madras nor the 
Government of India would have objected to the underlying principle 
of Logan's argument for both had already enacted legislation 
consistent with it. 
Initially the Madras administration's response to the 
planters • persistent solicitations was unfavourable. The Governor 
43. I.O.L.R., Madras Judicial Proceedings, 1877, No.1692, 
w. Logan, Collector of Malabar, to Chief Secretary to 
Government, 12th Oct., 1876. 
44. Ibid. 
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of Madras, Lord Hobart, responded to a memorial from the Wynaad 
Planters' Association in 1875 by acknowledging the planters' 
complaints, but also reasoned that where a defaulter was imprisoned 
the advance was not lost as planters had claimed. Hobart noted that 
• 
under Act XIII the planters retained their recourse to civil 
proceedings whereby the money might be recovered 45 Although 
Hobart • s argument denied the reality of the planter • s situation-
maistris and labourers usually had little property from which the 
advance could be recovered, and civil proceedings were notoriously 
slow and inefficient- it demonstrated that the Governor was not 
convinced that the threat to the planting industry was severe 
enough to warrant government intervention. 
By 1877 the Madras government appeared to be more sympathetic 
to the planter • s cause. As plantation agriculture had expanded, 
planters' difficulties in securing labour had multiplied and 
problems encountered in the application of Act XIII to estate 
labour cases became more widespread. These facts combined with the 
greater efforts that planters now expended in drawing the 
governments' attention to their difficulties led the Madras 
authorities to reassess their earlier opinions. Whereas previously 
they had considered legislation unnecessary because planting had 
45. Ibid., 1877, No.l692, G.O. No.35, 7th Jan., 1875. 
continued to expand notwithstanding the labour problem 46 
now concluded that; 
"the planting industry in the Wynaad is suffering from 
a substantial grievance a.. The season for gathering 
the crops is at a critical moment, and the planters are 
liable to ~7avy loss for which an adequate remedy is 
difficult" 
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• 
Clearly it was the prospect of the industry's declining 
profitability which persuaded the government now to declare itself 
"disposed to give the planters all the assistance in their power, 
consistent with adequate protection to the employes (sic)", and 
consistent with the principles of law in British India 48 . The 
government then proc'eeded to refer the planters' specific proposals 
arising from the Manantoddy Conference to the Advocate-General to 
ascertain whether these were open to objection 49 
That planters were aware of the principles underlying recent 
labour law in British India is evident in their memorial of 1877. 
Planters prefaced their appeal by indicating that they were 
"inclined to agree" that the Ceylon Labour Ordinance of 1865 "would 
be inappropriate and would really imply a revolution of the 
46. Ibid., 1877, No.1692, G. 0. No.1692, 19th July, 1877. 
47. Ibid. 
48. Ibid. 
49. Ibid. 
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principles which had hitherto been embodied in the legislation _of 
India" 50 Despite these comments it was plainly evident that 
planters had taken little cognizance of the labour laws enacted in 
northern India, or of the opinions of William Logan. Both !J¥d 
sought legal protection for the labourer as well as the planter. In 
contrast, southern planters had campaigned for measures which were 
decidedly one-sided, and were based on principles unacceptable to 
both Madras and calcutta. 
The Advocate-General's assessment crushed the planters' hopes 
of wringing reform from the administration in Madras. It was the 
Advocate-General's opinion that the current labour law was "as 
stringent as it 'ought to be" 51 , and planters were advised that 
it was beyond the province of the Madras Government to extend the 
law in the manner in which planters had requested 52 . While 
planters were advised that they were free to approach the 
Government of India in this matter, the Government of Madras 
declined to do so on their behalf 53 
50. Ibid., 1877, No.1692, E. Thompson, Secretary, Wynaad 
Planters' Association to Chief Secretary to Government, 
24th Sept., 1876. 
51. Ibid., 1879, No.98, G.O. No.98, 18th Jan.,1879. 
52. Ibid. 
53. Ibid. 
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The Madras authorities took a similarly dim view of the 
planters' request for compulsory registration of maistris and 
contracts. The government primarily rejected the scheme because it 
was "an interference with the law of contracts and the gene.,al 
freedom of contracting" 54 Furthermore, the government informed 
planters that such a measure was .likely to increase planters' 
difficulties as the number of available labour contractors would 
diminish, rather than increase, were registration required 55 • on 
this issue the Madras Government held distinctly to a policy of 
laissez-faire, partly because they believed it would be more 
effective in mobilising labour. Planters disagreed, and in this 
matter as well decided to approach the Government of India in the 
hope that it would override decisions made in Madras. 
In their memorial to the Government of India planters made 
clear that their intention was to win legislation which would 
tighten their hold over estate labourers and maistris. Planters 
compared the current application of Act XIII to plantation labour 
cases with the operation of labour laws in other British colonies, 
such as Ceylon and Mauritius, which imported India labour. They 
concluded that in south India not only were labour laws less 
54. Ibid., 1879, No.1372, Government Order No.1372, 11th 
June, 1879. 
55. Ibid. 
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stringent, but the ease with which labour could abscond 
necessitated a degree of legal control over labour at least equal 
to that existing abroad 56 Among the more important provisions 
proposed by planters were that where an advance had been lost •the 
onus should fall on the maistri to prove his honest intention, that 
labourers who were already under advance who were found working on 
a second estate should be presumed to have acted dishonestly and be 
liable to prosecution, and that breach of contract where no advance 
was paid be punished similarly to instances where an advance had 
been paid. Most Dmportantly, planters requested that where a 
labourer or maistri was sentenced to prison for breach of contract, 
he should also be required to repay the advance or complete the 
work at the expiration of his term 57 Planters clearly desired 
more than the recovery of lost advances;" as labour became 
increasingly scarce their foremost concern became the retention of 
labour on the 'plantation, even when that labour had already been 
judged as dishonest. 
For the first tlme planters indicated that in return for 
extended legal control over labour they would be willing to accept 
56. Ibid., 1879, No.15B3, G. L. Yonge, Secretary, Wynaad 
Planters' Association to Acting Chief Secretary to 
Government, 29th June, 1879. 
57. Ibid. 
that they too might be made "Subject to criminal 
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punishment 58 
However, this did not imply any elevation in status for the 
labourer who traded employment with a village landlord for a 
contract to labour on a plantation. Planters indicated that• any 
punishment for which they themselves might be made liable needed to 
be less severe than that which could be accorded to their 
employees. In the planters• eyes the two contracting parties could 
"hardly be considered on the same level" 59 Unlike the early 
contracts which pioneering planters had made with local labour for 
piece work, contracts with migrating labour for seasonal positions 
as field workers never denoted any notion of equality between 
employer and employee. This was in part due to the operation of Act 
/ 
XIII, and planters had no intention of abandoning the upper hand. 
The Government of India's reply to the south Indian planters' 
memorial bluntly denied proposals to alter Act XIII. Its reasons 
for doing so were legal rather than social. The notion that someone 
convicted for breach of contract should be required at the end of 
his prison sentence to either repay the advance or complete his 
contract was rejected as involving double punishment for the same 
58. Ibid. 
59. Ibid. 
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offence GO a Neither would the Government of India entertain the 
proposal that a person breaching a contract be presumed to have 
done so willingly as this contradicted the Evidence Act and was 
said to fetter "the discretion now allowed by Law • to 
Magistrates" 61 The remainder of the planters' proposals were 
rejected either because they contradicted existing legislation or 
were the province of the Madras authorities whose previous 
decisions the Viceroy was not prepared to question 62 
Although Act XIII never proved a consistently effective means 
of controlling labour or recovering advances, it must be noted that 
on occassion the Act was rigidly enforced·. In its unamended form, 
the Act therefore periodically assisted planters in retaining 
labour on their estates. When a maistri who had been contracted to 
provide labour failed to appear on an estate the usual procedure 
was for the planter to obtain a warrant for his arrest from an 
honorary magistrate and bring the maistri to trial. When the 
maistri was ordered by the court to complete the contract he then 
secured warrants with bail for the arrest of his labourers. These 
60. Ibid., 1879, No.3193, c. Bernard, Officiating Secretary 
to the Government of India (Home, Revenue and 
Agriculture), to Acting Chief Secretary to Government, 
21st Nov., 1879. 
61. Ibid. 
62. Ibid. 
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workers were then brought from their home districts to face trial 
in the Wynaad or Nilgiris. The usual outcome of that trial was that 
the labourer was ordered to work, especially as the rnaistri rarely 
asked that his advance be 63 returned . It was in the maistni..' s 
financial interests to retain the labourer since at the end of the 
season the maistri would have recovered the original advance and 
have received a conunission equal to one tenth of the labourer's 
wages. In the opinion of the Acting Head Magistrate of Nilgiri 
District in 1884, F. A. Wedderburn, the Act was a powerful 
instrument in the hands of the maistri who was thereby enabled to 
force the labourer to travel to the planting districts 64 . In one 
extreme case noted by Wedderburn the Act was used to bring a 
defaulting coolie some five hundred miles from Anantapur to the 
Wynaad at the height of the monsoon 65 
Once the labourer had been brought to the hills he stood 
little chance of being acquitted. Removed from his home, the 
labourer, illiterate and very probable possessing at best a 
rudimentary understanding of the law, could produce neither written 
63. Ibid., 1884, Nos.1911-1912, Report of the Acting Head 
Magistrate of Nilgiri District, Mr F. A. Wedderburn, 9th 
April, 1884. 
64. Ibid. 
65. Ibid. 
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evidence nor witnesses from his village to support his case. In 
Wedderburn's experience, 
"the trial of the coolie was a farce. If the advance 
was said to have been given in the coaly's country his 
witnesses were there and could not be produced without. 
delay ..• nor would verbal evidence that an advance was 
given or not two or three years ago be of any value, 
still less whether 6geveral years ago the coaly was 
really sick or not" • 
Although the process by which the labourer was brought to trial was 
fraught with the difficulties of obtaining and executing warrants, 
the operation of Act XIII advantaged the planter at the labourer's 
expense. 
The disadvantages which the labourer suffered in a courtroom 
conflict with his new landlord or the landlord's agent may well 
have represented a continuation of his experiences with the British 
judicial system in his home village. Hjejle reports that the 
repressive measures enacted by Indian landlords upon their 
depressed class tenants often involved "direct exploitation of the 
intricacies of the British judicial system" 67 Just as village 
landlords were able to bring false cases against agricultural 
68 
workers , so too maistris were able to make witnesses 
materialise to support their claims that labourers, who denied 
66. Ibid. 
67. Hjejle, op. cit., p 116. 
68. Ibid., p 115. 
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taking advances, had actually done so 69 The fact that workers# 
trials took place near the plantation and not at the place where 
their contract had been entered into clearly worked in favour of 
the maistri and the planter. Similarly, the ignorance of labo~ers, 
their illiteracy, and their low socio-economic station, which all 
contributed to their victimization in the village, continued to 
prejudice their chances of obtaining justice under Act XIII in the 
hills. 
Although Act XIII remained unamended, the application of the 
Act to cases of absconding plantation labour was affected by 
rulings made by the Madras High Court in the 1880s. In January, 
1880 and again in 1883, the court ruled that the advance given by 
the maistri to the labourer was not an- advance against work to be 
done, but an interest free loan made to induce the labourer to 
enter into a contract to labour 70 Similarly in 1884 the Court 
ruled that if a workman took an advance in Mysore but failed to 
journey into British India to fulfil his contract, a warrant to try 
69. I.O.L.R., Madras Judicial Proceedings, 1884, 
Nos.1911-1912, Report of Mr F. A. Wedderburn, Acting 
Head Assistant Magistrate for Nilgiri District, 9th 
April, 1884. 
70. Ruling No.39, 9th Jan., 1880, in I.o.L.R., Madras 
Judicial Proceedings, 1884, Nos.1911-1912, Report of 
F. A. Wedderburn, Acting Head Magistrate of Nilgiri 
District, 9th April, 1884. 
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him in British India was illegal 71 These decisions severely 
curtailed the power of a maistri to bring defaulting labourers into 
the planting districts through the use of Act XIII. In Nilgiri 
courts maietris were instructed that their recourse agai..nst 
defaulting coolies now lay only in civil proceedings as Act XIII 
could no longer be applied to their cases 72 • Although the 
planter retained his right to criminally proceed against a maistri 
for breach of contract offences, the High Court's interpretation of 
Act XIII added to planters• difficulties in retaining a steady work 
force on the estates. 
There can be little doubt that planters felt the results of 
these decisions acutely. In February, 1884, G. L. Yonge, the former 
Secretary to the Wynaad Planters• Association and Resident Manager 
for Ouchterlony Trustees, the most extensive landholder in the 
Ouchterlony Valley, complained to the Madras government that the 
law was now "a dead letter" 73 • Yonge estimated that the extent 
of his outstanding advances stood at one lakh of rupees, but failed 
to state whether this figure included old debts which were long 
71. Ibid. 
72. Ibid., 1884, No.676, Letter from G. L. Yonge, Resident 
Manager, Ouchterlony Valley, to Chief Secretary to 
Government, 18th Feb., 1884. 
73. Ibid. 
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past being recoverable 74 • If the advances had all been current, 
then this would have represented an average debt of Rs 25 for each 
of Yonge's 4,000 employees, who would (given the location of the 
estate) have largely been drawn from Myso~e. Clearly, the.High 
Court's decisions adversely affected Yonge•s ability to recover 
outstanding advances, and Yonge responded by making a personal plea 
that Act XIII be amended to bring contracts between maistris and 
labour within its scope 75 • The Government of Madras reacted by 
soliciting responses to Yonge's request from the Advocate-General, 
judges of the Madras High COurt and all District Magistrates within 
the Presidency. 
Replies. obtained from government officials revealed much 
opposition to Yonge's request. Local officials largely condemned 
any move to widen the scope of the Act. A. G. Cardew, the Assistant 
Magistrate of Nilgiri District, praised the recent rulings of the 
High Court because they now prevented the Act from being "used for 
a purpose for which it was not intended and to which it should 
never have been applied" 76 In Cardew• s opinion the object of 
74. Ibid. 
75. Ibid. 
76. Ibid., 1884, Nos.19ll-l912, Report of the Assistant 
Magistrate, Mr A. G. Cardew. 
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the Act had never been to allow "a coolie who has received an 
advance of two rupees in Mysore (to) be dragged some hundreds 
of miles and forced to work for a year on a coffee 
estate" 77 • Cardew praised the recent rulings of the Madras .High 
Court for having reduced "the abuses which have characterised the 
application of the Act in this district" 78 . F. A. Wedderburn, 
Head Assistant Magistrate, pointed out to Madras officials that not 
all local planters agreed with Yonge•s standpoint. Wedderburn cited 
one planter in whose opinion the past operation of the Act was "a 
blot on our legislature ••• (which) works as an instrument of 
torture and oppression to a large class who cannot speak for 
themselves" 79 . It was an opinion with whi"h Wedderburn heartily 
concurred, and which was later to earn him the enduring acrimony of 
the planting community 80 
Other officials identified the advance system, rather than 
the operation of Act XIII, as the seminal cause of the planters• 
difficulties. L. R. Burrows, Acting District Magistrate of Nilgiri 
77. JBig., 1884, Nos.1911-1912, Report of the Acting 
District Magistrate of the Nilgiris, Mr L. R. Burrows, 
to Chief secretary to Government, 20th June, 1884. 
78. JBig. 
79. Ibid. 
80. U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1894, p 74. 
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District, expressed the view that the advance system ought to be 
actively discouraged by government, and as Yonge' s suggested 
amendments would only revitalise the system of advances, he was not 
prepared to support them 81. In Tanjore District the Jeint 
Magistrate described advances as "an ensnaring system" and every 
step in legislation which encouraged them as "a mistake" 82 
Tanjore District was then a great labour catchment region and 
although it was virtually untapped by planters from the Nilgiri 
hills, it provided large numbers of labourers for Ceylon planters 
who also recruited on the advance system. According to the Joint 
Magistrate, if the Act were abolished "advances would soon die out, 
and a better ~system would be introduced in which the pay of 
labourers would be a sufficient inducement to labour" 83 • 
Legalistic opinions solicited by government from members of 
the Madras judiciary accorded strongly with the views of local 
district officials. Although the judges of the Madras High Court 
recognized the planters' difficulties, they argued that these 
problems could not be cured by legislation. Justice Brandt 
81. Ibid. 
82. I.O.L.R., Madras Judicial Proceedings, 1884, 
Nos.1911-1912, District Magistrate of Tanjore to Chief 
Secretary to Government, 9th May, 1884. 
83. Ibid. 
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recognized that the relationship between planter and labourer was 
dependent, 
"to a very great extent on the state of supply and 
demand in the labour market, . . . . owing to a great 
demand for labour in Mysore, the planters feel the 
difficulty acutely; and they not unnaturally ascribe no 
small porti"B'4 of the blame to the labor-law (sic) and the courts" . 
• 
In assessing the effects of the application of Act XIII to 
plantation labour cases Brandt countered Yonge's plea by concluding 
that the Act in its current form "may be worked very hardly against 
the coaly, and that the devices for bringing cases against 
labourers are very ingenious and not easy .to frustrate" 85 • The 
Chief Justice of the High Court, Sir Charles Turner, concurred and 
pointed out th~t the solution to the planters' problem lay in their 
inducing labour by the offer of higher wages 86 Turner noted 
that the amendments suggested by Yonge were inconsistent with 
recent legislation in India which had abolished imprisonment "of 
any kind for the enforcement of contracts or civil wrongs resulting 
in debts or measured in damages" 87 and bluntly opined that if 
84. Ibid., 1884, Nos.l911-1912, J. A. Davies, Acting 
Registrar, Appellate Side, High Court, Madras, to Chief 
Secretary to Government, 21st May, 1884. 
85. Ibid. 
86. Ibid. 
87. Ibid. 
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Yonge's suggestions were adopted they would "accord the sanction of 
the law to a qualified form of slavery" 88 Turner was 
particularly aware that he was corrunenting upon ·the application of 
British law in an Indian environment. He considered, 
"such legislation especially undesirable in this 
country, where ignorance of the language on the part of 
the master often leads to seeming disobedience on the. 
part of the servant; where a dominant race of masters 
is from its circumstances encouraged to exercise 
arbitrary power over servants, where the servant can 
expect but little protection from the effecta9'f public 
opinion in controlling his master's conduct" • 
• 
Turner understood that in India, cultural differences and British 
racial prejudice enfeebled the labourer in relation to the planter, 
and for this reason Turner was probably more sympathetic to the 
legal position of" the Indian labourer than he might have been to 
the legal standing of servants in contemporary British law. 
Moreover, Turner's own personal assessment of planters as 
originating "among the lower grades of society" may well have 
prejudiced him against their cause. According to Turner, the lower 
orders were ill fitted to the role of the master because they had 
"not been accustomed from their youth to fulfil the duties entailed 
by that 1 . h" 90 re at~ons ~p" 
88. Ibid. 
89. Ibid. 
90. Ibid. 
As a result of the official opinions 
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which the Government of Madras collected in 1884, Yonge's 
suggestions for amending Act XIII were rejected. 
Despite almost twenty years of unsuccessful campaigning south 
Indian planters persisted in their drive to have the provisiogs of 
Act XIII altered. The continued expansion of tea planting 
constantly exacerbated the labour shortage and absconding labour 
became an increasingly acute and widespread problem. These 
developments encouraged planters not only to act in a more unified 
fashion, but to view an amended Act XIII as an essential tool in 
ensuring retention of the plantation labour force. 
By 1892 some semblance of unity among planters was evident in 
the memorial which they addressed to the Viceroy in that year. 
Seven separate planting associations in south India indicated their 
solidarity of purpose by being signatories to the memorial. 
Planters from the Nilgiri hills and the wynaad were represented by 
the Kotagherry Planters' 
Association 91 respectively • 
Association 
At about the 
and Wynaad Planters' 
same time an attempt 
was made to found a new association of planters at Coonoor 92 . 
Whereas in 1877 the planters' desire to combine in an association 
in order to control wage rates for labour had eventually proved an 
91. U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1893, Appendix, p 74. 
92. South of India Observer, 8th Oct., 1892, p 10. 
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insufficient inducement to a long-lasting . . 93 assocl.atl.on , in 1892 
the general support for reform of the Breach of Contract Act 
allowed for the permanent establishment of the Nilgiri Planters' 
Association 94 • Its location at Coonoor reflected the gradUIBlly 
shifting centre of plantation agriculture to the south eastern 
regions of Nilgiri District. 
The 1892 memorial provided the most clear cut evidence to 
date that the planters had come to regard Act XIII as an adjunct to 
their labour drive rather than as a measure to assist in the 
recovery of advances. Planters stated that it was "the universal 
object and practice of Planters" in dealing with labour contractors 
and through t~em with the labourers, to "avoid punishment if by any 
possibility they can get the contract for labour fulfilled" 95 
That the planters• chief object was to use Act XIII to assist in 
the fulfillment of labour contracts was also apparent in their 
paramount objection to the way in which the Act was interpreted and 
applied in the Wynaad. There local magistrates refused to issue 
warrants against defaulting maistris after the expiry date of a 
93. Ibid., p 9. 
Ibid., 1877, lOth Oct., p 2; 24th Oct., p 5; 
7th Nov., p 4. 
94. Ibid., 8th Oct., 1892, p 10; 
95. U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceeding, 1893, Appendix entitled 
"Memorial of the Planters' Associations of Southern 
India on the Subject of Act XIII of 1859", Clause 3. 
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contract if the work specified in the contract had been completed 
by other 96 labourers This state of affairs was 
unsatisfactory to planters suffering severe labour shortages. 
highly 
The reforms suggested by planters in 1892 were primirily 
aimed at converting the Act into an effective mechanism for 
retaining estate labour. Planters proposed that the Act be modified 
so that where a breach of contract was committed, the defaulter 
would be liable both to the punishment provided and to complete the 
work even after the expiry of the contract 97 • Planters cast this 
amendment as beneficial to labourers and maistris, rather than as 
being in their own interests. Planters argued that it was "unfair 
to the coaly _that if on arrest after the expiry of the term of his 
contract he is willing to work and the planter to accept his 
service, 98 the Court cannot pass an order to that effect" In a 
similar fashion, planters posed as defenders of the maistri's 
interests since a contractor whose labour absconded was not 
legal redress after the expiry date of the entitled to 
contract 99 In the planters• account the Courts and the Act 
96. !Qig., Clause 2. 
97. Ibid., Clause 4, part II. 
98. Ibid. 
99. Ibid., Clause 5. 
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prevented a just solution from being reached. However, while 
planters cast their amendment as being beneficial to all parties 
concerned, in legal terms it would have made the labourer forever 
liable for the breach of contract offence. Furthermore, it .. auld 
allow a defaulting labourer to be punished doubly for a single 
offence. Clearly, planters desired that the Breach of Contract Act 
be converted into a fully fledged act of criminal law, where expiry 
of the term of contract would no longer protect the labourer by 
effecting, in practice, a statute of limitations. The planters• 
desire to mould the Act into a practical mechanism whereby the 
strength of a plantation labour force might be more readily 
preserved, could only be won by eroding the scant legal protection 
accorded to labour in the existing enactment. 
Planters also sought to modify the Act by bringing the 
loosest of contractual arrangements within its scope. Planters 
proposed that where labourers had their names entered in the check 
roll of an estate, and where they had received an advance, even in 
the form of a cumbly (blanket), they should be deemed to have 
entered into a contract. The minimum term of the contract was one 
month, and was to be renewable on a monthly basis 100 
Planters attempted to persuade the Government of India that 
100. Ibid., Clause 4, Part III. 
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their proposed amendments were consistent with the body of British 
Indian law. They reproduced the opinions of William Logan who in 
1876 had argued that, 
"the law of India has hitherto recognized the necessit~ of 
criminally punishing breaches of contract, first, where the 
master is more or less at the mercy of his servant, and 
second, where a breach of contract by the servant leaves the 
master without adequate compensation for the wrong suffered. 
Both of these sets of circumstances apply with peculiar. force 
to the case of a coffee planter in the Wynaad, who is 
deserted by his coolies lOI the time of year when he most 
requires their services" . 
Plainly planters did not recognize the considerable developments 
which had taken place in regard to penal punishment for breach of 
civil contract in the intervening period. The law of master and 
servant, which had .been under consideration by the Government of 
India in the, late 1870s, had eventually been allowed to languish 
because the stringent penal clauses were considered open to 
objection 102 In North Indian tea districts, the repeal of all 
exceptional legislation permitting penal punishment for breach of 
civil contract had been considered since 1882 103 • Where the 
flow of migrant labour to colonial enterprise already appeared to 
101. Ibid., Clause 1. 
102. Francis Du Pre Oldfield, "Law Reform", in H. H. Dodwell 
(Ed.), The Cambridge History of India, The Indian 
Empire, 1858-1918, Vol.VI, Cambridge, 1932, p 386. 
103. Revenue and Agriculture Department, <Emigration), 
Letter No.77, Viceroy Lansdowne to Secretary of State, 
Cross, 5th Oct., 1891, Para. 2, Reprinted in 
U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1893, pp 76-103. 
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be assured the Government of India had eliminated laws permitting 
penal contract of labour. For this reason the Burma Labour Law was 
repealed in 1883, and in 1888 Bengal Act I of 1882 was withdrawn 
from Chittagong and the Hill Tracts districts 104 of Bengal • • By 
1891 the Government of India could confidently declare that its 
eventual object was the abandonment of all special legislation 
governing emigration to Assam, so that labour would be subject only 
to the provisions of civil contracts 105 • 
Not surprisingly, the Government of India was not inclined to 
lend the south Indian planters' memorial a sympathetic hearing in 
1892. Moreover, the central administration's recent report to the 
Home government on the operation of Act XIII and other labour laws 
in the tea districts of northern India prejudiced the southern 
planters' chances of winning amendments to the law. The Viceroy, 
Lord Lansdowne, described the wording of the 1859 Act as so vague 
as to allow the law to be worked "in a manner harsh and inequitable 
to the labourer" 106 , and the Act's provisions as "objectionable 
in theory and opposed to the spirit of modern legislation in 
104. Ibid., Para. 24. 
105. Ibid. 
106. Ibid., Para. 8. 
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England" 107 In Assam the application of Act XIII to cases of 
absconding labour was defended by the Government of India only 
because its use was confined to healthy gardens where death rates 
were low, wages high and. the rate of judicial punishments less ~an 
four cases per ten thousand workers 108• The Government of India 
clearly preferred Act I of 1882 which bound the employer as· well as 
the labourer, and provided for government supervision of estates. 
It was only the specific circumstances of Act XIII's application in 
Assam which constrained the Government of India from recommending 
that it be repealed. 
These views were in accord with the government's overall 
conception of ft.ts role in regard to plantation labour. Plantation 
labour laws clearly served the tea industry of North India by 
establishing a legal structure whereby labour was mobilised and 
engaged by estates. On the other hand, the Government of India also 
believed that work emigration provided economic benefits for 
recruitment districts commonly characterised either by 
overpopulation, or great impoverishment, or both 109 . These dual 
interests were reflected in the actual provisions of plantation 
107. Ibid., Para. 26. 
108. Ibid. 
109. Ibid., Para.4. 
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labour laws which attempted to protect the employer from loss of 
labour, and the employee against ill treatment and over-work. 
Moreover the government believed that, in regions such as Assam 
where planters had not yet secured a flow of labour sufficienf. to 
their needs, planters would only undertake legal obligations 
towards their work force because penalties for desertion were 
provided by the same legislation 110 Legislation which struck a 
balance between the interests of employer and employee was both 
pragmatically and philosophically based. 
The Government of India recognized that its willingness to 
undertake the defence of working class interests contrasted with 
the role of the government at home. In 1891 .the administration in 
Calcutta claimed that in England "the working classes are in a 
position to help themselves and Government interference is 
resented", while in India "the intervention of Government is not 
only necessary, but is expected and welcomed by the labourer who 
has not yet learnt to stand alone" 111 In England for more than 
a century industrial growth had been accompanied by the rise of the 
middle classes, wider enfranchisement, and the growth of trade 
unions. As a result, legislation to further protect the interests 
110. Ibid., Para. B. 
111. Ibid. Para. 26. 
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of the working classes was, in the 1890s, demanded from below 
rather than proffered from above. In India no parallel development 
had taken place, and the British administration there undertook to 
guard labour against the abuses which had characterised the ra.pid 
industrial development of Britain. 
At home the India Office was even less predisposed ·to the 
reforms suggested by British planters in Madras Presidency. 
Secretary of ·state, Cross, supported the Government of India's 
attempts to protect labourers from misuse, and therefore was not 
readily convinced that a law as one-sided as Act XIII should be 
retained on the statute books. While he was prepared on this 
occasion to assent to the Government of India's wish to retain Act 
XIII, Cross described the Act as "objectionable" 112 , ·and "out 
of harmony with the general principles of legislation accepted by 
civilized Governments" 113 Cross• decision was strongly 
influenced by the fact that local officials in Assam had in 
practice been able to use the Supervisory powers enacted in Act I 
of 1882 to inspect tea plantations using Act XIII, and he warned 
the Government of India of the "obvious danger" should the Act of 
112. Letter No. 13, Secretary of state, cross, to Viceroy. 
11th Feb., 1892, Reprinted in U.P.A.S.I., Annual 
Proceedings, 1893, pp 106-107, Para. 14. 
113. Ibid., Para. 2. 
140 
1882 fall into disuse in any part of the country and labourers 
become subject to penal contract without "the protection which 
renders the special law defensible" 114 Cross expressed his 
approval for the government • s policy of amending the law only J;o 
facilitate the abolition of the system of penal contract of 
labour 115 
The correspondence conducted between the Government of India 
and the Secretary of State in relation to the labour laws operating 
in Assam tea gardens bore heavily upon Calcutta's blunt refusal to 
enact any of the amendments contained in the Madras planters' 
memorial of 1892 116 Nor was support forthcoming for the 
planters' cause from the Madras administration. In a full report to 
the Government of India officials in Madras rejected outright all 
the planters • pleas for amending Act XIII 117 Their reasons for 
doing so were in accord with the opinions expressed by their 
predecessors in Madras, and more recently by the Government of 
114. Ibid., Para. 13. 
115. Ibid., Para. 2. 
1~6. I.O.L.R., Madras Judicial Proceedings, 1893, No.1238, 
Sir E. C. Buck, Secretary to Government of India 
(Revenue and Agriculture Oepartment-Emigration),to 
Chief Secretary to Government of Madras, 19th May, 
1893. 
117. Ibid., 1892, No.l458, Chief Secretary to Government of 
Fort st George to Secretary to Government of India 
(Revenue and Agriculture Department), lOth Aug., 1892. 
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India and the Secretary of State. Moreover, local developments also 
predisposed the Government of Madras to reject the planters' 
requests. In 1891 the Government's attention had been drawn to the 
conditions endured by depressed class agricultural labour in -the 
Chingleput District, firstly by Protestant missionaries attending 
the Madras Missionary Conference and subsequently by the Collector 
of Chingleput, J. H. A. Tremenhere. Among the measures suggested by 
Tremenhere in his report in October was the recasting of the 
Workman's Breach of Contract Act in the labourers' favour so that 
landlords in Chingleput could no longer exploit the Act to keep 
their labour in a semi-servile state. Although the Government of 
Madras rejecte~ Tremenhere' s account as exaggerated and, in any 
case, had no authority to amend Act XIII, its concern for the 
plight of pariah labour was demonstrated by its decision to provide 
greater opportunities for pariahs to acquire land, education and 
security of tenure in their own homes 118 The Madras 
Government's reaction to the pariah question in Chingleput and the 
weight of humanitarian concern stemming both from past 
administrative decisions in Madras and more recently from Calcutta, 
all created a climate of opinion in Madras which was unfavourable 
to the planters• memorial. Accordingly, the Madras Government 
118. G. A. Oddie, Social Protest in India: British 
Protestant Missionaries and Social Reforms 1850-1900, 
Manohar, 1979, pp 138 143. 
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denied the planters' request that the Government reverse the Madras 
High Court's rulings of 1880 and 1883, and so make a labourer who 
had reCeived an advance from a maistri punishable under the Act. 
They believed that this would give renewed vitality to the ad¥ance 
system - a result which the government termed "undesirable" as it 
clearly preferred that labour should be attracted to the estates by 
increased wages and good treatment 119 . The notion that 
defaulting labourers should be liable both to repay the advance and 
complete their contracts was renounced as unjust 120 Similarly, 
the suggestion that labourers whose names had been entered in a 
plantation check-roll and who had received an advance should be 
deemed to have entered into a month long contract was declared 
"most objectionable" as it would "destroy all freedom of contract 
and leave the coaly entirely at the mercy of his employer", perhaps 
for his whole lifetime 121 • Overall, the Madras Government 
recorded its unwillingness to strengthen an Act which it already 
122 
considered unbalanced They argued that a freer wage and 
119. I.O.L.R., Madras Judicial Proceedings, 1892, No.l458, 
Chief Secretary to Government of Fort St George to 
Secretary to Government of India (Revenue and 
Agriculture Department}, lOth Aug., 1892. 
120. Ibid. 
121. Ibid. 
122. Ibid. 
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contract market was not only in the labourer's interest but would 
ultimately benefit planters as labour supply would be 
increased 123 As the tea industry was suffering no adverse 
economic circumstance which might warrant government interventi.li>n, 
the cidministration in Madras preferred to maintain a policy of 
laissez faire with regard to the plantation labour market. The 
united opposition of the governments of Madras and India, and of 
the Secretary of state, was evident in the government orders 
imparted to the Wynaad Planters• Association in June, 1893 124 
The failure of south Indian planters to win legal reform in 
1892-1893 was the catalyst which inspired the unification of the 
various planting- associations under the leadership of one central 
organization. The Government of India's reply to the Wynaad 
Planters' Association was considered "curt and discourteous in 
tone" 125 while the failure of both the Government of India and 
the Government of Madras to communicate the reasons for their 
rejection of the planters• memorial contributed to the planters' 
123. Ibid. 
124. Ibid., 1893, G.O. No.l238, J. F. Price, Chief 
Secretary, Government of Madras, to Wynaad Planters' 
Association, 17th June, 18934 A copy of the letter from 
Sir E4 C4 Buck, Secretary to Government of India, 
(Revenue and Agriculture Department-Emigration), to 
Government of Madras, 19th May, 1893, was also sent to 
the Association4 
125. U.P4A.S.I4, Annual Proceedings, 1893, Preface. 
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belief that their plea had been subjected to haughty and high-
handed treatment. Widespread discontent in planting circles led to 
the convening of a planters' conference in Bang a lore in August, 
1893. In the following year planters resolved that the vamious 
district planting organizations should form a permanent association 
under the umbrella of a single, central authority. This 
organization, the United Planters' Association of Southern India 
(U.P.A.s.I.), now became the chief vehicle by which southern 
planters directed their drive to increase the stringency of the 
existing labour law. 
At the annual planters' conferences held in 1893 and 1894 
reform of the_ law governing contracts on plantations was of major 
concern to delegates. Planters complained that the .wording of the 
Act was imprecise and that as a consequence the Act was neither 
interpreted in the High Court, nor administered in the local 
courts, in its true spirit. 126 • George Romilly, Secretary to the 
Wynaad Planters' Association and author of the planters' most 
recent memorial, informed delegates in 1893 that the government had 
failed to fulfil the commitment which it had made in 1877 to give 
the industry "all the assistance in its power consistent with 
126. Ibid., 1893, p 2. 
adequate protection to their 127 employees" Romilly' s 
145 
view 
found ready support amongst delegates who resolved to resubmit 
their memorial of 
reconsideration 128 
1892 to the ·Government of India 
In readdressing the Government of 
for 
India 
• 
planters hoped to win amendments which would prevent magistrates 
and the High Court "placing a narrow and prejudicial construction" 
upon the Act 129 In plainer language, the planters hoped to win 
special legal privileges without undertaking any reciprocal 
liability for the welfare of labour. 
At the same time, planters attempted to exert additional 
legal control over the labour market by instituting compulsory 
registratiori of maistris and labour contracts. An experi~ent in the 
voluntary registration of maistris had been instituted in the 
Wynaad under government supervision in January, 1891 130 
Although planters believed that a maistri would derive benefits 
from establishing the reliability of his character, only a few 
127. Ibid., p 4. 
128. Ibid., p 44. 
129. Ibid., p 9. 
130. I.O.L.R., Madras Judicial Proceedings, 1895, No.198, 
G. L. Yonge, Secretary to U.P.A.S.I. to Chief 
Secretary to Government, Madras, 15th Oct., 1894. 
., 
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maistris had bothered to register 131 In a planting region 
chronically short of labour, maistris had little incentive to 
register as their services were already in constant demand. Without 
legal compulsion the scheme was clearly inoperable. 
• 
Planters generally vie_wed ,the compulsory registration of 
maistris and contracts to labour as an important measure which 
would complement the operation of Act XIII. Under the proposed 
scheme it was believed that a defaulting maistri could be traced, 
and that fraud and crimping would be deterred 132 • As the supply 
of plantation labour continued to be deficient these benefits 
appeared attractive, and in September, 1893 south Indian planters 
requested th~ Madras government to convert the voluntary 
registration scheme to a compulsory 133 programme The 
importance which planters attached to ,its successful operation is 
indicated by the fact that in October, 1894 planters accepted a 
government suggestion that in return for establishing the scheme, 
planters be made liable to , a penal clause if they employed 
131. U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1893, p 58. 
132. Ibid., 1894, p 34. 
133. I.Q.L.R., Madras Judicial Proceedings, 1895, No.198, 
G. L. Yonge, Secretary to U.P.A.S.I. to Chief 
Secretary to Government, Madras, 15th Oct., 1894. 
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unregistered maistris 134 
Discussions conducted during the 1893 conference in relation 
to the compulsory registration of maistris reveal that planters 
were aware that they were attempting to exert greater control QVer 
the labour market. Baron Von Rosenburg, a delegate from the Kannan 
Devan Hills, related how maistris who were employed by the 
government constantly enticed plantation labour away to work on the 
Periyar River engineering project where they received a higher rate 
of pay 135 However, Von Rosenburg believed that "if our 
maistries could show that they had registered their men in a 
Government registry office the Government maistries would not dare 
to interfere with them" 136 • In this example the scheme would 
clearly prevent workers from obtaining the highest price available 
for their labour. This was recognized by at least one planter who 
believed that the scheme left planters open to the charge that the 
Government could "_rightly say that such service was akin to slavery 
in that you prevent a man from bettering himself by going to 
another estate" 137 
134. Ibid. 
135. U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1893, p 60. 
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Planters were particularly sensitive to the charge that were 
oppressors of labour. They bitterly resented the implication 
contained in much official correspondence that their demands for 
legal reform would result in the enslavement of the labou~ing 
class, and were angered by the more public campaign conducted 
against them by a "certain section of the community" whose object 
they believed was to set "class against class, the European against 
the native" 138 In Madras, the !!llli!Y had already voiced its 
opposition to the planters' clamour for enhanced legal control over 
labour. The paper claimed that if the planters' demands were 
conceded then, 
••the extinct serfdom which once existed in Mysore will be 
revived and those unfortunate labourers who enter into any 
contract with the planters will, for all practical ~poses, 
be their slaves, till they have paid back the debt" 
In the planters' own eyes they had "unquestionably freed" 
their labourers from bondage "by advancing large sums of money and 
affording constant and congenial employment". They perceived that 
reversion to slavery could only occur if plantation employment 
contracted, and those factors which had originally promoted 
138. Ibid., pp 2-3. 
139. Hindu, 27th April, 1889, p 4. 
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emancipation "British capital and advice" were 
withdrawn 140 • 
In addition, the Hindu opposed the planters• campaign on the 
grounds that it would further imbalance Act XIII by strengthe•ing 
the employers • avenue of legal redress at the expense of their 
employees. The paper recognized that in practice, 
"a coaly has neither the means nor the knowledge to prosecute 
a European planter for assault in the Madras High Court, and 
the planter therefore enjoys practical immunity from 
punishmen141 even in the most aggravated cases of 
offence" • 
It is evident that towards the end of the nineteenth century 
south India planters began to receive hostile press notices from 
Indian Owned newspapers, just as their counterparts in North 
India had done 142 In Madras Presidency the execution of 
Act XIII by the courts came under particular fire from the Indian 
press. By 1900 such articles had taken on a stronger racist and 
nationalist tone. Whereas in 1891 the Indian press in Madras had, 
for humanitarian reasons, supported the missionaries' call to 
140. U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1893, p 18. 
141. Hindu, op. cit. 
142. Revenue and Aariculture Department, <Emigration), 
Letter No.77, Viceroy Lansdowne to Secretary of State, 
Cross, 5th Oct., 1891, Para. 6, Reprinted in 
U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1893, pp 76-103. 
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improve the conditions of pariahs in Chingleput 143 , the growth 
of nationalist feeling among educated Indians coupled with the fact 
that most sizeable tea plantations were British owned, lent 
vehemence to the press' defence of depressed class plantat,on 
labour. In October, 1900 the swadesamitran, a weekly Tamil 
publication which like the Hindu was associated with the founders 
of the Indian National Congress in Madras 144 , asserted that 
British Magistrates in the Presidency were partial to_ the interests 
of British planters. Magistrates were said to regard labourers as 
"beasts of burden", and to believe that they had "no cause of 
action against their masters" 145 The paper further implied 
that the Madras Government was prepared to tolerate magisterial 
practices such as this where a commonality of race and nationality 
overrode the pursuit of justice 146 similarly, the paper's 
assertion that conditions of labour on Nilgiri plantations were 
143. Oddie, op. cit., pp 141-143. 
144. The Swadesamitran was founded by G. Subramania Iyer in 
1882. He served .as its editor for 25 years. 
145. Reports on English Papers owned by Natives Examined by 
the Criminal Investigation Department. Madras and on 
Vernacular Papers Examined by the Translators to the 
Government of Madras, (Madras Native Newspaper 
Reports), 1900, Report No.20, Swadesamitran, 19th Oct., 
1900. 
146. Ibid. 
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akin to those existing on Assam estates 14 7 , had the effect of 
not only associating the tea industry of the south with past 
outrages committed against labour in the north, but also linked the 
two planting communities by virtue of their race and econc:>atic 
activity. British planters in south India- regarded these 
criticisms as unjustifiable. 
In addition to the their attempts to convince government to 
amend Act XIII and to institute the compulsory registration of 
maistris, the planting delegates to the Bangalore conference of 
1894 also considered fixing the rate of advances and wages paid to 
labour 148 . The benefits of such self-regulation by the industry 
were obvious. As labour was in constant short supply maistris were 
often able to win increased rates from their employers by falsely 
claiming that they had received higher offers from planters in 
other districts 149 • By setting maximum rates for advances and 
wages planters would become far less vulnerable to the maistri' s 
ploy. While the suggestion had the advantage of not requiring any 
governmental support, decisive action was constrained by lack of 
information about the prevailing wage rates in various planting 
147. Ibid. 
148. U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1894, pp 47-48. 
149. Ibid., p 48. 
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regions, and by the fact that labour•s cost of living varied from 
district to district 150 The planters• desire to limit advances 
and rates of pay was effectively an attempt to regulate the labour 
market. Rather than continuing to allow market forces to determi~ 
the price which labour could command, planters hoped to 
artificially fix a ceiling price for labour by eliminating 
competition for plantation labour both within and between the 
various planting districts. 
The annual convening of planters' conferences from 1893 
encouraged growers of various plantation products in diverse 
regions of southern India to increasingly consider themselves 
members of a single and important industry which had failed to 
receive adequate consideration from government. Planters hoped that 
by demonstrating a united front they would not only win legal 
concessions but would command "a more respectful attitude ... than 
has hitherto been shown" by 151 government Delegates to the 
1893 conference looked to a recent enactment to enlarge the 
Representative Councils in India as an opportunity to secure 
political influence in government while simultaneously receiving 
150. Ibid., 1893, p 8. 
151. Ibid., 1893, p 8. 
.,. 
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appropriate and public recognition of the industry's 
importance 152 Accordingly, in September, 1893 planters 
appealed to the Governor of Madras to appoint one of their 
community to a recently vacated seat in the Legislative Council• In 
their request planters emphasised the economic worth of their 
industry and informed the Governor that their capital investment 
alone approximated twelve million pounds 153 Although on this 
occasion the planters' request was refused, in the following month 
the Governor committed himself to appointing a planter to the next 
unforseen 154 vacancy It was an important 
the newly unified planting community. 
initial victory for 
The united' associations• attempt to modify the form and 
application of Act XIII also _produced some early results. In 1894 
the newly elected Planting Member of the Legislative Council, 
George Romilly, reported to the second .. annual planters' conference 
that the Madras High Court had recently ruled that warrants could 
be issued against defaulting maistris and labourers even where the 
time limit in the contract had expired, or where the work specified 
152. Ibid., pp 8-9. 
153. Ibid., 1894, p 97, Letter from the Secretary of 
U.P.A.S.I. to Government of Fort StGeorge, 28th Sept, 
1893 . 
154. Ibid., p 98, Letter from Mr G. Romilly to the 
Secretary, U.P.A.S.I., 17th Oct., 1893. 
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had been completed by others 155 . This decision reversed current 
magisterial practice and effectively permitted contractors an 
indefinite time span in which to prosecute defaulters. In 1894 
magistrates in the local district courts were reported to 11Plve 
begun applying the law in accordance with the latest interpretation 
of their judicial superiors 156 
Additionally, the planters• appeal for a recasting of 
Act XIII met a more hospitable reception in Madras than any earlier 
submission made by an individual planting association. In a letter 
eliciting clarification of some points raised in the planters' 
memorial, the Government of Madras indicated that it would have no 
objection in reCommending to the Government of India that the 
circumst~nces should be widened in which maistris, who made 
advances to labourers, had recourse to the Act 157 • Shortly 
afterwards in April, 1894 the Governor of Madras, Lord Wenlock, 
received a planters• deputation. As a result of that meeting 
planters were requested to compose a draft bill embodying their 
155. Ibid., p 12. 
156. Ibid. 
157. Madras Judicial Proceedings, Government Order No.2482, 
28th Nov., 1893, reprinted in U.P.A.S.I., Annual 
Proceedings, 1894, p 75. 
155 
proposed amendments to the Breach of Contract Act 158 By 
November the Government of Madras was in receipt of the planters• 
draft entitled the Estates Labour Act 159 Although the draft 
bill was referred to the Madras High Court 160 for comment , -the 
Madras government did not repeat those objections which had marked 
its response in 1892 to the same document. It is apparent that the 
authorities in Madras were now sympathetic to the planters• cause. 
The planters • success in winning concessions from the 
Government of Madras may in part be attributed to their formation 
of a strong, central organization to represent their interests. The 
memorials which they submitted to government could no longer be 
described by administrators as the protestations of a scattered 
handful of planters, for the U.P.A.S.I. embraced growers of tea, 
coffee, cinchona-, and cardamoms_ across fourteen different planting 
districts both within Madras Presidency and in the native states 
which it adjoined. 
At the same time government may well have been more prepared 
to entertain the planters' proposals for a more stringent labour 
158. U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1894, p 3. 
159• I.O.L.R., Madras Judicial Proceedings, 1895, No.198, 
G. L. Yonge, secretary to U.P.A.S.I. to Chief 
Secretary to Government of Madras, 31st Oct., 1894. 
160. Government of Fort St George to the Secretary to 
U.P.A.S.I., 31st January, 1895, reprinted in 
U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1895, p 93. 
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law as the economic outlook for tea growers grew increasingly 
gloomy. From about 1885 the rate of increase in tea consumption in 
Britain began to slow 161 and oversupply of Ceylonese and 
Indian teas was reflected in declining market prices 162 . At 
• 
first planters were cushioned from the full impact of the declining 
returns of tea production by the falling value of the rupee in 
terms of sterling exchange 163 and the industry in southern 
India continued to expand. However, the government • s closure of 
Indian mints in 1893 radically exacerbated the economic position of 
planters. The value of the rupee rose and then stabilized well 
above its 1891 price of thirteen pence 164 . Planters were now 
exposed to the ,full effects of a depressed tea trade, particularly 
in 1893 when a rise in the value of the rupee corresponded with the 
lowest prices to date in the London tea market. The ill effects 
suffered by tea producers encouraged the U.P.A.S.I. to view the 
government,s decision to close Indian mints as a deliberate attempt 
161. s. Rajaratnam, "The Ceylon Tea Industry 1886-1931", 
Ceylon Journal of Historical and social studies, Vol.4; 
Pt 2, 1961, p 175. 
162. Ibid., p 177. 
163. Ibid. 
164. V. B. Kulkarni, British Statesmen in India, Bombay, 
1961, p 224. 
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to peg the rupee's value at an artificially high level 165 and 
the organization fully understood the unpalatable economic 
consequences upon their export earnings. In response the U.P.A.S.I. 
petitioned the government to reverse its decision and allow t41e 
rupee to find its own "natural" value 166 • 
Irrespective of whether the plight of south Indian tea 
growers was more attributable to the oversupplied state of the 
market or to the exchange rate, the rapid expansion of tea planting 
in Nilgiri district was quickly arrested. In 1895 and 1896 only 155 
additional acres were added to the 7,000 acres already cultivated 
167 by U.P.A.S.I. members It is highly probable that the sudden 
slowdown in the eXpanding tea industry may well have influenced the 
Madras government's attitude to reform of the breach of contract 
legislation. In previously rejecting the enhancement of Act XIII 
the Madras government had not confined itself to considerations of 
judicial equity but had voiced utilitarian considerations in 
165. U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1895, p 60. 
166. Indian Currency Commission, 1898, Minutes of Evidence 
taken before the Committee to Inquire into the Indian 
Currency, Together with an Analysis of Evidence, 
Part I, Sessional Papers of the British House of 
Commons, 1898 Session, Vols.lxi (c. 9037), Readex 
Microprint Edition, p 460, Chairman of U.P.A.S.I. to 
Government of India, Finance and Commerce Department, 
14th Feb., 1898. 
167. Griffiths, op. cit., p 163. The figures are taken from 
the U.P.A.S.I, Annual Report of 1897. 
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arguing that amendment was unnecessary since the cultivation of 
exotic plants had expanded notwithstanding the labour 
problem 168 That expansion was clearly curtailed by economic 
circumstances in the mid-1890s. Economic relief might be affo•ded 
to the planter by permitting the free fall of the rupee, but such a 
decision had massive economic consequences for the whole of ·British 
India, and was beyond the province of the Madras authorities. On 
the other hand, an enhanced labour law could be had at virtually no 
cost to government, and could provide economic relief for planters. 
Beleaguered by low world prices for tea which were beyond their 
capacity to control, and bearing a significant freight disadvantage 
against their competitors in Ceylon, the slim profit margin held by 
south Indian tea planters in the mid-1890s could only be easily 
increased by lowering the cost of production. As tea cropping was a 
labour intensive enterprise, substantial savings could be made if a 
cheap, stable labour force could be retained and lost advances 
reduced. While the Madras administration was convinced that the 
economic circumstances of tea planters in the Presidency warranted 
government interference in the plantation labour market, planters 
had also to persuade the Government of India that its policy of 
laissez faire was undermining the profitability of southern 
168. I.O.L.R., Madras Judicial Proceedings, 1877, 
No.l692, Government Order No. 1692, 19th July, 1877. 
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planting districts. 
However, the Government of India was still more attuned to 
the long standing humanitarian and judicial concerns of the India 
Office than to the recent economic difficulties experienced• by 
southern planters. In Calcutta, the planters' plea received a less 
than hospitable hearing. There the Government of India reiterated 
its earlier misgivings in stating that the Act was "a dangerous 
instrument capable of being worked most oppressively" 169 As a 
result, the Government of Madras advised planters that "it would be 
useless to proceed further" 170 
Despite their failure to convince the Government of India of 
the necessity .Of reform, the newly united planters of southern 
India recognized that they had made a valuable ally of the Madras 
administration. They noted that the Madras Government had declared 
itself "reluctantly compelled.. 171 to 'abandon the legislation 
desired by the planting community, and concluded that they had 
convinced the Government "on the spot .•• that the grievances laid 
169. Ibid., 1895, No.l309, D. Ibbertson, Officiating 
Secretary to Government of India, Department of Revenue 
and Agriculture (Emigration), to Chief Secretary to 
Government of Madras, 1st· May, 1895. 
170. Ibid., 1895, No.l309, J. F. Price, Chief Secretary to 
Government of Madras, to the Secretary, U.P.A.S.I., 
19th June, 1895. 
171. Ibid. 
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before them by the Association are real and require 
adjustment" 172 However, Act XIII was not an .enactment of the 
Madras legislature and it could only be recast under the auspices 
of the central administration. Members of the U.P.A.S.I. ~ow 
considered the methods by which they might convince the seemingly 
intransigent authorities in Calcutta of the necessity for reform. 
Having failed to advance their cause through the 
administrative channels of the Government of India, planters 
concluded that their appeal might be more effectively promoted by a 
direct and personal approach to individual authorities. Planters 
had before them the positive results of their consultation with the 
Governor of Madras, and now hoped that similar benefits might be 
derived if the central administration could be made more aware of 
the peculiar difficulties confronting the planting enterprise in 
southern India. Planters at the U.P.A.S.I. annual meeting of 1895 
initially considered approaching the Secretary of State. However, 
this scheme was quickly abandoned when planters were informed that 
the Secretary of State was closely associated with Sir Charles 
Turner, the former Chief Justice of the Madras High Court who had 
reported strongly against the planters plea in 1884, and whose 
Minute on the Labour Law and cases brought under Act XIII was 
172. U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1895, p 3. 
161 
equally unfavourable 173 The Viceroy~s impending tour of Madras 
Presidency appeared to planters to provide a more promising 
opportunity to influence the prevailing attitude in 
Calcutta 174 
• 
In the memorial which the U.P.A.S.I. deputation presented to 
the Viceroy, Lord Elgin, in December, 1895 the planters of southe~n 
India made a novel attempt to distinguish their enterprise from the 
planting industry of northern India. They proposed that their oft 
repeated plea for increased legal protection against loss of 
advances and wilful breaches of contract was due in part to the 
fact that the government in Calcutta was not sufficiently aware of 
"the radical differences" existing between the conditions of labour 
in northern and southern India 175 • This argument, coupled with 
the appearance of a united planting conununity, led the Viceroy to 
profess "himself unwilling to refuse assistance to a great industry 
so long as there was room for doubt as to the material facts of the 
case" 
176 As a result, Lord Elgin too~ up the planters• 
173. Ibid., p 16. 
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175. I.O.L.R., Madras Judicial Proceedings, 1896, 
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suggestion that a committee of enquiry be established to 
investigate the particular problems of plantation labour 
recruitment in south India 177 . 
The association's personal approaches to the Governor • of 
Madras and the Viceroy of India should not be undervalued. In 1897 
the Chairman of the U.P.A.s.r. informed delegates from the various 
district associations that in his opinion Lord Elgin had been 
instructed by his Council prior to his tour of Madras Presidency to 
reject the planters • memorial outright, but on arrival had been 
persuaded otherwise by the personal representations of Lord 
Wenlock 178 
However, ·it is highly probable that the Viceroy's willingness 
to grant an enquiry into the labour recruiting system of southern 
plantations was more attribut~ble to the increasingly adverse 
economic circumstances then affecting both the Indian tea and 
coffee industries. In the north the Government of India had already 
capitulated on the issue of reducing the maximum length of tea 
plantation labour contracts in Assam from five to three 
years 179 Government acquiesence on this point, and on other 
177. Ibid. 
178. U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1897, Supplement, p 3. 
179. Raymond K. Renford, The Non-Official British in India 
to 1920, New Delhi, 1987, p 69. 
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proposed changes to Bengal Act I of 1882, stands in stark contrast 
to the opinions expressed shortly beforehand by both the Secretary 
of State for India and Viceroy Lansdowne. In his correspondence 
with Calcutta, the Secretary of State, Cross, described ~e 
reduction of the term of plantation labour contracts as the 
principal amendment proposed in 1892 by the Government of India to 
the labour law of Assam 18° Cross argued that both he and his 
predecessor regarded contracts of five years duration with grave 
misgivings for they raised the value of the labourer to the planter 
and consequently "greatly increased the temptation to malpractices 
on the part of the recruiter" 181 • The abandonment of this and 
other measures for reform was highly satisfactory to the Indian Tea 
Association 182 which represented the interests of tea growers 
in North India. This development assisted northern tea producers in 
drastically reducing their production costs. Only by reducing costs 
did the tea industry of North-East India survive the downturn in 
the international tea market 183 • For the Government of India it 
180. I.O.L.R., Letter No. 13, Secretary of State, Cross, to 
Viceroy, 11th Feb., 1892, Reprinted in U.P.A.S.I., 
Annual Proceedings, 1893, pp 104-107, Para. 9. 
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182. Renford, op. cit. 
183. Griffiths, op. cit., p 128. 
164 
was an unusual reversal of an official policy which had been aimed 
at producing a plantation labour market free of government 
regulation. This reversal signified the ascendancy of economic 
considerations over humanitarian concerns in the governmewt's 
regulation of tea plantations during the recession of the 1890s. 
Additionally, the overall condition of British-Indian 
finances in the mid-1890s may well have influenced the Government 
of India to pursue policies which were favoured by tea producers. 
By 1894 the Government of India • s deficit stood at Rs. 3 crore and 
50 lakhs 184 . Under Elgin, import duties and excise taxes were 
temporarily imposed to raise much needed _revenue. In such adverse 
economic circu~mstances the value of the Indian tea industry,. and 
the valu~ of the sterling exchange which tea exports generated, was 
heightened. As Kling has noted, the willingness of the authorities 
in Bengal to intervene on behalf of indigo producing ryots in their 
contractual relationship with planters, was inversely related to 
the government's dependence of indigo 185 remittances 
Similarly, in the 1890s as export earnings from tea became more 
valuable to the British administration in India, the government 
184. S. Gopal, British Policy in India 1858-1905, Cambridge, 
1965, p 210. 
185. Blair B. Kling, The Blue Mutiny, The Indigo 
Disturbances in Bengal 1859 1862, Philadelphia, 1966, 
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demonstrated greater reluctance to enhance the legal protection it 
had afforded to labour. In the case of Indian tea, government 
policy was not complicated by consideration for home production as 
it had been with the cotton cloth industry. Rather, the intere~ts 
of the Government of India in 1895 coincided with the interests of 
British consumers, for strict labour laws in India would assist the 
supply of a cheap staple foodstuff to the mass of the British 
working classes. The appeal of southern planters was clearly 
timeiy. 
In requesting an enquiry south Indian planters hoped not only 
to acquaint the Government of India with the difficulties of 
recruiting plantation labour, but also to dissociate their 
activities from those of planters in Assam. In an address to the 
u. P.A. s. I. annual conference of 1895 the Planting Member of the 
Madras 18gislature, George Romilly opined that, 
"the Government of India does not understand our labour 
arrangements at all. They think we are governed by the same 
customs as prevail in Assam. The whole situation is 
absolutely different, and the sooner we make the 'Government 
of fg&ia understand that, the better it will be for 
us" 
Southern planters ~auld reap substantial benefit from establishing 
that their recruitment practices were radically different from 
186. U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1895, p 18. 
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those of the northern tea regions. In the case of north India, the 
authorities in Calcutta had adopted a protective role towards 
migratory plantation labour in the face of their persistent 
mistreatment by planters and recruiting agents alike. In seuth 
India, where desertion of the estate was relatively easy, no such 
outrages had come to public notice. Similarly, there was virtually 
no official record of prevailing conditions of labour and no 
official mortality statistics, as the Government of Madras had 
never assumed the right to inspect or regulate plantations. In the 
absence of any defamatory evidence, planters might hope to wring 
increased legal control over labour without bearing reciprocal 
obligations to their workers. By the mid-1890s changes in official 
attitudes in Calcutta and Madras had giyen encouragement to 
planters. Although the Government of India had proved less 
receptive to southern planters' pleas than its counterpart in 
Madras, Calcutta had already demonstrated that it was prepared to 
abandon proposed reforms favouring plantation labour in Assam since 
it was convinced that these threatened the economic viability of 
the tea industry. The appointment of the Mackworth-Young committee 
in 1896 provided planters with an ideal opportunity to demonstrate 
the immediate utility of legal reform in south India. That reform 
would ultimately represent a reversal of labour law policies which 
the Government of India had maintained for over thirty years. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ENQUIRY, ENACTMENT AND NATIONALIST RESPONSE 
• 
The findings of the South of India Planters' Enquiry 
Committee in 1896 triggered two major political battles in Madras 
Presidency. Contention between the Government of Madras and its 
superiors in Calcutta arose chiefly over the degree of protection 
to be afforded to workers in the new plantation labour law. As its 
reference point the Government of Madras adopted wholeheartedly the 
findings of the Committee which, from the outset, had been narrow 
in scope and prejudicial to the cause of labour. In contrast the 
Government of India considered the Committee~a recommendations in 
the light of its experience with the tea planters of north-east 
India. A political compromise allowed for the eventual enactment of 
the Madras Planters• Labour Law (Act I) in 1903, but the Madras 
administration, unlike its counterpart in Calcutta, never accepted 
an obligation to protect plantation labour from misuse. As a 
result, clauses designed to shield labour were considerably 
weakened at the last moment, and these continued to be regarded in 
Madras as concessions benevolently bestowed from above rather than 
an integral part of balanced legislation. 
At the same time the new plantation labour code hardened 
Indian nationalist opposition to British colonial rule. In both the 
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country-wide press and the Madras legislature, nationalists 
protested that the new Act would confer considerable economic 
benefits on colonial enterprise at the expense of the Indian 
labourer. Ironically, the humanitarian arguments employed b~ the 
nationalists to condemn both the provincial and central governments 
of British India, largely mirrored those which had been previously 
used by the Government of India in its attempts to temper the 
legislative fervour of the Madras administration. By 1903 
nationalists had succeeded the Government of India as the chief 
defendant of plantation labour in Madras. 
By investing planters with the legal authority of the 
colonial stat~, the operation of the new plantation labour code in 
the major planting districts of southern India was to increase 
considerably controls over plantation labour. The passage of the 
Madras Planters' Labour Law ultimately resulted in plantation 
labour practices which were amongst the harshest 
prevailing in British India . 
• • • • • • • • 
of those 
The composition, guidelines and investigative methods of the 
South of India Planters; Enquiry Committee provided planters with a 
favourable opportunity to impress upon government the necessity of 
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legal reform. In March, 1896 the Government of India appointed a 
Committee composed of only three members. The Chairman assigned to 
the Conunittee was W. Mackworth Young, then British Resident in 
Mysore and Chief Commissioner of coorg 1 • While the opinions ~hich 
Hackworth Young held about the system of plantation labour 
recruitment prior to the establishment of the enquiry are unknown, 
as Resident in Mysore he must have been well acquainted with many 
of the difficulties encountered by planters who drew labour from 
that state. From 1874 planters in the Nilgiri hills and Wynaad 
plateau had clamorously sought the assistance of the Madras 
administration in facilitating extradition from Mysore State for 
breach of contract offences 2 . Although the planters' demands were 
constantly rejected by the Government of India, the issue generated 
considerable correspondence between the authorities in Calcutta, 
Madras and Mysore city, and this set out plainly the disadvantages 
suffered by planters in British India who employed Mysorean labour. 
The second member of the Committee was nominated by the U.P.A.S.I. 
from amongst its own ranks, while the third member was an officer 
of the Madras Government which had already expressed its sympathy 
1. Report of the South of India Planters' Enquiry committee, 
op. cit., p 1. 
2. See for example I.O.L.R., Madras Judicial Proceedings, 
1875, Nos.31-36; Ibid., 1878, No.l072; Ibid., 1881, Nos.89 
and 2424; Ibid., 1887, No.194; Ibid., 1895, No.1309. 
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for the planters• case. on balance, the composition of the 
Committee appeared partial to the planters' cause. 
Similarly, the guidelines governing the Committee's 
investigation were seemingly tailored to the planters' inter..ats. 
Aside from its concern with the problem of coffee stealing 3 , the 
Committee was instructed to enquire into the nature of the current 
system of advances, "the necessity for its continuance, . . • the 
difficulties experienced in its operation, 
method of removing 4 them" The committee's 
(and) the best 
frame of reference 
constrained in advance the recommendations it might make. It could 
only conclude that official policy should be to allow the current 
system either .to continue unchanged or to fUnction in an amended 
form. Precluded from examining alternative methods of labour 
recruitment, the Committee also lacked a broad experience of labour 
relations which may well have highlighted the fundamental flaws and 
abuses of the advance system. 
Ultimately, the planters' campaign was probably most highly 
assisted by the Committee's methods of data collection. The 
3. Theft of both unharvested and harvested coffee was 
widespread in south India. Although the Coffee Stealing 
Prevention Act has been passed in 1878 to combat the 
problem, it could only be applied to plantation employees 
in possession of green-gathered coffee. Planters sought 
to have the Act amended to protect their coffee crops in 
all stages of production and whilst in transit. 
4. I.O.L.R., Madras Judicial Proceedings, 1896, Nos.664-666, 
Viceroy's reply to U.P.A.S.I. memorial, 4th April, 1896. 
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fourteen different district planting associations which were united 
under the U.P.A.S.I. umbrella, and all of their 466 individual 
members, were requested to supply written answers to the 
committee's questionnaire. In all, the Committee received •65 
replies from individual planters, but in contrast it approached 
only 32 planters who were outside the planting associations 5 • 
While the Committee took evidence from 14 maistris, at no stage did 
they visit plantations nor did they interview a single estate 
labourer 6 • The predominant weight of evidence gathered by the 
Committee therefore originated with those who had the most to gain 
from the official shoring up of the advance system. 
It was therefore hardly surprising that the Committee found 
that th~ advance system was essential to the operation of 
plantations in Madras Presidency 7 The Committee's summation 
reflected the planters • view that their most substantial legal 
difficulty was "the absence of any provision by which specific 
performance of contracts can be ultimately enforced under Act XIII 
of 1859" 8 Furthermore, the Committee implied that the Madras 
5. Report of the South of India Planters' Enquiry Committee, 
op~ cit., p 3. 
6. Ibid. 
7. Ibid., p 13. 
8. Ibid., p 54. 
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Government had not fulfilled a commitment it had made in 1877 ''when 
all assistance to planters was promised" 9 . However, it failed to 
indicate that the Madras administration had originally qualified 
its response by indicating that the labourers' interests, and• the 
legal status of the planters' proposals for legislative reform, had 
also to be taken into account 10 • By ignoring these provisos the 
committee inaccurately recounted the past actions of the Madras 
administration so that they were now consistent with its own 
conclusions some two decades later. Finally, the Committee's Report 
recommended that the Government of India should relieve the 
planters • situation by amending Madras Act V of 1866 to form a 
plantation labour law akin to the Ceylon Labour Ordinance or Bengal 
Act I of 1882 11 . Clearly the Committee believed that the 
magnitude of the planters' problems warranted greater government 
regulation of the plantation labour market in Madras Presidency. 
Of the two laws cited by the Planters• Enquiry Commission as 
possible models for future legislation in Madras Presidency, that 
is the Ceylon Labour Ordinance and Bengal Act I of 1882, the 
9. Ibid., p 41-42. 
10. I.O.L.R., Madras Judicial Proceedings, 1877, No. 1692, 
G.O. No. 1692, 19th July, 1877. 
11. Report of the South of India Planters' Enquiry Committee, 
op. cit., p 59. 
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Calcutta administration favoured the latter. This legislation was 
itself an enactment of the Government of India, and embodied the 
principle that both the planter and the labourer should receive 
protection from abuse. Under Bengal Act I labour was protectect by 
the reintroduction of a minimum daily wage, subject to the 
completion of set tasks. In cases where illness prevented the 
labourer from working, the planter was obliged to pay subsistence 
wages. The government reserved for itself the power to inspect 
working conditions on plantations, the power to reduce the size of 
daily tasks if they were considered excessive, and the right to 
withhold benefits, which accrued to planters under the Act, from 
unhealthy gardens. 
-Planters welcomed the Committee's recommendation that a 
labour law be framed for southern India along the lines of Bengal 
Act I of 1882. At the U.P.A.S.I. Annual Conference in 1897 
delegates from the Shevaroy Planters' Association voiced the 
opinion that penal provisions for fraudulent breach of contract, 
such as those embodied in Act I of 1882, were essential to solve 
the plantation labour difficulties experienced in Madras 
Presidency 12 However, the conference overall gave little 
consideration to the implication that planters might be 
12. U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1897, Supplement, p 14. 
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reciprocally bound by clauses which safeguarded labour • s welfare. 
Rather, they believed that "the testimony of the Committee, as to 
the kind treatment they (labourers) receive scarcely warrants such 
a supposition" 13 As the committee had not unearthed • any 
widespread abuse of labour, such as had motivated the Government of 
India to legislate in defence of labour in Assam, southern planters 
conceived that any future plantation labour· law in Madras 
Presidency would operate purely in their own interests. 
The Government of Madras gave every indication that its 
conception of future labour law was as partisan as that held by 
planters. Having first ascertained that the Committee's 
recommendations were acceptable to U.P.A.S. I. members, the 
Government of Madras notified the Calcutta authorities that "no 
remedy for the difficulties under which the planting community at 
present labours is to be found in the existing laws", and that 
"what is required is a penal law of contracts which should 
provide for enforcing specific 14 performance" These opinions 
echoed those expressed by the Secretary of the U.P.A.S.I., George 
Romilly, in his conununication to the Madrasi authorities some six 
13. Ibid. 
14. I.O.L.R., Public and Judicial Department, Annual 
Departmental Papers, 1895, No. 287, G.O. No. 168, 
T. s. Arundel, Chief Secretary to Government of Fort St 
George, to Secretary to Government of India, 28th Jan., 
1898. 
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months earlier. Romilly had informed the Madras Government that a 
law which would successfully enforce labour contracts was of far 
greater value than one which merely punished defaulting 
15 labourers Moreover, the Government of Madras in • its 
correspondence with Calcutta emphasised two of the Committee's 
proposals which Romilly considered crucial to southern planters. 
Firstly, the Government of Madras argued that the framing of fresh 
legislation should not automatically lead to Act XIII being 
declared inapplicable to plantation labour cases. Rather, it 
believed that the two acts might be allowed to run 
16 
concurrently This, it was argued, would greatly assist 
planters in prosecuting defaulting labour which had been locally 
contracted. As local workers did not migrate to the estates, the 
planter was unlikely to be granted any legal redress against local 
defaulters through the revamping of Act V of 1866. Secondly, the 
Government of Madras stressed the necessity of obtaining 
extradition rights over defaulting labour from the native states of 
15. Ibid., Annual Departmental Papers, 1899, No. 287, 
G.O. No. 167, George Romilly, Secretary to U.P.A.S.I., 
to Chief Secretary to Government of Madras, 13th Aug., 
1897. 
16. Ibid., Annual Departmental Papers, 1899, No. 287, 
G.O. No.168, T. S. Arundel, Chief Secretary to Government 
of Fort st George, to Secretary to Government of India, 
28th Jan., 1898. 
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Mysore, Travancore and Cochin 17 The position adopted by the 
Madras administration on this issue went beyond the recommendations 
made by the 1896 Committee of 0 18 Enqu1ry In effect the 
Government of Madras was restating an argument which planter• had 
previously advanced, and which had ,been previously rejected by 
former administrations both in Calcutta and Madras at the time of 
Mysore's rendition to Indian rule 19 
While the Government of Madras was prepared to depart 
radically from the policy of its predecessors, the Government of 
India was not. The new Viceroy, Lord Curzon, informed the Secretary 
of State that although he was convinced that the Committee's Report 
contained sufficient evidence to warrant legislation, it was 
essential to secure "in return for the penal contract, adequate 
advantages and protection for the labourer" 20 
17. Ibid. 
18. U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1897, Supplement, 
pp 17-18. 
19. I.O.L.R., Madras Judicial Proceedings, 1887, No.194, 
Curzon's 
H. E. Stokes, Acting Chief Secretary to Government of 
Madras, to the Resident in Mysore, 31st Jan., 1884. 
Ibid., 1892, No. 1458, Chief Secretary to Government of 
Fort st George, to Secretary to Government of India, 
Revenue and Agriculture Department, lOth Aug., 1892. 
Ibid., 1893, No. 1238, E. c. Buck, Secretary to 
Government of India (Revenue and Agriculture Department, 
Emigration) to Chief Secretary to Government of Madras, 
19th May, 1893. 
20. I.O.L.R., Public and Judicial Department, Annual 
Departmental Papers, 1899, No. 287, Viceroy in Council, 
to Secretary of State, Emigration Letter No.6, 26th Jan., 
(continued over) 
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philosophical stance faithfully reflected the principle which had 
guided all previous national administrations in framing plantation 
labour laws in Assam. 
Curzon' s point of view was reinforced by his own ca)ieful 
assessment of the evidence contained in the Report of the South of 
India Planters' Enquiry Committee. He noted that the Committee 
could not explain adequately the circumstances in which over a 
thousand estate labourers in Coorg had been "found dead or dying on 
the roads" some years before, and expressed regret ·that the 
previous administration in Calcutta had not requested the Coorgi 
authorities to furnish a full explanation 21 This instance 
smacked of the abuses committed against labour in Assam, and curzon 
was cautious to reserve his opinion on the desirability of penal 
contract legislation in Madras Presidency until after the Madras 
Government could formulate more precisely the form that the 
22 
enactment would take 
At the same time, there can be little doubt that Lord Curzon 
was also intent on curbing the administrative 
displayed by provincial administrations. In May, 
1899. 
21. Ibid. These deaths occurred during the famine of 
1876-1877. 
22. Ibid. 
independence 
1899 curzon 
complained to the Secretary of State that; 
"Decentralization is all very well, but it appears to 
me that in the case of Bombay and Madras to have been 
carried to a point in which the supreme Government is 
nowhere, and in which the petty kings in these 
dominions are even unconscious z.rat responsibility 
attaches to anyone but themselves" • 
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• 
Curzon proposed that the status of Madras and Bombay Presidencies 
be reduced, that their Governorships be abolished, and the 
administration of the both regions be entrusted to Lieutenant-
Governors as was already the case in other large provinces. Curzon 
preferred authority to reside in senior I.C.S. men rather than in 
political appointees from home, whose ignorance of India, he felt, 
made them "prisoners of their secretariats" 24 . Additionally, 
Curzon argued that the provincial administrations had failed to 
keep Calcutta sufficiently informed of both their own actions, and 
event's within their territories. curzon considered the Madras 
government under Sir Arthur Havelock to be particularly remiss. 
Some five months after taking up his appointment as Viceroy he 
informed the Secretary of State that; 
"Sir A. Havelock for the first time since I arrived in 
India broke silence a few days ago with a short letter 
to inform me that someone had tarred the Queen's statue 
23. Curzon to Hamilton, 7th June, 1899, in Michael Edwardes, 
High Noon of Empire. India Under Curzon, London, 1965, 
p 78. 
24. David Dilks, curzon in India, London, 1969, Vol.I, p 77. 
at Madras. Meanwhile a rather serious succession of 
outbreaks is taking place in the Tinnevelly district, 
and about this we get no information from his 
Government and have ~ trust to the newspapers to tell 
us what is going on" 
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• 
Plainly, Curzon placed little confidence in the Government of 
Madras to report voluntarily in a full and open manner. This, 
coupled with Curzon's predilection for the centralization of 
colonial power in Calcutta, provided an additional incentive for 
bringing the proposed planting legislation of Madras Presidency 
into line with previous enactments of the Government of India. 
As a result, the Government of Madras was informed that the 
Viceroy's Council had no objection to the drafting of legislation 
subject to the inclusion of a number of provisions designed to 
protect labour. According to Calcutta, labour had to be permitted 
to rescind a contract at any time if the advance had been returned 
and forfeit money paid 26 . Similarly, a magistrate • s enforcement 
of a contract was to be "strictly conditional" on the labourer 
having been fairly treated on the estate 27 Madras was advised 
that even though many of the restrictions placed on planters in the 
25. Michael Edwardes, op. cit., p 79. 
26. I.O.L.R., Public and Judicial Deoartment, Annual 
Departmental Papers, 1899, No. 287, Resolution of Revenue 
and Agriculture (Emigration) Department, 21st Jan., 1899. 
27. Ibid. 
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Assam Act could be dispensed with in the south because the evidence 
indicated that labourers were "generally well-cared for", it would 
still be necessary for the Madras Government to take upon itself 
"the power to inspect plantations and to enforce sanitE.ry 
regulations" 28 Although the Secretary of state, George 
Hamilton, was to later note in his correspondence with Curzon that 
the absence of mortality figures hampered any assessment of the 
degree to which labour required legal protection in south 
India 29 , it was apparent that the Government of India preferred 
to safeguard labour in the light of its experiences with the 
northern tea industry. 
Additionally, the prudence of the Government of India was 
also displayed in its flat refusal to recast the Breach of Contract 
Act (Act XIII). Although the .Government of India now accepted that 
southern planters' grievances were legitimate, it vetoed the Madras 
Government's suggestion that the Breach of Contract Act could 
provide a suitable basis for new legislation. Calcutta damned Act 
XIII as "unfair and one-sided in its provisions", and "liable to be 
28. Ibid. 
29. Ibid., Annual Departmental Papers, 1899, No. 287, 
Secretary of State to Viceroy in Council, 9th March, 
1899. 
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misunderstood and misused" 30 • Furthermore, Act XIII applied 
throughout British India, and both the Government of India and the 
home administration were already committed to a policy of 
rescinding laws of penal contract 31 • Although the Government.of 
India was not prepared to abandon that policy, the findings of the 
1896 Committee had demonstrated that a law of penal contract for 
plantation labour was as warranted in south India as it was in the 
north. The Government of India was therefore obliged to find some 
other remedy while keeping Act XIII in place. 
Reluctantly, the Government of India conceded that Madras 
Act V of 1866, which regulated the recruitment of Madrasi labour 
for service outside the Presidency, might be adapted to meet the 
planters' needs 32 Madras Act V was widely acknowledged as a 
dead letter 33 , but its attraction for Calcutta lay in the fact 
that it was an enactment of the Madras legislature, and thus only 
applied within Madras Presidency. The Government of India was 
30. Ibid., Annual Departmental Papers, 1899, No. 287, 
Resolution of Revenue and Agriculture (Emigration} 
Department, 21st Jan., 1899. 
31. Secretary of State, Cross, to Viceroy Lansdowne, 11th 
Feb., 1892, Letter No.l3, reprinted in U.P.A.S.I., Annual 
Proceedings, 1893, p 104, Para.2. 
32. I.O.L.R., Public and Judicial- Department, Annual 
Departmental Papers, 1899, No • . 287, Resolution of Revenue 
and Agriculture (Emigration) Department, 21st Jan., 1899. 
33. Ibid. 
I 
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"constrained to agree"· with the Government of Madras that what was 
required was "a labour law of special application to Southern 
India" 34 but it was not prepared to tolerate any India-wide 
measure which countered its objective of reducing government 
regulation of labour recruitment. 
Proposals for reform of plantation labour law in sou-th India 
had evoked widely different responses from the governments of 
Madras and Calcutta. In Madras Presidency official reaction was 
influenced by the relative proximity of the planting enterprise and 
the constant lobbying of planters• representatives. The continuing 
downturn in the tea and coffee industries; the increase in labour 
emigration, particularly to 35 Malaya ; high interest rates and 
the relatively high value of the rupee 36 , all gave added impetus 
to the planters• campaign for legal reform. In 1899 H. P. Hodgson, 
the Planting Member in the Madras legislature, argued before the 
Governor of Madras that the economic circumstances of planting were 
34. Ibid. 
35. Kernial Singh Sandhu, Indians in Malaya. Some Aspects of 
their Immigration and Settlement (1786-19571, ope cit., 
pp 81-84, 87, 304-305. 
36. In 1898 the annual interest rate on bank loans taken out 
by planters to fund their advances to labour were 
reported to have risen from the usual rate of 12% to 
around 18%. The Planting Member in the Governor's Council 
of Fort st George attributed the rise to the Government 
of India's monetary policies. (Proceedings of the Council 
of the Governor of Fort St. George, 4th April, 1898, 
p 32.) 
., 
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now so grave that it was debatable whether a new labour law would 
eventuate_ before the current generation of planterS was crushed by 
irrecoverable advances 37 The great geographic distances which 
separated Calcutta from the southern planting districts insul,jtted 
the Government of India from the vociferous lobbying of southern 
planters, and encouraged that administration to assess planters' 
grievances in the light of official experience with the tea 
planters of north-east India. Calcutta, unlike Madras, was both 
conversant with the prevailing conditions of labour on plantations, 
and experienced in drafting labour codes. Despite the fact that 
the findings of the 1896 Committee of Enquiry effectively 
legitimized the planters' campaign for legislative reform, the 
Government of India in 1899 appeared committed to equalizing the 
legal protection afforded to planters and labourers, and to 
minimizing government intervention in plantation labour recruitment 
practices. The contrasting attitudes of the governments of India 
and Madras marked all attempts to successfully draft a plantation 
labour statute for Madras Presidency. 
Between 1899 and 1902 the Madras Government's endeavours to 
compose penal contract legislation for southern plantations met 
with constant rejection in Calcutta. Where the Government of Madras 
37. Proceedings of the Council of the Governor of Fort St 
George, 7th April, 1899, p 114 . 
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saw itself as legislating largely to redress the local planters' 
hardships, the Government of India did not. Overall, Calcutta's 
objections reflected a heightened desire to protect labour, and to 
limit the application of the law to circumstances whic« it 
considered exceptional. In 1901 the Government of India found 
unacceptable Madras' intention to make the new law accessible to 
all estates greater than twenty acres irrespective of whether they 
produced coffee, tea, pepper, cardamoms or cinchona 38 • Calcutta 
adopted the ca~e of Assam plantations as its reference point, and 
indicated that in south India an enhanced labour law was also only 
warranted where labour was imported over long distances and at 
considerable expense to the employer 39 The Government of India 
similarly opposed Madras' proposal that any estate made subject to 
the new Act should retain its access to Act XII I of 1859 40 . At 
the same time Calcutta considered that the draft clauses which 
provided for the punishment of maistris who failed to supply 
labourers were unacceptable, "as they throw the burden of proof on 
38. I.O.L.R., Public and Judicial Department, Annual 
Departmental Papers, 1902, No. 2545, T. W. Holderness, 
Secretary to Government of India (Department of Revenue 
and Agriculture-Emigration) to Chief Secretary to 
Government of Madras, 5th Jan., 1901, Para. 2. 
39. Ibid. 
40. Ibid. 
"' 
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the maistry and impose severe penalties" 41 Madras was 
instructed to use the Assam Labour Law as its guide, and to subject 
maistris and labourers to penalties which were not in excess of 
those contained in that Law for similar offences 42 Nor .were 
offences by planters to be treated more lightly than in north-east 
India 43 • Additionally, the Government of India sought to bolster 
the protection afforded to the labourer by suggesting that contract 
forms should be required to state wage rates, the size of advances, 
the nature of employment, the length of the working day, and the 
number of working days per month 44. With the same object in 
view, Calcutta opposed the application of criminal penalties to 
cases of drunkenness and disobedience, and recommended that the 
circumstances in which a magistrate was empowered to release a 
labourer from a contract should be widened 45 
41. Ibid., Para. 5. 
42 • .!J:!.ig. 
43. Ibid. 
44. Ibid., Para.6. 
45. I.O.L.R., Public and Judicial Department, Annual 
Departmental Papers, 1902, No. 2545, J. B. Fuller, 
Secretary to the Government of India, Department of 
Revenue and Agriculture (Emigration), to the Chief 
Secretary to the Government of Madras, 4th April, 1902. 
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The Government of Madras displayed considerable resistance to 
recasting the bill to comply with the Government of India's 
recommendations. In particular, the Madras administration strove to 
retain Act XIII alongside the new estate labour law. This provision 
• 
had been incorporated into the 1900 draft bill, and was strenuously 
rejected by Calcutta in both the initial and subsequent versions of 
46 the new Act Despite this opposition, the Government of Madras 
attempted to evade compliance with Calcutta's wishes as late as 
1902, by arguing that concurrent application would be prevented 
inasmuch as contracts made under one act could not be enforced 
under the other 47 Not surprisingly, this failed to satisfy the 
administration in Calcutta. 
The GOvernment of Madras' obstinate refusal to comply with 
Calcutta's directive reflected the deterioration in relations 
between the two administrations which had occurred during curzon's 
term as Viceroy. Both Sir Arthur Havelock as Governor of Madras, 
and his successor, Baron Ampthill, had complained to the Secretary 
46. Ibid.; 
Ibid., Annual Departmental Papers, 1902, No. 2545, 
T. W. Holderness, Secretary to Government of India 
(Department of Revenue and Agriculture-Emigration), to 
Chief Secretary to Government of Madras. 5th Jan., 1901. 
47. Ibid., Annual Departmental Papers, 1902, No. 2545, 
G. s. Forbes, Agricultural Chief Secretary, Government of 
Madras, to Secretary to Government of India, Department 
of Agriculture and Revenue, 7th July, 1902. 
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of State, George Hamilton, that Curzon was unduly intent on 
centralizing authority in Calcutta, and that his manner was brusque 
and overbearing 48 In 1901 Ampthill, in his correspondence with 
Hamilton, pointedly accused Curzon of victimising the Maaras 
administration 49 . Hamilton interceded to placate Ampthill, while 
curzon adopted a more conciliatory tone in his dealings with the 
Governor of Madras 50 • By the end of the following year Calcutta 
had partly succeeded in bringing Madras to heel over the new 
plantation labour bill. The Madras Planters• Labour Law (Act I of 
1903) in its final form prevented the simultaneous operation of Act 
XIII in any geographic region in which the new law applied 51 
Nevertheless, 6n other points the Government of India was less 
successfut in imposing its will on the Government of Madras. As a 
result, the new labour law met with vigorous opposition from some 
Indian members of the Madras legislature, and from Indian owned 
newspapers throughout India. 
The Madras Planters• Labour Law was introduced to the 
48. Dilks, op. cit., pp 78-79. 
49. Ibid., p 79. 
so. Hamilton to Ampthill, 23rd oct. and 13th Dec., 1901, in 
Ibid. 
51. Madras Planters' Labour Law, (Madras Act I of 1903), 
Section 2, Reprinted in U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 
1903, pp 179-192. 
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Governor's Council in Madras in December, 1902. The contents of the 
Act were vigorously opposed by two of the five Indians who were 
permanent members of the Council. K. Perraju Pantulu and 
Ratnasabhapati Pillai argued that the Act was unnecessacy, 
anachronistic and unjust. They reasoned that in India the abundance 
of impoverished labourers favoured the planter 52 • This Act would 
markedly strengthen the power of the planter in dealing with his 
employees who were ignorant, incapable of collective action and 
physically isolated on their estates 53 • While Perraju ~and 
Ratnasabhapati criticized the Act because it contradicted the 
principles of natural justice, they also regarded it as an 
instrument of iinperial oppression. Perraju clai'rried that it was 
unreasonable that the law would be applicable only to estates 
greater than twenty acres which produced tea, coffee or cinchona, 
and rhetorically challenged the government to explain why producers 
of cotton or foodstuffs had been excluded 54 Plainly, Perraju 
believed that the answer lay in the nationality of the producer, 
and not in the ultimate destination of the crop, for cotton, like 
tea and coffee, was produced for export. 
52. Proceedings of the Council of the Governor of Fort St 
George, 15th Dec, 1902, p 213. 
53. Ibid. 
54. Ibid., p 216. 
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Following its presentation in the Madras legislature, the 
Madras Planters' Labour Law was referred_ to a Select Committee for 
consideration. The Governor of Madras, Baron Ampthill, failed to 
appoint either of the two dissenting Indian members to ~hat 
Committee, and instead chose G. Srinivasa Rao on the grounds that 
he originated in Madura, a labour recruiting district 55 • The 
Governor•s action was a blatant attempt to avoid political 
friction, and it attracted attention both at home and within India. 
In the British House of Commons the secretary of State's attention 
was directed to their omission by c. E. Schwann, the Member for 
Manchester North. Schwann was a committee member of the 
parliamentary .lobby group formed by William Wedderburn in 1893. 
Although ·the group was in principle committed only to overseeing 
just treatment of Indian issues in the House of Commons, in 
practice it was firmly tied to the British Committee of the Indian 
National 56 Congress In addressing the Secretary of State 
Schwann alleged that the Act would establish a form of "legalized 
55. Ibid. 
56. Mary Cumpston, "Some Early Indian Nationalists and their 
Allies in the British Parliament, 1851-1906", English 
Historical Review, Vol.LXXVI, April, 1961, pp 295-296. 
Sir William Wedderburn was the first Chairman of the 
British Committee of the !.N.C. A number of the committee 
members of the I.N.C in Britain also served as committee 
members to the parliamentary group. These included 
w. S. Caine, J. E. Ellis, and w. S. B. McLaren. 
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slavery" on plantations in British India 57 • Schwann•s question 
was plainly intended to embarrass the Secretary of State for he 
quickly followed it with a query concerning the death of an 
absconding labourer in cachar at the hands of a plantation manager, 
the details of the event being conveyed by Schwann in lurid 
language 58 In reply, the Secretary of State declared that the 
provisions of the Act were akin to labour legislation already 
operating in India, in other British colonies, and within Great 
Britain itself 59 The composition of the Select Committee was 
also said to be satisfactory since it included "a native of 
India" 60 
In Madras the largest Tamil daily, the Swadesamitran, was 
less than satisfied with Srinivasa Rao's appointment, and expressed 
its regret that as an Indian he had not differed from his European 
colleagues in recommending that the protection afforded to the 
labourer by the Act should be further reduced 61 . The Act itself 
57. Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 1903, Vol. CXVIII, 26th 
Feb, 1903, Question No.925. 
58. Ibid., Question No.926. 
59. I.O.L.R., Public and Judicial Department, Annual 
Departmental Papers, 1903, No. 39. 
60. Ibid. 
61. Madras Native Newspaper Reports, 1903, Report No. 6, 
p 81, Swadesamitran, 5th Feb., 1903. 
.., 
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was described by the Swadesamitran as evidence that the Madras 
Government "which does not evince sufficient interest in the 
advancement of the agricultural classes", was prepared to attend to 
"all the complaints of the Anglo-:.Indian planters and support their 
cause" 
62 The Madras Planters' Labour Law was plainly regarded 
by the nationalist elements in Madras as an instrument of imperial 
exploitation, and this perception added a novel and dynamic 
dimension to the questions of judicial equity which arose during 
the Act's troubled passage through the Governor's Council. 
In its final form the Madras Planters' Labour Law tilted the 
judicial scales decidedly in the planters' favour. This was evident 
in many of the Act's provisions including Section 10 which 
effectively prevented plantation labourers from breaking their 
contracts without giving three months' written notice. Similarly, 
where a contracted labourer was convicted for deserting his estate, 
Section 32 provided that the period of his imprisonment would be 
added to the term of his labour contract. Imprisonment no longer 
released the labourer from his obligation to complete his contract, 
as had been the case under Act XIII. However, under Act I a 
labourer facing trial could avoid imprisonment by agreeing to 
62. Ibid., 1903, Report No.4, p 58, Swadesamitran, 21st Jan., 
1903. 
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return to work. The labourer's return to his estate was made more 
certain by Section 33 of Act I which permitted magistrates to place 
a labourer in the physical custody of his employer. In short, it 
was now work, rather .than prison, that had become unavoidabl~ for 
plantation labourers facing prosecution. These new provisions 
faithfully reflected the planters • primary concern that the law 
assist them in retaining their labour. 
The presentation of the Madras Planters' Labour Law (Act I) 
before the Governor's Council in Madras in February, 1903 provoked 
a racial and political division within the legislature. Of the 
eight Indian members, four voiced their strong objection to the Act 
while no European member joined them. The attack on the government 
was led by the same members who had initially opposed the bill in 
the previous December, and they were now joined by L. A. 
Govindaraghava Aiyar and c. Sankaran Nair 63 • Sankaran Nair's 
entry into the debate was particularly significant for although he 
had served the I.N.C. by presiding over its annual session in 1897, 
his support for Congress' campaigns to date had often been half-
hearted 64 . On the other hand, the provisions of Act I were most 
63. Proceedings of the Council of the Governor of Fort St 
George, 27th Feb., 1903, pp 9 83; 3rd March, 1903, 
pp 87-97. 
64. John R. McLane, Indian Nationalism and the Early 
Congress, Princeton, 1977, p 104. 
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strenuously defended by G. Stokes, former Chief Secretary to the 
Government of Madras and mover of the bill; by G. Acworth, the 
Planting Member, and by Sir G. Arbuthnot, the Mercantile Member, 
both of whom had personal interests in tea and coffee estates. • 
The aim of the Indian members' attack on the Madras Planters' 
Labour Law was to publicly expose the inequitable treatment of the 
labourer under the Act, for they were well aware from the outset 
65 they could not command the necessary numbers to amend the law . 
They recognized that it was "against the spirit of modern 
legislation to convert breaches of civil contract into penal 
offences" 66 ; and moved that in the new plantation labour law the 
nature of imprisonment should be changed from rigorous to 
simple 67 and that the provision permitting a labourer to be 
doubly punished for the same offence be abandoned 68 . Similarly, 
they argued that it was unjust that the fine imposed on a planter 
who willfully and maliciously brought about the wrongful arrest of 
a labourer was at the magistrate's discretion, and in any case 
65. G. Subramania Iyer, Some Economic Aspects of British Rule 
in India, Madras, 1903, p 185. 
66. Proceedings of the Council of the Governor of Fort St 
George, 27th Feb., 1903, p 23. 
67. Ibid. 
68. Ibid., p 78. 
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could not exceed Rs.SO. 69 • By comparison, in Assam such a fine 
was mandatory rather than optional. Most importantly, they objected 
to the impediments which Act I placed in the path of a labourer who 
wished to rescind his contract. Under the Act a labourer who fa~ed 
to give his employer three months~ notice of his intention to leave 
could only be legally released from his contract if he could 
convince a magistrate that he had "reasonable grounds" for breaking 
the agreement, had repaid any advance he had received, and had 
forfeited to his employer 3 annas for every working day remaining 
in the unexpired term of his contract 70 • An amendment moved by 
the Indian members of the Council to reduce the penalties imposed 
on the labourer' for breaking his contract was lost, as was every 
other amendment which they proposed to reduce the labourer's 
obligations under the Act. Although the Madras Planters• Labour Law 
had been loosely based on the plantation labour code of Assam, it 
was readily apparent that in southern India the labourer would be 
more tightly bound and more harshly punished than his northern 
counterpart. 
Opponents of Act I noted correctly that while the Government 
of Madras was content to emulate those provisions of the Assam 
69. Ibid., p 80. 
70. Madras Planters' Labour Law, (Act I of 1903), 
op. cit., Section 10. 
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Labour Act which assisted planters, they ignored those which 
protected the labourer 71 Planters in Madras Presidency, unlike 
their counterparts in Assam, were not legally obliged under the new 
Act to pay a minimum monthly· wage to their labourers, or to lim•t 
the working day to eight hours. Nor were they required to 
compensate labourers who were injured on their estates. In ·part, 
the Government was unwilling to regulate work practices because 
this would require the establishment of substantial administrative 
machinery 72 In a similar fashion, the inspection of plantation 
water supplies, hoUsing, sanitation and medical aid which the 
planter was legally bound to provide for resident labourers 73 
was left to the discretion of district officials 74 • Nor did the 
Government of Madras establish guidelines to which they could 
refer. As a result, the final form of the Madras Planters• Labour 
Law largely relieved the Government of Madras of the responsibility 
of ensuring minimum standards of plantation labour conditions. 
It was readily apparent to the Indian opponents of Act I that 
71. Government of Madras, Proceedings of the Council of the 
Governor of Fort StGeorge, 3rd March, 1903, p 97. 
72. Ibid., 27th Feb., 1903, pp 46, 67. 
73. The Madras Planters• Labour Law (Act I of 1903), 
op. cit., Section 15. 
74. Ibid., Section 42. 
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the new law was out of accord with the Government of India's 
guidelines for legislation of this kind. By requiring a labourer to 
demonstrate before a magistrate that he had reasonable grounds for 
rescinding a contract, members contended that the Government .of 
Madras was acting against Calcutta's expressed desire that the 
labourer be free to end his contract at any time given that the 
advance had been repaid and forfeit money paid 75 • Critics of 
Act I argued that the labourer's fear and ignorance of authority 
would effectively preclude him from legally severing his tie to the 
planter 76 • In response the Advocate-General, J. E. P. Wallis, 
informed critics of the Government of Madras that they had "lost 
sight of the fact that these sections were an indulgence to the 
labourer" 77 Where the protection of labour was regarded as a 
concession, it was evident that the Madras administration, despite 
directives from Calcutta, did not accept an obligation to protect 
labour and capital equally in industrial labour law. At the same 
time, the weakness of those measures designed to safeguard labour 
welfare made a mockery of Calcutta's directive that magistrates 
should enforce labour contracts only where they were convinced that 
75. Proceedings of the Council of the Governor of Fort st 
George, 3rd March, 1903, p 94. 
76. Ibid., 27th Feb., 1903, p 58. 
77. Ibid., 3rd March, 1903, p 53. 
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labour had been fairly treated 78 Where conditions of labour 
were neither regulated nor inspected, no impartial assessment of 
the work place could be available to the courts. 
The Government of India had attempted to impose its view~ on 
the Madras administration but having met with considerable 
resistance, Calcutta was plainly prepared to accept a pOlitical 
compromise in 1903. Although this may well reflect Calcutta's 
limited capacity to curb the autonomy of a provincial 
administration, it is ·important to note that recession in the tea 
industry had already prompted the Government of India under Curzon 
to make important concessions to tea producers in north~east India 
in the Assam L~bour and Emigration Act (Act VI of 1901). Despite 
the co~i~ed opposition of the Assam Chief Commissioner, Sir Henry 
Cotton, and several Indian Members of the Indian Legislative 
Council, Curzon's administration capitulated to pressure exerted by 
the Indian Tea Association to both reduce and delay the 
implementation of higher minimum wage rates in Assam tea 
gardens 79 • Although these concessions were of an economic rather 
than a judicial nature, they opened a gap between the Government of 
India's professed position and the reality of plantation labour 
78. I.O.L.R., Public and Judicial Department, Annual 
Departmental Papers, 1899, No. 287, Resolution of Revenue 
and Agriculture (Emigration) Department, 21st Jan., 1899. 
79. Renford, op. cit., pp 71-73. 
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law. So too, the final form of The Madras Planters• Labour Law led 
K. Perraju to conclude in the Governor• s Council that, opinions 
"enunciated by the Government of India <_:>n the subject of extending 
penal servitude to breaches of civil contract are more liberal Qhan 
those that resulted in the present Bill" 80 
None of the critiqisms voiced by Indian Members of the Madras 
legislature appeared to sway proponents of the Act. The Government 
of Madras led by Ampthill was intent upon passing legislation which 
would be an effective means of countering fraud committed by 
labourers and maistris which it described "as an evil of great 
magnitude, demoralising to the labourer and crippling to the 
planter and one which it is the duty of the state to correct" 81 
These economic and moral imperatives had led it to enact 
legislation which was decidedly one-sided. 
At the same time as the Government of Madras was redressing 
the planters• labour difficulties it was confronted with a similar 
request from the landowners of Tanjore. In Tanjore District the 
growing recruitment of depressed class workers for the sugar and 
nascent rubber estates of the Malay peninsula contributed greatly 
to an increasing shortage of agricultural labour. At its height, 
80. Proceedings of the Council of the Governor of Fort st 
George, 3rd March, 1903, p 94. 
81. Ibid., 15th Dec., 1902, p 208. 
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emigration removed up to 30 per cent of the able-bodied male work 
force 82 , and this fact has led Kathleen Gough to describe 
Tanjore as the Madrasi district "most intensively exploited" as a 
human "service station for British plantations" 83 A peak• in 
emigration to Malaya in 1900 84 was soon followed by the 
presentation of a memorial from the Tanjore Mahajana Sabha 
requesting that government desist from aiding emigration abroad, 
and instead lend its support to Indian mirasdars in enforcing 
85 labour agreements 
The presentation of the Tan jere mirasdars' memorial 
undermined the nationalists' attack on Act I in the Madras 
Legislative Council. The Planting Member, Acworth, rebuffed Indian 
Members• criticism of the new plantation labour law by pointing out 
that some of their compatriots also looked to the colonial state to 
enact legislation which would alleviate their labour problems 86 
82. Kathleen Gough, "Colonial Economics in Southeast India", 
Economic and Political Weekly, 26th March, 1977, 
p 549. 
83. Ibid. 
84. Sandhu, op.cit., pp 304-305. 
85. Proceedings of the Council of the Governor of Fort St 
George, 3rd March, 1903, p 92. See also Madras Native 
Newspaper Reports, 1903, Report No.8, p 101, 
Swadesamitran, 21st Feb., 1903. 
86. Proceedings of the council of the Governor of Fort St 
George, 1903, 3rd March, 1903, p 92. 
200 
Acworth's argument was both timely and effective for both the 
I.N.C. and its members within the Madras legislature were currently 
divided over the issue of landlord support of the nationalist 
movement. Many !.N.C. members recognized the Indian landlord c~ss 
as an integral part of the Indian economic system, and one which 
could provide substantial financial assistance to the nat-ionalist 
cause. In Madras the link between the elected Indian members of the 
Madras legislature and landholding was more intimate than in other 
provinces, chiefly because investment in land was "much in favour 
with the professional classes" 87 • Between 1893 and 1898 many 
Madras Congressmen retained their seats on the Council largely 
because they ~ad defended the economic interests of substantial 
h d ' 88 land ol ers However, by the turn of the century the I.N.C. 
contained a growing number who believed that the Congress' 
association with large landowners was a political liability since 
it allowed the colonial regime to pose as the protector of the 
poor 89 In 1903 the Madras legislature included nationalists 
from both camps. Members such as P. Ratnasabhapati, who had opposed 
the Madras government's attempt to increase the occupancy rights of 
87. McLane, op. cit., p 239 and note as. 
88. Ibid., p 239. 
89. Ibid., p 230. 
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tenants at the expense of their landlords in 1898 90 , stood 
alongside c. Sankaran Nair and K. Perraju, who believed that 
landlords had "not done anything socially or politically to merit 
state aid or protection" 91 . Although Sankaran Nair himself own.ed 
rent collecting rights in his native Malabar 92 he was also a 
dedicated social reformer 93 committed to the legal enhancement 
of tenants' rights 94 The inhospitable treatment inflicted upon 
Sankaran Nair by Tamil Brahmans within the Madras 95 Congress , 
and the philosophy of Non-Brahmanism, may well have been additional 
catalysts behind his anti-mirasdar stance 96 ; especially as 
grievances against Brahman hegemony had already been politically 
90. !Qig., p 238. 
91. K. Perraju, "Impartial Estates in India", Hindustan 
Review and Kayastha Samachar, Vol.VII, No. 5, May, 1903, 
p 424, quoted in McLane, op. cit., p 231. 
92. Ibid., p 206. 
93. K. P. S. Menon, C. Sankaran Nair, Delhi, 1967, pp 28-31. 
94. McLane, op. cit., p 231. 
95. Ibid., p 102. 
96. ~. p 231. McLane cites biographical data from 
the Statesman, 6th Jan., 1901, which indicated that 
Sankaran Nair took up the issue of tenant rights as an 
expression of Nair anti-Brahmanism. 
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well aired by Malayali emigrants to Madras city in the 1890s 97 
In this particular instance, Sankaran Nair's defence of the Tanjore 
tenantry could only be won at the expense of their predominantly 
98 Brahman landlords 
• 
Despite the fact that all three men were vocal in their 
criticism of Act I, their failure to uniformly disassociate the 
nationalist cause from the economic self-interest of Tanjore 
mirasdars seriously weakened their portrayal of Act I as the action 
of a partisan, imperial administration shamelessly bolstering 
colonial enterprise. Moreover, as mirasdar tenure was commonly 
associated with severe exploitation of the agricultural labourer, 
proponents of Act I were left free to argue that the Act would 
safeguard the rural worker's route to emancipation by ensuring that 
alternative employment on plantations would continue to be 
available 99 . Although nationalists had found it simple to oppose 
bills which fostered British capital, their position on legislation 
97. Robin Jeffrey, ''A Note on the Malay ali Origins of 
Anti-Brahrnanism_ in South India", Indian Economic and 
Social History Review, 1977, Vol. XIV, No.2, pp 255 268. 
98. David Washbrook, "Political Change in a Stable Society: 
Tanjore District 1880 to 1920", in C. J. Baker and 
D. A. Washbrook (Ed.), South India: Political 
Institutions and Political Change 1880 1940, Delhi, 
1975, p 24. Washbrook claims that a high percentage of 
the wealthiest mirasdars in Tanjore District were 
Brahman. 
99. Proceedings of the Council of the Governor of Fort St 
George, 3rd March, 1903, pp 95 96. 
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which afforded protection to Indian landlords had proved more 
elusive. In the past, the tie between Indian capitalists and 
Congress had similarly led nationalists in other regions to adopt 
positions on mining and factory legislation which were incompat~le 
with their stance against European enterprise in India. In the 
Madras legislature the Planting Member had successfully employed 
the Tanjore landholders • memorial to drive a wedge through the 
opposition's ranks. 
While the Government of Madras had experienced no difficulty 
in overriding the objections of Indian councillors to Act I, it had 
yet to face the wider and more biting criticism of the Indian 
press. The. passage of the Madras Planters• Labour Law attracted 
widespread' censure in Indian newspapers. Most commonly the Indian 
press concentrated its criticism on the inequity of the Act, while 
its more politicised elements were prompted to launch a bitter 
nationalist and racialist attack upon the administration of British 
India. In Madras the Swadesamitran, under the editorial leadership 
of the nationalist G. Subramania Iyer, played the protagonist • s 
role. In March, 1903 it declared the planters• assertion that 
labourers were well treated and well paid on estates "not 
believable" 100 It argued that exceptional legislation, such as 
100. Madras Native Newspaper Reports, 1903, Report No.lO, 
p 116, Swadesamitran, 4th March, 1903. 
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Act I, could only be required because plantation labour conditions 
were unsatisfactory 101 and that the new law would lead to a 
system of legalized slavery 102 • The passage of Act I also drew 
scornful ire from the Hindu. It labelled the Planting Membe~ • s 
description of plantations as an "earthly paradise .... (where) the 
coolie ... has all the advantages which a community requires short 
of cricket and lawn tennis" as "twaddle" 103 In the opinion of 
the Hindu, Act I would generate a new system of agricultural 
slavery far harsher than that which had existed in the Indian 
countryside some fifty years beforehand 104 • Similar sentiments 
were expressed in the H_indu Nesan, the Sasilekha, the 
Prapanchatharaki- and the Prapanchamitran in Madras 105 
' 
the 
Dakshana Deepam in Salem 106 , the Manorama and Kerala Pratika in 
101. Ibid. 
102. Ibid., 1903, Report No.ll, p 124, Swadesamitran, 
13th March, 1903. 
103. Hindu, 4th March, 1903, p 4. 
104. Ibid. 
105. Madras Native Newspaper Reports, 1903, Report No. 10, 
pp 116 117, Hindu Nesan, 4th March, 1903; Sasilekha, 3rd 
March, 1903; Prapanchatharaki, 6th March, 1903; 
Prapanchamitran, 6th March, 1903. 
106. Ibid., p 117, Dakshana Oeepam, 7th March, 1903. 
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Calicut 107 In Bombay the Kaiser-i-Hind, a leading Anglo-
Gujurati weekly, was fired by the conflict taking place in Madras 
and promptly printed an article by Subramania Iyer which damned the 
Madras administration for acquiescing to the demands "of a m~t 
selfish class .•• (to) enslave a voiceless and helpless 
people" 108 Reaction was equally unfavourable in the national 
capital. There the Bengalee and the Bengal Times claimed that the 
"slave Bill of Madras" would reproduce the shameful treatment of 
labour which had marked the development of the Assam tea 
gardens 109 . The Benqalee noted the wider economic ends that the 
legislation would serve; "It will be enforcing, among other things, 
a legalized system of slavery that foreign capital is to be 
attracted -to this country, or already having come into this 
country, is to be induced to stay on" 110 The enactment of Act 
I was plainly seen as the action of an alien administration 
compliantly fostering the imperialist exploitation of the Indian 
107. IQ19., 1903, Report No.11, p 117, Kerala Pratika, 
28th Feb., 1903; Ibid., 1903, Report No. 11, p 125, 
Manorama, 9th March, 1903. 
108. Report on the Native Newspapers of Bombay Presidency, 
1903, Report No.11, Kaiser i-Hind, 8th March, 1903. 
109. Benqalee, 15th Feb., 1903, p 4. 
Bengal Times, 18th Feb., 1903, p 6. 
110. Bengalee, op. cit. 
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worker. 
However, the most direct and strident political attack on the 
structure of British ·colonial government took place in Madras, 
rather than in the acknowledged centres of nationalist agitat~n. 
In Miidras the Swadesamitran, the Hindu and the Hindu Nesan all 
argued that the undue influence which planters had exerted -in the 
Governor • s council made Indian participation in the legislative 
process farcical. "It would be better if there was nothing like a 
Legislative Council at all", opined the swadesamitran, "for then 
the Governor and his Councillors alone would sit for legislating 
and use their own discretion; but not under the pretext of allowing 
the natives to" take part in the Legislative council" 111 In a 
similar vein the Hindu Nesan claimed the Madras Government's 
ability to enact "laws and regulations favourable to the Anglo 
Indians and in defiance of public opinion", contributed to rising 
dissatisfaction among the Indian population 112 • At the same 
time, the Hindu asserted that the passage of Act I demonstrated 
that "the interests of handful of European planters are more 
important to those who are appointed to rule over us than the 
111. Madras Native Newspaper Reports, 1903, op. cit., Report 
No.lO, p 116, Swadesamitran, 4th March, 1903. 
112. Ibid., Report No.10, pp 116-117, Hindu Nesan, 4th March, 
1903. 
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goodwill of the 40 millions who contribute to their 
maintenance" 113 The Hindu Nesan ended its commentary with a 
clear appeal to nationalist unity, "But we, the people of this 
country, are ourselves the cause of our misfortune. We have •no 
union among us, and so we have no privileges to enjoy and no voice 
to speak" 114 
There can be no doubt that the enactment of the Madras 
Planters' Labour Law increased the disaffection of the Indian 
National Congress in Madras for their British rulers. G. Subramania 
Iyer who had helped found the I.N.C. in Madras, and whose political 
views were far from extreme, soundly condemned the Madras 
administration for acting in defiance of educated, Indian opinion. 
Following the passage of Act I he wrote; 
"The reformed Legislative Council so far as the 
influence of public opinion on Government is concerned, 
is worse than a failure. Indian members under the old 
regime, were able to exercise some real and effective 
influence on Government. Then there was a sincere 
desire on the part of Government to know Indian opinion 
and give effect to it as far as possible. There was a 
time when Bills, before they were introduced into the 
Legislative Councils, used to be sent to public bodies 
and select individuals for their opinions. But, now, 
the only public bodies consulted are the Chambers of 
Commerce . . . No individual Indians nor Indian public 
bodies were consulted . .... Official (Council) members 
are bound to vote on the side of Government whether 
they vote according to or against their conscience. 
113. Hindu, 4th March, 1903. 
114. Madras Native Newspaper Reports, 1903, Report No.10, 
pp 116~117, Hindu Nesan, 4th March, 1903. 
Never was a system of legislation a more solemn farce 
than the Indian system is at present; and never did the 
Legislative Council of Madras show less fairness or 
dignity than it did in 1f?rrying through this hateful 
measure in March, 1903" • 
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• 
The passing of Act I not only hardened Indian opinion against 
British political domination but it is highly probable that it 
contributed to the recasting of the !.N.C. in a less elitist mould 
after 1903. The passing of Act I signified the triumph of economic 
concerns over a number of non-economic forces which had acted to 
restrain the Government of Madras between 1896 and 1903: Curzon • s 
centralism, the Government of India's humanitarian impulse and the 
overtly politicised humanitarianism of the Indian press and the 
I.N.c .• However, debate in the Madras legislature had also 
demonstrated that the !.N.C. could no longer afford to ignore those 
issues, such as tenants' rights, which had divided its membership 
since its foundation 116 • Moreover, the alignment of the Indian 
press throughout British India alongside, and even ahead of, the 
leading nationalist opponents of Act I may also have hastened the 
growing rift between the I.N.C. and landlords in Madras Presidency 
and further afield. In order both to tap the groundswell of popular 
nationalist sentiment evident in the Indian press and to restrain 
115. Iyer, op. cit., pp 183-185. 
116. McLane, op. cit., pp 95, 212, 227, 230-242. 
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the Government of Madras through its humanitarian appeals on behalf 
of labour, the I.N.C. itself had to be above political reproach. At 
the same time, Act I also ensured that the planting sector would 
remain a target of nationalist attack. By according planuers 
preferential treatment under the law, Act I not only made future 
conflict between planters and nationalists more likely but it 
helped to define the lines along which that conflict would run. 
In 1904 the Madras Planters Labour Law came into operation in 
Nilgiri District and the Wynaad taluk of Malabar. These were the 
leading planting regions of Madras Presidency employing 
approximately 45,000 annually migrating workers between 
them 117 In the lesser planting districts of Salem, Madura and 
Tinnevelly, many planters preferred that Act XIII be 
retained 118 As these planters drew largely on local labour 
supplies their losses from unrecovered advances were low and they 
had little need for the tighter contractual arrangements laid down 
in Act I. 
117. No accurate record of plantation labour numbers is 
available. The figure given here has been estimated from 
acreage statistics, and from the results of the Indian 
Census of Nilgiri District in 1901 and in 1911. 
(Plantation acreage data was drawn from: 
Report on the Conditions of Tea Garden Labour in the 
Ouars of Bengal. in Madras. and in Ceylon, op. cit., 
p 9; Francis, op. cit., pp 172, 177; Griffiths, 
op. cit., p 163. Local labour has been excluded from the 
estimate. See Report of the South of India Planters' 
Enquiry Committee, op. cit., pp 10, 94.) 
118. U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1903, pp 31-47. 
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In the Nilgiri hills and the Wynaad the operation of the 
Madras Planters' Labour Law wrought enormous changes in the 
relationship between labour and capital on plantations. The formal 
legal power with which planters had been invested by the colol'Mlal 
state was coupled to the informal control which they already 
derived from the maietri system of recruitment. As a result, 
planters were able to effectively wield their enhanced authority to 
prevent labour's permanent desertion of estates. Under Act I the 
existing system of labour contracting became more binding. The pre-
colonial mechanism of debt bonding was now enhanced by the creation 
of a modern agro-industrial labour market in which the worker • s 
freedom was legaliy and severely constrained. Additionally, the 
operation of the Act confirmed and compounded the maistri's role ·as 
planter's agent. For a quarter of a century the application of the 
Madras Planters' Labour Law ensured that plantation labour 
relations in the Nilgiri hills would be chiefly characterised by 
the planter's coercion of his employee. 
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CHAPTER 5 
COERCION AND COMPETITION IN THE PLANTATION LABOUR MARKET • 
Between December, 1904 and November, 1927, the Madras 
Planters' Labour Law governed all plantation labour contracts 
between migrating workers and estates in both Nilgiri District and 
the Wynaad taluk of Malabar. The new Act enhanced the coercive 
power which planters had derived from its predecessor, Act XIII of 
1859, through provisions which compelled workers to complete _their 
labour contracts and placed defaulting workers who had been brought 
to trial in the physical custody of their employers. By exploiting 
these provisions planters hoped to combat an increasing shortfall 
in plantation labour supply. As a result, cases against labour not 
only increased dramatically throughout the period but also made up 
a growing proportion of all cases instituted under Act I. Rapid 
increases in the number of cases initiated against labour can be 
directly correlated with periods of inadequate labour supply. These 
developments were most pronounced in the Gudalur taluk of Nilgiri 
District and in the Wynaad taluk of Malabar where inferior 
conditions of labour encouraged labour's desertion of estates. In 
these regions the growth of corporate ownership provided an 
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additional spur to prosecution of labour since companies proved to 
be more litigious than individual proprietors. The emergent pattern 
of labour cases throughout the Nilgiri hills faithfully reflected 
the planters' intention to secure an economic advantage .by 
restricting the interplay of market forces for plantation labour. 
Nevertheless, Nilgiri planters were never able to exercise 
full control over the plantation labour market in south India. 
Their efforts were thwarted initially by their inability to compel 
maistris to supply labour under Act I and also by the widespread 
non-service of warrants issued under the Act. Although these 
difficulties were largely overcome, competition for plantation 
labour in south 'India increased after 1908 due both to the rapid 
growth of rubber estates, particularly in Ceylon and Malaya, and 
the expansion of planting corporations in the Nilgiri hills. In 
these circumstances Act I provided planters with a relatively 
effective means of coercing their contracted labour but it could 
not deliver complete authority over the burgeoning labour market 
into their hands. 
• • • • • • • • 
The application of Act I to plantation labour cases in the 
Nilgiri hills provided planters with a relatively inexpensive and 
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simple means of holding contracted plantation labour against its 
will. The report of the Acting Magistrate of Malabar in 1913, 
C. A. Innes, provides a rare view of the courts 1 usual procedure in 
a breach of contract case; 
"on the day of the trial the Magistrate begins by 
asking the accused if he contracted with the maistry. 
If he denies having done so or alleges that he received 
no advance, the case is tried on its merits. But if be 
admits the contract, before his statement is formally 
recorded, the maistry is permitted to interview him in 
the dock. Very often the coaly gives some excuse for 
his failure to appear for work and professes his 
willingness to go to work. And in that case the maistry 
is permitted to wifhdraw his complaint and the cooly 
goes off with him" . 
• 
In granting physical custody of the labourer to the planter or 
maistri, Act I of 1903 conferred an enormous advantage on the side 
of capital which had been notably absent in Act XIII of 1859. Under 
the Breach of Contract Act (Act XIII of 1859) labourers could be 
ordered by magistrates to complete their contracts, but since they 
were not handed over to their employers, many labourers chose to 
abscond again rather than return to their estates. EmploYers were 
frequently forced to bring an absconding worker to court on two 
separate occasions in order to win legal restitution. 
1. I.O.L.R., Annual Reports on the Workings of the Madras 
Planters• Labour Law of 1903, 1914, G.O. No.589, 
C. A. Innes, Acting Magistrate of Malabar, to Chief 
Secretary to Government, 16th Feb., 1914. Note that all 
reports refer to the preceding year. 
The 
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advantages of the new plantation labour law for employers of labour 
were manifold: the deserting labourer need "Only be prosecuted once, 
the labourer's return to the estate could be secured before his 
trial formally began and was guaranteed by placing the labour~ in 
his employer's hands, the labourer's continued presence on the 
plantation could be assured by greater vigilance. In short, -for the 
small cost of issuing a warrant, Act I granted planters and 
maistris a simple mechanism by which absconders could be returned 
to estates. The popularity of this measure in planting circles is 
reflected in the high rates of acquittal of cases brought against 
labour for desertion under Section 30 of the Act. These rates are 
displayed in Table 6. 
TABLE 6 AVERAGE RATES OF ACQUITTAL IN CASES INSTITUTED 
AGAINST PLANTATION LABOUR UNDER SECTION 30 OF 
ACT I, 1910-1927. 2 
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Average % of Cases 
Acquitted in 
Nilgiri District 
Average % of Cases 
Acquitted in 
Wynaad ~. Malabar 
District 
Average % of Total 
Cases Acquitted 1e 
in Nilgiri and 
Malabar Districts 
94\ 56\ 82\ 
While the ratio of acquittals to convictions in cases against 
plantation labourers was high throughout the whole of the planting 
region, the lower average proportion of acquittals obtained in 
Malabar m~y have been partly due to workers' reluctance to return 
to plantations in the Wynaad where conditions of labour were less 
satisfactory. Nevertheless, between 1918 and 1927 the proportion of 
acquittals in Malabar climbed steadily, and by 1927 stood at 82\ of 
labour cases instituted 3 
2 .. !Q!g., 1911-1928. In Nilgiri District the vast majority of 
cases were dismissed under Clause 248 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure (1898). In Malabar acquittals under 
this Clause approximated the number secured under 
Section 40 of Act I whereby offences could be compounded. 
Section 40 allowed an employer to seek a compensation 
payment of 4 annas per day for each day on which the 
labourer was absent from work and the repayment of 
outstanding advances in addition to a penal sentence for 
desertion. Note that cases transferred, cases pending, and 
cases in which the accused escaped or died have been 
excluded from calculations. 
3. Ibid., 1928, G.O. No.704L, H. R. Pate, District Magistrate 
of Malabar, to Secretary to Government, Public Works and 
Labour Department, 8th Feb., 1928. 
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The rates of acquittal displayed in Table 6 should be 
regarded as minimum rates, for Act I also allowed planters to gain 
custody of labourers who had already been convicted. Section 35 of 
the Act prevented defaulting labourers from being released frorn~he 
terms of a labour contract through conviction 4 As a result, 
employers were entitled to apply to a magistrate for custody of 
convicted labourers so that the terms of their labour contracts 
might be completed 5 • In instances where a labourer refused to be 
made over prior to conviction, the planter had merely to wait until 
the expiry of a labourer's sentence to gain custody of his 
employee 6 • Moreover, Act I ensured that convicted labourers could 
be made to ser~e out the full term for which they had originally 
been contracted. At the employer's request, periods of absence and 
imprisonment were added to the remaining term of a contract when 
the labourer was returned to his estate 7 • This provision greatly 
disadvantaged labour since it permitted double punishment (through 
imprisonment and forced labour) for the same offence, and prevented 
workers from exiting the plantation labour market freely. On the 
4. The Madras Planters• Labour Law (Act I of 1903), op. cit., 
Section 35. 
5. Ibid., Section 33. 
6. Ibid., Section 35. 
1. Ibid., Section 32. 
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other hand, Act I allowed planters to secure labourers on very 
favourable terms either before or after their conviction. 
The legal rights bestowed on labour contractors by Act I were 
further strengthened by malpractices associated with the servic@ of 
hand warrants. Unlike a common warrant which was dispatched to a 
police constable for service, custody of a hand warrant was given 
to the complainant. The complainant, usually the maistri, could 
then facilitate service of the warrant by identifying the 
defaulting labourer to the local police in his 8 home village • 
Although hand warrants were issued with the intention of increasing 
the efficiency of legal processes under Act I, it soon became 
apparent that .they were widely misused by maistris in their 
dealings with contracted labour. Maistris commonly took out hand 
warrants against labourers who remained resident on estates, but 
"who evinced any disposition to give trouble or bolt" 9 • The hand 
warrant, and the threat of further legal proceedings which it 
embodied, became a powerful weapon by which the maistri fostered 
compliance and docility in recalcitrant workers. Widespread misuse 
of hand warrants led to their temporary suspension in Nilgiri 
District in 1911, but in the Wynaad taluk of Malabar they continued 
8. U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1911, p 97. 
9. Ibid., 1912, p 79. 
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to be issued freely 10 
As the Madras Planters• Labour Law allowed employers in the 
Nilgiri hills enhanced legal and quasi-legal authority over their 
employees, it is hardly surprising that plantatiori labour bec.1!ne 
more frequently subject to prosecution for desertion and other 
breach of contract offences. Initially planters made only moderate 
use of the new Act. In 1906 a total of only 768 cases was 
filed 11 However, from 1908 dramatic increases in case numbers 
began to occur, and by 1919 a record total of 5,878 cases was 
recorded. Although plantation agriculture was expanding in the 
region, the rate of increase in plantation labour cases far 
outstripped the "growth of the plantation work force. Whereas in 
1906 two breach of contract cases were instituted for every one 
hundred plantation workers; the equivalent ratio in 1927 was in the 
10. Ibid., 1911, pp 96-97. Although the U.P.A.S.I. believed 
that the decision to suspend hand warrants had been taken 
by the District Magistrate, it is highly probable that 
the initiative lay with c. Sankaran Nair who was at this 
time a judge of the Madras High Court. Sankaran Nair 
called upon the District Magistrate to account for the 
fact that over two thousand warrants in Nilgiri District 
remained unexecuted. Sankaran Nair was unconvinced by the 
Magistrate's reply and ordered all warrants to be 
cancelled. (Menon, op. cit., p 51.) 
11. I.O.L.R., Annual Reports on the Workings of the Madras 
Planters' Labour Law of 1903, 1907, G.O. No.418, 
A. R. Knapp, Acting District Magistrate, Malabar, to 
Chief secretary to Government, 7th Feb., 1907; 
L. E. Buckley, District Magistrate, Nilgiris, to Chief 
Secretary to Government, 8th Feb., 1907. 
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order of five cases for each one hundred 12 labourers . Moreover, 
the prosecution rate in 1927 was by no means exceptional, and in 
all probability had been well exceeded in some intervening years, 
such as 1919, when the number of labour cases had jumped shar,ply 
higher. Under Act I of 1903 employers resorted to legal action for 
breach of contract offences with increasing frequency. 
Overall increases in the numbers of plantation labour cases 
were not only dramatic in themselves, but they also represented a 
significant rise over the rate of prosecutions registered under Act 
I • s predecessor, Act XIII of 1859. In Nilgiri District the number 
of cases brought annually under Act XIII had averaged 538 between 
13 1891 and 1895 • By 1915 the number of cases instituted in the 
same region under Act I had almost tripled 14 . Five years later 
cases against plantation employees were being filed at more than 
five times the rate at which they had been instigated under 
12. The figures are calculated with reference to estimates 
of the size of the plantation labour force contained in 
Report on the Conditions of Tea Garden Labour in the 
Duars of Bengal. in Madras and in Ceylon, op. cit., p 9, 
and in Report of the Royal Commission on Labour in India, 
in Sessional Papers of the British House of Commons, 
1930-31 Session, Vol.xi, pp 949-953. Where estimates were 
unavailable, they have calculated from acreage figures. 
13. I.O.L.R., Public and Judicial Department, Annual 
Departmental Papers, 1897, No.637, p 92. 
14. I.O.L.R., Annual Workings of the Madras Planters' Labour 
Law of 1903, 1916, G.O. No.728, M. Young, District 
Magistrate, Nilgiris, to Secretary to Government, 15th 
Feb., 1916. 
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Act XIII at the end of the nineteenth century 15 The prodigious 
growth in the prosecution of plantation labour led c. A. Innes, who 
served in Malabar as a judicial officer for five years, to complain 
to his superiors in Madras that "the increasing use made of the Act 
is becoming decidedly embarrassing" 16 
The burden of rising prosecution rates fell most heavily upon 
common field workers. In 1908 almost 80% of all cases filed under 
Act I were directed against labourers, but by 1914 this had climbed 
to 84%. A decade later the proportion of total cases initiated 
against labourers in the two districts averaged 93% 17 • Labourers 
were therefore increasingly the subject of prosecution not only 
because of the dramatic increase in the total number bf cases, but 
also because a greater proportion of those cases were directed 
against them, rather than against higher ranking employees such as 
maistris and cole-maistris. 
The increase in plantation labour cases was regionalized, 
rather than evenly spread over the area in which Act I was 
applicable. While courts in the Wynaad ~ of Malabar recorded a 
15. Ibid., 1921, G.O. No.585, G. W. Wells, Acting 
Collector, Nilgiris, to Secretary to Government, Home 
(Misc.) Department, 15th March, 1921. 
16. Ibid., 1914, G.O. No.589, C. A. Innes, Acting 
Magistrate of Malabar, to Chief Secretary to Government, 
16th Feb., 1914. 
17. Ibid., 1909-1925. 
six-fold increase in cases in 
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the decennial period 1906-1915 18 
in Nilgiri District the increase in plantation cases during the 
same period was only half as 19 great . However, the border which 
separated the two districts disguised the true geographic divisian 
between one region characterised by a prodigious increase in 
litigation against plantation labour, and another area where the 
growth of litigation was comparatively moderate. An analysis of 
plantation case figures by taluk reveals that an overwhelming 
majority of cases instigated under Act I in Nilgiri District were 
filed in the western taluk of Gudalur (See Map 4). 
Gudalur taluk adjoined the Wynaad taluk of Malabar, and 
together they formed a plateau, commonly called the Wynaad, which 
was distinct from the more highly elevated Nilgiri hills -proper 
(See Map 3). From 1907 to 1918 approximately two thirds to four 
fifths of all cases instituted under Act I within Nilgiri District 
originated in Gudalur 20 • The division between the Wynaad plateau 
18. Ibid., 1907, G.O. No.418, A. R. Knapp, Acting District 
Magistrate, Malabar, to Chief Secretary to Government, 
7th Feb., 1907; Ibid., 1916, G.O. No.728, F. B. Evans, 
District Magistrate, Malabar, to Chief Secretary to 
Government, 4th March, 1916. 
19. Ibid., 1907, G.O. No.418, L. E. Buckley, District 
Magistrate, Nilgiris, to Chief Secretary to Government, 
8th Feb., 1907; Ibid., 1916, G.O. No.728, M. Young, 
District Magistrate, Nilgiris to Chief Secretary to 
Government, 15th Feb., 1916. 
20. Ibid., 1908-1919. 
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and the higher Nilgiri hills formed the true boundary of an area 
distinguished by its exceptional rate of litigation against 
plantation labour. This boundary lay eastward of the Malabar-
Nilgiri border, and approximated the dividing line between Guda~r 
and Ootacamund taluks (See Map 4). 
It is plainly apparent that planters took legal action 
against their employees more frequently in the Wynaad plateau, than 
in the higher regions of Nilgiri District. In 1908 when the size of 
the plantation labour force engaged over the whole of the Wynaad 
plateau was approximately equal to that employed in the remaining 
area of Nilgiri District 21 it is estimated that a plantation 
employee in the Wynaad was about five times more likely to be 
prosecuted for a breach of contract offence as his counterpart in 
the Nilgiri hills 22 This phenomenon is best explained by 
21. Estimates of the size of the plantation work force in 
each area are based on Report on the Conditions of Tea 
Garden Labour in the Ouars of Bengal, in Madras and in 
Ceylon, op. cit., p 9. One fifth of the work force 
employed in Nilgiri District has been calculated as 
being engaged on plantations in Gudalur. This 
calculation is in accord with the figures given for the 
distribution of the district's rural population in the 
1901 census, and the census of 1921. (Census of India, 
1901, Vol.XV-B, op. cit., Part III, Provincial Tables, 
p 7; Census of India, 1921, Vol.XIII, op. cit., Part II, 
Imperial and Provincial Tables, p 341.) 
22. Of the 767 cases instituted in Ni1giri District in 1908, 
586 cases originated in Gudalur. At the same time 431 
cases were instituted in Malabar. The total number of 
cases for the Wynaad therefore equalled 1017. The 
remaining area of Nilgiri District produced only 201 
cases. (I.O.L.R. Annual Reports on the Workings of the 
Madras Planters' Labour Law of 1903, 1909, G.O. No.1063, 
F. c. Parsons, District Magistrate, Malabar, to Chief 
secretary to Government, 4th March, 1909; Ibid., 
(continued over)\ 
an 
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analysis of the changing nature of plantation ownership in the 
Wynaad, and by an examination of the prevailing conditions of 
labour. 
The extraordinary increase in plantation labour cases in ~e 
Wynaad was largely due to the rapid acquisition of plantations by 
corporations. At the turn of the century, estates in the Nilgiri 
hills were mainly in the hands of individual proprietors. However, 
in the twentieth century individual ownership frequently gave way 
to corporate control as the capital required for the mechanisation 
of tea processing proved beyond the means of many small growers. 
This development was most marked in the south and south-east Wynaad 
which witnessed the entry of companies such as the East India Tea 
and Produce Company in 1907, the Meppadi-Wynaad. Tea Company in 
1910, and the Panora Tea and Produce company in 1911 23 In 1912 
C. A. Innes informed the Madras government that "In the last few 
years the private estate has practically gone out, and now the 
majority of the tea estates in South Wynaad belong to two big 
companies" 24 Although a few small Indian companies and Ceylon-
w. Francis, District Magistrate, Nilgiris, to Chief 
Secretary to Government, 1st April, 1909.) 
23. Arnold Wright (Ed.), Southern India-Its History, People, 
Commerce and Industrial Resources, London, n.d., p 263. 
24. I.o.L.R., Annual Reports on the Workings of the Madras 
Planters' Labour Law of 1903, 1912, G.O. No.610, c. A. 
Innes, Acting Deputy Magistrate of Malabar, to Chief 
Secretary to Government, 20th Feb., 1912. 
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based British firms took up estates in 25 the Wynaad it was the 
larger British corporations, such as Harrisons and Crosfield 
(trading as Malayalam Plantations Ltd.) and the English and 
Scottish co-operative Wholesale societies, which grew to dominete 
tea production in the region. By 1924, corporations controlled 
almost 20,000 acres or about 50% of the acreage devoted to planting 
in the Nilgiri-Wynaad 26 , and by 1927 this had increased to 
27,555 acres or 67% 27 The higher regions of Nilgiri District 
were by no means immune to an increase in corporate ownership, but 
company acquisition of these areas was more moderate. In 1924 and 
1927 companies had acquired only 29% 28 and 34% 29 respectively 
of all land devoted to planting in the higher reaches of the hills. 
The impact of increasing corporate control of plantations was 
25. U.P.A.S.I., Planting Directory of Southern India, 1924, 
Madras, pp 54-77; U.P.A.S.I., Planting Directory of 
Southern India, 1927, Madras, pp 62-86. Ceylon baaed 
firma which acquired interests in the Wynaad included 
the Ceylon Land and Produce Co. Ltd., and Lewis Brown 
and Co., Ltd, Colombo. 
26. Ibid., 1924, pp 70-77. 
27. Ibid., 1927, pp 80-86. 
28. Ibid., 1924, pp 54-69. This figure, and the following 
figure, refer to estates situated in Ootacamund and 
Coonoor taluks. 
29. Ibid., 1927, pp 62-79. 
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evident in the Wynaad courts. The Acting Deputy Magistrate of 
Malabar attributed a rapid increase in breach of contract cases in 
the South Wynaad in 1911 to the fact that company estates, 
"are run on strictly business lines; they are inspected 
periodically by visiting agents; Superintendents who do 
not give satisfaction, are got rid of; and naturally 
therefore they are apt to make much use of the Act not 
so much with the object of getting their maistries and 
labourers punished as t~0 put pressure on them to 
complete their contracts" • 
• 
The demands made by companies upon their estate managers not only 
led directly to an increase in plantation labour cases, but 
simultaneously encouraged higher rates of desertion. Companies 
which ordered cultivation to be extended or intensified without 
regard to difficulties experienced in obtaining labour, were in 
effect encouraging their estate managers to crimp labour from other 
planters. This was particularly the case where the company could 
afford to raise advances above the normal market ratea The 
Nilgiris' delegate to the 1909 U.P.A.s.I. annual meeting, Fairless 
Barber, recognized that, "if a man was bidden to get labour at all 
costs, he would do so in the only way that was open to him unless 
30. I.O.L.R., Annual Reports of the Workings of the Madras 
Planters• Labour Law of 1903, 1912, G.O. No.610, c. A. 
Innes, Acting Deputy Magistrate of Malabar, to Chief 
Secretary to Government, 20th Feba, 1912. 
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he was prepared to lose his billet" Jl e By obtaining labour in 
this way a manager might quickly satisfy the demands of 
shareholders at home, but as other companies followed suit, the 
capacity of all planters to retain their labour was undermined. ~n 
the South Wynaad, where company control was concentrated, a high 
litigation rate reflected both the readiness of corporatioris to 
prosecute their absconding employees, and the impetus given to 
desertion by corporate management practices. 
High rates of desertion in the Wynaad were also probably 
fostered by working conditions which were often unsatisfactory. 
Many estates in the Wynaad had been established in the mid-
nineteenth cent~rY and had been primarily devoted to coffee 
culture. From around 1880 hard times in the coffee industry had 
left individual producers with scanty resources and little 
incentive to upgrade workers' living quarters, or to improve 
standards of medical assistance, sanitation, water reticulation or 
preventative health care. Under Act I of 1903 local government 
officials could set and enforce minimum standards for plantation 
working conditions, but there is no evidence to suggest that 
government officers in the Wynaad took more than a passing interest 
in plantation labour's welfare. 
31. U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1909, p 38. 
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Initially, local officials in the Wynaad did not exercise 
their right under Act I to frame rules governing labourers' living 
conditions on plantations. When the Wynaad Planters • Association 
applied for copies of the regulations they were instructed tha"til, 
"they·might frame their own rules and send them for the approval of 
the District Magistrate" 32 Moreover, the great majority of 
District Magistrates appointed to Malabar. between 1904 and 1927 
adopted the stance that all must be well on Wynaad plantations 
since no official complaints had been lodged by labourers. District 
Magistrates ignored, or were blind to, the barriers of distance, 
expense, ignorance and official practice, which deterred labourers. 
from appealing to government. The location of estates in a 
relatively remote part of the district, and the inaccessibility of 
many plantations meant that government inspection occurred rarely, 
if at all. It is interesting to note that the sole instance in 
which a District Magistrate brought to the Madras authorities' 
attention "a total lack of proper accommodation and of sanitary and 
medical arrangements in a few estates" in the Wynaad, aro~e as the 
result of an inspection conducted by a Factory Inspector and not by 
the District Magistrate himself 33 Although there is no direct 
32. Ibid., p45. 
33. I.O.L.R., Annual Reports on the Workings of the Madras 
Planters' Labour Law of 1903, 1927, G.0.417, H. R. Pate, 
District Magistrate, Malabar, to Secretary to 
Government, Public Works and Labour Department, 9th 
(continued over) \ 
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evidence of collusion between district officers and British 
planters with regard to working conditions on estates, it is 
probable that planters enjoyed a tacit understanding with local 
officials and police. Planters in the Wynaad were known •a 
socialise with their local police force, which included few Indians 
even in its subordinate ranks; and in both Nilgiri District and the 
Wynaad a disproportionately heavy police presence was stationed to 
combat coffee stealing and to enforce the 34 labour law • In any 
case, the official failure to regulate and inspect plantations in 
the Wynaad allowed for the existence of antiquated and 
unsatisfactory conditions of labour. These conditions coupled with 
an unpleasant climate, and the prevalence of malaria, promoted 
desertion among the work force and, in turn, contributed to an 
extraordinary growth in plantation labour cases. 
The increasing frequency with which planters in the Nilgiri 
hills resorted to legal action against their employees can also be 
partly attributed to the planters• growing familiarity with the new 
law, and to the increase in tea cultivation throughout the 
Feb., 1927. The majority of estates in the Wynaad did 
not have processing factories employing sufficient 
numbers of workers to warrant inspection under the 
Factories Act. 
34. David Arnold, Police Power and Colonial Rule, Madras 
1859-1947, Delhi, 1986, pp 156 157. 
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. 35 
reg1.on However, these factors alone fail to explain the 
irregular pattern of rising prosecutions. 
While the number of plantation labour cases instituted under 
Act I rose between 1904 and 1927, the rate at which they increa~d 
was neither steady nor consistent. Rather, it was marked by periods 
of rapid increase followed by years in which the total number of 
prosecutions declined, though to a lesser degree. These irregular 
oscillations are apparent in Table 7 and mirror the impact of 
forces, external to Nilgiri District, which affected the plantation 
labour market. These factors brought about two extended periods of 
dire labour shortages. The first of these commenced in 1907 and 
eased in 1914. The second was shorter in duration, running between 
1918 and 1920. 
35. In 1927 U.P.A.S.I. tabulated 19,869 acres under tea in 
the two areas. This figure excludes land taken up, but 
unplanted. (U.P.A.S.I., Planting Directory of Southern 
India, 1927, op. cit., pp 78, 86.) By comparison, the 
total acreage of tea estates in Nilgiri District in 1908 
was reliably estimated at 8,000. (Francis, op. cit., 
p 177.) 
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TABLE 1 NUMBER OF CASES INSTITUTED UNDER ACT I OF 1903, 
1906-1927. 36 
• 
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Act I was initially applied in the Nilgiri hills at a time 
when plantation labour was relatively abundant. Although planters 
still experienced some difficulties in locating and obtaining 
sufficient numbers of workers, they were assisted by a series of 
36. I.O.L.R., Annual Reports on the Workings of the Madras 
Planters' Labour Law of 1903, 1907-1928. 
231 
poor grain harvests, particularly in 1906, which released vast 
numbers of agricultural workers in the plains. While the supply of 
plantation labour increased, the demand for that labour was 
simultaneously dampened as coffee crops were again afflicted bt" 
diseaSe" and depressed by low world prices 37 • The impact of these 
events on plantation contractual relations was readily evident. In 
1906, the District Magistrate of the Ni1giris, L. E. Buckley, 
informed his superiors that a "poor season and high prices" led to 
many plantation workers arriving in the district without formerly 
executing work" contracts 38 • While some planters contracted their 
labourers upon arrival, the majority, however, were content to hire 
labourers without legally binding 39 them , for the risk of 
desertion was slight, and replacement labour was relatively easy to 
obtain. Most importantly, the annual tally of plantation labour 
cases in this period was still roughly commensurate with the number 
of cases formerly lodged under Act XIII each year. 
However, the return to rural prosperity in 1907 combined with 
the expansion of tea and rubber planting in Travancore, Cochin, 
37. U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1906, pp 9-10. 
38. I.O.L.R., Annual Reports on the Workings of the Madras 
Planters• Labour Law of 1903, 1907, G.O. No.418, 
L. E. Buckley, District Magistrate, Nilgiris, to Chief 
Secretary to Government, 8th Feb., 1907. 
39. Ibid. 
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Ceylon, and the Federated Malay States, quickly ushered in a period 
of acute labour shortage for plantations in Madras Presidency. A 
plentiful harvest in Mysore and in the plains to the south of the 
Nilgiri hills increased competition to obtain available labOitlr, 
exerted upward pressure on wage rates, and encouraged lB.bour • s 
desertion of estates. In the Nilgiris the District Magistrate was 
quick to note that the advent of "a good season leads to the 
evasion of contracts" 40 • Later officials explained more fully 
the connection between keen competition for labour and high 
desertion rates. In 1913 c. A. Innes surmised that in an 
undersupplied labour market "coolies have greater temptations than 
before to abscOnd, that maistries are advanced with less 
circumspection and they crimp one another•s coolies more than they 
were wont to" 41 Innes' subsequent report implied that maistris 
were not alone in crimping labour, for he included a "lack of co-
operation among the planters themselves" as a factor which promoted 
widespread abscondence 42 In Nilgiri District, Innes' 
40. Ibid., 1908, G.O. No. 353, L. E. Buckley, District 
Magistrate, Nilgiris, to Chief Secretary to Government, 
12th Feb., 1908. 
41. Ibid., 1913, G.O. No.l622, c. A. Innes, Acting 
Magistrate of Malabar, to Chief Secretary to Government, 
25th Feb., 1913. 
42. Ibid., 1914, G.O. No.589, c. A. Innes, Acting Magistrate 
of Malabar, to Chief Secretary to Government, 16th Feb., 
1914. 
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counterpart, M. Young, noted in 1913 that even though no 
plantations had been newly opened in the previous year, planters 
were seeking labour more keenly than before 43 Both Young and 
Innes cited the recent development of tea and rubber gardens 4.n 
Cochin and Travancore as contributing to the labour shortfall in 
the region and to high desertion rates. Young argued that ;the 
absence of extradition arrangements between British India and 
Travancore and Cochin also added to the planters' difficulties, as 
labourers were "fast becoming aware" that they could "effectively 
evade arrest by their former employers" in these native 
states 44 As well, planters perceived the rising tide of 
emigration as a major threat to the prosperity of plantations in 
Madras Presidency. 
In particular, southern planters identified emigration to 
rubber estates abroad as undermining their capacity to obtain 
sufficient numbers of suitable workers. Surging world prices for 
rubber created two booms; firstly from 1905 to 1908, and again 
between 1910 and the outbreak of the First World War 45 
43. Ibid., 1913, G.O. No. 1622, M. Young, District 
Magistrate of Nilgiris, to Chief Secretary to 
Government, 15th February, 1913. 
44. Ibid. 
High 
45. s. Rajaratnam, .,The Growth of Plantation Agriculture in 
Ceylon, 1886-1931", op. cit., p 10. 
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returns on rubber production encouraged rapid growth of the 
industry in the Malay peninsula, and to a lesser extent in Ceylon 
where expansion was largely confined to the initial boom 
years 46 Nevertheless, the overall increase in rubber 
cultivation in both countries was remarkable. In Ceylon only 25,000 
acres had been under rubber in 1904 when Act I first came into 
force, but by 1913 220,000 acres had been planted with rubber 
trees 47 • In Malaya, commercial plantings of rubber began only in 
1905, and by 1913 stood at 433,000 acres 48 • At the same time the 
international coffee market remained depressed, while tea 
experienced only moderate gains. The growth of foreign rubber 
fields was iOlll\ediately mirrored in migration statistics, 
particularly in those relating to Malaya. Whereas approximately 
22,000 Indian labourers entered Malaya in 1904, a staggering 
108,000 of their compatriots, largely from south India 49 , were 
landed in 1913 50 • Malayan labour recruitment, in comparison with 
that of the Nilgiri hills, was centralized, well organized, and 
46. Ibid., pp 10-11. 
47. Ibid., p 11. 
48. Ibid. 
49. Sandhu, op. cit., p 56. 
50. Ibid., Appendix I, p 305. 
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roughly commensurate with demand. After 1900, emigration to Malaya, 
unlike migration to the Nilgiri hills, was partly determined by the 
pull of plantation employment and not solely by the push of adverse 
conditions in India. 
• 
The rapid rise in south Indian emigration to Malaya, and to a 
lesser extent Ceylon, wrought severe consequences for southern 
planters. Emigrant labourers t9 Malaya were mainly drawn from the 
same geographic and depressed caste labour pools that south Indian 
planters had been wont to exploit. This was partly due to the fact 
that British planters in Malaya had largely. originated in Ceylon 
and as a consequence preferred the "class of coaly they were 
accustomed to and whose language they understood" 51 
Additionally, it proved far simpler, and therefore cheaper, for 
professional recruiters of emigrant Indian labour to tap existing 
labour sources in Tanjore, Trichinopoly, Madras, Salem and 
Coimbatore 52 the Arcots, Ramnad, Madura and Malabar districts, 
Bangalore and Vellore 53 than to locate and develop previously 
unexploited regions. 
51. U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1908, p 7. See also: 
John Ferguson, Ceylon in 1884, op. cit., p 100; Sandhu, 
op.cit., pp 56 57. 
52. Sandhu, op. cit., p 82. 
53. U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1910, p 122. 
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The exceptional profitability of rubber estates frequently 
fin anced large advances and high wage rates for estate labour. 
Recruiting agents often induced south Indian labour to emigrate by 
proffering substantial monetary 54 advances . • Whereas planters in 
Madras Presidency had customarily advanced Rs. 10 or less per 
worker, foreign estates were often prepared to offer far larger 
amounts. In 1910 delegates to the U.P.A.S.I. annual conference were 
informed by AYlmer Martin, a Kannan Devan planter of note, that; 
"The rate paid by individual European recruiters varies 
immensely; for instance, a Straits planter got together 
about 250 coolies, making Erode his headquarters from 
January to May-and the amount he paid local depots and 
recruiters averaged Rs. 7 per head. Another planter at 
the same time, from the Straits, gave no less than 150 
rupees for two men and one woman, and was influenced in 
doing so by the fact that the woman of the party was 
loaded with jewels. Imagine his disgust on seeing the 
depot-keeper, after pocketing the rupees, calmly 
proceed to unscrew the nose and ear ornaments off her 
face! That planter, quickly realising t~ Erode was no 
place for him, took himself elsewhere." 
Similarly, high recruitment costs were paid by Ceylon planters as 
the experience of D. G. Bremner, of Kew Estate, Norwood, Ceylon 
indicates; 
"On the 30th April I went off to the Agency to recruit 
54. Ibid., 1908, p 59. 
55. Ibid., 1910, p 123. 
coolies, while my friend recruited bugs in the wretched 
dak bungalow. The Ceylon Labour Agent's method of 
producing coolies is to introduce you to a Tulican 
(Muslim labour contractor) more or less covered with 
massive gold cable chains and gold watches, for all the 
world like one of the old African slave dealers. The 
Tulican at once proceeds to business by asking how much 
you are prepared to give. "How much do you want", said 
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I? "Rs.40 a head", said the Tulican. I gave a shiver. • 
With Rs.12 to Rs.l4 to land the coolies on the estate, 
this means Rs. 52 to Rs. 54 per head for a coast coaly. 
Out of this the coaly receives Rs. 3-12. I arranged to 
give the Tulican Rs. 33 per head, and 11 coolies were 
produced on my giving my word that I would say nothing 
about what I had paid the Tulican to the coolies. 
The Tulicans, who have the whole business in their 
hands, simply pit one Ceylon kangany against another; 
the coolies are rounded up and kept hidden until the 
bargain is struck; and th~6highest bidder, generally a 
rubber estate gets them." 
Despite the increase in fraudulent practices among labour 
suppliers, by 1913 many plantation workers bound for Malaya and 
Ceylon were being offered the equivalent of three years' wages in 
57 cash before they departed India In addition, estate wages 
overseas were frequently higher: in 1911 daily wage rates for 
plantation labourers in .. ,Madras Presidency averaged 4 annas per day, 
while in the Straits and Ceylon daily remuneration rates ranged 
between 12 and 14 annas 58 • Southern planters also recognized that 
56. Ibid., 1911, pp 77-78. 
57. Ibid., 1913, p 41. 
58. Ibid., 1911, p 85. In the Straits, as in Ceylon (Supra., 
pp 81-82), high wages disguised higher prices for staple 
food stuffs. Sandhu estimates that the cost of living on 
Malayan plantations was approximately 2 and 1/2 times 
that of south Indian estates in the early decades of the 
twentieth century. However, such information was 
probably inaccessible to raw recruits bound for 
(continued over) 1 
238 
that within south India labourers found Travancore plantations an 
attractive destination since "they got 6 annas a day for picking 
tea and bathing, while in Mysore they wanted them to work with a 
mamootie (an agricultural tool) for 4 anna a a day" 59 Lao~:ge 
advances coupled with higher wages, and possibly superior 
conditions of labour 60 , combined to draw labour away from 
employment in the Nilgiri hills, and other planting regions in the 
Shevaroys, Anamalai and Mysore state. For Nilgiri planters, the 
widespread infiltration of Coimbatore District by recruiting agents 
from Ceylon from about 1908 61 , whittled away what had previously 
been a reliable labour source on which they had become increasingly 
dependent. Furthermore, foreign recruitment frequently imposed 
substantial financial burdens on Nilgiri planters and their 
maistris, as emigrant workers were in many instances already under 
advance to planters in south India 62 • Although U.P.A.S.I. 
members attempted to avert the growing crisis by identifying and 
developing alternative sources of plantation labour, their 
plantations overseas. (Sandhu, op. cit., p 101). 
59. Ibid., pp 84-85. 
60. Ibid., 1913, p 7. 
61. Ibid., 1908, p 60. 
62. Ibid., p 42. 
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enquiries, had by 1911, convinced them that "there is no fresh 
source of supply in those districts of the Madras Presidency where 
the languages Tamil, Malayalarn, Canarese and Tulu are spoken" 63 • 
By 1913 the shortage of plantation labour for estates .;.n 
Madras Presidency was dire. Aylmer Martin, in his capacity as 
Chairman of the U.P.A.S.I. summed up the position of many soUthern 
planters, including those located in the Nilgiri hills, before the 
Association's annual gathering in 1913; 
"in some districts things may be said to be approaching 
a crisis. Rates of pay have been raised, and still 
coolies are short. Maistries, on whom we have depended 
for years, have either fail~ us, or have come in with 
less than half their gangs" • 
Moreov~r, Martin believed that future plantation labour supplies in 
south India were likely to contract even further. Martin reasoned 
that as rubber estates abroad matured, their labour requirements 
would rise. In the Malay peninsula alone, Martin predicted that 
within three years an additional 230,000 workers would be needed 
even if no further planting of rubber took place 65 
Planters were not alone in feeling the shortage of 
63. Ibid., 1911, p 90. 
64. Ibid., 1913, p 9. 
65. Ibid., p 123. 
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agricultural labour which emigration had exacerbated. As early as 
1909 delegates to the u. P.A. s. I. annual conference were informed 
that tracts of land in the plains were now lying fallow for want of 
labour 66 In Tanjore District landlords were often unable ot.o 
cultivate their hol~ings as emigration, particularly to the 
Straits, deprived them of their customary labourers while the less 
able-bodied remained at home 67 • Despite the fact that labourers 
generally only worked overseas on a temporary basis, many "returned 
to their homes as small capitalists" 68 and not as field workers, 
and so were permanently lost to their former landlords. By 1912 
Tanjorean landholders had resorted to lobbying the Madras 
69 Government to stem the efflux of labour overseas 
The. southern planters' campaign _to restrict emigration was, 
like that of Tanjorean landlords, strongly motivated by economic 
self-interest. Initially, the U. P.A. s. I. instructed the Planting 
Member of the Madras legislature, H. P. Hodgson, to seek directly 
"measures for the protection of the interests of planters in South 
66. Ibid., 1909, p 70. 
67. Ibid., 1910, pp 129-130. 
68. Ibid., p 130. 
69. David Washbrook, "Political Change in a Stable Society: 
Tanjore District 1880-1920", op. cit., p 49. 
241 
India" from the provincial government 70 However, the U.P.A.S.i:. 
quickly realized that its requests could be readily tailored to 
suit the current groundswell of Indian nationalist opposition to 
indentured emigration. Although the Government of India under Lerd 
Minto continued to assert that India generally benefited from the 
employment of its nationals abroad 71 , the combined opposition of 
the I.N .c. and Indian capitalists, coupled with overwhelming 
evidence of the maltreatment of indentured Indians in Natal, had 
already resulted in the curtailment of labour emigration to 
southern Africa 72 . Accordingly, the U.P.A.S.I. altered its tack. 
It recast its proposals to limit emigration as measures designed to 
protect the labourer against the deceptive practices of foreign 
recruiters 73 . The U.P.A.S.I. requested the Government of Madras 
to set in place legislation which would require the registration of 
all labourers and labour contractors connected with emigration, as 
well as the compulsory appearance of all labourers before a 
Protector of Emigrants whose duty would be "to satisfy himself that 
the coolies understand the true conditions under which they have 
70. U.P.A.S.I., annual Proceedings, 1907, p 62. 
71. Ibid., 1910, pp 124-125. 
72. Tinker, op. cit., pp 304-317. 
73. Ibid., p 124. 
been asked to emigrate" 74 
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Although the U.P.A.S.I. argued that 
the latter measure would merely raise the level of legal protection 
afforded to emigrant labour to that which already existed within 
Madras Presidency for migrating labour under Act I, there can be ne 
doubt that the U.P.A.S.I. •a intention was to impede the flow of 
labour abroad. Other proposals advanced by the U.P.A.S.I. were 
specifically directed against its major foreign competitors for 
plantation labour in southern India. By 1913 the U.P.A.S.I. was 
campaigning to have the professional recruiter of labour outlawed 
on the grounds that, unlike the maistris employed by southern 
planters, the professional recruiter "collects coolies and sells 
them at any centre, and afterwards ceases to have any further 
interest in their well-being, future 
U.P.A.S.I. 's newfound concern for 
or 
75 
whereabouts" 
labour's welfare was 
The 
a 
transparent mantle which did not disguise its intention to 
undermine the means by which planters in Ceylon and Malaya secured 
their Indian workers. The U.P.A.S.I. recognized that unrestricted 
competition for plantation labour in south India could easily lead 
to "a war of advances" in which foreign planters would probably 
74. U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1910, pp 125-134. 
75. Ibid., 1913, p 34. 
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. . 76 
emerge v~ctor~ous 
The desire of southern planters to hobble the recruiting 
campaigns of their chief rivals in the plantation labour market led 
their representative in the Madras legislature, Fairless Barb~r, 
into a peculiar and brief alliance with Indian members who opposed 
the government's policy on the export of Indian labour. In April, 
1916 in the Governor's Council in Madras, P. Kesava Pillai called 
for the formation of committees of non-official Indians solely to 
inspect emigrants at depots prior to their departure overseas 77 
Kesava's motion reflected current and widespread concern within the 
!.N.C. for the plight of Indian labour recruited for overseas 
service. Although the Government of India had already been forced 
by the pressure of Indian political opinion and public opposition 
to announce its intention to abolish indentured emigration 78 , no 
firm programme had yet been set by which the system would be 
dismantled. Many Congressmen continued to pressure the government 
for its speedy end, and for more intensive supervision of all 
recruitment mechanisms used to procure unskilled Indian labour for 
foreign destinations. Their cause was made more difficult by the 
76. Ibid., 1910, p 127. 
77 .. Proceedings of the Council of the Governor of Fort St 
George, 5th April, 1916, p 727. 
78. Tinker, op. cit., pp 343-344. 
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departure of a sympathetic Viceroy in Lord Hardinge. Hardinge' s 
successor, Chelmsford, did not command the confidence of Indian 
nationalists, who feared that indenture would be replaced by an 
alternative but equally repugnant system 79 Kesava's action in-
the Madras legislature was timely, for it followed on the heels of 
Hardinge•s departure and Chelmsford's accession. Notably, the 
Planting Member in the Madras Council lent his support to Kesava's 
motion by asserting that whereas monetary advances made by south 
Indian planters to their labourers were legitimate, larger advances 
made by foreign recruiters amounted to bribery 80 Barber's 
attempt to draw a moral distinction between domestic and foreign 
recruitment mechanisms on the basis of the size of the advance was 
clearly motivated by economic self-interest, and it provoked an 
unsympathetic response. Sir Francis Spring, a retired government 
engineer, bluntly advised Barber and his counterparts to, 
"pay your labourers and they will stop in the country. 
You have got to compete against countries which pay 
them very much better • . • . If you want to keep the 
wages of a coaly to 3 or 4 annas on the land or on 
estates, you will not succeed. If a recruiter is 
willing 1ft pay 12 annas or a rupee he will get the 
labour." 
79. Ibid., p 345. 
80. Proceedings of the Council of the Governor of Fort St 
George, 5th April, 1916, p 729. 
81. Ibid., p 739. 
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Although the U.P.A.S.I. was strongly motivated in 1916 to 
exploit mounting opposition to indentured emigration, its 
association with the nationalists' campaign could, by necessity, be 
nothing more than a fleeting dalliancea The political, economic ~d 
moral grounds on which many nationalists opposed indentured 
emigration could be turned with equal force against indentured and 
contracted recruitment within India itself, particularly as the 
system was frequently made use of by colonial enterprises. The 
Viceroy's Council had already witnessed Gokhale's spirited call to 
end indenture both abroad and at home 82. Within Madras 
Presidency, Act I had been the subject of nationalist debate at the 
Coimbatore District Conference of 1915 83 , and in the Governor • s 
Council Kesava harried the government over "the hardships suffered 
by maistries and coolies working in the plantations" under 
Act I 84 • Clearly, the long term political objectives of many 
Madrasi Congressmen ran counter to the economic interests of 
southern planters. 
In a broader sense the U.P.A.S.I. 's proposals to restrict 
labour emigration were an attempt to thwart the expansion of the 
82. Tinker, op. cit., p 320. 
83. Proceedings of the Council of the Governor of Fort St 
George, 23rd Nov., 1915, p 32. 
84. Ibid. 
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south Indian labour market. This development had been fostered by 
the growth of planting abroad, and by the concomitant development 
of industry and public works at home, and it marked the marketls 
transition from a pre-colonial mode 85 toward a colonifi, 
capitalist form. In model, fully fledged, capitalist labour 
markets the lack of extra-market mechanisms for labour recruitment 
generally compels employers to compete for workers by implementing 
measures such as higher wages, reduced hours of work, or improved 
conditions of labour. However, in the developing but imperfect 
labour market of southern India the tacit co-operation of the 
colonial administration in enacting and executing Act I made 
Nilgiri planters less reliant on such measures to attract and 
retain labour. Rather, Nilgiri planters came to depend heavily on 
the Act as their major mechanism fOr combatting labour shortages. 
As a result, planters attached immense importance to the new labour 
85. The term pre-colonial is used here primarily to denote 
non-market mechanisms for obtaining and retaining 
agricultural labour in South India prior to the 
development of colonial plantations. In general, 
historians have preferred to use the term feudal to 
describe the nature of economies prior to the rise of 
capitalism. However, the cultural mores and geographic 
specificity of European feudalism preclude its use here. 
Unfortunately, nomenclature remains a problem wherever 
any term is used to span a wide range of production 
systems, cultures or time spans, and where capitalism 
alone has been carefully defined. In these instances the 
term feudalism (or its substitute) becomes, as Eric 
Hobsbawm has indicated, a residual category which 
encompasses everything that capitalism is not. For 
further discussion see, Jay R. Mandle, "The Plantation 
Economy: An Essay in Definition", Science and Society, 
1972, Vol XXXVI, pp 49-62. 
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law and this was reflected in their coristant attempts to improve 
the efficiency of its application. Recurring labour shortfalls 
between 1908 and 1914 prompted planters to call upon government to 
amend procedures used in the execution of warrants, and to bo!Mter 
simultaneously the legal rights of employers under Act I. 
The non-service of warrants issued against defaulting 
labourers and maistris was a particularly vexing problem which 
plagued planters for the duration of Act I's operation. As 
prosecution of defaulters under Act I became time-barred tw9 years 
after a contract's commencement date 86 , employees were often 
strongly motivated to evade warrants issued against them during 
this period. Evasion might be effected by accepting employment on 
another estate where the labourer was unknown, by constant 
journeying, or most effectively by migration to a planting district 
in a native state 87 or overseas. Defaulting maistris, who 
generally possessed superior financial resources, could influence 
low ranking officials to ensure that warrants for their arrest 
remained unexecuted. In addition, planters claimed that the problem 
of unserved warrants was exacerbated by a lack of diligence among 
86. The Madras Planters• Labour Law (Act I of 1903), 
op. cit., section 35. 
87. In most native states no extradition agreement existed 
with British India for breach of contract offences. In 
theory, extradition proceedings could be instituted in 
Mysore, but these were notoriously difficult to execute. 
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police officers. Their claim is lent credence by the opinion of the 
Acting Deputy Magistrate of Malabar in 1911 who reported that, "the 
police are, as the planters say, slack and indifferent in executing 
warrants" 88 Planters asserted that in many instances a poli-ce 
constable, 
"knowing there was no extradition to Native States, and 
to save himself the trouble or to cover his reasons for 
not serving the warrant, simply endorsed the warrant 
"gone to Cochin", "gone to Travancore", &c., because 
the constable knew that no further action could be 
taken • . . the number returned with such endorsements 
was extraordinary, whereas they knew that in 1:Rfhin 
there was no Tamil pariah labour working at all." 
Rankled by practices such as these which rendered a great number of 
warrants 90 powerless the planters• confederation, the 
U.P.A.S.I., requested that the Government of Madras adopt a number 
88a I.O.L.R., Annual Reports on the Workings of the Madras 
Planters• Labour Law of 1903, 1912, G.O. No. 610, 
c. A. Innes, Acting Deputy Magistrate, Malabar, to Chief 
Secretary to Government, 20th Feb., 1912. 
89. U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1910, p 139. 
90. It is impossible to accurately calculate the number of 
warrants which remained unserved in any year because of 
the official practice of assigning some of these to a 
special register where they were included among other 
cases which had been disposed of satisfactorily. Cases 
which had been assigned to the special register could 
only be resurrected in the unlikely event of the 
defaulter being arrested. Magistrates employed this 
administrative practice to lower artificially the number 
of cases pending. A large file of pending cases invited 
official scrutiny. Nevertheless, it is possible that in 
some areas up to two thirds of all warrants remained 
unserved. (U.P.A.s.r., Annual Proceedings, 1911, p 96.) 
249 
of administrative reforms to combat non-service of warrants. These 
reforms included provisions requiring warrants and sununons to be 
endorsed with the number of the constable to whom they had been 
entrusted for service 91 , the maintenance of special registers. to 
record the fate of 92 every warrant , and the expansion of the 
police force in districts such as Coimbatore where non-service was 
rife 93 
Within Mysore state, the failure of officials to execute the 
provisions of Act I bordered on passive resistance. A large 
proportion of warrants, taken out by planters in British India 
against their Mysorean employees, remained unserved. In 1916, when 
the plantation labour market was only moderately undersupplied, 
this proportion amounted to more than half of the total number of 
warrants 94 • Moreover, it was common practice in Mysore for 
magistrates to treat non-bailable warrants as bailable, and this 
frequently resulted in the escape of the accused 95 • As the two 
warrant forms were of different colours, planters identified this 
91. U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1907, p 54. 
92. Ibid., 1911, p 95. 
93. Ibid., 1910, p 139. 
94. Ibid., 1922, p 40. 
95. Ibid., 1913, pp 45-46. 
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practice as a deliberate attempt to contravene a recognized 
procedure 96 Additionally, planters frequently met with delays 
and difficulties in having new labour contracts attested by 
officials in Mysore. In 1910 W. c. Deane, a Nilgiri Plantacs' 
Association delegate to the U.P.A.S.I.'s annual conference, related 
the experience of one hills' planter to demonstrate the problems 
commonly encountered by estates whic~ attempted to recruit Mysorean 
labour under Act I. 
"One of my Head Maistries has just come back from his 
village and has told me that it is utterly impossible 
to get any official in the Mysore State to attest coaly 
agreements. EVen the Sub-Postmasters of villages refuse 
to do it •.•• Some little time ago, this very Maistry 
went to an official called a Taluq Shakidar, who holds 
the same position as a Revenue Inspector in British 
Government, and asked him to attest a coaly agreement. 
This man, too, told him he would not do it, and 
requested'the Maistry to go to the Amildar. When he did 
so, the Amildar in his turn kept putting him off by 
telling him to come to-morrow, the day after, and so 
forth, tiV7 he finally refused to attest the 
agreement" • 
Although sympathy for the plight of Mysorean plantation 
labour under Act I probably existed among petty officials in 
Mysore 98 the attitudes of local administrators also reflected 
the prejudices of the Mysore Durbar. Inter-state arrangements which 
96. Ibid. 
97. Ibid., 1910, p 142. 
98. r.o.L.R., Annual Reports on the Workings of the Madras 
Planters• Labour Law of 1903, 1911, G.O. No.560, 
S. P. Rice, District Magistrate, Nilgiris, to Chief 
Secretary to Government, lOth Feb., 1911. 
251 
granted warrants originating in British India full validity in 
Mysore, but which prevented Mysorean courts from enjoying 
equivalent reciprocal rights in British ,India, affronted the Myso-re 
court 99 • 
Despite these developments, the Government of Madras did not 
respond favourably to the U.P.A.S.I.'s requests for reform of 
warrant serving practices. In 1909 the government declared itself 
satisfied with existing regulations covering police procedures, and 
indicated that the evidence of maladministration which had been 
laid before it by the U.P.A.S.I. was insufficient to justify the 
adoption of any new and special measure 100 Similarly, the 
Government of Madras refused to take up the planters' case against 
officials in Mysore, and informed the U.P.A.S.I. that the matter 
could be pursued only if planters were prepared to approach the 
Mysore authorities directly themselves 101 At the same time, 
Madras made clear to the U.P.A.S.I. that the current expansion of 
the Coimbatore police force was the result of a general 
99. U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1913, pp 44-45. 
100. Government of Madras, Judicial Department, w.s. Meyer, 
Chief secretary to the Government of Madras, Judicial 
Department, to the secretary, U.P.A.S.I., 8th Dec., 
1909, in Ibid., 1910, pp 168-169. 
101. Government of Madras, Judicial Department, Chief 
Secretary to the Government of Madras, to the 
Secretary, U.P.A.S.I., 22nd Oct., 1910, in Ibid., 
1911, pp 127-128. 
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reorganization Scheme rather than a consequence of the planters' 
petition 102 
While the Government of Madras had proved less than 
sympathetic to the planters' cause, planters reacted to &he 
official rebuttal of their attempts to improve warrant service by 
floating a number of producer-operated schemes designed to curtail 
labour's free exit from the labour market. such schemes were 
particularly prevalent at times when suitable labour was extremely 
scarce, as in the period preceding the First World War when 
proposals were made by U.P.A.S.I. delegates to geographically limit 
the recruitin"g ground of each planting district" 103 and to 
record the fingerprints and employment history of every maistri and 
labourer engaged by the association • s members in an attempt to 
combat fraud and desertion 104 • Such sChemes were intended to 
supplement the legal power which planters already derived from Act 
I. However, these proposals, unlike litigation under Act I, 
generally required a high degree of co-operation amongst planters 
both inside and outside the U.P.A.S.I. confederation; a highly 
organized and complicated administrative structure; or further 
102. Ibid. 
103. Ibid., 1909, p 43. 
104. Ibid., pp 48-73; 
Ibid., 1912, p 70. 
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government legislation 105 In comparison, the execution of 
procedures under Act I was relatively simple, well established and 
affordablea Moreover, the operation of the Act created little 
dissention within planting circles. In short, prosecution •of 
defaulting labour remained the Nilgiri planters' most effective 
means of maintaining plantation labour supply. As a result, Nilgiri 
planters were concerned to strengthen their legal position under. 
Act I. 
The planters' drive to amend Act I was chiefly concerned with 
removing those provisions of the bill which directly hampered the 
flow of plantation labour. In January, 1906, the Wynaad Planters• 
Association complained to the Government of Madras about recent 
judgements delivered in cases conducted against defaulting maistris 
in the Wynaad. The Sub-Magistrate in Vayittiri, v. P. Krishna 
Menon, had made clear that a defaulting maistri could be ordered to 
return any outstanding advance to a planter by whom he had been 
engaged to recruit labour, but no maistri could be forced to supply 
105. The plan proposed by C. H. Brock, an experienced and 
well known planter, to the 1909 U.P.A.S.I. annual 
conference amply demonstrates the difficulties 
associated with comprehensive schemes to control 
labour4 Brock's scheme required the establishment of a 
central government record office, the keeping of a 
record office number book, a fingerprint file, village 
and local register files, as well as additional 
legislation to penalise fraudulent registration, 
crimping of labour, employment of unregistered 
labourers, and bribery. (Ibid., 1909, pp 53-58.) 
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106 
workers to an estate The Wynaad planters• protest was soon 
followed by the U.P.A.S.I.'s request that the government amend Act 
I so that labour contracts no longer need be executed in the 
presence of a village magistrate or similar official 107 • Th€1Be 
restrictions governing the attestation of labour contracts and 
limiting the maistri's legal responsibility to supply labour, were 
considered by Nilgiri planters to seriously impede them in 
recruiting satisfactory numbers of labourers. 
Both the Government of Madras and the Government of India 
expressed serious objections to the planters' requests. The Madras 
authorities informed the U.P.A.S.I. that no maistri could be held 
penally liable for his failure to supply labour, and that planters 
were adequately compensated by the repayment of outstanding 
advances. The U.P.A.S.I. 'a suggestion that a maistri should be 
subject to imprisonment if he failed to prosecute his absconding 
labourers was considered a harsh provision by Madras, and one which 
might "be worked with great injustice" against the maistri 
106. I.O.L.R., Public and Judicial Department, Annual 
Departmental Papers, 1906, No. 1164, c. E. Abbott, 
Honorary Secretary to Wynaad Planters' Association, 
9th Jan., 1906. 
107. Ibid., G.O. No.558, H. P. Hodgson, Chairman, 
U.P.A.S.I., to Government of Madras. 
lOB. Ibid., H. Bradley, Agricultural Chief 
Secretary to Secretary, U.P.A.S.I. 28th March, 1906. 
lOB 
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Nor was the proposal to alter the attestation requirements of Act I 
well .received in Calcutta or in the India Office. London asserted 
that the proposed change in the law was "of doubtful 
expediency" 109 while the Government of India noted tha~ it 
undercut the "only safeguard which the law has provided for the 
protection of the coolie from unscrupulous recruiting 
agents" 110 As a result, the Government of India indicated to 
Madras that it would entertain amending attestation procedures only 
on condition that labourers remained free to choose one of two 
witnesses to their contracts, and retained the option of having 
their contracts executed before a magistrate 111 • The U .P .A. S. I. 
viewed this proposal with alarm, and argued that labourers would be 
able to "evade their obligation to work by claiming that they had 
executed a contract without knowing that they had the right to 
appoint a witness, or that neither witness was of their 
h . 112 c 0051.09 The U.P.A.S.I.'s dissatisfaction with governmental 
109. Ibid., Comments of J. w. Holderness, Revenue Secretary, 
25th April, 1906. 
110. Ibid., W. L. Harvey, Secretary to Government of India, 
to Chief Secretary to Government of Madras, Judicial 
Department, lOth Aug., 1906. 
111. Government of India, Acting Chief Secretary to 
Government of Madras, lOth Aug., 1907, in United 
Planters• Association of Southern India, Annual 
Proceedings, 1907, p 92. 
112. Ibid., 1908, p 40. 
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responses to its proposals eventually led the planters• 
confederation to abandon its efforts to strengthen its control over 
plantation labour through reform of Act I. 
Despite their failure to secure either legislativ~ or 
administrative reform, Act I remained the Nilgiri planters' most 
effective weapon against mounting labour shortfalls. As a result, 
planters were motivated to develop strategies which would improve 
the efficiency of the law without further assistance from 
government. The most notable initiatives were made after 1914 
through the newly established Labour Department of the U.P.A.S.I. 
The proposal to establish a Labour Department within the 
U.P.A.S.I. was 113 first moved by Fairless Barber in 1913 . 
Barber initially envisaged that the Labour Department would serve 
as an agency to "look after the interests of the maistries ... and 
of the coolies recruited, and further would exploit and recommend 
new recruiting grounds and advise, on the position of maistries, in 
such districts" 114 • Southern planters who were faced with 
severe labour shortages, a seemingly finite supply of labour, and 
government rej action of their overtures for legislative reform, 
regarded Barber's scheme as a means of competing with the plethora 
113. Ibid., 1913, p 10. 
114. 1Bi9·· p 27. 
i' 
,. 
i· 
I 
II 
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of outside agencies then actively recruiting plantation workers in 
Madras Presidency .. Moreover, the Labour Department aimed at 
increasing planters' control over labour by facilitating the 
attestation of labour contracts, the execution of warrants and the 
recovery of outstanding 115 advances These objectives proved to 
be a sufficient inducement for its establishment, despite the fact 
that finance had to be provided by a system of self-imposed levies 
upon subscribers 116 The Labour Department commenced its 
operations in July, 1914 117 
The aCtivities of the U.P.A.S.I. 's Labour Department 
considerably increased the impact of Act I upon plantation labour 
in southern India. A large proportion of the Department's energies 
were expended in expediting the arrival of lagging workers on 
estates, in recovering outstanding advances, and in executing 
warrants. These tasks were facilitated after January, 1916, when 
the Government of Madras permitted warrants to be served directly 
through the Labour Department 118 • This measure considerably 
assisted the Department in successfully resolving disputes between 
115. Ibid., p 71. 
116. Ibid., 1914, p 18. 
117. Ibid., p 2. 
118. Ibid., 1917, p 22. 
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contracted labourers and'their employers. In recruitment districts 
such as South Canara the proportion of warrant cases settled to the 
satisfaction of Labour Department subscribers rose from 45% in 
1916, to 80\ in 1922 119 similarly, in Coimbatore Dis~ict, 
which supplied much of the labour for plantations in the Nilgiri 
hills, labour case resolution rates remained well above· 80% in 
every year between 1917 and 1921 120 The operations of the 
Labour Department made labour's evasion of its contractual 
obligations more difficult. 
The Labour Department's extraordinary success in resolving 
labour cases may be partly attributed to its employment of methods 
which were generally unavailable to individual planters. Prior to 
the establishment of the Labour Department, a Nilgiri planter who 
s-ought the return of his absconded labourers possessed no practical 
alternative to prosecution under Act I. Plantation agriculture 
required constant supervision, and it was both impractical and 
uneconomic for a planter to leave his estate in order to pursue 
former workers some distance away. Moreover, as most planters had 
little direct contact with their field labourers, successful 
identification of former employees in their home villages was a 
119. Ibid., 1922, p 40. 
120. Ibid., 1921, p 46. 
• 
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difficult task. However, the Labour Department was not beset by 
many of these difficulties. The Department was not- restrained by 
the economics of a particular case: ··until 1922 the Department's 
policy was to persevere indefinitely in its attempts to reCJDver 
debts as meagre as Rs. 2 121 Additionally, the Department's 
task of tracing defaulting labourers was assisted by the dispersal 
of its agents throughout the recruitment districts. As a result, 
Labour Department agents were frequently able to enter villages 
where they pressurised recalcitrant workers through "moral suasion" 
and the formation of impromptu panchayats 122 . Since the 
department's agents were often in possession of warrants, their 
attempts to pe_rsU.ade defaulting workers to return to their estates 
123 frequently rested on the threat of imprisonment as well as 
traditional village influence. In these instances the colonial law 
of penal contract was clearly supplemented by the planters• use of 
a traditional mechanism to force absconders to return to their 
estates. The arrival of an agent who held advances in one hand and 
warrants in the other may have done little to promote plantation 
121. Ibid., 1922, p 42. 
122. Ibid., 1917, p 21. 
123. Ibid., p 41. 
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employment 124 but it did allow many planters to retrieve 
defaulting labourers without recourse to the law courts.. In 1917 
these methods were responsible for the recovery of outstanding 
advances valued at approximately Rs 24,000 125 In cornpa.r,j.son 
only half that amount was recovered by the Department through court 
action 126 As well, employers were able to "to use the 
department as a threat to their defaulters" 127 for the 
activities of the Labour Department demonstrated "to all the world 
that defaulters have no easy time" 128 • The litigious activities 
of the U.P.A.S.I.'s Labour Department and those of individual 
planters maximised the impact of Act I upon plantation labour in 
the Nilgiri hi~ls. 
,For southern planters the crisis in labour supply was 
relieved by the outbreak of the First World War. The enlistment of 
southern planters and planting superintendents often curtailed 
expansion and reduced t~e intensity of cultivation on established 
124. Ibid., 1922, p 37. 
125. Ibid., 1917, p 21. 
126. Ibid. 
127. Ibid., 1918, p 32. 
128. Ibid., p 12. 
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estates 129 . After 1915, higher freight charges, a shortage of 
shipping, a contraction of the British tea market, and also the 
American rubber market after 1917, all dampened the rate at which 
the demand for plantation field workers grew 130 Many of tflese 
factors applied equally to plantation agriculture abroad, and as a 
result the export of Indian plantation labour overseas was reduced4 
In Malaya surplus capital was scarce, and the flow of immigrant 
labour was restricted by the Government of India 131 • In 1915 
south Indian labour emigration to Malaya had fallen to 
approximately 60 per cent of the migrant flow recorded in 1913, and 
for the duration of the war it remained below pre-war 
levels 132 While planters in the Nilgiri hills continued to 
find the supply of labour inadequate (chiefly because of the 
extension of plantation agriculture in Travancore and 
Malabar 133 ), their difficulty was less severe than that which 
129. I.O.L.R., Annual Reports on the Workings of the Madras 
Planters• Labour Law of 1903, 1915, c. A. Innes, Acting 
District Magistrate of Malabar, to Chief Secretary to 
Government, 15th Feb., 1915. 
130. s. Rajaratnam, "The Growth of Plantation Agriculture in 
Ceylon, 1886-1931", op. cit., pp 11-13. 
131. Sinnappah Arasaratnam, Indians in Malaya and 
Singapore, London, 1970, p 29. 
132. Sandhu, op. cit., Appendix 1, p 305. 
133. I.O.L.R., Annual Reports on the Workings of the Madras 
Planters' Labour Law, 1916, G.O. No.728, M. Young, 
District Magistrate, Nilgiris, to Chief Secretary to 
(continued over) 
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had prevailed between 1908 and 1913. However, the war years 
provided southern planters with only a partial and temporary 
respite from their long standing labour problem: by 1918 the 
plantation labour market had reverted to a position of ~ute 
undersupply. 
Severe labour shortfalls recurred in 1918. Initially the 
growth of village groundnut cultivation and the extension of 
commercial cotton cropping in south India were perceived as 
important local factors which reduced the availability of 
plantation labourers 134 . In 1918 Aylmer Martin, now acting as 
Director of the recently created Labour Department of the 
U.P.A.S.I., argued that agricultural workers had little incentive 
to seek employment outside their home areas because, "With the 
prices ruling for cotton, cultivators of that crop has been able to 
afford wages to coolies in or near villages quite equal to those 
paid by ourselves" 135 ~ -However, it was the outbreak of pandemic 
influenza in 1918 which was to the greatest impact on plantation 
Government, 15th Feb., 1916; Ibid., 1917, G.O. No.450, 
c. F. Brackenbury, Joint Magistrate in charge of the 
Nilgiris, to Government, 16th Feb., 1917; F~ B. Evans, 
District Magistrate, Malabar, to Secretary to 
Government (Home Department), 6th March, 1917. 
134. U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1918, p 36. 
135. Ibid. 
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labour supply in the immediate post-war period. 
The influenza epidemic was regarded by the District 
Magistrates of Nilgiri and Malabar Districts as the major cause of 
the rapid rise in prosecutions instituted under Act I in 1918 and 
1919 136 . The effects of the epidemic were probably most intense 
in the Wynaad 137 where extremes of climate, the prevalence of 
malaria, and unsatisfactory conditions of labour had already 
contributed to the enfeeblement of the plantation work force. In 
addition to death and debility, the outbreak caused further 
dissipation of the work force as labourers -deserted estates because 
138 
of fear of infection Many left "only to find that it 
existed in the plains as well as in the hills" 139 • Others, who 
136. I.O.L.R., Annual Reports on the Workings of the Madras 
Planters• Labour Law of 19D3, 1919, G.O. No.SB6, 
A. R. Cummings, District Magistrate, Nilgiris, to 
Secretary to Government, Home (Misc.) Department, 11th 
Feb., 1919; J. F. Hall, District Magistrate, Malabar, 
to Chief Secretary to Government, Home (Judicial) 
Department, 21st Feb., 1919; ~. 1920, G.O. No.SS4, 
E. F. Thomas, District Magistrate, Malabar, to 
Secretary to Government, Home (Misc.) Department, 19th 
Feb., 1920; J. F. Bryant, District Magistrate, 
Nilgiris, to Secretary to Government, Home (Misc.) 
Department, 5th March, 1920. 
137. Ibid., 1920, G. 0. No.SS4, E. F. Thomas, District 
Magistrate, Malabar, to Secretary to Government, Home 
(Misc.) Department, 19th Feb., 1920. 
138. Ibid. 
139. Ibid., 1919, G.O. No.SB6, J. F. Hall, District 
Magistrate, Malabar, to Secretary to Government, Home 
(Judicial) Department, 21st Feb., 1919. 
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were granted temporary leave by their employers to go to their 
villages, did not return to their estates after the epidemic had 
waned 140 In addition, the failure of some planters to raise 
wages in line with increases in the prices of basic foodstuff• was 
reported as contributing to labour's inclination to abscond, and 
hence of a greater number of prosecutions 141 It was these 
events which were primarily responsible for a doubling of the 
number of plantation labour cases instituted between 1917 and 
1919 142 
The dire shortage of labour abated only on the outbreak of 
the Mappila rebellion in 1921 as those labourers who had been drawn 
from rebel ar~aS proved content to remain on their estates 143 
140e Ibid., A. R. Cummings, District Magistrate, Nilgiris, 
to Secretary to Government, Horne (Misce) Department, 
11th Feb., 1920. 
141. Ibid., 1920, G.O. No.554, E. F. Thomas, District 
Magistrate, Malabar, to Secretary to Government, Home 
(Misc.) Department, 19th Feb., 1920; J. F. Bryant, 
District Magistrate, Nilgiris, to Secretary to 
Government, Home (Misc.) Department, 5th March, 1920. 
142. Supra., Table 7, p 230. 
143. I.O.L.R., Annual Reports on the Workings of the Madras 
Planters• Labour Law of 1903, 1922, G.O. No.719, 
R. H. Ellis, Deputy Magistrate, Malabar, to Secretary 
to Government, Law (General) Department, 15th Feb., 
1922; Ibid., 1923, G.O. No. 786, J. A. Thorne, District 
Magistrate of Malabar, to Secretary to Government, Law 
(General) Department, 14th Feb., 1923. This explanation 
of an easing in labour supply is consistent with the 
origins of Cheruman plantation labour in the interior 
of southern Malabar, (Supra, p 55), particularly as 
Mappila outbreaks were largely confined to the rural 
areas of Ernad and Walluvanad taluks (Stephen Frederic 
Dale, Islamic Society on the South Asian Frontier, The 
(continued over) 
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Yet for planters relief was short-lived. The return to peace in 
Malabar brought a resurgence of large labour shortfalls, 
particularly in 1925. However, these labour shortages never 
attained the proportions of those which had been experieiced 
already in the period between 1908 and 1913, and in the immediate 
post-war years. 
The link between labour shortages and a growing degree of 
legal coercion of plantation labour in the Nilgiri hills is clear 
cut and irrefutable. The institution of Act I augmented the legal 
authority which planters had previously possessed over labour under 
Act XIII of 1859, chiefly by granting employers the right to 
extract .the specific performance of labour contracts from their 
defaulting workers. Although dissatisfied labourers continued to 
desert their plantations, the ability of planters t9 obtain 
physical custody of absconding employees, and the fact that 
incarceration provided no release from the terms of a labour 
contract, ensured that many plantation labourers were returned to 
their estates against their will. Moreover, confinement on Nilgiri 
tea estates also deprived workers of the freedom to sell their 
labour power to higher bidders in the plantation labour market. 
Economic exploitation in this sense was therefore implicit in the 
Mappilas of Malabar 1498-1922, Oxford, 1980, pp 120, 
187). 
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coercion of labour under Act I. 
Although the legal coercion of plantation labour was 
dependent on the existence of an underdeveloped wage-labour market, 
it is both important and ironic that the various coe.cive 
recruitment systems prevailing in the British dominions of south 
and south-east Asia were brought into fierce competition in south 
India from around 1908. The increasing regularity with which 
Nilgiri planters instituted legal proceedings against their workers 
was directly related to the expansion of the southern plantation 
labour market. The intensified efforts of overseas recruitment 
agencies, particularly from Ceylon and Malaya, provided migrating 
labourers with alternative destinations. Greater competition for 
plantation labour and the profitability of rubber cropping abroad 
exerted upward pressure on advances and wage rates, which could not 
be matched by Nilgiri planters. In an effort to retain their labour 
supply, Nilgiri planters resorted to the more rigorous and 
widespread enforcement of Act I. While the intensive application of 
Act I produced substantial benefits for Nilgiri planters, it is 
evident that the law provided only a partial solution to their 
labour supply problems. Even in the period following the 
establishment of U.P.A.S. I.'s Labour Department, Nilgiri planters 
continued to suffer a want of labour, and relief was largely 
afforded by the impact of external forces beyond the planters' 
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control. In spite of the efforts expended by the various planting 
regions to coerce labour and to control the plantation labour 
market, a degree of competition prevailed as the planters• 
increased demand for labour was over-exercised in the ~arne 
depressed class labour pools of south India. These conditions 
encouraged Nilgiri planters to find additional means of retaining 
those workers they had already contracted. 
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CHAPTER 6 
ACT I AND PLANTATION RELATIONS • 
The legalised coercion of tea plantation labour in the 
Nilgiri hills was highly dependent on the social and contractual 
relations existing between labourers and their employers. The 
institution of the Madras Planters' Labour Law (Act I of 1903) 
dramatically altered the nature and balance of these relationships, 
as the redistribution of legal power contained in Act I fostered a 
complementary transformation of the plantation's social order. In 
particular, the rising status, authority and wealth of maistris 
assisted the legal coercion and economic subjugation of common 
field labourers. On Nilgiri tea plantations the coupling of social 
and legal change sharpened the divide between capital and labour, 
and resulted ultimately in an increasingly rigid social 
stratification based largely on economic class . 
• • • • • • • • 
The pre-eminent social change engendered by the 
implementation of Act I was the fundamental alteration of the 
plantation maistri' s role and status. Under Act I the maistri' s 
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position as an employer of plantation labour was officially 
recognized 1 , and was buttressed by the enhancement of his legal 
authority over his contracted workers. As the new plantation labour 
law drew no legal distinction between the various classes- of 
plantation employers, maistris were entitled to secure their 
defaulting labourers through the courts in exactly the same manner 
as plantation owners and managers 2 The maistri• a right to 
instigate legal proceedings, and his ability to win physical 
custody of recalcitrant workers considerablY enhanced his authority 
and~tatus on the plantation. 
At the same time, the scant legal protection afforded by 
Act I to employers of fraudulent and defaulting maistris encouraged 
planters tO draw maistris into closer working relationships. Most 
importantly, planters possessed no legal means of compelling a 
maistri to fulfil his contract to supply labour; nor could the 
maistri be forced to take legal action against workers who had been 
advanced, but who had failed ~to complete the terms of their 
contracts. Planters drew "little comfort from their right to recover 
monetary advances from a defaulting maistri, as the production 
losses which resulted from the failure of a labour supplier 
1. The Madras Planters' Labour Law, (Act I of 1903), 
op. cit., Section 3, parts (a) and (f). 
2. Ibid., Sections 30, 31, 33, 35. 
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generally far outstripped the actual cash advanced 3 . Compensation 
for production losses through the criminal courts was denied to 
planters under Act I: restitution for damages suffered from breach 
of contract offences could be extracted only through tardy c.Wil 
proceedings. The impediments encountered by planters who proceeded 
against their maistris were outlined by a Wynaad planter, 
H. Waddington, in a letter to his local planting association 4 
Although Waddington's maistri had failed both to supply labourers 
and to return his advances in line with a court directive, 
Waddington complained that he was unable to extract specific 
performance of the contract. Neither could the maistri be charged 
with contempt .of court as had previously been the case under 
Act XIII. As a last resort Waddington had instigated a distraint 
order against the maistri' s moveable property, but as he pointed 
out, "the accused, being a Curumber, you will understand he has no 
property of value" 5 . Clearly, the conditions of the new 
plantation labour law left Nilgiri planters financially vulnerable 
to the misdeeds of their maistris. 
3. U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1906, p 86. 
4. I.O.L.R., Public and Judicial Department, Annual 
Departmental Papers, 1906, No. 1164, H. Waddington to 
Secretary Wynaad Planters Association, 9th Nov., 1905. 
5. Ibid. Curumbers were one of the hill tribes occupying the 
Nilgiri hills prior to British settlement. (Supra., p 2) 
Kurumba is a more common spelling. 
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In order to remedy their position planters once more trod the 
familiar, and previously fruitful path of the political lobbyist. 
In 1906 complaints brought forward by the Wynaad Planters' 
Association led the U.P.A.S.I. to appeal to the Governmerft of 
Madras to amend Act I so that maistris would become criminally 
liable if they did not prosecute their recalcitrant 6 workers . 
Madras rejected the planters' request arguing that "such a power 
might, moreover, be worked with great injustice" against the 
maistri 7 but in the following year the Madras administration 
obtained Calcutta • s acquiesence to concede that planters might be 
permitted to proceed directly against a maistri's defaulting 
labourers 8 . However, both the India Office and the Government of 
India were ever mindful of the malpractices in labour recruitment 
which had occurred in northern India and equally desirous of 
6. U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1906, pp 85, 91. 
1. I.O.L.R., Public and Judicial Department, Annual 
Departmental Papers, 1906, No. 1164, G.O. No. 558, 
H. Bradley, Agriculture Chief Secretary to Government of 
Madras to U.P.A.S.I., 28th March, 1906. 
8. Ibid., Annual Departmental Papers, 1906, No. 1164, 
Viceroy to India Office, 6th July, 1906. 
Ibid., W. L. Harvey, Secretary to Government of India, to 
Government of Madras, lOth Aug., 1906. 
Government of Madras, Acting Chief Secretary to the 
Government of Fort st. George, to the Secretary of 
U.P.A.S.I., 22nd March, 1907, in U.P.A.S.I., Annual 
Proceedings, 1907, pp 91-92. 
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maintaining a balance of rights within the Act 9 . They therefore 
directed Madras to indicate to planters that such an enhancement of 
their legal powers must be countered by reciprocal concessions to 
labour. Accordingly, the Government of Madras informed .the 
U.P.A.S.I. that if planters were to be permitted to prosecute their 
workers for desertion, "it is but reasonable" that labourers be 
entitled to leave their estates without loss of wages to prefer 
complaints against a planter, and to prosecute their maistris for 
wages wrongfully withheld 10 
These proposals excited the U.P.A.S.I.'s long standing 
opposition to labour concessions and the association promptly 
damned them as neither reciprocal nor practical. The .Planting 
Member in the Madras Legislative Council, H. P. Hodgson, argued at 
the association's annual conference in 1907 11 that "no sane 
planter" would ever accept the amendments formulated by the 
9. I.O.L.R., Public and Judicial Department, Annual 
Departmental Papers, 1906, No. 1164, J. w. Holderness, 
Revenue Secretary, India Office, 25th April, 1906, 
comments on proposals submitted by Government of Madras 
in Letter No.3, Judicial, 24th April, 1906. 
Ibid., Telegram from Viceroy to India Office, 6th July, 
1906. 
10. Acting Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras, to 
the Secretary of U.P.A.S.I., 22nd March, 1907, in 
U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1907, pp 91-92. 
11. Under U.P.A.S.I.'s rules the Planting Member was able to 
participate in U.P.A.S.I. 's Annual Conference as a 
Committee member. 
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authorities in 12 Madras . Hodgson asserted that the proposed 
alterations to the Act would place a "premium on dishonesty ... (by) 
simply suggesting to the coaly and the maistry to combine together 
13 to defraud the planter" The Wynaad Planters' Associatidh 
delegate, C. E. Abbott, labelled the Government's suggestion that 
planters prosecute their own defaulting workmen as "utterly 
futile" 14 
' 
and proceeded to dramatically outline the practical 
difficulties which would impede planters: 
"You would have to take perhaps 100 contracts to Court, 
have petitions written out on stamped paper and get 
warrants issued; then you would have to go to Court day 
after day when the coolies were brought in one by one. 
But even if any planter had time to do all this, I 
maintain that nobody but the maistry who has actually 
handed ou~ ·the money dare take out warrants for his 
coolies: -there is a special penalty of Rs.50 in the Act 
for arresting the wrong man; and even if the right man 
is arrested and says he is not the Chinnappen of Erode 
that was advanced, how is the planter who has never 
seen him to say he is ? The bulk of the defaulting 
coolies might be working on the next estate, a fact of 
which your1~eighbour as well as yourself would be quite ignorant" . 
Abbott recognized that in plantation labour cases the maistri • s 
intimate knowledge of his employees was indispensible to the 
12. U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1907, p 39. 
13. Ibid. 
14. Ibid., 1906, p 85. 
15. Ibid. 
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planter's cause. Under Act I the maistri had clearly emerged as a 
key figure in plantation labour control. 
Closer affiliation between planters and their rnaistris was 
further encouraged by developments in the plantation labour marke •• 
As plantation labour became increasingly scarce in the period after 
1908, southern planters were forced to increase the valUe of 
advances in order to attract labour. At the same time the growth 
of large, corporate holdings promoted rapid increases in the size 
of each maistri•s labour force. Maistris who wished to maximise 
their profits by retaining as many workers as possible, but who 
.... 
were no longer able to personally supervise all their gangs, became 
increasingly reliant on cole-maistris who acted as overseers. Cole-
maistris were invariably financed by the maistri out of the 
planters' original advance. While· the maistri was legally 
accountable under Act I for the advances which he received, his 
cole-maistris were free from any similar liability. Consequently, a 
maistri whose subordinate overseers had defaulted frequently chose 
16 to abscond also rather than face prosecution by the planter 
The prevalence of this occurrence motivated the Wynaad Planters' 
Association to petition the Government of · .. !"l~dras to bring contracts 
between a maistri and his labour suppliers within the jurisdiction 
16. Royal Commission on Labour in India, Evidence, Vol. VII, 
op. cit., Part II, p 342. 
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of Act I 17 . Their request, which itself was evidence of the 
closer financial bond between planters and maistris, was referred 
to the Government of India for comment. 
Taking the Report of the South of India Planters' Enqu<iry 
Committee as its reference point, the administration in Calcutta 
denied the planters' plea on the grounds that cole-maistris had not 
been mentioned in the Committee's report of 1896 18 Moreover, 
the Government of India was wary of legitimizing recruitment 
procedures which it regarded as dubious. Consequently, Madras was 
informed that "a system which interposes a lengthening chain of 
intermediaries between the principal parties is open to obvious 
objection" 19 While Calcutta's opinion was in keeping with its 
/ 
commitment to counter-balancing the legal protection afforded to 
capitar and labour, its decision denied the evolution of 
contractual relationships which had already taken place over the 
previous decade on plantations in Madras Presidency. The planters' 
failure to extract amendments which would have reflected these 
changes, and the constantly inadequate nature of plantation labour 
17. U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1905, pp 18-19. 
18. I.O.L.R., Public and Judicial Department, Annual 
Departmental Papers, 1905, No. 1164, W.L. Harvey, 
Secretary to Government of India, to Judicial 
Department, Madras, lOth Aug., 1906. 
19. Ibid. 
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supply, encouraged planters to increasingly regard the maistri as a 
useful agent of labour coercion rather than a mere procurer of 
field workers. 
The development of an economic and contractual alliance 
• 
between planters and their maistris is reflected in the increase in 
cases brought against plantation labourers 20 and in the 
concomitant decline in prosecutions mounted by planters against 
their maistris under Act I. Table 8 illustrates this latter 
development in Wynaad taluk of Malabar. 
20. Supra., pp 218-220. 
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TABLE 8 ANALYSIS OF CASES INSTITUTED ONDER SECTIONS 24 AND 30 OF 
ACT I OF 1903 IN WYNAAD TALUK OF MALABAR DISTRICT, 
1906-1924. 21 
YEAR TOTAL NUMBER % OF CASES % OF CASES BROUGHT 
OF CASES AGAINST LABOUR AGAINST MAISTRIS 
(under Section 30) (under section 24) 
1906 191 35% 65% 
1907 241 52% 48% 
1908 431 60% 40% 
1909 439 52% 48% 
1910 582 51% 49% 
1911 663 62% 38% 
1912 1039 64% 36\ 
1913 1452 77\ 23\ 
1914 1259 76\ 24\ 
1915 1209 82\ 18\ 
1916 1370 81\ 19\ 
1917 1196 82% 18\ 
1918 1531 81% 19\ 
1919 Not Available 
1920 1672 86\ 14\ 
1921 Not Available 
1922 1341 83% 17\ 
1923 1180 81\ 19\ 
1924 957 92\ 8\ 
Under Act I planters almost invariably proceeded against 
their defaulting maistris by utilizing the provisions of Section 24 
which imposed a maximum penalty of three months imprisonment or a 
fine of Rs 500 upon a maistri who had failed to account for the 
advances he had received, or had failed either to present himself 
21. Annual Reports on the Workings of the Madras Planters' 
Labour Law of 1903, 1907-1925. Sections 24 and 30 were 
the prime sections of Act I under which the vast 
majority of cases against maistris and labourers were 
instituted respectively. The annual totals of cases 
cited here do not correspond exactly with those given in 
Table 7 since a few cases were instituted under other 
sections. 
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on an estate or to remain there for his contracted term 22 It 
can be readily seen in Table 8 that whereas cases against maistris 
comprised approximately two thirds of all proceedings instituted 
under Act I in 1906 in Malabar, this proportion had fallen in 1~4 
to about one tenth of all cases. In addition, a dramatic decline 
in the actual number of cases brought against maistris is reported 
in magisterial records over the same period. While 125 cases had 
been initiated against maistris in 1906 23 , their counterparts in 
1924 had been the subject of only 72 separate actions 24 This 
development appears more significant when viewed against the 
quintupling of total case numbers which took place in the Wynaad 
between 1906 and 1924 25 as a result of the redevelopment of 
moribund coffee estates, the general expansion of plantation 
agriculture, and the subsequent increases in both the plantation 
work force and the rate of labour litigation. 
Significantly 1 an identical analysis of plantation labour 
22. The Madras Planters• Labour Law, (Act I of 1903), 
op. cit., Section 24. 
23. Annual Reports on the Workings of the Madras Planters' 
Labour Law of 1903, 1907, G.O. No. 418, A. R. Knapp, 
Acting District Magistrate, Malabar, to Chief Secretary 
to Government, 7th Feb., 1907. 
24. Ibid., 1925, G.O. No. 934, J. A Thorne, District 
Magistrate, Malabar, to the Secretary to Government, Law 
(General) Department, 13th Feb., 1925. 
25. Ibid., 1907-1925. 
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cases brought within Nilgiri District reveals that no parallel 
development took place outside the Wynaad. Although a marginal 
decrease in the proportion of cases instituted against maistr is 
between 1908 and 1927 is evident in Table 9, it is more importabt 
to note that such cases constituted only a very small proportion of 
total case numbers from the outset in Nilgiri District. 
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TABLE 9 ANALYSIS OF CASES INSTITUTED UNDER SECTIONS 24 AND 30 OF 
ACT 1 OF 1903 IN NILGIRI DISTRICT, 1908-1927. 26 
YEAR TOTAL NUMBER % OF CASES % OF CASES BROUGHT 
OF CASES AGAINST LABOUR AGAINST MAISTRIS 
(under Section 30) (under Section 24) 
1908 766 91% 9% 
1909 Not Available 
1910 900 92% 8% 
1911 854 90% 10% 
1912 1088 94% 6% 
1913 Not Available 
1914 1115 93% 7% 
1915 1600 95% 5% 
1916 Not Available 
1917 Not Available 
1918 Not Available 
1919 Not Available 
1920 Not Available 
1921 1958 93\ 7\ 
1922 1881 90\ 10\ 
1923 1550 93\ 7\ 
1924 2403 93\ 7% 
1925 1983 95\ 5\ 
1926 2013 96\ 4\ 
1927 2936 97\ 3\ 
/ 
Tables 8 and 9 demonstrate the contrasting methods by which 
Wynaad and Nilgiri planters utilized Act I against their employees. 
Within Nilgiri District litigation against maistris was rare 
initially, and remained so throughout the period in which Act I 
operated. In the Wynaad taluk of Malabar planters gradually 
abandoned the practice of prosecuting maistris for breach of 
contract offences and it became commonplace for maistris to 
26. Ibid., 1908-1928. 
As in Table 8, the total number of cases cited here for 
each year does not correspond exactly with the number of 
cases quoted in Table 7 as a small number of cases were 
instituted under sections other than 24 and 30. 
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prosecute their defaulting workers directly. Despite the rapid 
escalation in labour litigation between 1907 and 1917, maistris 
continued to file in excess of 89\ of all cases instituted against 
workers 27 • By 1924 this development had proceeded to the ~int 
where Wynaad planters were using Act I in a manner akin to that of 
their Nilgiri neighbours. Although Act I was universally employed 
to combat the incidence of broken labour contracts, it was no 
accident that Wynaad and Nilgiri District planters differed in the 
manner in which they had initially brought the law into play. 
Rather, their contrasting methods were the direct result of the 
historical development of plantation agriculture within the region. 
In the Nilgiri hills the "old" style maistri system was most 
slowly supplanted on the Wynaad plateau where planting had 
originally concentrated. "Old" rnaistris, who had not been 
completely converted to the side of capital, were more likely to 
face prosecution at the hands of the planter than "new" maistris 
whose economic interests on the plantation were identical to those 
of their employers. Throughout the Nilgiri hills the transformation 
of the rnaistr i' s role to that of a planter's agent was completed 
under Act I, but this process was a protracted one. It was marked 
by a prolonged intermediate stage in which "old" and "new" maistris 
27. Ibid., 1908-1918. 
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co-existed, and individual maistris commonly combined 
characteristic functions of both roles. This process was retarded 
in the Wynaad largely because planters preserved their ties to 
nearby Mysorean labour and a generation of "old" maistris. In •906 
the Wynaad Planters• Association estimated that Mysore state 
continued to supply a little over 35\ of the migrating labour force 
employed in the Wynaad 28 
In contrast, the highly elevated central and eastern regions 
of Nilgiri District were more readily accessible, (and the 
conditions more agreeable 29 ) to the Tamil speaking plains' 
peoples. As large scale planting subsequently spread to these 
regions in a period marked by the declining availability of 
Mysorean labour, it is highly probable that these planters came to 
rely on Tamil labour prior to their counterparts in the 
Wynaad 30 As these second generation planters had few if any 
28. Planters' Chronicle, Nov., 1906, p 42. 
29. Supra.; pp 83-84; pp 222-226 
30. Supra., pp 39-41. 
The lack of Tamil labour in the Wynaad was evident as 
late as 1943 when a U.P.A.S.I. Census of plantation 
labour revealed that Coimbatore, the Tamil district most 
commonly exploited by Nilgiri planters, supplied 35% of 
all workers labouring on estates belonging to 
subscribers of the Nilgiri Planters' Association, but 
only 6\ of labourers on estates belonging to members of 
the Nilgiri-Wynaad Planters• Association. (U.P.A.S.I. 
Labour Census, cited in Report on An Enquiry into 
Conditions of Labour in Plantations in India, op. cit., 
Table 89, p 128.) 
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bonds to established plantation maistris they possessed 
considerable latitude in establishing the terms of recruitment, as 
well as the opportunity to speedily elevate loyal and reliable 
workers to the rank of maistri. The "new" maistri who had b~en 
chosen and financed by the planter, and whose loyalty to his 
employer had already been demonstrated, was unlikely to be 
prosecuted by his employer. In Nilgiri District the predominance of 
"new" maistris throughout the quarter century in which Act I 
operated was evident in the fact that estate owners always 
preferred their maistris to proceed against labour directly in 
breach of contract cases. 
Both planters and maistris reaped benefits from their more 
intimate alliance. Dependable maistris proved most valuable to tea 
planters when field workers were scarce, as in the period 1908-
1913. In part, this was because an undersupplied labour market 
frequently nursed fraudulent labour contractors 31 who extracted 
advances from planters but failed to deliver workers to estates. 
Additionally, a critical undersupply of labour on estates during a 
heavy flush of tea could result in inadequate harvesting. Since 
plantation profits could more easily be reduced by a poor harvest 
31. Annual Reports on the Workings of the Madras Planters~ 
Labour Law of 1903, 1914, G.O. No. 589, C. A. Innes, 
Acting Magistrate of Malabar, to Chief Secretary to 
Government, 16th Feb., 1914. 
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than by lost advances, it was in the planters' economic interests 
to retain reliable and honest rnaistris. Farsighted planters were 
therefore often prepared to shoulder the "new'' maistri 's immediate 
losses whenever his workers absconded in search of higher wage~ or 
more congenial conditions of emplOyment. This practice also 
released established maistris from the fear of prosecution and 
relieved them of losses which they would otherwise have borne when 
labour absconded. Closer contractual affinity between maistris and 
planters secured the "new" maistri in a permanent and profitable 
trade, while the perquisites of stable employment were often 
considerable, sometimes extending to sizeable personal loans which 
were interest free 32 • Clearly, the contractual relationship 
between "new" maistris and their employers was economically 
advantageous to both parties. 
The emergence of the maistri as a subject of political 
criticism reflects not only the growth of nationalist interest in 
the plight of Indian labour under British planters, but is further 
evidence of the proliferation of "new" maistris throughout south 
India. Significantly, it is the maistri's immoral recruiting 
practices which came under attack early in the twentieth century, 
rather than his role as a collaborative agent in the British 
32. Royal Commission on Labour in India, Evidence, Vol. VII, 
op. cit., Part II, p 317. 
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planting enterprise. In 1903 the Kerala Pratika directed its 
attention to the fate of Cheruman plantation labour in the Nilgiri 
hills ~nd concluded that, 
"As a rule the recruiting agents fill the ears of the 
coolies with all sorts of lies and do not faithfully 
represent to them the consequences which will f~ow if 
they infringe any of the terms of the contract" • 
• 
In the same year, G. Subramania Iyer, in a commentary directed 
against the introduction of Act I, portrayed a typical maistri as a 
man who commonly, 
"goes about the country with a bag of money, ••. pries 
into the secret quarrels and differences of families, 
and, by plenty of false promises, allures the 
discontenj~d male or female member away from the 
:village" • 
In Iyer•s more detailed account each worker is deceived into 
working on an estate where he "has no idea of the nature of his 
work, of the wages he will receive, of his treatment from the 
planter, from the manager or the magistrate" 35 These accounts 
33. Madras Native Newspaper Reports, 1903, Report No. 31, 
p 293, Kerala Pratika, 25th July, 1903. 
34. Iyer, op. cit., p 183. 
35. Ibid. 
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resemble strongly the description of the maistri's recruitment 
practices presented to the Royal Commission on Labour almost thirty 
years later by Ramaswarmy Ayyanger. As President of the Coimbatore 
Labour Union, Ayyanger was chiefly concerned with the condi~ons 
under which cotton mill workers were employed, but he also took a 
particular and personal interest in tea estate labour in the 
Animalai and Nilgiri hills. Ayyanger reported that; 
"The kanganny or maistry goes about village fairs 
(shandys) and festive places and paints a rosy picture 
of life and wages on the hills. The outcasts, the 
immoral women, the oppressed coolies of the village, 
men and women who quarrel with their kith and kin, 
disappointed people and such sort are easily prevailed 
upon ~nd 36they respond to the call of the kangannJ.es ". 
All three extracts depict the maistri as a deceitful character. His 
relative sophistication and the advances which he tenders add to 
his importance and allow him to prey on the ignorance and 
discontent of simple villagers. Additionally, Iyer• s maistri is a 
malevolent agent of social destruction, whose recruitment practices 
undermine the labourer's familial and village inter-relationships. 
In the 1920s and 1930s similarly damning descriptions of the 
maistri and his activities surfaced in the Madras Legislative 
Council. Throughout 1925 J. A. Saldanha, President of the Malabar 
36. Royal Commission on Labour in India, Evidence, Vol. VII, 
op. cit., Part I, p 250. 
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Allied Nationalist Conference and Swaraj Party member 37 , harried 
the government over conditions of labour on plantations. In a 
series of questions directed at the Home Minister, Saldanha made 
clear his belief that plantation labourers drawn from South Canara 
were frequently enticed, 
"by labour agents with hopes of high wages and comforts 
of life ••. which are falsified in the actualities of 
life and that a considerable number of 3ahem return broken down in health and extreme poverty" 
In addition, Saldanha later maintained that it was common practice 
amongst maistris to insert workers' thumbprints on labour contracts 
prior to the inclusion of details relating to their employment. 
This practice allowed maistris to "enforce contracts which never 
took place", as did the alleged practice of forcibly detaining the 
close relatives of recalcitrant workers on the estate 39 Such 
misuse of labour was made possible by labours' ignorance and fear 
of the law. 
It cannot be claimed that Saldanha • s allegations contrast 
37. For an exposition of Saldanha's political views in 1925 
see; J. A. Saldanha, The Malabar Allied Nationalists 
Conference, Calicut, Presidential Address, Calicut, 
1925. 
38. Government of Madras, Proceedings of the Legislative 
Council of the Governor of Madras, 20th Aug., 1925, 
pp 326-327. 
39. Ibid., ,26th Aug., 1925, p 760. 
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starkly with the experiences of plantation labour prior to 1903, as 
coercion of plantation labour had previously taken place under 
Act XIII of 1859. "Exaggerated descriptions and false promises" 
have been "the characteristic tools" of the professi•nal 
recruiter's trade here and in other migrant labour streams 40 . 
However, coercion can be present in varying degrees. Coercion of 
tea estate labour became more intense and widespread in the 
Nilgiris as maistris came to act almost exclusively on behalf of 
capital in the twentieth century. Abuse of labour was clearly 
dependent on an effective labour law and the maistri's increasing 
invulnerability to prosecution under the same law. 
Coercion and abuse of labour had been less severe in the 
"old'' maistri system. Prior to 1850 in the Wynaad and in Mysore 
state, pioneering planters had engaged only "old" style maistris 
whose status was attained amidst their own communities prior to 
their arrival on estates 41 Originally, the maistri probably 
bound his workers by oral agreements rather than by formal written 
contacts 42 Moreover, early written contracts were often of 
40. J. Norman Parmer, Colonial Labour Policy and 
Administration: A History of Labour in the Rubber 
Plantation Industry in Malaya c.1910 1941, New York, 
1960, p 17. 
41. Moore, op. cit., p 217. 
42. Ibid., pp 204-206. 
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dubious value even after the passage of Act XIII in 1859, since 
defrauded maistris found legal restitution difficult to 
effect 43 
' 
particularly where Mysorean labour had been 
44 
engaged Amongst Mysorean labour, plantation employment .was 
widely regarded as secondary to village agricultural production. In 
both the wet and dry regions of the Mysore plains the tasks of 
ploughing, sowing and harvesting grain took precedence over 
temporary employment on coffee estates in Mysore state and in the 
Wynaad 45 In any case, the highest seasonal demand for coffee 
workers corresponded with the quietest period of the agricultural 
cycle in Mysore, and casual estate work could be neatly dovetailed 
between the planting and reaping of ragi and cholum. The influx of 
cash wages into the plains' villages of Mysore sustained many 
familial plots of land in an increasingly monetized· economy 46 
Plantation employment··· was sufficiently remunerative to weaken the 
tie between the bonded, landless, Mysorean labourer and his 
landlord in the mid-nineteenth century, and to aid the casual 
43. Supra., pp 97-98, 108-109. 
44. Supra., pp 124-125. 
45. Moore, op. cit., pp 204-208. 
46. Ibid., pp 204-206, 212. 
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plantation labourer in preserving his hold over his village 
land 47 More importantly, the payment of monthly 
48 
emoluments rather than commissions, to maistris precluded a 
major form of exploitation which was to become universal in,., the 
"new" maistri system a The workers' ability to enter and exit the 
plantation labour market in response to their own economic 
circumstances, and to permanently quit plantation employment when 
agrarian conditions improved dramatically, as they did in Mysore 
after the great famine 49 indicate that coercion was milder in 
the "old" maistri system. 
The most detailed evidence of the abuses which became 
inherent in t]le "new" maistri system ·of labour recruitment are 
contained in Dr P. H. Daniel's Red Tea 50 Although Daniel has 
chosen to present his account of tea plantation life in the 
Anamalai as fiction, it is closely based on interviews conducted by 
the author with labourers who had been engaged on estates in the 
47. Ibid., pp 224-234. 
48. Planting OPinion, April 1, 1899, p 240. In the 1870s 
monthly payments to maistris ranged between Rs 30 and 
Rs 80. 
49. Supra., pp 31-33. 
50. P. H. Daniel, Red Tea, 2nd Ed., Coimbatore, 1984. 
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region prior to 1930 51. Further, Daniel gained extensive 
personal experience of plantation labour conditions through twenty 
five years service as a medical practitioner on tea estates in the 
region 52 In Daniel's narrative a naive and impoveriabed 
outcaste labourer, Karupan, is seduced into plantation service by a 
wealthy and worldly-wise maistri, Sankarapandian. In his attempt to 
engage Karupan, Sankarapandian presents a highly coloured 
description of British tea planters and plantation life which is 
cleverly calculated to appeal to the downtrodden rustic: 
"The estates are owned by white doraies (European 
masters). They are a blessed lot, I tell you. Here the 
Naickers and Thevars own the land. They are a wicked 
lot. Look at the way they treat us. We are not allowed 
even to go near their houses. They will not allow us to 
take water from their wells, even when we die of 
thirst. You have been working all these years for your 
land lords (sic.) and see, they have let you starve 
now. But the white doraies are very kind. That is why 
God has blessed them and their business. Here, Naickers 
and Thevars threat us worse than their cattle. So God 
is angry and their is no rain. But the white doraies 
deal with us like their equals. They eat beef like us. 
Our caste people cook their food. Because they are 
kind, God is kind to them, and in the estates there is 
rain throughout the year. The land is fertile and 
therefore we get work on all the days of the year •••• 
There are a few high caste coolies. The white doraies 
treat them exactly like us. To tell you the truth, I 
have in my gang a few high caste coolies. I treat them 
exactly like the rest of my coolies who are our caste 
people. They have also to live with us ~ the same 
padee (barracks) and drink the same water" 
51. Ibid., Introduction. 
52. Interview with Dr. P. H. Daniel conducted in Coimbatore, 
11th Feb., 1987. 
53. P. H. Daniel, Red Tea, op. cit., pp 10-11. 
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For Karupan, the opportunity to escape oppression which is based on 
his low ritual status is made more attractive by the promise of new 
found wealth. His impression that plantation employment would 
provide him with social and economic advancement is reinforcedeboth 
by the maistri•s personal tale of his own promotion from common 
field worker to labour recruiter 54 , and by the ease with which 
the maistri convinces the plantation labour agent to provide 
Karupan with an exceptionally large advance 55 Karupan is awed 
by the economic standing and the apparent authority of these men. 
Before the labour agent Karupan is presented as "a perfect picture 
of abject submission" 56 while he addresses the maistri in a 
filial fashion: "You are my father. We are in your hands. Look 
57 
after us as your own children and God will reward you" 
However, Karupan and his fellow labourers are cruelly mistreated 
after their arrival on the tea estate. Karupan discovers that he is 
bonded both by the maistri's advance, and by his labour contract 
which Sankarapandian had previously described to him as merely, "a 
54. Ibid., p 9. 
55. Ibid., p 27 
56. Ibid., p 27. 
57. Ibid., p 15. 
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paper signifying your willingness to go the estate for work" 58 
In order to maximise his commission the maistri drives Karupan to 
work in foul weather and when he is debilitated by malaria. The 
ignorant and illiterate Karupan has neither the opportunity nor~he 
means to check his mounting debt burden with his maistri and the 
estate shopkeepers. Daniel uses one of Karupan' s companions as a 
mouthpiece to explain the trap: 
"once a worker enters an estate, it is very difficult 
to get out of the clutches of the maistries and their 
masters, the white doraies. The advance which a man 
gets in the beginning will be his shackles • • • The 
maistries will see to it that you are not able to clear 
the debt and thereby your services will be secured for 
another year •.•. In another two months the fever 
season will start. Most of the coolies will suffer two 
or three attacks of the fever .•. you will be forced to 
borrow ,either from the maistry or get provisions on 
credit from Kali Chettiar. At the end of the year they 
will produce an account, which will surprise you 
you ha~~ no alternative except to borrow or 
'starve" . 
The economic interdependence of planters and "new" maistris 
underlay the system of debt-bonding, and Daniel notes that the 
maistris have become "the tools of the doraies", while "the doraies 
will do all that they can to keep up the authority of the 
58. Ibid., p 25. 
59. Ibid. , p 82. 
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maistris" 60 • By converting the maistri to the side of capital, 
the planter hoped to secure a regular labour supply and protection 
from fraud. No maistri could afford to ignore his employer's 
demands, for the maistri • s dismissal also involved settlement. of 
his whole gang. This deprived the maistri not only of a profitable 
business but also of the opportunity to recoup the advanceS which 
he had already made to his workers. Throughout Red Tea the 
maistri' a mistreatment and exploitation of Karupan progressively 
acquire a broader meaning; ultimately, Sankarapandian develops as 
the archetypal maistri and Karupan • s experiences on Kumarimalai 
estate come to symbolise the subjugation of all plantation labour 
in south India ~nder the yoke of the "new" maistri system. 
By ,the 1920's it is evident that plantation maistris had 
become so utterly distinct from the workers whom they had 
originally represented that they began to comprise a new and 
distinct social category. 'It is clear that the maistris • newly 
elevated status evolved in the economically orientated world of 
plantation production, and was derived from their increased 
importance in plantation contractual relations, their new found 
wealth, their possession of legal authority coupled with their 
relative immunity from prosecution. However, it is also apparent 
60. Ibid., p85. 
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that some ••new" maistris chose to express their rising socio-
economic status through very traditional mechanisms. To distinguish 
themselves from their labourers, who were frequently their own 
caste. people, they began attaching the term maistri to their I14J.rnes 
in the manner of a conventional caste honorific. In 1924 a 
U.P.A.S.I. compilation of plantation proprietors within the domain 
of the Nilgiri Planters' Association included Jogi Maistry, 
Savannah Maistry and Vellaja Maistry as owners of tea and coffee 
estates of modest proportions 61 In 1948 the five Indian 
planters who had incorporated the title maistri into their names 
were all located in the Kil~kunda area on the southern tip of the 
Nilgiris, adjacent to the Tamil speaking plains of Coimbatore 62 
It is, 13ignif icant that this development has been recorded within 
the region where "new" maistris first dominated plantation 
recruitment. No similar entries appear within the Wynaad planting 
associations' territory, either in 1924 63 1927 64 1932 65 
61. U.P.A.S.I., Planting Directory of Southern India, 1924, 
op. cit., pp 54-68. 
62. Ibid., pp 85-96. 
63. Ibid., pp 70-77. 
64. Ibid., 1927, pp 80-86. 
65. U.P.A.S.I., Planting Directory of Southern India, 
Madras, 1932, pp 94 103. 
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or 1948 66 
The maistris' adoption of a novel nomenclature resembles in 
some respects the assumption of the suffix "chetty" by non-Chetty 
caste traders in the seventeenth century. In his study of the ear•y 
Indo-European trade in southeastern India, Sinnappah Arasaratnam 
has noted that oil-pressers, Paravas, and a number of fisher castes 
who took up mercantile pursuits, were known to have attached the 
title "chetty" to their names as "a symbol of their shedding 
previous traditional occupations" 67 Like plantation maistris, 
the newly established merchants altered their formal names to 
indicate their new vocation and to distinguish themselves from 
their fellow caste members. However, while the suffix "chetty" 
connoted an established, though widely variable, socio-economic and 
religious status; the title "maistri" had no traditional 
implication of rank. The connotations of the title "maistri" as a 
caste honorific could only be drawn from the increasingly 
favourable economic circumstances of the maistris' employment. In 
the rapidly evolving plantation class structure maistris were 
distinctly superior to their fellow caste men who laboured as 
66. U.P.A.S.I., Planting Directory of Southern India, 
Coonoor, 1948, pp 97-101. 
67. S. Arasaratnam, "Indian Commercial Groups and European 
Traders, 1600-1800: Changing Relationships in 
Southeastern India", op. cit., p 42. 
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common field workers. The maistris' desire to append their names 
was a bald attempt to exploit a conventional mechanism whereby 
their rising economic status would be legitimised and transported 
beyond the boundaries of their estates. • 
It is probable that the trade of the plantation maistri also 
became an hereditary occupation, akin to a c(;mventional 'caste's 
practice of a particular vocation. Although the available evidence 
is meagre, it is clear that not all labourers were equally eligible 
for promotion from the labour ranks to the position of estate 
maistri. Aside from their individual qualities as employees, 
planters were particularly interested in those_ workers who already 
had establish~d labour connections. In 1930 the manager of 
Paehamalai Estate in the Anamalai informed the Royal Commission on 
Labour that his policy was "to promote men who have proven to 
be good coolies and possibly have family connections and who we 
think may be able to bring coolies" 68 One "new" maistri who 
had never worked as a field labourer, but whose father was also a 
plantation maistri, explained to the Commission that he was 
initially employed on Nonsuch Estate in the Nilgiris because, "my 
relations in my village wrote to me that there were some workers 
who were in difficulty in the village and who wanted to go to the 
68. Royal Commission on Labour in India, Evidence, Vol. VII, 
op. cit., Part II, p 355. 
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garden" 69 A maistri•s son, irrespective of whether he was 
already labouring on the estate or not, had a distinct advantage in 
providing labour connections. Additionally, the fact that 
plantations owned by maistris in Nilgiri District were often 
• 
registered in the names of both the father and his sons 70 is a 
further indication that employment as a maistri became a familial 
occupation. 
The social advancement of plantation maistris was made 
possible by the rising rates at which they were remunerated on 
Nilgiri estates. As labour supply grew increasingly inadequate, 
planters became more dependent on familiar labour contractors, more 
tolerant of the negligent among them, and more generous towards 
them in order to secure their permanent engagement. In the 
twentieth century a maistri•s earnings were frequently substantial, 
and were derived from two main sources: a monthly wage and a 
commission based on his labourers' earnings. Head maistris, who 
often commanded up to 250 workers, were paid a flat wage in the 
vicinity of Rs 70 per month in 1930, while the monthly payment made 
to a cole-maistri who supplied only 25 estate workers was 
69. l£ig., p 309. 
70. U.P.A.S.I., Planting Directory of Southern India, 1932, 
op. cit., p 86; lhiQ., 1948, pp 89 91. 
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approximately Rs 12 per month 71 While wages generally 
represented only a small proportion of a maistri's total income, a 
large maistri•s rate of pay was high by comparison with his 
labourers whose daily wage, prior to deductions made for advanc~s 
received and the cost of sustenance, was 7 annas in 1930 72 . 
Maistris usually derived the greater part of their total income 
from their commissions. Commissions ranged between 10 and 15 per 
cent of their ·labourers' earnings. In 1930 the Royal Commission on 
Labour accepted evidence that substantial maistris received 
commissions ranging between Rs 250 and Rs 60 each month 73 . In 
total, the earnings of a head maistri on a large estate could 
amount to as much as Rs 3,000 annually. These earnings allowed many 
maistris to accumulate a considerable capital base which could then 
be used to purchase income producing assets. 
The maistri's newly acquired wealth was frequently channelled 
into land acquisition. In the Nilgiris in the 1920s "new" maistris 
had acquired plantations ranging in size from 14 to 34 acres 74 
71. Roval Commission on Labour in India, Evidence, Vol. VII, 
op. cit., Part 2, p 314. 
72. Report of the Royal Commission on Labour in India, 
op. cit., p 998. 
73. Royal Commisslon on Labour in India, Evidence, Vol. VII, 
op. cit., Part 2, pp 384, 394. 
74. U.P.A.S.I., Planting Directory of Southern India, 1924, 
op. cit., pp 54-68; Ibid., 1927, pp 62-79. 
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Although these estates were small scale operations by comparison 
with other privately owned British plantations which could extend 
over two and three hundred acres 75 they were physically 
distinct from the mass of small holdings 76 which were larljlely 
owned and cultivated by Badacja families 77 • Purchase of even a 
small estate required a considerable capital outlay; and if the tea 
fields were newly established, then a cash reserve or substantial 
cash flow would have also been required to maintain the estate 
until returns accrued from the first harvest. By 1948 rnaistris' 
estates in the Nilgiris had increased in size with the largest 
holding standing at a little more than two hundred acres 78 
It is probable that the rnaistri's wealth was also directed at 
land purchase in labour catchment zones. In Red Tea the maistri, 
75 •. Ibid., 1924, pp 54-69. 
76. Although the planting directories compiled by U.P.A.S.I. 
classify small holdings as estates of ten acres or less, 
many of these were little more than garden plots. As the 
small amount of leaf produced on these holdings did not 
warrant the cost of constructing a tea factory, small ' 
holders sold their plucked leaf to large estates where 
it underwent processing along with the crop produced on 
the larger estate •. 
77. Interview conducted with Mr R. Menon, Chairman of Tea 
Estates India Ltd. (a division of Brooke-Bond) at 
coonoor, 18th Feb., 1987. 
78. U.P.A.S.I., Planting Directory of Southern India, 1948, 
op.cit., p 90. 
' Sankarapandian, invests his earnings in village land; 
"As a maistry with hundred (sic) coolies in his gang, 
he received every year, about a thousand rupees as 
commission. First he rebuilt his house and bought a 
pair of bulls. Then he bought some land for 
cultivation. Every year he added to it. His father 
cultivated the land in the beginning. As more land was 
acquired, he hired men to work along with him. At last 
the holding increased to such an extent that the father 
found it very difficult to look after the cultivation 
of the land as well as atte"AJ to the cattle and sheep 
that he had recently bought" . 
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• 
The influx of the maistri' s capital into the rural recruiting 
grounds depicted in Red Tea heightens the existing economic 
inequalities in the village, as the description of Vyramuthu, an 
elderly retired maistri, illustrates: 
"Vyramuthu was the rich man of the village and lived in 
a tiled house. He owned about five acres of land ... -He 
had his own pair of bulls for ploughing. He owned the 
solitary bullock cart in the village which was 
harnessed once in a week, on market day ... The 
villagers who had any produce to sell paid a small sum 
to Vyramuthu and rode in his cart to the market. He 
also lent money on interest • • • (when) Vyramuthu had 
come to the village on retirement it was rumoured that 
he ha'So brought with him nearly five thousand 
rupees ". 
The maistris' acquisition of village lands and tea estates 
transported the gross differential in the estate earnings of 
79. P. H. Daniel, Red Tea, op. cit., pp 29-30. 
80. Ibid., p 4. 
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maistris and labourers further afield. As the flow of estate 
earnings was concentrated by maistris on the purchase of income 
producing assets such as agricultural land, ·the growth of colonial 
plantation agriculture and the influx of cash earnings which. it 
generated probably produced little economic relief for the majority 
of depressed class labourers in their home villages. However, it is 
interesting to note that the maistri' s new found status was not 
always readily accepted by those who previously had been his social 
superiors at .home. In 1895 a Wynaad planter recounted that; 
"One of my men rose by means of industry to possess 
some property, part of which he invested in a gold 
ring, the caste men of his village resented this and 
accused ~iln of having stolen the ring with the reSult 
that the matter was compromised by his handing the ring 
over "to the Village Magistrate. The next step was to 
burn his house down, and eventually the m'Wt had to 
.leave his village and seek shelter elsewhere" . 
The conflict between this rich, outcaste maistri and the caste men 
of his village exemplifies the collision of two opposing systems of 
social stratification: the pre-colonial caste structure based on 
ascribed status and the capitalist framework of economic class 
based on attained status. 
On Nilgiri tea estates the maistri' s rising status 
contributed directly to the economic exploitation of plantation 
81. U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1895, p 36. 
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labour. The revolution in plantation contractual relations under 
Act I allowed the development of an ever widening economic gulf 
between maistris and their labourers since planters proved adept at 
harnessing the maistris' enhanced authority to the interests• of 
capital. As a result, the earnings of plantation labour between 
1904 and 1929 bore little relation to the state of the 
international tea market, an individual estate's capacity to pay or 
to the value of the work completed. Rather, the gradual 
impoverishment of estate labour was an accurate reflection of the 
maistris' burgeoning coercive authority over field workers. An 
examination of the economic condition of common plantation 
labourers reveals a dramatic decline in labour's standard of living 
throughout the period of Act l's application. This decline is amply 
illustrated in Table 10 which details the falling purchasing power 
of plantation wages in real terms. 
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TABLE 10 INDEX OF PURCHASING POWER OF PLANTATION WAGES IN COMMON 
GRAINS, 1904-1929. 82 
YEAR (a) RAGI (B) RICE (Second sort) 
1904 100 points 100 points 
1905 86 " 95 .. 
1906 64 .. 82 " • 
1907 60 " 76 " 
1908 66 " 72 " 
1909 56 " 65 " 
1910 61 " 73 " 
1911 67 " 81 " 
1912 63 " 74 .. 
1913 56 .. 66 " 
1914-1916 Not Available Not Available 
1917 64 points 69 points 
1918 55 " 64 .. 
1919 38 " 53 " 
1920 34 " 50 " 
1921 45 " 45 " 
1922 47 " 56 " 
1923 45 " 58 " 
1924 43 " 57 " 
1925 39 .. 53 " 
1926 41 " 56 " 
1927 42 " 58 " 
1928 42 .. 59 " 
1929 43 " 61 " 
-·------·- - - - - - - ------
Labour's declining standard of living on plantations was the 
result of continual increases in grain prices between 1904 and 1920 
which were not compensated for by any increase in plantation wages. 
As a result, a male worker in 1920 who expended his total earnings 
82. The index is based on the prevailing daily male wage 
rate. Wage rates were obtained from: Report on the 
Conditions of Tea Garden Labour in the ouars of Bengal, 
in Madras and in Ceylon, op. cit., p 12; Annual Reports 
on the Workings of the Madras Planters' Labour Law of 
1903, 1920, E. F. Thomas, District Magistrate Malabar to 
Secretary to Horne (Misc.) Department, 19th Feb., 1920; 
U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1921, p 102. Grain 
prices are annual district averages taken from: 
Madras District Gazetteers. Statistical Appendix for the 
Nilgiri District, 1905, op. cit., p 15; Ibid., 1915, 
p 20; Ibid., 1928, pp 26 27; Ibid., 1933, p 23. 
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on grain would have received only one third the quantity of ragi or 
one half the quantity of rice he could have purchased in 1904. Some 
relief was provided by a rise of 20% in plantation wages in 1921, 
but the inadequacy of this increa~e is indicated by the fact ~at 
at no point afte~ 1921 was th~ purchasing power of plantation wages 
restored to its 1904 level. From 1921 to 1929 plantation wages in 
the Nilgiri provided, at best, two thirds the quantity of grain 
which had been available to workers in 1904. 
The declining purchasing power of plantation wages was 
evident for consumers both of ragi and rice. By 1920 the prevailing 
daily male wage in the Nilgiri provided the worker with only 1. 56 
seers of rice per day 83 At this price, rice was probably 
already too expensive to serve as ~he conunon staple food of most 
workers. A rice eating wor;Jter might obtain some relief from his 
straightened circumstances by switching to the cheaper ragi. 
However, ragi eating workers were- further disadvantaged by the more 
rapid escalation of ragi prices in comparison to rice, particularly 
83. The standard government seer of 2.057 lbs has been 
employed throughout the text. In the imperial system of 
weights 1.4 seers is equal to 2lbs 14oz, and to 1.3 
kilos in the metric system. It is important to note that 
female wages were approximately two thirds that of their 
male counterparts both in money terms and in grain 
purchasing power. In the Nilgiri adult female labour was 
at least as common as adult male labour. (Report on an 
Enquiry into Conditions of Labour in Plantations in 
India, op. cit., p 115.) Since the earnings of young 
children were negligible on estates, a woman who had 
dependents but no adult male to contribute to the 
support of her family was most vulnerable to any decline 
in real wages. 
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in the decade 1919-1929. Although the prices of rice and raqi 
tended to move together, the overall attrition of labour's 
purchasing power was, by 1929, more evident in ragi than in rice. 
Although coercive labour practices on plantations cush:tbned 
the impact of the decline in real plantation wages upon estate 
labour supply, planters in south India were never able to exert 
complete control over the plantation labour market. As a result, 
Nilgiri planters remained partly exposed to the vicissitudes of the 
labour marketplace. While planters frequently utilised legal and 
quasi-legal methods of preventing contracted labour from 
permanently deserting their employment, the rapid increase in the 
number of pla~tation labour cases instituted in 1919 was attributed 
by the Acting Collector of Nilgiri District solely to the fact that 
"some estate authorities were slow in increasing the wages of the 
coolies in proportion to the rise in foodstuffs'" 84 . Similarly, 
the recruitment cif fresh workers was made more difficult by the 
steady erosion of real wages on estates. There can be little doubt 
that in the years 1908 and 1919, which heralded the onset of severe 
labour shortages in the Nilgiri 85 the dramatic drop in the 
84. Annual Reports on the Workings of the Madras Planters• 
Labour Law of 1903, 1921, G.O. No. 585, G. W. Wells, 
Acting Collector of the Nilgiris, to Secretary to 
Government, Home (Miscellaneous) Department, 15th March, 
1921. 
85. Supra., pp 229ff. 
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purchasing power of estate wages contributed to the planters' 
difficulties in obtaining labour. Although the real value of 
plantation pay was to decline even 'further, labourers experienced 
immediate cuts to their ragi purchasing capacity of 15% in 1908 •nd 
31% in 1919. The latter cut was by far the largest experienced in 
the period. 
It is also probable that the decline in real plantation wages 
between 1904 and the early 1920s brought the standard of living of 
plantation workers below that experienced by agricultural day 
labourers in their home villages. While Dharma Kumar has noted the 
overall tendency of agricultural wages to increase in south India 
between 1906 and 1920 86 , tea plantation wages did not rise over 
the period. In both 1906 and in 1920 the prevailing daily male wage 
rate on Nilgiri tea estates was 5 annas per 87 day , and it is 
also probable that in the intervening years Nilgiri planters were 
able to reduce wages to 4 annas 6 pies, as their counterparts in 
86. Dharma Kumar, "Agrarian Relations, South India" 
op. cit., pp 238-239. 
87. Report on the Conditions of Tea Garden Labour in the 
Duars of Bengal, in Madras and in Ceylon, op. cit., 
p 12; Annual Reports on the Workings of the Madras 
Planters' Labour Law of 1903, 1920, G.O. No. 554, 
E. F. Thomas, District Magistrate of Malabar, to 
Secretary to Government, Home (Misc.) Department, 19th 
Feb., 1920. 
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the Anamalai had done in 1907 BB Although a comparison of 
plantation and agricultural wages is hampered by a want of reliable 
statistical data and complicated by a multiplicity of payment 
modes, evidence suggests that stated plantation wage rates ~re 
approximately equivalent to the monetary payments made to 
agricultural day labourers in recruitment areas. The Tinnevelly 
District Gazetteer of 1917 recorded the daily remuneration of field 
labourers as coaunonly ranging between 4 and 6 annas 89 In Mysore 
state 90 and in Malabar District similar wage rates have been 
reported 91 However, it is important to note that the real 
earnings of tea estate workers frequently fell below stated daily 
wage rates because of the practice of docking wages for small 
. d 92 m1.s emeanors under-employment, and the introduction of fine 
88. Planters' Chronicle, Jan., 1907, p 95. The reduction 
was effected in response tO a poor tea crop and low 
prices for tea exports. Note that Table 10 is based on 
the assumption that wages did not fall below 5 annas per 
day. 
89. H. R. Pate, Tinnevelly, Madras, 1917, p 193. 
90. Prices and Wages in India, Calcutta, 1923, pp 160-161. 
91. R. Gopinath, "Aspects of Demographic Change and the 
Malabar Agrarian Economy, 1871-1921", Economic and 
Political Weekly, Jan., 1897, PE 35. Note that Gopinath 
has relied on oral evidence to establish agricultural 
wage rates between 1914 and 1916. 
92. The practice of giving "half-name", and by implication a 
half-day's pay, as punishment for the worker's lack of 
diligence or late arrival at roll call, was a common 
practice on South Indian plantations. (Report on an 
{continued over) 
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l k . 93 p uc ~ng Fine plucking also invariably reduced pluckers' 
earnings since these were always calculated on the weight of the 
plucked leaf and the practice allowed the removal of only the 
smallest tips from the tea bush. Furthermore, the isolated locatJon 
of many tea estates and the nature of plantation employment 
generally prevented plantation workers from supplementing- their 
income through the home production of vegetables 94 or from 
exploiting subsidiary sources of income, such as cottage 
industries, which were sometimes open to village agricultural 
Enquiry into Conditions of Labour in Plantations in 
India, op. cit., p 133; P. H. Daniel, Red Tea, op. cit., 
pp 99-101.) Examination of Tamil language primers 
indicates that these practices, and variations on them, 
were probably transposed from Ceylon where they were 
widespread on tea estates. (W. G. B. Wells, Coaly Tamil 
as Understood by Labourers on Tea and Rubber Estates, 
3rd Ed., Colombo, 1921, pp 29, 35, 50, 54, 56, 59.) 
93. The practice was generally made use of when 
overproduction was thought to be the cause of low tea 
prices. As finely plucked tea brought higher prices than 
coarsely plucked leaf, producers hoped to simultaneously 
maximise estate earnings and to reduce the total 
quantity of tea available in the market. The economic 
impact of fine plucking upon production is discussed in, 
Bhubanes Misra, "Quality, Investment and International 
Competitiveness, Indian Tea Industry, 1880-1910", 
Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XXII, No.6, 7th 
Feb., 1987, pp 235 236. 
94. Unlike their counterparts in north India, southern 
tea workers were rarely allocated land for vegetable 
production. Moreover, plantation land was frequently 
unsuitable for vegetable cultivation. Nor did field 
workers keep cattle on tea estates. (Report of an 
Enquiry into Conditions of Labour in Plantations in 
India, op. cit., p 144.) 
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labour 95 . The daily wage rates cited for plantation employment 
were unlike agricultural pay .rates in that they represented a clear 
ceiling on potential earnings. 
Between 1910 and 1920 south Indian planters recognized ahat 
the diminishing real value of plantation wages adversely affected 
not only the quantity, but also the quality of the labour 
recruited. Aside from recurring labour shortages, some planters 
argued that low wages on plantations brought about an increasingly 
low caste and inexperienced work force. In 1910 the Wynaad delegate 
to the U.P.A.S.I. Annual Conference, Mr Mead, informed his 
colleagues that "in certain districts they were only getting the 
lowest class of coolies to work in the plantations, because others 
would not move out of their villages for a wage of 4 annas" 96 
Mead related that his superintendent had informed him that there 
was now not a single Vellala labouring on Wynaad estates, because 
planters were paying such low wages that "they got only scum 
labour" 97 Moreover, as declining real wages proved insufficient 
95. The prevalence of multiple sources of income among 
village labourers can be gauged by the fact that it 
proved necessary to in~truct officials conducting the 
0 1881 census to record a worker's occupation as the one 
from which he derived his chief source of income. 
(Imperial Census of 1881- Operations and Results in the 
Presidency of Madras, Vol.II, op. cit., p 211.) 
96. U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1910, p 129. 
97. Ibid. 
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inducement to migration among customary labour pools, planters were 
tempted to tap unsuitable, peripheral sources of depressed class 
workers. In 1920 the U.P.A.S.I. 's Labour Department investigated 
the prospect of obtaining labour from the reform schools• of 
Tanjore 98 ; while in 1916 Anamalai tea planters employed a 
thousand Lombardy labourers 99 who had been mobilised under the 
Criminal Tribes Act by the Government of Madras in a measure 
designed for their rehabilitation 100 That these latter workers 
were engaged despite the fact that they were regarded as less than 
ideal recruits is indicated in the planters • declaration that, 
"What they were really striving for was the next generation. Then 
they would have -people who were accustomed to Estate work and life 
from childhood" 101 Although planters in the Anamalai hoped to 
breed a resident labour force on their estates, tangential labour 
sources such as these were too limited to alleviate the overall 
labour shortfall on southern plantations. Nor was their engagement 
98. Ibid., 1920, p 5. 
99. Ibid., 1916, p 7. 
~, 100. Proceedings of the Council of the Governor of Fort St 
George, 5th April, 1916, p 727. A further 5,000 
Piramalai Kallar labourers were sent to Anamalai 
estates in the 1920s under the Act. (David Arnold, 
Police Power and Colonial Rule, Madras 1859-1947, 
op. cit., p 153.) 
101. U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1916, p 7. 
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necessarily a sound economic proposition since it frequently 
involved the hidden cost of tempering workers unaccustomed to both 
agricultural labour and plantation life. The mass exodus of tribal 
recruits_ from the Anamalai after only a single 88¥00'8 
102 
employment the U. P .A. S. I. • s failure to extract labour from 
the Telugu speaking districts 103 in years marked by the 
restoration of Malayan emigration to its pre-war levels 104 
and the continued acute undersupply of plantation labour in the 
immediate post-war years, all served to convince m_any tea planters 
that plantation employment had. to be made more remunerative. 
The attractiveness of plantation employment might have been 
immediately restored through higher wages. However, the post-war 
downturn- in international tea prices lOS was not conducive to 
wage increases. At the same time, Nilgiri tea planters were 
confronted by a rapid escalation in the number of absconding 
labourers, as sudden increases in all grain prices in 1918 further 
102. Ibid., 1917, p 83. 
103. Ibid., 1920, p 6. 
104. Sandhu, op. cit., Appendix 1, p 305. 
105. V. D. Wickizer, Tea under International Regulation, 
California, 1944, pp 58 62. 
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reduced the purchasing power of plantation 0 106 earn1ngs In the 
following year the advent of severe grain shortages threatened to 
disrupt 'the supply of grain to tea plantations. This development 
served as the immediate catalyst to the widespread adoption. of 
concessionary grain sales on estates 107 Nevertheless, 
plantation labour supply remained in a parlous state 108 partly 
as a result of the influenza outbreak. Despite the general downturn 
in the tea industry 109 , planters were forced to concede a 
general increase of one anna in the daily male wage rate during the 
1920-1921 season to augment existing grain concessions 110 
However, concessionary grain schemeS soon proved to be an effective 
vehicle for the coercion of labour, and this ensured their 
continuation beyond the period of serious grain shortages. 
Initially, concessionary grain sales were viewed by planters 
106. Annual Reports on the Workings of the Madras Planters• 
Labour Law of 1903, 1921, G.O. No. 585, G. w. Wells, 
Acting Collector of the Nilgiris, to Secretary to 
Government, Home (Miscellaneous) Department, 15th 
March, 1921. 
107. Planters• Chronicle, 14th Feb., 1920, pp 117-120. 
108. Annual Reports on the Workings of the Madras Planters' 
Labour Law of 1903, 1920, G.O. No.554, E. F. Thomas, 
District Magistrate, Malabar, to secretary to 
Government, Home (Misc.) Department, 19th Feb., 1920. 
109. v. D. Wickizer, op. cit., pp 58-62. 
110. U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1921, p 102. 
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as a flexible means of alleviating what they believed to be a 
passing crisis in plantation labour supply. The official U.P.A.S.I. 
organ, the Planters • Chronicle, declared in october, 1920, that, 
"It is, in fact, economically unsound to raise wages to me¥ a 
temporary 111 emergency" It informed its readership that 
similar reasoning had already led planters in the Federated Malay 
States to reject an overall increase in wages in favour of a small 
increase coupled with rice concessions, since the latter was 
"removable as circumstances admit" 112 As labour supply 
improved, planters also reasoned that it would be easier to retain 
workers if grain concessions were abolished than if wages were 
reduced. 
At the same time, concessionary grain sales were simpler to 
institute that higher wage rates. By 1921 the U.P.A.S.I. had 
already moved to prevent its members from further raising the pay 
of labourers without giving six months advance notice to the 
U.P.A.S.I. 's Labour Department 113 Although the notice period 
was subsequently reduced to two months 114 many planters 
111. Planters' Chronicle, 2nd Oct., 1920, p 664. 
112. Ibid. 
113. U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1921, Appendix entitled 
"Labour Rules", Rule X. 
114. U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1926, p 118, 
Rule XIII. 
315 
considered the prqcess of raising wages in order to attract labour 
an ungentlemanly act since some producers, notably corporations, 
possessed clear financial advantages in a war of wage rates. 
Furthermore, an increase. in wage rates was frequently cast. as 
damaging the profitability of the whole industry since all planters 
would be forced to _follow suit. Any individual attempt to raise 
wages was clearly impo~itic given the U.P.A.s.I.'s frequent 
attempts to exert control over the plantation labour market by 
establishing maximum rates of pay in the various planting 
districts 115 In reality, the U.P.A.S.I. 's members only raised 
wages by common consent. 
Above all, concessionary grain sales embellished the coercive 
power of -an already intricate system of wage payment on Nilgiri tea 
estates. Although subsidised grain sales were commonly regarded by 
planters as a concession to labour, _they were in reality a part of 
the labourers' earnings. They had been instituted initially in lieu 
of sizeable wage increases- which would otherwise have been required 
if planters were to retain their workers. On most estates it is 
probable that cheap grain was available only to working employees, 
and not to either thei·r non-working counterparts or to their 
115. Ibid., 1920, "Labour Department Report", p 5; 
Ibid., 1921, p 19; Ibid., 1922, pp 81-84. 
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dependents. This alone was a strong inducement for labourers to 
perform their tasks. As the wages of migrating labour were 
generally only settled annually 116 
' 
maistris were usually 
alloted the task of distributing weekly sustenance paymiPts 
(selavu) from estate funds to their workers. Selavu payments, which 
often took the form of a token, were then debited agaihst the 
labourer 1 s outstanding pay. With this token the labourer obtained 
his weekly provisions from the estate bazaar. These arrangements 
were open to abuse, either by the maistri acting alone or in 
collusion with estate grain dealers. The relatively isolated 
location of most plantations protected estate storekeepers from 
outside competition, and once the post-war crisis in grain supplies 
had receded, estate merchants were free to import grain and to set 
its price in the bazaar. On some plantations arrangements were made 
by maistris for estate bazaar keepers to issue grain concessions 
directly to labour 117 thereby providing merchants with the 
opportunity to defraud labour by issuing inferior quality or short 
weighted grain. When selavu payments proved insufficient to meet 
116. Report of the Royal Commission on Labour in India, 
op. cit., p 998. Annual settlement remained common in 
the Nilgiris until at least 1946. Although local labour 
had traditionally been paid on a weekly basis, this was 
rare amongst migrating workers. (Report on an 
Enquiry into Conditions of Labour in Plantations in 
India, op. cit., pp 149-151.) 
117. Reoort of the Royal Commission on Labour in India, 
op. cit., p 999. 
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the labourer's needs he had no alternative but to borrow, either 
from the maistri directly, or from the storekeeper in the form of 
credited supplies. As a worker became more indebted, his bond to 
his maistri grew stronger, his term of employment lengthened~ and 
he became increasingly subject to the maistri's daily whims. Grain 
concession schemes were a form of payment-in-kind, and when 
combined with a system of annual wage settlement and borrowings, 
provided maistris and estate merchants with greater opportunity to 
defraud plantation labour. 
Concessionary grain schemes resulted in numerous disputes 
over the quality and price of the grain supplied 118 However, 
the fact that, disputes between labour and management were largely 
confined to grain sales reflects the inability of labour to 
challenge other aspects of the wage paying system, and particularly 
the maistri•s command over it. On tea estates the amount paid to 
any labourer for a working season equalled his annual earnings less 
the value of selavu cash, original advances and any subs!'quent 
loans made to him by his maistri. In effect, the labourer kept 
running accounts with both his maistri and the planter, but he 
possessed no means of checking their accuracy. On many estates 
workers were simply assembled once a month and their current 
118. Report of an Enquiry into Conditions of Labour in 
Plantations in India, op. cit., p 140. 
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balance of earnings were announced to all present 119 Although 
annual wage payments were increasingly made over by estate managers 
in person 120 this practice afforded labour little protection 
since opportunities for defraudment were present throughout .the 
yea:i:'; Even where a labourer had the right to inspect his wages 
account, his inferior status and lack of schooling undermined his 
attempts. In the opinion of the 1930 Royal Commission on Labour, 
"there is and can be little or no effective check on the part of 
the worker" 121 Although the U.P.A.S.I. 's representatives 
informed the Commission that labourers were free to report their 
complaints directly to the planter 122 
' 
it was the universal 
custom to channel all communication between labour and management 
through the maistri 123 This practice effectively barred labour 
from obtaining recourse from exploitation, and in the opinion of 
some outside observers, was a blatant flaw in the administrative 
structure of plantations. In 1924 the District Magistrate of 
119. Royal Commission on Labour in India, Evidence, Vol.VII, 
op. cit., Part II, p 333. 
120. Ibid., p 196. 
121. Report of the Royal Commission on Labour in India, 
op. cit., p 998. 
122. Royal Commission on Labour in India, Evidence, 
Vol. VII, op. cit., Part II, p 196. 
123. Ibid., pp 376, 383. 
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Malabar, J. A. Thorne, informed his superiors in Madras that "It is 
a defect of the maistri system that managers of estates are not 
directly in touch with their labour" 124 Thorne's counterpart 
in Nilgiri District, M. Young attributed the high rat~ of 
abscondence among labourers largely to monetary disputes between 
maistris and their contracted labourers. 
"Most of these maistries are illiterate men and cannot 
keep accounts. Consequently they frequently 
overestimate in their own favour the amount of the 
balance of advance still due to them by the coolies. 
The coolies are naturally apt to underestimate such 
balance. The consequence is that the coolies have 
little f'i~IS' in their maistries and they frequently 
abscond" . 
As rnaistri~, increasingly acted as planters' agents and subsequently 
exercised their enhanced authority to independently exploit labour 
on their own financial interests, labourers became heavily yoked to 
maistris with whom they shared no common economic ground and for 
whom they had little personal regard. At the same time, it is 
readily apparent that by the 1920s labourers could effect desertion 
124. Annual Reports on the Workings of the Madras Planters' 
Labour Law of 1903, 1924, G.O. No. 793, Law (General) 
Department, J. A. Thorne, District Magistrate, Malabar 
to Secretary to Government, Law Department, 13th Feb., 
1924. 
125. Ibid., 1914, G.O. No. 589, M. Young, District 
Magistrate, Nilgiris, to Chief Secretary to Government, 
14th Feb., 1914. 
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more easily than they could obtain justice. 
There is every indication that planters gave tacit approval 
to the maistris' coercion of his workers. Planters designated 
maistris a. key role in concessionary grain payments after 1918,•and 
maintained annual wage settlements despite the Royal Corrunission on 
Labour's recommendation that they be abandoned in 1930 126 
Similarly, planters made .almost no attempt to control or combat the 
maistri•s role as an estate moneylender. In 1930 the U.P.A.S.I. •s 
representatives· could recount only four instances in which southern 
planters had attempted to establish labour co-operatives designed 
to provide low-interest loans in order to circumvent the power 
maistris comma.nded through the provision of 127 advances • On the 
contrary, planters began to provide maistris with financial 
incentives in the 1920s to supply advances to labour personally, 
128 
rather than from estate funds This measure transferred the 
responsibility for raising recruitment costs and for recovering 
outstanding advances from the planter to the maistri. .since 
maistris could no longer evade their financial obligations by 
126. Report of the Royal Commission on Labour in India, 
op. cit., Recommendations. 
127. Royal Commission on Labour in India, Evidence, 
Vol. VII, op. cit., Part 2, p 206. 
128. Ibid., pp 215, 318. 
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absconding, the widespread acceptance of this practice reflects not 
only the growing wealth of maistris, but also their ability to 
efficiently recover loans made to labourers. Similarly, it became 
commonplace in the late 1920's for planters to increas8 the 
commission rates of those· maistris who could reliably muster a high 
outturn of estate workers at morning roll call 129 • While 
planters and maistris alike reaped economic gains from a diligent 
and residual labour force, the increasing willingness of planters 
to reward maistris who efficiently fulfilled tasks which had 
previously been regarded as obligations, suggests that by the late 
1920'9 maistris held the upper hand in their new economic alliance 
with planters. 
Under Act I the position of the plantation maistri had been 
transformed. In a period notable for recurrent labour shortages, 
planters failed to secure legal authority over their maistris on 
whom they had grown more reliant, and who possessed the means of 
prosecuting, incarcerating and retrieving defaulting workers with 
greater ease than themselvesa As a result, maistris emerged as 
truly independent figures capable of supplying, organizing and 
controlling much needed labour without the planters' assistance. 
This development was also in part the result of the wage payment 
129. Ibid., p 371. 
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system utilised in the Nilgiri. On tea estates the lack of regular 
cash wages encouraged borrowing and dependence amongst labourers, 
while concessionary grain payments deprived them of the freedom to 
expend their earnings as they chose. Moreover, the maist•i's 
position as intermediatory between capital and labour allowed him 
not only to exploit his contracted workers, but to reorient the 
focus of labour • s contractual bond away from a particular estate 
towards himself. In the period between 1904 and 1929 the maistri 
had rapidly supplanted the planter as the immediate source of 
authority over tea plantation labour. 
By 1929 the relative status of plantation maistris and 
labourers had polarised. As a result of their estate employment, 
maistris fi:'equently acquired considerable wealth and an elevated 
social status which belied their commonplace origins among the 
depressed classes. In contrast, their workers were increasingly 
impoverished by plantation employment, increasingly subjected to 
prosecution and the harsh penal provisions of the plantation labour 
law, and, above all, increasingly coerced within the daily routine 
of plantation operations. While these extraordinary social and 
economic changes had been promoted by the enactment of the Madras 
Planters' Labour Law of 1903, they could not be simply reversed by 
the Act's repeal. The rapid entrenchment of new plantation 
practices and new social rankings ensured their survival despite 
• 
£<:£ 
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CHAPTER 7 
REPEAL OF ACT I: PLANTATION RELATIONS PRESERVED. • 
The repeal of Act I of 1903 and its counterpart, Act XIII of 
1859, was largely the result of rising Indian nationalist interest 
in the conditions of indentured emigrant labour. By 1917 the 
I. N.C. •s implacable opposition to the efflux of indentured Indian 
labour abroad had spilt over into concerted criticism of the 
conditions under which plantation labour was contracted within 
India. The repeal of Act XIII of 1859 and Act I of 1903 soon 
followed the abolition of penal provisions governing emigrant 
Indian labour in Malaya and Ceylon, and the enactment of the Indian 
Emigration Bill whose provisions were intended to afford 
considerable protection to Indian labour overseas. However, in the 
Nilgiri hills the repeal of Act I in August, 1927 was not followed 
by the implementation of legislation which could effectively 
protect plantation labour. In the absence of legislative 
initiative, and for reasons which will be explored in this chapter, 
the social and contractual relations which had evolved on tea 
estates under Act I remained fundamentally unaltered. Maistris 
continued to exercise a resolute hold over the plantation labour 
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market until independence. 
* * * * * * * * 
• 
The nationalist campaign to abolish the legal framework which 
supported the recruitment of indentured migrating labour within 
India began in February, 1917 when Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya 
notified the Indian Legislative Council of his intention to 
introduce a Bill repeialing- the Workman's Breach of Contract Act 
(Act XIII of 1859) 1 . Mohan Malaviya • s action followed the success 
of his resolution calling for the abolition of indentured 
emigration which he had placed before the 'house in the previous 
March- 2 , and was. indicative of the focal point which the issue of 
indentured labour had come to occupy within Indian nationalist 
politics. However, with the public exposure of abuses inherent in 
labour emigration to Fiji by c. F. Andrews and W. W. Pearson, the 
success of Gandhi's anti-indenture campaign of 1915 3 and the 
growth ·of local associations opposed to indenture in Madras and 
1. Proceedings of the Indian Legislative Council, 17th Sept., 
1919, in I.O.L.R., Economic and Overseas Department, 
Annual Departmental Papers, 1924, No. 1142. 
2. Tinker, op. cit., p 343. 
3. Ibid., pp 335-342. 
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Bengal 4 1 the I.N .. C. 'a battle to end indentured labour emigration 
was largely ·won by 1917. Although the timetable by which indentured 
emigration was to be finally abolished was still open to 
. . 5 negot~at1.on some nationalists began to direct their attentien 
to the legal framework binding Indian labour at home. It was 
natural that their scrutiny fell upon Act XIII of 1859 which, 
unlike the Madras Planters' Labour Law (Act I of 1903), applied 
throughout British India. Act XIII also attracted notice because it 
Continued to be applied to large numbers of workers in a wide 
variety of occupations. In contrast, Act I was provincial 
legislation which could only be applied to migrating plantation 
labour in the Nilgiri hills. The central legislature had already 
proved itself a useful venue for the exertion of nationalist 
political pressure upon both the Government of India and the India 
Office to end indentured emigration. Nevertheless, if the 
Government of India was to -maintain a consistent legal structure 
throughout its domain, the fate of Act I was interwoven with that 
of Act XIII. 
Nationalist opposition to Act XIII prompted the Government of 
India to investigate the operation of the statute. In conventional 
4. Ibid., pp 335, 347. 
5. Ibid., pp 354-360. 
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fashion the central administration called upon the various 
provincial governments to indicate whether or not the Act stood in 
need of reform 6 Within Madras Presidency the U.P.A.S.I. 
expressed its considerable opposition to the "question of amen«ing 
Act XIII being brought up at this time, when owing to the .War, the 
Planting Industry is already handicapped", and it promptly informed 
Madras that the Act provided essential protection against loss of 
advances in planting districts where Act I of 1903 did not 
apply 7 . While the U.P.A.S.I. maintained that it knew of no misuse 
of the Act by estate managers, it was prepared to accept legal 
amendments "to avoid abuse of its provisions by petty landholders 
and others" 8 . Having cast aspersions upon the legalistic habits 
of Indian landholders, the U.P.A.S.I. proceeded to suggest 
amendments, such as limiting the recognition of written contracts 
to those of less than a year;s duration 9 which required no 
concessions from its membership since tea plantation labour was 
generally contracted for ten months. As a result of the advice it 
6. I.O.L.R., Economic and overseas Department, Annual 
Departmental Papers, 1924, No. 1142, Viceroy to India 
Office, 15th July, 1919. 
7. U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1917, p 79. 
8. Ibid. 
9. Ibid. 
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had solicited, the Government of India concluded that Act XIII 
should be retained but in a modified form 10 • In particular, it 
proposed that the Act's use be restricted to cases where the 
outstanding advance was less than Rs 300 and where default ~ad 
taken place within the previous three months. By the close of 1919 
the Workman's Breach of Contract Act· (Amendment) Bill was before 
the India Office in London. 
Although the Government of India had clearly attempted to 
undermine Act XIII's use as an instrument of labour coercion, the 
India Office suspected it had not gone far enough. The Government's 
proposed amendments were therefore subject to severe scrutiny in 
London. B. s. Basu, a member of the Judicial and Public Committee, 
advised the Secretary of State, E. s. Montagu, in December, 1919 
that; 
"It is better that these old statutes be allowed to 
drop into disuse rather than that they be revived in a 
somewhat modified form. . • • • It is wrong to condemn a 
man to criminal imprisonment for refusing to work •••• 
This is reminiscent of slavery ... . Laws, like these, 
must necessarily be oppressive because one of the 
parties is generally ignorant, and needy. We are 
lending the weight of the criminal law to capital, as 
against labour, of an ignorant and needy labour .... 
It is a questi~n of principle, slavery versus free 
labour ... " 
10. I.O.L.R., Economic and Overseas Department, Annual 
Departmental Papers, 1924, No. 1124, Viceroy to India 
Office 15th July, 1919. 
11. Ibid., Comments of the Judicial and Public Committee. 
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The Committee's sentiments were shared by Montagu. Despite the 
amendments proposed by the Government of India, Montagu wrote "I 
still cordially dislike this Bill", and indicated that he would 
"not be prepared to assent to it if there was any chance of '•it 
being insisted on" 12 However, with the Bill's successful 
passage through the Indian Legislative Council in 1920, Montagu was 
advised by G. H. Silver, a Resident Clerk in the India Office, 
that, "There is no precedent for the Secretary of State 
recommending to H. M. (His .Majesty) to withhold his assent to an 
Act passed by the Indian 13 Legislature" Silver also informed 
Montagu that if the amending Bill were disallowed, greater 
injustice would prevail since Act XIII would continue to be applied 
in its. original form 14 . Montagu relented and Act XII of 1920 
came into force. The Secretary of state could draw some consolation 
from the Government of India's action in advising its provincial 
administrations that the Act should be enforced with the greatest 
leniency 15 , and from Silverf a observation that it was "generally 
recognized that the retention of the Act on the Statute Book is 
12. Ibid. 
13. Ibid., Note by G. H. Silver, 7th July, 1920. 
14. Ibid. 
15. Ibid. 
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only a matter of time" 16 • 
Between 1920 and 1923 two major factors worked to convince 
the Government of India that Act XIII should be repealed. In 1922 
the Assam Labour Enquiry Committee, which had been appointed by ~e 
Goverriment of India, reported that many large company owned 
plantations in Assam were simply ignoring those new provisions 
attached to Act XIII which had been drafted to protect the 
17 labourer The Committee cast Act XIII as an anachronistic 
statute whose major effect was "to make the coolie ·accept a lowe-r 
wage than he would if labour was entirely free" 18 • Repeal of the 
Act was favoured by a majority of the Committee • s members 19 • At 
the same time -the Government of India came under increasing 
pressure to abolish the Act from Indian members of the central 
legislature. In September, 1921, N. M. Joshi, founder of the All 
India Trade Union Council and India • s official delegate to the 
International Labour Office's inaugural conference in Washington, 
attacked Act XIII as an example of legislation which was both 
16. Ibid. 
17. Report of the Assam Labour Enquiry Committee, Shillong, 
1922' p 91. 
18. Ibid., p 87. 
19. Ibid., p 91. 
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prejudicial to the poor and imbued with racist ramifications 20 
Joshi reasoned that the Government had granted magistrates greater 
discretionary powers under the Act in 1920 to deny a rising number 
of Indian employers the full authority of the 21 law • .The 
continuance of Act XIII was, Joshi argued, inconsistent with the 
Government's concerted drive to abolish penal laws governing Indian 
immigrant labour abroad 22 The objections of Joshi and other 
Indian politicians, the findings of the Assam Labour Enquiry 
committee and the attitude of the India Office under Montagu all 
prompted the Government of India to inform its ·provincial 
administrations in April, 1923 of its intention to repeal the 
Workman's Breach of Contract Act (Act XIII of 1859) in 1926 23 • 
·The Government of India's revived commitment to free labour 
contracting bore far reaching consequences for planters in Madras 
Presidency. In the Anamalai, Shevaroys, and other planting regions 
of the Presidency where the Madras Planters' Labour Law (Act I of 
20. I.O.L.R., Economic and Overseas Department, Annual 
Departmental Papers, 1924, No.ll42, extract from Indian 
Legislative Assembly Debates, lOth Sept., 1921, 
pp 227-230. 
21. Ibid., p 227. 
22. Ibid., p 230. 
23. I.O.L.R., Economic and overseas Department, Annual 
Departmental Papers, 1924, No. 1142, Letter No.l68-22 
Judicial, U. c. Stuart, Assistant Secretary to Government 
of India, to Secretaries of Local Governments, 
12th April, 1923. 
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rude manners, and with no proper education" 25 • While the 
planters' "atrocities know no bounds" continued the Swadesamitran, 
"the Government has framed a law known as the Planters Labour Act 
(Act I of 1903), whereby the coolies are held in the clutches• of 
the planters" 26 Similarly, in 1914 the Madras Standard in 
reporting the case of a plantation cartman killed by his employer 
in Coorg, directed its readers' attention along clear racial lines 
in asserting that it was not unusual for European planters to take 
delight in physically abusing Indians 27 
Although south Indian newspapers had, from the turn of the 
century, characterised both Act I and its predecessor Act XIII as 
inequitable, in the years immediately preceding the war they took 
an increasing interest in the local administration of plantation 
labour law. The rapid rise in cases brought against estate labour 
under Act I in 1913 and 1914 attracted the attention of the West 
Coast Reformer in Calicut 28 as well as the Indian Patriot 29 
25. Madras Native Newspaper Reports, 1905, Report No. 37, 
Swadesamitran, 8th Aug., 1905. 
26. Ibid. 
27. Ibid., 1914, Report No. 12, Madras Standard, 18th March, 
1914. 
28. Ibid., 1913, Report No. 36, West Coast Reformer, 18th 
Sept., 1913. 
29. Ibid., 1913, Report No.36, Indian Patriot, 6th Sept., 
1913. 
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and the Andhrapatr ika in 30 Madras . All three were skeptical of 
the local magistrate's "hypothetical statement" that "the 
management of estates is said to be good •" 31 while the ~ 
Coast Reformer directed the government to investigate wo~ing 
conditions on estates so as to establish whether poor wages, ill-
health, or cruel treatment was primarily responsible for driving "a 
peaceful and law-abiding people to break the law and brave 
prosecution" 32 
Bitter political criticism of the privileged position 
occupied by European planters and British planting corporations 
flowed into the Madras Legislative Council with the institution of 
dyarchy in 1919. This development is amply illustrated in the 
political controversy which arose over the distribution of 
compensation in the planting regions of Malabar following the 
Moplah uprising of 1921. During the uprising many rubber estates 
had suffered considerable damage which included the burning of 
30. Ibid., 1914, Report No. 12, Andhrapatrika, 4th April, 
1914. 
31. Ibid., 1913, Report No. 36, West Coast Reformer, 
18th Sept., 1913. 
32. Ibid.,l913, Report No.36, Indian Patriot, 6th Sept., 
1913. 
rubber stocks, rubber factories and planters• bungalows 
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Although the Government of Madras did not accept any legal or moral 
responsibility for the rebellion, it did attempt to alleviate 
distress on rubber estates by providing loans to producers wnl.ch 
attracted little or no interest 34 • Compensation was also paid by 
the Government of Madras directly to a number of families whose 
breadwinners had been victims of the revolt. The prevailing 
political climate forced the Madras officials to treat the case of 
Mrs s. P. Eaton, whose husband had been the only European planter 
killed by the rebels, with extreme delicacy. In 1922 the Government 
of Madras informed the Under-Secretary of State that "it is quite 
out of the question to make an advance payment to any particular 
individual and especially to a European it would be most 
undes1rable to discriminate in principle between her and the other 
survivors" 35 Mrs Eaton was, according to the administration in 
Madras, to be compensated "in precisely the same way as the 
33. I.O.L.R., Public and Judicial Department, Annual 
Departmental Papers, 1921, No. 6201; Letter from Kerala 
Calicut Estates Ltd to the Secretary South Indian 
Association in London, 28th Oct., 1921; Report from 
Pullangode Rubber Estate Ltd to Collector's Office, 
Melanpurarn, 25th Oct, 1921. 
34. Ibid., Letter No. 3461-2, Chief Secretary to 
Government of Madras to Secretary to Government of India, 
Horne Department, Simla, 23rd June, 1922. 
35. Ibid., R. A. Graham, Chief Secretary to the Government of 
Madras, to Under-Secretary of State for India (Public 
Department) 18th Oct., 1922. 
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Hindus'' 36 . However, the fact that victims received grants from a 
charitable fund at the Governor's disposal, rather than from fines 
levied on the rebels as the Government had originally 
envisaged 37 , allowed the Government of Madras to provide 4krs 
Eaton with a benefit of Rs 30,000 38 which was far in excess of 
those received by her Indian counterparts 39 Nevertheless, the 
Madras administration's statements and its use of semi-official 
rather than official funds, are indicative of its concern that it 
should appear to dispense equivalent treatment to Indian and 
British victims of the rebellion. The Madras administration's 
caution was justified in the light of the attitudes displayed by a 
number of Indian members of the Madras Legislative Council towards 
the European planting enterprise within the Presidency. The 
government's decision in 1925 to write off some of the loans it had 
provided to planters in Malabar provoked a number of Indian 
representatives including M. Krishnan Nayar, a prominent Justicite, 
to accuse the government of favouring sterling companies at the 
36. Ibid. 
37. Ibid. 
38. Ibid. 
39. Ibid. 
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expense of Indian owned concerns 40 • The institution of dyarchy 
had plainly exposed the Madras administration's relations with the 
British planting industry to close and critical examination. 
Between 1922 and 1926 the Government of Madras was gradually 
convinced of the need to abolish penal contract legislation within 
the Presidency. Initially, the impending repeal of Act XIII by the 
central government moved the _Madras administration to invite the 
U.P.A.S.I., as well as the Madras Chamber of Commerce and the 
Madras Trades Association, to suggest whatever means they 
considered reasonable for regulating contractual relations between 
workers and their employers 41 The U.P.A.S.I. responded by 
declaring that legislation to protect large employers of labour was 
essential 42 , and proceeded to spearhead the formation of a sub-
committee whose duty was to transpose the planters' 
requirements 
43 government 
into draft 
However, 
legislation for presentation 
the Committee's belief that 
legal 
to 
the 
Government of Madras was open to new legislation which incorporated 
penal provisions was out of touch with the atmosphere prevailing in 
40. Ibid., extract from Official Reports of Madras 
Legislative Council Debates, 31st March, 1925, p 993. 
41. U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1923, pp 40-41. 
42. Ibid., p 41. 
43. Ibid., 1924, p 6. 
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the Madras Legislative Council. Within the Council, the Home 
Member, Sir Arthur Knapp, and his successor in 1925, Mohamed Usman, 
were subjected to regular questioning regarding the nature of 
labouring conditions on estates. The most notable criticse of 
government policy towards plantations_ arose from within the Swaraj 
Party's ranks. They included s. Satyamurti, the Member for Madras 
University and a prominent figure within the Party; J. A. Saldanha 
the Member for the West Coast Christian community who took a 
particular interest in the treatment afforded to South Canarese 
plantation labour; and Saldanha's close ally, C. V. Ayyanger who 
represented CoLmbatore, an important recruitment District for 
southern planters. Probing enquiries also arose from R. Veer ian, 
the nominated representative for Adi-Dravidas and from P. Kesava 
Pillai, a Justicite whose adherence to the non-Brahman cause had 
led him to abandon his earlier adherence to the I.N.C .• Throughout 
1924 and 1925 these Members constantly exploited question time in 
the house to formulate enquiries which were commonly calculated to 
embarrass the government rather than to solicit information, and 
which were also clearly intended to expose the maltreatment of 
depressed class estate labour, the abuses arising from the 
operation of the Madras Planters' Labour Law, and from the 
government's failure to inspect and regulate conditions of labour 
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on plantations 44 By 1925 the strength of their political 
opposition led the U.P.A.S.I. to excise all penal provisions from 
its proposals 45 More importantly, by the close of 1925 the 
Government of Madras had announced that it would appoina a 
committee to examine the question of amending Act .I of 1903 46 • 
The political climate in which the Parliamentary Committee 
was to report its findings in 1927 was, with the electoral 
trouncing of the Justice Party in the previous year, markedly 
different from that which had existed at the time of its 
appointment. Within the Madras Legislative Council itself, the 1926 
election had resulted in the return of a Swaraj Party majority. 
Although the swal:'ajist majority was swollen -by a number of former 
Justicites 47 whose embrace of a more radical political 
philosophy was as timely as it was suspect, the chamber more 
accurately reflected the mounting strength of the nationalist cause 
44. Proceedings of the Legislative Council of the Governor of 
Madras, 22nd Aug., 1924, p 769; 22nd OCt., 1924, 
pp 792 794; 4th and 5th March, 1925, pp 716-717, SOB; 
27th March, 1925, pp 779-783; 20th, 21st and 26th Aug., 
1925, pp 326-329, 478, 760. 
45. U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1925, p 29. 
46. Proceedings of the Legislative Council of the Governor of 
Madras, 17th Dec., 1925, p 381. 
47. David Arnold, The Congress in Tamilnad, Nationalist 
Politics in South India, 1919-1937, New Delhi, 1977, 
p 89. 
340 
than it had previously done. Outside the Madras Legislative Council 
politicised opinion swung against the planters' cause. Planters 
failed to find any effective ·means of countering the numerous 
allegations of plantation malpractice and of abuse of estate la8our 
which appeared throughout 1926 in both the Hindu and the Madras 
Mail. The U.P.A.S.I. considered this publicity so adverse that it 
toyed with the idea of requesting a full governmental enquiry into 
estate labour conditions in the belief that "the very fact of our 
asking for one will show that we are not afraid" 48 • In North 
India the All India Trade Union Bulletin discovered that Act I 
cases could be numbered in their thousands, and accused the 
Government of India of previously misleading N. M. Joshi when he 
had called for the Act's repeal by informing him that the Act was 
but rarely applied 49 The Bulletin concluded that Act I was 
"essentially undemocratic. The sooner it is removed from the 
50 
statute book, the better" . 
At the same time external political pressure to repeal Act I 
increased. In the latter half of 1926 the Madras Planters• Labour 
48. U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1926, p 56. 
49 .. I.O.L.R., Economic and Overseas Department, Annual 
Departmental Papers, 19.26, File No. 4425, extract from 
All India Trade Union Bulletin, July, 1926. 
50. Ibid. 
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Law was the subject of a number of questions directed at the Under-
Secretary of State in the British House of Commons. The Secretary 
of State was asked by the Opposition to outline the frequency with 
which the Act was applied 51 and to indicate whether othe 
Government of Madras would take steps to repeal the penal 
provisions of the Act in view of the Government of India's repeal 
of the Workman's Breach of Contract Act 52 • While the Secretary 
of State, the Earl of Birkenhead, acknowledged the right of local 
governments in India to frame laws which protected employers 
against lost advances, he also recognized that in Madras Presidency 
a legal anomaly had existed since the repeal of Act XIII in the 
central legisl~ture 53 • Furthermore, Birkenhead declared that it 
had been his "constant endeavour to show that Indian legislation in 
regard to industrial matters and the protection of labour, is 
progressively, though slowly, advancing towards European 
54 
standards" Clearly, Birkenhead had little sympathy for the 
51. I.O.L.R., Economic and Overseas Department, Annual 
Departmental Papers, 1926, File No. 4425, Question dated 
2nd Aug., 1926. 
52. Ibid., Question dated 19th July, 1926. 
53. Ibid., Secretary of State to Secretary to Government of 
India, Department of Industry and Labour, 26th July, 
1926. 
54. Ibid. 
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preservation of legal privileges enjoyed by employers in Madras, 
and he directed that the Government of Madras outline what 
practical benefits, if any, were gained from the operation of 
Act I 55 • 
In January, 1927 the Committee appointed to review Act I in 
Madras reported its findings to the provincial legislature. While 
the Committee recommended that Act I be repealed, it concluded that 
such repeal should be conditional on the government undertaking to 
introduce alternative legislation "applicable to all industries in 
the Presidency where labour is employed on a system of 
advances" 56 The proviso attached to the Committee's 
recommendation was evidence of the strong influence exerted by the 
three planting representatives within the nine-member panel 57 
However, the Government of Madras had no appetite for such a 
compromise. While it immediately accepted the Committee's finding 
that Act I should be repealed, it reserved its opinion on the need 
for further legislation 58 Within two months a Bill had been 
55. Ibid. 
56. Proceedings of the Legislative Council of the Governor of 
Madras, 24th Jan., 1927, p 49. 
57. Planting representatives appointed to the Committee were 
R. Fowke, Chairman of U.P.A.S.I.; H. Waddington, 
Secretary to U.P.A.S.I.; and E. Windle, Planting M.L.C. 
58. Proceedings of the Legislative Council of the Governor of 
Madras, 24th Jan., 1927, p 49. 
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drafted to repeal Act I, and the comments of the Home Member, 
Mohamed Usrnan, in introducing Bill XII to the Madras Council 
plainly quashed any hopes nursed by planters to extract fresh 
legislation to replace Act I. Usman argued that, "It has been fo~d 
that modern public opinion regards with disapproval the existence 
of such penal laws. Even in the colonies where Indian labOur is 
employed there are no such provisions" 59 The abolition of 
Act XIII by the Government of India in 1926 had, Usman argued, made 
it impossible for Madras "to justify the retention of the Madras 
Planters • Labour Act on the Statute Book" 60 • Penal punishment of 
defaulting workmen was plainly regarded, even by conservative 
politicians, as an unacceptable anachronism. The Madras Planters • 
Labour Law was subsequently repealed in August 1927 61 • 
While the legalistic framework supporting plantation 
contractual relations had been fundamentally altered by the repeal 
of Act XIII and Act I, their abolition was of no immediate benefit 
to common field labourers on south Indian estates. Initially, many 
labourers remained ignorant of the legislative changes that had 
59. Ibid., lst March, 1927, p llO. 
60. Ibid. 
61. Ibid., 26th Aug., 1927, p 296. Contracts framed under 
Act I remained valid until 1929. 
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taken place as no attempt was made either by planters, or by 
government officials, to inform them that penal punishment had been 
abolished. Although the U.P.A.S.I. 'a representatives informed the 
Royal Commission on Labour in India in 1930 that estate labour.had 
been made aware of changes in the 62 law , evidence taken from 
labourers in the planting districts of the Nilgiris and Animalai 
reveals that workers were frequently ignorant of these 
developments. Thangami, a female worker on Pachamalai Estate in the 
Animalai, informed the Commission that; 
"I do not know that there is a change now and the 
policeman cannot come any longer whether there is an 
agreement or no agreement. I never heard anyone talking 
in the bazaar about the change, 'Wf did I hear the 
sahibs telling us about the change" • 
Thangami 's evidence was :·sUpported by the testimony of other 
plantation labourers interviewed by the Commission 64 and by 
information gathered from the District Collector and Magistrate of 
Coimbatore, E. F. Thomas. Thomas, who had served in Coimbatore in 
1929 when Act I became inapplicable, testified that no publicity 
62. Royal Commission on Labour in India, Evidence, Vol. VII, 
op. cit., Part II, p 216. 
63. Ibid., p 334. 
64. Ibid., pp 335, 376, 378. 
had been devoted to the Act's 65 repeal 
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The Conunission 
considered the point worthy of pursuit and pressed Thomas to 
explain how these workers could have otherwise become aware of the 
Act's repeal 66 • "I presume", Thomas replied, "they discover ~at 
67 the Act does not work as far as they are concerned" . However, 
such a discovery was not easily effected by labour; especially as 
many planters continued to use the same contract forms throughout 
1929 and 1930 as they had previously employed under Act I and 
Act XIII. These forms required only minor changes in wording to be 
valid under the Indian Civil Contract Act 68 • However, there can 
be little doubt that this was a deliberate attempt by planters and 
maistris to deceive their illiterate and ill-informed workers, who 
were confronted with recruitment agreements which were identical in 
appearance to those which had previously been executed under penal 
plantation law. The government's failure to propagate news of 
Act I's repeal was, in view of the large number of plantation 
labourers who migrated annually to southern estates, a serious 
fault: it prolonged unduly the maistri's hold over labour and 
65. Ibid., p 415. 
66. Ibid., p 418. 
67. Ibid. 
68. Ibid., p 195. 
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granted employers both time and opportunity to devise an 
alternative, though equally effective, system of control. 
The abolition of penal provisions governing plantation labour 
contracts prompted many tea planters to abandon eventually the ~se 
of written contracts between themselves and their 69 employees 
Alternatively, they sought to protect themselves against 
defraudment by reducing the amount they outlaid in pre-employment 
advances. Although this development had been instigated by the 
rescission of Act XIII and Act I, it was only made possible by the 
imposition of rapidly changing international economic forces upon 
the south Indian plantation labour market. From 1929 falling world 
prices and falling demand for plantation produce reduced the call 
for Indian labour abroad. Malaya, which had long been a popular 
destination for south Indian workers, witnessed a net loss of some 
sixty thousand Indians annually in 1930, 1931 and 1932 70 As a 
result, plantation labour became more readily available to south 
Indian tea planters. The subsequent collapse of the international 
rubber market in 1933 and the closure of rubber estates abroad, and 
in Malabar and Travancore, compounded the effect 71 as did the 
69. Ibid., pp 196, 198. 
70. Sandhu, op. cit., Appendix 4. 
71. Windle, op. cit., p 19. 
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institution of a series of International Tea Agreements aimed at 
restricting world tea production in the face of falling 
prices 72 In Coimbatore mill owners were able to expand 
production while simultaneously reducing wages because of the re~dy 
availability of "a mass of poor agriculturalists, landless 
labourers, small traders, village servants" and others left 
unemployed or insolvent in the wake of rural depression 73 . In 
the early 1930s E. G. Windle, a prominent Nilgiri planter and 
former Planting Member in the Madras legislature, believed that 
labour was both plentiful in south India and available "on 
reasonable terms" 74 While Windle reported that planters• 
advances in 1933 were sometimes as low as Rs 5 per worker 75 , the 
U. P. A._s. I. calculated that, on average, advances had fallen from 
Rs 35 to Rs 10 between 1922 and 1935 76 In the 1930s low 
advances became the standard among southern planters. 
Advances could not, however, be entirely dispensed with. In 
order to take up plantation employment most labourers required 
72. Wickizer, op. cit., pp 60-84. 
73. Murphy, op. cit., pp 27-29. 
74. Windle, op. cit., p 19. 
75. Ibid. 
76. U.P.~.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1934, p 8. 
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funds sufficient to disperse their village debts, to cover their 
travelling expenses, and to provide for the upkeep of dependent 
relatives left at hornea In order to meet these expenses plantation 
labourers in 1930 commonly required sums ranging between Rs 15 and 
• 
Rs 60 in the form of pre-employment 77 advances • Clearly, 
planters' advances fell short of the labourers • needs. In the 
period after 1929 this financial gap was increasingly bridged by 
the plantation maistri in the form of a personal loan to his 
workers 78 • 
The planters• decision to minimise estate advances in the 
face of the labourer's continuing need was a deliberate attempt to 
shift the financial burden of labour recruitment onto plantation 
maistris. The planters• policy was only made possible by the 
maistri•s emergence under Act I as an authoritative and 
increasingly independent figure in plantation relations. While the 
maistri's growing wealth allowed for the provision of advances 
which frequently amounted to Rs 50 per head 79 
' 
maistris, like 
their employers, required legal protection for the monies they 
77. Royal Commission on Labour in India, Evidence, Vol. VII, 
op. cit., Part 2, pp 308, 310, 311, 335, 336, 342, 374. 
78. Report on an Enquiry into conditions of Labour in 
Plantations in India, op. cit., p 123. 
79. Ibid., p 125. 
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outlaid. As labour contracts fell into disuse, maistris utilised 
promissory notes in their place 80 Promissory notes, or pro-
notes as they were more commonly known, were easily executed as 
they did not require official attestation 81 and they provided 
• 
maistris with a degree of legal protection against both desertion 
and defraudment by recording the labourer's obligation to repay 
monies advanced to him at the beginning of a working season. 
The institution and popularity of pro-notes owed little to 
their legal efficacy. Rather, the extra-legal benefits which they 
conferred on maistris best accounts for their widespread use. 
Maistris were plainly advantaged by the fact that pro-notes 
required illiterate workers to affix their thumbprints in exactly 
the same manner as had previously been required on written 
contracts under Act I. In the opinion of E. F. Thomas, whose domain 
as collector of Coimbatore included the tea planting region of the 
Animalai, a plantation labourer did not know the difference between 
placing his mark on a pro-note and marking a labour contract in the 
same manner 
82 Planters were keenly aware that this procedure 
blurred the clear legal distinctions between pro-notes 
80. Royal Commission on Labour in India, Evidence, Vol. VII, 
op. cit., Part II, pp 196, 198. 
81. Ibid., p 126. 
82. Ibid., p 415. 
and 
350 
contracts to labour. They informed the 1930 Royal Commission on 
Labour that even where a worker was aware that he no longer had to 
appear before an attesting officer, and "has been told by the 
maistri and by everybody in the village" that penal clauses h.ave 
been abolished, he might still look upon the pro-note as binding 
him to work 83 In spite of this observation, planters expressed 
no reservations about the use of pro-notes. On the contrary, the 
fact that the U.P.A.S.I. •s Labour Department pursued those 
labourers who stood in default of their 84 pro-notes , indicates 
that planters actively bolstered the use of promissory notes by 
maistris. The association of pro-notes with labour contracts partly 
explains labour,~s widespread belief in the continuance of penal 
punishment. It also ensured that maistris could continue to extract 
labour's compliance by wielding labour's fear of imprisonment and 
the coercive power of debt as determining factors in plantation 
relations. 
The maistri' s hold over his indebted workers was further 
enhanced by his right to charge interest on sums advanced against 
pro-notes. Annual interest rates on pro-notes could be as high as 
83. Ibid., p 198. 
84. Ibid. 
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85 24 per cent While this rate cannot be considered usurious by 
the standards prevailing in south Indian villages 86 , the overt 
extraction of interest on advances was a novel practice on 
plantations which encumbered any labourer.' s attempt to leave estmte 
employment. Moreover, even in cases where the maistri had no 
intention of charging interest, he frequently inserted an iOterest 
rate in the pro-note so that it could be invoked if the labourer 
absconded 87 . Although maistris regarded accumulated interest as 
justifiable compensation in cases of desertion 88 , this practice 
heightened the maistri's hold over his workers who remained 
ignorant of the extent of their outstanding debts until the 
conclusion of their working season 89 
As a result, labour remained sedentary on estates. Aside from 
the hold exercised over labour through the pro-note system, it 
remained common practice for estates to refuse employment to 
labourers who were not in possession of a discharge note from their 
85. Ibid. p 322. 
86. Gilbert Slater (Ed.), Some South Indian Villages, London, 
1918, Vol. I, pp 9, 40, 157-158, 176-177, 195. 
87. Royal Commission on Labour in India, Evidence, Vol. VII, 
op. cit., Part 2, p 214. 
88. Ibid. 
89. Ibid., p 322. 
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previous employers, even in the mid-1940s 90 . This measure 
deprived workers of the freedom to sell their labour to the highest 
bidder. At the same time, this practice indicates that planters 
were prepared to forego potential recruits in order to pre¥ent 
workers escaping the shackles of a maistri•s debt-bond. Despite the 
abolition of Act I and Act XIII, the planters' economic iil.terests 
continued to lie in supporting the rnaistri's authority over 
plantation labour. 
There is little, if any, evidence to suggest that the repeal 
of Act I and Act XIII wrought any significant change in the working 
experiences of south Indian plantation labour. Although written 
contracts fell into disuse, maistris continued to exercise a 
financial hold over their workers through their widespread adoption 
of the pro-note system. Neither did the reduction in planters' 
advances serve to release the labourer from the grip of debt-
bonding, It is likely that maistris rarely resorted to prosecution 
of their employees for outstanding debts since the maistri' s role 
as employer, creditor and, in many cases, overseer, provided 
protection against default. 
The maistrisl position as patron to his client workers 
continued to be reinforced by work practices on tea estates in the 
90. Report on an Enquiry into Conditions of Labour in 
Plantations in India, op. cit., p 127. 
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period between 1929 and 1947. The sy~tem of annual or monthly wage 
settlements continued to provide maistris with opportunities to 
strengthen their hold over their workers. Aside from advances 
offered at the time of engagement, most labourers were fcacced 
periodically to borrow additional funds from their maistris during 
their term of employment; primarily because selavu (daily 
sustenance payments) remained inadequate. Selavu payments of 6 
annas for males and 4 annas for females were insufficient to meet 
labour~s simple daily expenses 91 The only resorts open to 
labour were either to borrow from the maistri or to secure 
provisions on credit from an estate shopkeeper. As maistris were 
frequently in league with estate storekeepers, and were responsible 
for the distribution of selavu 92 it is hardly surprising that 
in 1946 the Rege Committee concluded that most workers acquired 
debts which equalled or exceeded their accumulated earnings at the 
end of a working season 93 
Selavu payments were made essential only by the wage 
settlement systems employed by planters. Despite the recommendation 
of the 1930 Royal Commission on Labour that the system of annual 
91. Ibid., p 149. 
92. Ibid., pp 149-152. 
93. Ibid., p 152. 
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settlement be abandoned 94 , and despite the traditional payment 
of weekly wages to local and casual 95 labour , annual settlement 
of migrating field labour remained commonplace in the 1940s 96 
This was particularly the case in the Wynaad, where seven of •the 
nine estates surveyed by the Rege Committee in 1944 paid wages 
annually 97 In the Nilgiri hills proper, monthly settlements 
were more common 
98 In either case, estate owners and managers 
were reluctant to provide workers with credit against their 
99 
accumulated wages and this drove labourers further into debt 
with their maistris. Although planters were keen to defend the 
system of annual settlement on the grounds that it encouraged 
thrift amongst 100 labourers planters were the real 
benefl:ciaries since workers' earnings remained at their disposal 
until the end of the working season. 
94. Report of the Royal Commission on Labour in India, 
op. cit., Recommendations. 
95. Report of an Enquiry into Conditions of Labour in 
Plantations in India, op. cit., p 150. 
96. Ibid., p 151. 
97. Ibid. 
98. Ibid. 
99. Ibid., p 150. 
100; Ibid., p 151. 
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The maistri • s continuing authority over his labour allowed 
for the maintenance of antiquated industrial practices which 
severely disadvantaged labour. On tea estates the working hours of 
field labourers were unregulated and were frequently extegded 
beyond their mandatory eight or nine hours. It was not uncommon for 
field workers who had started work at 7.30arn to quit the fields at 
7pm 101' or for pluckers to carry their harvest one or two miles 
to the tea factory after the end of their working day 102 
Although planters claimed that workers were permitted a lunch break 
of one hour, the fact that workers were forbidden to return to 
their lines implies that lunch time was frequently cut 
short 103 At .the same time, no minimum rate of pay could be 
said to have applied on tea estates. Although the earnings of all 
workers ·except pluckers appeared to be calculated according to 
time-rates, the Rege Committee reported that "even the time-rates 
are governed by a rough idea of task" 104 On some estates wages 
were withheld if the labourer's work was considered inadequate, 
while on others the cost of production was kept stable by 
101. Ibid., p 155. 
102. Ibid., p 135. 
103. Ibid., p 156. 
104. Ibid., p 129. 
increasing the size of the task to match wage rises 
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105 
Deductions from wages were also prevalent. The most common of these 
was the reduction of pluckers' earnings according to the amount of 
moisture thought to be on the plucked leaf. In the Nilgiria. and 
Wynaad dampness deductions commonly ranged between 15% and 
25% 106 During the rainy season deductions of 30% to 50% were 
not 107 unknown This practice had long since been abandoned in 
North India 108 , but it remained a universal, though unpopular, 
penalty imposed upon the unorganized estate labourers of south 
India. Other deductions from wages included heavy penalties for 
failure to remove stalks and coarse leaf from plucked tea prior to 
weighing 109 , and the loss of a whole day's pay for late arrival 
at work or for lack of diligence 110 That field workers were 
absolutely ignorant of the latter practice illustrates labour's 
inability to impose any check on wage calculations. 
The ongoing strength of the maistri system also continued to 
105. Ibid., p 132. 
106. Ibid., p 135. 
107. Ibid. 
108. Ibid. 
109. Ibid., p 134. 
110. Ibid. 
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ensure that labour's standard of living would remain low. While 
workers probably had benefitted from falling grain prices in the 
Depression years, the onset of rapid inflation during the second 
World War quickly eroded the'value of plantation earnings. On aany 
estates partial compensation was provided by the payment of a dear 
provisions allowance from October, 1942 and by the institution of a 
war outturn bonus for regular workers at the end of 1943. However, 
as Table 11 illustrates, these additional payments were both late 
and inadequate. 
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TABLE 11 COMPARISON OF INCREASES IN COST OF LIVING AND 
PLANTATION WAGES FOR NILGIRI DISTRICT AND WYNAAD 
TALUK OF MALABAR, 1939-1944. 
YEAR COST OF LIVING INDEX lll PLANTATION 112 
(Coimbatore) WAGE INDEX • 
1939 100 100 
1940 - 100 
1941 105 100 
1942 116 100 - 111 
1943 174 100 - 132 
1944 209 117 - 149 
While the declining purchasing power of stated plantation wages is 
illustrated in Table 11, average earnings are probably a more 
accurate guide to the economic position of the majority of 
plantation labourers. on the basis of material collected by the 
Rege Committee, it is possible to calculate average daily male 
111. Ibid., p 142. The index base has been recalculated to 
begin in 1939. 
112. Ibid., pp 130-132, 140-143. The index is based on the 
prevailing daily male wage. The minimum figures given 
for 1942, 1943 and 1944 indicate the basic wage paid. 
The maximum figures given for the same years indicate 
the value of the basic rate plus a dear provisions 
allowance and a full war outturn bonus. No account is 
taken of the effect of selling grain at concessionary 
rates. As workers were on average only able to purchase 
up to 2.5 seers of subsidised rice per week (Ibid., 
p 142), the economic value of concessionary grain sales 
to workers was small. Furthermore, workers who did not 
labour for six days per week usually had their quota of 
cheap grain reduced, while the quantity of subsidised 
grain available to female labourers was less than that 
of their male counterparts (Ibid.). In 1943 the price 
recommended by U.P.A.S.I. for subsidised grain was 
approximately 30% below market cost. (Planters' 
Chronicle, 1944, pp 108, 148, 167, 188, 228, 274, 322, 
355.) 
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earnings in Nilgiri District in 1944 at lla 5p 113 In 
comparison, remuneration for casual agricultural plains labour in 
the same year ranged between Rs 1 and Rs 1. 5 per day 114 Even 
where plantation labour had access to subsidised grjlin, 
compensation was incomplete, as Table 12 illustrates. In 1944, only 
those estates which generously supplied their male workers with 1.5 
seers of subsidised grain every day could restore the purchasing 
power of average male earnings to a level higher than that which 
could have been attained by plantation wages in 1904 115 
113. Ibid., pp 147-148. The calculation is based on 20 days 
labour per month for 10 months of the year. 
114. Ibid., p 146. 
115. Supra., Table 10, p 304. 
TABLE 12 COMPARISON OF THE PURCHASING POWER OF PLANTATION 
WORKERS AND CASUAL AGRICULTURAL LABOURERS IN 1944. 
AVERAGE EARNINGS PER DAY 
(in annas and pies) 
EARNINGS ~N SEER~ 1gF RICE (no subs~dy) 
EARNINGS IN SEER~ 19F RICE (with subsidy) 
Male Plantation 
Worker 
lla 5p 
3.2 
3.7 
Casual Male 
Agricultural 
Labourer 
16a - 24a 
4.5- 6.7 
Not 
Applicable 
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The poverty of plantation labour is also clearly reflected in 
the observations recorded by the Rege Conunittee. They noted that 
the workers' tines contained few possessions, their cooking 
utensils were of the cheapest kind of earthenware, their clothing 
was minimal, and the women's jewellery was made of glass 118 
Milk, sugar and ghee were completely absent from their diets which 
116. Quantities given are calculated on a price of Rs 17-9-6 
per 164lb bag which is equal to 3.5 annas per seer. This 
price has been calculated from average monthly rice 
prices throughout 1944 in the rice markets most conunonly 
utilized by southern planters, namely Cocanada, Madura 
and Trichinopoly. (Planters• Chronicle, 1944, pp 108, 
148, 167, 188, 228, .274, 322, 355.) As the cost of 
transporting rice to Nilgiri estates varied widely, no 
freight charges have been added. 
117. It is assumed that the worker is able to purchase 1.5 
seers of rice per day at a subsidised price of 2.35 
annas per seer. The remainder is purchased at the 
average market price of 3.5 annas per seer. 
118. Report on an Enquiry into Conditions of Labour in 
Plantations in India, op. cit., p 154. 
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consisted almost entirely of rice with a little dahl, vegetables 
and, occasionally, meat 119 The Committee concluded that "the 
workers are forced to keep body and soul together" 120 This 
description bears comparison with Francis Buchanan's remarks 
concerning annual agricultural servants in Coimbatore at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century. Buchanan reported they lived 
mainly on "rough rice ••• a little salt and vegetable", found milk 
too expensive and "procure a little animal food" only once or twice 
a month 121 Despite a century of plantation development the 
standard of living of common agricultural labourers appears 
unchanged. 
The poverty of plantation workers was often matched by 
unhealthy living conditions. Although the Rege Committee noted that 
substantial improvements had been made since 1930 to housing, 
medical facilities, water supply and sanitation on some estates, it 
also observed that such progress had been very uneven 122 On 
Nilgiri tea estates, even the most recently constructed labour 
lines were condemned by the Committee as very inferior to the more 
119. Ibid., p 155. 
120. Ibid., p 142. 
121. Buchanan (Hamilton), op. cit., Vol.II, p 315. 
122. Report on an Enquiry into Conditions of Labour in 
Plantations in India, op. cit., p 172. 
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progressive style of lines used in the Animalai and Kannan Devan 
hills 123 In the Wynaad, old buildings characterised by small 
windows and doors, low plinths, and rooms partitioned by wooden 
planks and corrugated iron sheeting, were still in use 124 • • The 
use of partitioning is indicative of the worst feature of estate 
housing -overcrowding. Two rooms comprising approximately 220 
square feet accommodated, on average, four or five workers as well 
as their dependents. Where a separate kitchen was provided, it 
inevitably was used to house an additional family 125 Neither 
was clean, piped water available on all estates 126 and the 
lack of field toilets was held by the Committee to be primarily 
responsible for 'widespread infestation of estate populations with 
127 hookworm A subsequent enquiry into the health of industrial 
workers in India in 1947 conducted under the guidance of 
Dr. E. Lloyd Jones, concluded that such infestations commonly 
resulted in anaemia amongst south Indian plantation 
123. Ibid., p 157. 
124. Ibid. 
125. Ibid., pp 1156-159. 
126. Ibid. p 161. 
127. Ibid., p 161-162. 
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128 labourers • Jones, who was the current Deputy Director 
General of Health Services in the central administration, was well 
satisfied with the medical care offered by the larger company owned 
estates in the Animalai. In these large garden hospitals Jenes 
observed, "healthy well nourished and happy mothers, with chubby 
babies weighing six or seven pounds" 129 However, on the 
a·maller individually owned estates of the type that still 
predominated in Nilgiri District, few if any medical facilities 
were offered. The planters • strategy of dispatching ill labourers 
to over-taxed and antiquated government hospitals was employed 
because it reduced the estate·, s expenses, and not because the 
medical" service·provided was adequate 130 
The poor living and working conditions of migrating estate 
labour in south India reflected the government's tardiness in 
enacting industrial legislation to regulate plantation production. 
While the inaugural conference of the International Labour Office 
(I.L.O.) in 1919 had spurred the Government of India to exert 
stricter controls over female and juvenile factory labour, planters 
128. Standards of Medical Care for Tea Plantations in India, 
A Report by E. Lloyd Jones, Ministry of Labour, 1947, 
p 12. 
129. Ibid., p 12. 
130. Ibid., p 14. 
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continued to win exemptions for tea and coffee processing works 
from the provisions of the Indian Factories Act. Originally, 
exemption had been granted on the grounds that tea and coffee 
processing not carried out in confined . 131 was prem1.ses ,. 
However, in the 1920s, planters in Madras Presidency, unlike other 
factory proprietors, remained free to set the hours of labour and 
rest intervals in their factories at will, primarily because 
government was convinced that these regulations would seriously 
disrupt efficient processing of plantation produce. The sympathy of 
the Madras administration for planters who, in 1923 were faced with 
imminent regulation of their processing plants, is amply 
demonstrated in the Acting Labour Commissioner's address to the 
U.P.A.S.I. •s annual gathering. Mr H. Tyler informed the meeting 
that; 
"The Act was passed chiefly to suit the conditions of 
factories on the plains, and it is perfectly obvious 
that there are a good many conditions in tea factories, 
and factories on the hills which are not similar to 
those of factories on the plains ••••• you do not know 
when your leaf is going to flush, you do not know how 
long your leaf is going to take to wither, and you do 
not know when your coolies are going to turn up ..... 
As far as I am concerned I shall certainly back up the 
recommendation that tea factories should be exempted 
.•.•. The result of that will be that it will not be 
necessary for you to fix before hand the rest interval 
and you could employ any people on Sundays and when 
there is a pressure of work you can employ them more 
131. U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1920, p 80. 
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than 11 hours a day, or 60 hours a week 132 
Lobbying by the U.P.A.S.I. and its more powerful northern 
counterpart, the Indian Tea Association, led to the succeseful 
passage of the Indian Factories (Amendment) Act in 1926. This Act 
effectively released planters from all industrial regulations which 
they regarded as a burden on production. 
The government's fa;lure to regulate the working environment 
of plantation field labour was a more serious shortcoming since 
field labourers made up the vast bulk on every estate's working 
population. Despite the conventions passed at the 1921 I.L.O. 
Conference governing the working hours of female and juvenile 
agricultural labour; and each participating government's 
responsibility to secure :r;egulated living conditions, systems of 
insurance against old age, sickness and invalidity, and accident 
133 
compensation the Government of India demonstrated little 
resolve for intervention in the plantation sphere. Although 
additional impetus to government action was provided in 1931 by the 
revelations of the Royal Commission on Labour in India, the 
Workman's Compensation Act (Amendment) Bill of 1934 proved the only 
132. Ibid., 1923, p 36. 
133. Ibid., 1922, p 13. 
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concrete result. Moreover, this Bill which required employers to 
provide monetary compensation to workers sustaining injuries whilst 
at work, was of little value to plantation workers since field 
accidents were rare 134 • 
The reasons underlying the goverrunent' s failure to protect 
plantation labour are clearly evident in its attempts to extend the 
Payment of Wages Bill of 1936 to southern estates. This Bill was by 
far the most serious challenge to existing contractual relations on 
plantations in southern India. In its original form the Bill was 
designed not only to force the prompt settlement of wages, but also 
to limit legal deductions from wages and to prevent agents from 
making claims .on behalf of employees 135 In requiring a formal 
record of pre-employment advances, and by imposing strict 
limitations on both the size of recoverable advances and the rate 
at which they could be recouped, the Bill struck hard at the 
maistri system. As planters remained heavily reliant upon maistris, 
both as recruiters and overseers, their economic interests lay in 
opposing the Bill's extension to plantation agriculture. In 1933 
the Commissioner of Labour in Madras, D. N. Strathie, approached 
the U.P.A.S.I. with the proposal that the Bill be implemented on 
134. Planters• Chronicle, 8th Oct., 1932, p 539. 
135. U.P.A.S.I., Annual Proceedings, 1934, p 7. 
367 
estates since it provided an effective means for achieving the 1930 
Labour Commission's recommendation that pre-employment advances be 
made irrecoverable 136 As planters' advances had already 
declined as a result of both the repeal of penal labour cont~cts 
and the Great Depression (which made agricultural labour more 
readily available), the U.P.A.S.I. was able to provide an effective 
counter to the ·government's objective. While the U.P.A.S.I. 
concurred that a reduction in advances was desirable, it also 
claimed that legislation was no longer required since planters' 
advances had already fallen over the last decade to around Rs 10 
per worker 137 The U.P.A.S.I. 's reply disguised the 
simultaneous rise in advances which were personally supplied by 
maistris,. and as the .Payment of Wages Bill was not instituted, 
~·..-· planters were free to increase future advances when labour supply 
contracted. In the 1930s the U.P.A.S.I. frequently recommended that 
its members act in advance of government demands for improved 
working and living conditions so as to stave off industrial 
legislation. This ploy maintained its members latitude to vary 
future conditions as circumstances required and accorded well with 
planters' distaste for what they regarded as government 
136. Ibid., p 8. 
137. Ibid. 
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intervention in the personal relations between employees and their 
masters. However, it must be remembered that U.P.A.S.I. had no 
authority to force its membership to adopt its recommendations, and 
at the same time a considerable body of tea planters rema~ed 
outside the U.P.A.S.I. confederation. 
In 1937 and 1938 the Congress Ministry in Madras 'took a 
renewed interest in plantation labour conditions and in the Payment 
of Wages Bill. Under the Bill each provincial government was 
entitled to frame specific regulations to govern the law• s local 
operation. By 1938 the Government of Madras had drafted the Madras 
138 Rules and presented these to the U.P.A.S.I. for comment • 
These rules represented a significant concession to planting 
interests since their framing acknowledged the U. P.A. s. I. • s long 
standing claim that plantation production should not be subject to 
the same regulations as industry. While planters would be required 
to formally record all monies advanced to labour, the Madras Rules 
allowed for the recovery of all pre-employment advances in 
full 139 • These regulations in no way challenged the existing 
arrangements on plantations, and their proposed imposition elicited 
138. Ibid., 1938, p 51. 
139. Ibid. 
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no critical comments from the U.P.A.S.I. 140 
The moderate nature of the Madras Rules was in accord with 
the line taken by the Madras Congress government in its other 
dealings with southern planters in the pre-war period. Bet1o19en 
1937 and 1939 a number of leading Congress ministers toured 
southern planting districts. In October, 1937 the Minister for 
Agriculture and Rural Development, V. I. Muniswami Pillai, received 
a memorandum of complaints compiled by labourers in the Animalai 
which detailed their poor living and housing conditions 141 • 
Muniswami' s parliamentary secretary, N. S. Varadachari, responded 
by informing a public gathering of labourers in Valparai that they 
should not only -present their grievances in an organized fashion, 
but that they should "be true, honest and God fearing and do their 
duty to God and to their masters" 142 • A few days later, 
Varadachari' s sentiments were repeated by the Minister himself in 
an address before plantation labourers in Valparai. Muniswami urged 
the assembled labourers "to be true and honest" and assured them 
that their grievances would "be redressed in time" 143 
140. Ibid. 
141. Madras Mail, 26th Oct., 1937, p 4. 
142. Ibid. 
143. Ibid., 28 Oct., 1937, p 5. 
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Similarly, at the Mudis Gymkhana Club Muniswami reminded a group of 
disgruntled estate administrators of their duty to provide a 
satisfactory link between labourers and employers 144 
Muniswami's words reflected the Madras Congress Governm~t's 
commitment to a conciliatory public stance. on labour issues. By 
October, 1937 the Madras administration had already formulated a 
comprehensive industrial policy 145 The rising tide of 
industrial unrest which followed the Congress Party's electoral 
victory in 1937 made such a policy essential as labour looked to 
its new rulers to remedy long-standing complaints. Rising tensions 
between labour and management on a number of Animalai tea 
plantations in l937 and 1938, and in the Wynaad and Nilgiris in 
1938, were symptomatic of the wider industrial mood. Provincial 
administrations in Madras and throughout India aimed to settle such 
disputes through the development of arbitration channels. Strike 
action, other than as a last resort, was condemned 146 
Nevertheless, the Madras Congress Government's aim in the 
planting sphere was to advance the cause of labour, primarily 
through greater government regulation of the work place. The 
144. Ibid., 29 oct., 1937, p 12. 
145. V. V. Giri, My Life and Times, Delhi, 1976, pp 122-124. 
146. Ibid., p 122. 
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government's objectives were made plain in a conununique issued by 
the Development Department in January, 1939 on the heels of another 
ministerial tour of the Animalai planting district. Government 
advised planters of their continuing obligation to upgrade laboir's 
estate housing; of the necessity of removing abuses in the systems 
employed in making cash advances, annual wage payments and in 
weighing leaf; and of labour' e right to buy grain on the open 
market. Furthermore, the Madras Government indicated that those 
wage cuts made during the Depression should now be restored with 
the effect that adult male and female wage rates be raised to 8 
annas and 6 annas per day respectively 147 
Planters were quick to realise that the Madras Government had 
no power to enforce its reconunendations. Although Madras had made 
its wishes clear in the form of a Government Order, no legislation 
existed to empower that Order. Moreover, the U. P .A. s. I. surmised 
correctly that the Government was not currently prepared to 
undertake legislation which would enforce 
compliance 148 Although the Animallais Planting 
147. I.O.L.R., International Tea Association Papers, 
No. 2055, Development Department, G.O. No.lOS, 
12th Jan., 1939. 
planters' 
Association 
148. Ibid., Secretary U.P.A.S.I. to Secretary, South Indian 
Association, London, 9th Feb., 1939. 
submitted a detailed response to Government 
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Order 108 149 
planters clearly resented the Government's action. At the 
U.P.A.s.I. Annual General Meeting of 1939 the Society's President, 
R. c. Morris, informed an audience which included v. v. ~ri, 
Minister for Industry and Labour~ v. I. Muniswami Pillai, Minister 
for Agriculture and Rural Development; and the Governor of Madras, 
Lord Erskine, that "if the Government have any recommendations to 
make with regard to conditions on Estates, they should be 
communicated to the U.P.A.S.I. for comment and consultation, and 
not publicly issued in the form of a Government Order" 150 
While the threat of impending legislation might have spurred 
planters on to upgrade labour's terms of employment on estates, 
there is no available evidence to suggest that this was the case. 
As plantation workers were readily available at low wage rates in 
the late 1930s 151 planters had no economic incentive to 
improve labour's working conditions. Neither did the threat of 
greater government intervention in plantation production ever 
become imminent enough to push planters to reform existing 
149. Ibid., No. 2056, A. s. Acaster, Secretary, U.P.A.s.I., 
to Secretary, Government of Madras, Development 
Department. 
150. U.P.A.S.I., Year Book of the United Planters' 
Association of Southern India', 1939, Madras, U.P.A.S.I., 
p 16. 
151. Ibid., p 17. 
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circumstances in advance of legislation. Between 1937 and 1939 
planters successfully staved off the application of the Madras 
Maternity Benefits Bill 152 and the Madras 153 Factory Rules 
as well as proposals for paid sick and holiday leave. 
• 
The Madras Congress Government's failure to implement these 
regulations was due to the brevity of its term in office, .to its 
desire to appear as a moderate, responsible administration, to 
Rajagopalachary's sympathy for Gandhi's style of harmonious 
industrial relations 154 and to the All India Congress 
Committee's emphasis on the establishment of nation-wide mechanisms 
for the fixing of wages, the conducting of enquiries, the 
collection of statistics, the recognition of trade unions and the 
settlement of disputes 155 Such mechanisms as Tripartite 
COnferences engaging planters, labour and federal politicians, and 
wage fixing boards modelled on the British example 156 were to 
prove effective in the post-war period. However, the !.N.C.'s 
152. Ibid., p SO. 
153. Ibid., p 51. 
154. Murphy, op. cit., p 151. 
155. Giri, op. cit., p 123. 
156. I.O.L.R., International Tea Association Papers, 
No.2056, Conference between the Minister for Labour, 
Dr. Ambedkar, and representatives of U.P.A.s.I. and the 
Indian Tea Association, New Delhi, Jan., 1943. 
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commitment to long term structural reform of industrial relations 
at the national level bore no immediate advantage for south Indian 
plantation workers. The net result was that labour remained as 
unprotected by legislation at the end of 1939 as it had bee8 in 
1936. 
While the Rege committee of Enquiry reported in 1946 that 
plantation living conditions had improved, (though very unevenly), 
since 1930 157 , working conditions showed little variation over 
the same period. The different rates of progress on living and 
working conditions may be attributable to the direct economic 
benefits which planters derived from a healthy work force. Where 
disease and c9ntagion could be minimised through the supply of 
clean water, better sanitation, improved housing and medical 
facilities, a greater outturn of labour could be expected each day. 
Additionally, planters could expect that healthy labourers would be 
more productive than unhealthy ones, and that less would be spent 
on recruiting new workers to replace those who had become infirm. 
Overall, the cost of improving labour's living conditions might 
well be outweighed by lower costs of production. In contrast, 
maternity benefits, paid sick leave, paid holidays, higher wages, 
and restrictions on the operating hours of tea factories, were a 
157. Report on an Enquiry into Conditions of Labour in 
Plantations in India, op. cit., p 172. 
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significant cost to employers and did nothing directly to increase 
labour's efficiency. 
In the absence of effective government regulation of 
plantation employment, labour might have won improved wo~ing 
conditions for itself through trade union activity. However, the 
development of trade unions among plantation workers in south India 
was extremely slow. Trade unions, where they did exist on estates 
before 1947, were short-lived organizations which were often 
confined to a single plantation. similarly, labour disputes were 
spontaneous affairs which did not· spread beyond the boundaries of 
an individual estate. The dispute which began on Nonsuch tea estate 
in Nilgiri District in March, 1939 clearly illustrates this. 
Although the Hindu some three months later reported that the 
conflict was "threatening to assume serious proportions", only the 
original 19 workers who had been dismissed for insubordination and 
lack of diligence had ever participated in satyagraha in the estate 
shandy 158 In the opinion of the Rege Enquiry Committee in 1946 
there was, 
"no organization of any kind worth the name among the 
large mass of plantation workers. • • . . If the workers 
in the plantations are left to their own devices in the 
matter of organization, not for another fifty years can 
158. Hindu, 22nd June, 1939. 
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we see a trade union corning up" 159 
Plantation employment in the hills lacked those features 
which allowed for the rapid spread of strikes in the textile ~lls 
of nearby Coimbatore, namely labour mobility between various places 
of employment and co-habitation of workers from a number of 
different establishments in the same village or area 160 
Significantly, Murphy has reported that in Coimbatore "a 
paternalistic employer whose employees worked and lived on his 
estate could easily keep the union out of his mill" 161 • This 
statement could be applied with equal force to almost all tea 
estates in the_,Nilgiri hills prior to independence. 
Prior to 1947, the only trade union of any substance in 
southern planting districts was the Estates Staffs' Union of South 
India (E. s. u.s. I.). E. S. u.S. I. was the direct descendent of the 
Estates Staffs• Association of South India (E.S.A.S.I.), a welfare 
society inaugurated in 1928 for the benefit of Indian 
administrative staff employed on plantations 162 Initially, 
159. Report on an Enquiry into Conditions of Labour in 
Plantations in India, op. cit., p 174. 
160. Murphy, op. cit., pp 199-200. 
161. Ibid., p 207. 
162. E.S.A.S.I., Estates Staffs' Association of South India 
Bulletin, VoL 1, 1932, p L The term "staffs" 
(continued over) 
the 
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society's aims were modest, its membership small, and its methods 
conciliat6ry4 In 1929 the society's objectives included the 
establishment of a benevolent fund -for aged employees, the raising 
of work efficiency levels on estates, the rendering of assistince 
to the Plante·rs' Association, and the attainment of U.P.A.S.I. 
membership 163 The Association invited a series of prominent 
European planters to preside over it until 1940 164 , while its 
premises were leased from the U.P .. A.S.I. and located within the 
165 U.P.A.S.I compound at Glenview, Coonoor until January, 1947 
However, the late 1930s and early 1940s witnessed increasing 
support for a more independent, radical stance within E.S.A.S.I.'s 
ranks. Whereas ,the Association had seen fit in 1935 to publish a 
letter advocating that all estate staff replace the ubiquitous term 
"master" with "Sir" when addressing a superior 166 by 1941 it 
was arguing that "a fundamental change in the relationship between 
the employer and the employee is necessary; the complex sense of 
encompassed all office and check-roll clerks, factory 
staff such as tea and rubber makers, estate doctors, and 
all field conductors and writers. It did not include 
maistris. 
163. Ibid. 
164. Ibid., July, 1940, p 1. 
165. Ibid., Aug., 1947, p 12. 
166. Ibid., Nov., 1935, p 36. 
167 
master and servant must go" 
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By 1944 the Association's 
bulletin included a series of articles in which one of its leading 
and more outspoken members, V4 I. Chacko, espoused the Hobson-
Leninist view- of colonial capitalism with the clear intentio~~t of 
mobilising Indian workers whose "fawning hospitality, incredible 
gullibility and •.• childlike passivity" made exploitation 
possible 168 • Encouraged by the successful transformation of the 
Ceylon Staffs' Association, the E.S.A.S.I. formally applied for 
registration as a trade union in 1946 169 • 
The obstacles encountered by those who canvassed estate staff 
on behalf of the E.S.A.S.I. are indicative of some of the broader 
influences whi~h inhibited the growth of trade unionism amongst 
plantation field labour in south India prior to 1947. The active 
oppOsition of estate owners and managers is foremost amo~gst these 
factors. In 1940 the E.S.A.S. I. Bulletin paid tribute to those 
early planters whose support was enlisted for the Association in 
spite of "all the displeasures and criticisms of their less 
foresighted colleagues" 170 For employed staff the consequences 
167. Ibid., Feb., 1941, p 1. 
168. Ibid., Dec., 1944, pp 18-19. 
169. Ibid., March, 1946, p 27. 
170. Ibid., Feb., 1940, p 53. 
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of joining the Association were often more dire. Later, the 
prospect of instant dismissal from an estate post was seen by the 
Estates Staffs' Union as a major threat which undermined its 
attempts to increase its membership 171 As a result, in~ial 
members were often enrolled clandestinely, and each new member was 
deliberately not informed of the identity of other staff ·who had 
also joined 172 In addition, some planters attempted to keep 
their staff ignorant of industrial and political developments 
outside of plantations by forcing their staff to notify management 
in advance of any visitors they intended to receive in their 
quarters 173 In an attempt to prevent trade unionism spreading 
from the estate staff to the labourers whom they supervised, a 
number of planters executed a basic policy of segregating estate 
staff from the field labour force. Although there were clearly many 
practical difficulties inherent in such a policy, the Animallais 
Branch of E.S.A.S.I. claimed in 1946 that "if any staff is found to 
take any interest in the welfare of the labour, he is classed as an 
171. Ibid. 
172. P. H. Daniel, Plantation Panorama, Madras, 1975, p 25. 
173. E.S.A.S.I., Estates staffs' Association of South India 
Bulletin, oo. cit., Feb., 1947, p 7, Memorandum of the 
Estate Staffs' Union of South India (Animallais) and the 
Estate Staffs' Association of South India (Animallais) 
to the Minister for Information and Harijan Uplift, Sri 
v. Kurmayya, Valparai, 15th Dec., 1946. 
380 
undesirable or a Communist, and he -is removed from the 
scene" 
174 A related tactic was to assert that trade unions 
were only suitable for common labourers, and that it was 
"unbecoming of staff who were under -the arm of Management to be,.ome 
members of a labour Union " 175 With the emergence of the 
Estates Staffs• ·Union of South India in 1946, a number of the 
larger company concerns; such as the Kannan Devan Hills Produce 
Company operated by James Findlay, and Messrs. Tea Estates India, 
Ltd. a subsidiary of Brooke Bond, adopted the more practical policy 
of establishing their own staff associations while simultaneously 
banning the formation of E.S.A.S.I. and E.s.u.s.r. branch 
associations on their holdings 176 Company associations such as 
these_ were ersatz organizations which held little p~ospect of 
producing improved conditions for estate staff. As the E. S.A. S. I. 
indicated, it is more probable that an organization of staff 
confined to one employer "encourages bribery, blackmailing, tale-
bearing, crowcatching, ·favouritism and all the meaner 
vices" 177 Nevertheless, in the short term, corporate sponsored 
174. Ibid. 
175. P. H. Daniel, Plantation Panorama, op. cit., p 27. 
176. E.S.A.S.I., Estates Staffs• Association of South India 
Bulletin, op. cit., August, 1947, pp 12-13. 
177. Ibid. 
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associations hampered the growth of the E.S.U.S.I •• 
Representatives of the nascent unions of field labour also 
encountered the active opposition of plantation managers. In 1946 
the newly emerged Nilgiri District Plantation Workers' »nion 
attempted to increase its membership among tea plantation workers 
in the Nilgiri hills proper. A number of the Union's workers, who 
secretly entered estates to meet with workers, were known to have 
guard dogs deliberately set upon them by outraged supervisors, 
while at Parkside Estate they were threatened by the gun-bearing 
manager 178 Union officials were commonly regarded by 
management as outside agitators and trouble makers 179 , and in 
some instances- workers were promptly dismissed if they were 
discovered communicating with union representatives 180 On most 
estates union canvassers found their attempts to publicise the 
trade union cause severely impeded by the planters • policy of 
restricting the movements of both workers leaving the estate, and 
of outsiders entering its gates. While this policy restricted the 
178. Interview with P. L. Perumal, General Secretary, Nilgiri 
District Estate Workers' Union, at Coonoor, 19th 
Feb., 1987. The Nilgiri District Plantation Workers' 
Union was founded in 1946 under the stewardship of Raman 
Nair, a Congress Party politician and Member of the 
Madras Legislative Council. 
179. See for example: Planters' Chronicle, let Jan., 1947, 
p 1; 1st Oct., 1947 ,, p 430. 
180. Interview with P. L. Perumal, Nilgiri District 
Estate Workers' Union, op. cit. 
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workers' knowledge of wider industrial and political developments, 
it was not new. Rather, planters had traditionally imposed 
travelling and visiting restrictions on their indebted labourers so 
that absconding workers could be readily identified. Aside Jrom 
Sundays when workers were generally allowed to visit local shandys, 
a lone labourer wandering the roads wa~ a conspicuous and' unusual 
sight. In the 1940s this policy served two additional purposes: it 
prevented contact between workers on various estates, and it 
simultaneously excluded the entry of peripatetic unionists. The 
planters' prejudice against outside organizers was, as the Royal 
Commission on Labour noted, often an attempt to ensure that 
labour's case would be put forward by less assertive and less 
effective representatives 181 
The isolated and insular nature of estate employment also 
inhibited the growth of trade unionism on estates. While geographic 
isolation has often been cited as a factor inhibiting the growth of 
unions on plantations 182 , it is landform rather than distance 
that insulated plantations in the Nilgiri hills from trade union 
developments in Madras Presidency. In the 1930s the cotton mills of 
1814 Report of the Royal Commission on Labour in India, 
op. cit., p 325. 
1824 P. K. Kurian, "Industrial Relations in Plantations 
-A Management Perspective", in International Labour 
Office, Management in Tea Plantations, Geneva, 1984, 
p 97. 
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Coirnbatore, less than fifty miles from Coonoor, became a stormy 
centre of trade union activity 183 Nevertheless, this wave of 
industrial unrest failed to spread onto the plantations in 
adjoining Nilgiri District despite the interest shown in planta~ion 
conditions by Ramaswamy Ayyanger, the President of the Coimbatore 
Labour Union 184 The landform of the hills was 'in part 
responsible. Since many slopes were simply too steep to cultivate, 
plantations were scattered throughout the hills, and remained 
separated by tracts of virgin jungle even in the 1940s. More 
importantly, the mill workers of Coimbatore were more committed to 
employment in the new workplace than plantation workers. While the 
early mill workers had _sandwiched temporary factory work between 
seasonal agricultural tasks and had maintained family plots of 
land, the-se practices had been gradually abandoned by the 
1920s 185 In contrast, the typical tea estate worker retained 
his village tie and, if possible, his village plot. He was less 
likely to regard his new employment as permanent, and this 
183. Chamanlal Revri, The Indian Trade Union Movement, New 
Delhi, 1972, p 218. 
184. Supra., p 286. Ayyanger's death shortly after his 
preparation of evidence for the Royal Commission on 
Labour removed a key agitator for trade unionism from 
the region. 
185. Murphy, op. cit., p 33. 
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militated against the growth of trade unions in the Nilgiris. 
It is also probable that the heterogeneous origins of the 
plantation labour force in the Nilgiris made unionisation a 
difficult task. Whereas the clerical ranks on plantations ~ere 
dominated by mission educated, Tamil Christians from Tinnevelly and 
Ramnad Districts 186 , the origins of. field labourers were more 
diverse. In the Nilgiri hills, Tamil, Telugu, and Malayali speakers 
from Madras Presidency as well as Kannada speakers from both South 
Canara and Mysore state were employed 187 Furthermore, it is 
' probable that on the smaller individually owned estates of the type 
that predominated in the Nilgiris, members of a labour gang were 
housed together rather than mixed indiscriminately with the members 
of other gangs 188 Gang members continued to be supervised on 
all estates by the maistris or cole-maistris who had recruited 
them, and to whom they were personally known and frequently 
indebted. In short, these features of estate life operated to 
186. P. H. Daniel, A Short Note on Estate staff, 1987, 
Unpublished manuscript. Kooiman has noted that 
mission educated, Christian employees were highly 
regarded by European planters in Travancore since they 
could be expected to be sober, honest and obedient. 
(Dick Kooiman, Conversion and Social Equality in India, 
op. cit., pp 107, 142-143.) 
187. Supra., pp 34-36, 38-39. 
188. On some large company-owned estates evidence suggests 
that labour was housed together without respect for 
caste. 
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cement ties between gang members, and between the gang and its 
cole-maistri, but not between the various gangs. The development of 
class consciousness amongst labour was also seriously handicapped 
by ethnic and linguistic differences. 
• 
Neither did the common origin of the vast majority of field 
labour in the depressed classes appear to serve as the basis of a 
common economic identity. In 1947 the Planters' Chronicle commented 
on "the tendency in some areas to organize plantation labour along 
communal lines" in south India 189 • This development had already 
taken place in Ceylon, where unions of plantation labour were well 
established and factional disputes between caste based unions were 
known to occur 190 The transfer of caste loyalties to the realm 
of trade union development in south India was the direct result of 
the planting sector's reliance on the traditional agri~ultural.· 
sphere to support the reproduction of the plantation labour force. 
Individual workers retained their village ties out of economic 
necessity and became annually migrating labourers rather than 
permanent settlers in the hills. The translocation of caste 
loyalties from labour's points of origin to its new industrial work 
place was a natural consequence of this economic structure. 
189. Planters' Chronicle, 1st Oct., 1947, p 430. 
190. Ibid., 1946, p 53. 
,. 
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Illiteracy, combined with geographic isolation and an 
artificial insularity enforced by planters, all operated to keep 
labour ignorant of the wider political and industrial changes which 
took place in India in the immediate pre-independence period. While 
• 
there is sufficient evidence to indicate that the majority of 
estate staffs were well informed about India-wide political 
developments in the period 191 , the same cannot be said for 
plantation field labour. In the opinion of P. L. Perumal, an early 
trade union official in the Nilgiris, 
"the workers' understanding of the nationalist movement 
was minimal - they knew the names of one or two of the 
main figures, understood that congress' aim was to 
evict th" British, and had photographs of Gfg2hi in 
their homes beside pictures of the Hindu Gods" .. 
Only in the late 1940s is there evidence that field labour in 
south India had become politicized to any degree. The first serious 
outbreak of plantation labour unrest occurred in 1946 in the 
Wynaad. Initial discontent was centred on the allotment of 
inadequate food rations, but quickly grew to encompass wider 
, 
191. E.S.A.S.I., Estates staffs' Association of south India 
Bulletin, op. cit., July, 1937, p 2. 
192. Interview with P. L. Perumal, op. cit. 
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demands for improved industrial conditions 193 • It is 
significant that labour's leadership was provided by communist 
sympathisers from outside the industry, rather than by the recently 
unionized estate staffs 194 Despite planters' fears that staff 
• 
employees should, by virtue of their particular place in plantation 
relations, prove a natural conduit for the transfer of pro-union 
sentiments to common 195 labourers no such trickle-down 
occurred. While some staff leaders foresaw, as the Indian National 
Trade Union Congress subsequently did in Assam 196 that the 
staffs' "intimate knowledge of labour" placed them in "a 
particularly advantageous position to serve the 197 labourers" 
E.S.U.S.I. fai,led to seize the opportunity before it. Faced with 
difficul~ies in securing official registration as a trade union, 
and engulfed by planters' attempts to undermine its membership, 
E.S.U.S.I. was engrossed in ensuring its own survival. Moreover, it 
193. Planters' Chronicle, 1st Jan., 1947, p 1. 
194. E.S.A.S.I., Estates staffs' Association of South India 
Bulletin, op. cit., August, 1947, p 10. 
195. Planters' Chronicle, 15th Oct., 1946, p 391. 
196. Amalendu Guha, Planter-Rai to Swaraj. Freedom Struggle 
and Electoral Politics in Assam 1826 1947, New Delhi, 
1977, p 296. 
197. E.S.A.S.I., Estates Staffs' Association of South India 
Bulletin, op. cit., Sept., 1946, p 16. 
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is questionable whether estate staff were best suited to represent 
labour's industrial interests for E. S .A. S. I. continued to profess 
its "sense of responsibility to the Industry", and the capacity of 
its members to serve capital as well as labour 198 However, •. in 
1946, concessions for plantation labour could only be won at 
capital's expense. E.S.A.S.I. 's failure to acknowledge this was 
largely the product of estate staffs' interposal role in plantation 
' 
relations. The Association's assumption that labour was incapable 
of organizing itself led it to believe that estate staff- educated, 
politicised and accustomed to supervising labour- could best fill 
the void in labour leadership. 
The tardy development of trade unionism amongst common field 
labourers left government regulation as the only vehicle capable of 
improving working conditions on plantations. While the Madras 
Congress government had largely failed to implement any significant 
reforms before the war, its counterpart fared better in 1946 and 
1947. In particular, the application in March, 1947 of the Payment 
of Wages Act (Central Act IV of 1936) to all plantations employing 
more than 25 workers struck a critical blow at the plantation 
maistri system. The Act required employers to fix wage periods at 
one month or less, made labour's travel costs irrecoverable, 
198. Ibid. 
) 
I 
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limited the recovery of pre-employment advances to the first wage 
period, imposed restrictions on the rate of recovery of all 
subsequent advances, and limited the proportion subject to recovery 
by deduction at either one third of total wages, or one quarter 
• 
where total wages fell below Rs. 20 per month. Moreover, planters 
were required to keep accurate registers detailing all advances 
made 199 
The U.P.A.S.I. had objected strongly to the application of 
the Act to plantation employment on the grounds that it would 
severely handicap labour recruitment by planters within Madras 
Presidency since both agricultural labour, and plantations in the 
princely states of Cochin, Travancore, Coorg and Mysore, would be 
outside the Act 200 While there is no evidence to suggest that 
the Ua P. A. S. I.'s fears were realized, the Act provided a clear 
incentive for all contracto'rs of labour to limit cash advances to 
workers. Despite the Act's provisions for recovery of advances, 
planters and maistris who suffered an exodus of indebted labour at 
any time were now forced to rely on their common rights as civil 
creditors in order to extract repayment 201 Over time planters 
199. Planters• Chronicle, 15th Sept., 1946, pp 361-362. 
200. Ibid., 1945, p 150. 
201. Ibid., 15th May, 1947, p 223. 
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had discovered that this was scant protection indeed, as civil 
proceedings proved slow and cumbersome. In addition, the Act 
undermined the long standing practice of persuading defaulting 
workers to return to estates to work off their outstanding debts . 
• 
In 1947 the U.P.A.S.I. 's Labour Department predicted that this 
practice was likely to fall into disuse, since the Act outlawed the 
recovery of costs incurred in transporting workers back to 
estates 202 
It is probable that the application of the Payment of Wages 
Act considerable weakened the maistri's hold over plantation 
labour. Whereas the repeal of both the Madras Planters' Labour Law 
and the Breach of Contract Act in the 1920s had merely removed the 
legal props supporting debt-bonding on plantations, the Payment of 
Wages Act actively discouraged the advance system, by providing 
penalties for non-compliance with its provisions and by making 
labour contracting illegal outside of the Act. 
The institution of the Payment of Wages Act was indicative of 
the increased capacity of both provincial and central 
administrations to regulate and standardise the conditions of work 
and terms of employment on all plantations throughout India. With 
the federal government's institution of an effective infrastructure 
202. Ibid. 
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for industrial relations, and with the question of the transfer of 
power firmly settled, the new Congress administrations were free to 
pursue those industrial policies which had been formulated, but 
rarely implemented, by the All India Congress Committee in 1937 . 
• 
Moreover, the revelations and recommendations provided by the Rege 
Committee of Enquiry in 1946, by Lloyd Jones' Report on Standards 
of Medical care for Tea Plantations in India in 1947, and by 
Deshpande's Reoort of an Enquiry into the Cost and Standard of 
Living of Plantation Workers in South India in the following year, 
all added impetus to the Government of India's legislative impulse. 
At the same time, these Reports (and in particular the Rege 
Committee's), with their detailed descriptions of an impoverished 
and frequently mistreated plantation labour force in south India, 
undercut many of the U.P.A.S.I.'s claims, including its long 
standing plea that special conditions in the south warranted labour 
practices different from those prevailing in North India. 
Similarly, planters' claims that plantations should remain exempt 
from regulations governing industry because plantation production 
was of an agricultural rather than an industrial nature, were 
undermined by the Rege Committee's exposition of plantation work 
practices, such as piece rate payments and the levying of fines on 
wages 203 which were akin to those prevailing in sweated 
203. Report of an Enquiry into Conditions of Labour in 
{continued over) 1 
' 
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workshops. These findings added to the government's resolve that 
plantations should be brought within the scope of ordinary factory 
legislation and that conditions of labour and terms of employment 
on estates should be standardised as far as possible throu~hout 
India. Since the U.P.A.S.I. •s attempts at self-regulation of the 
planting industry, (such as- its formulation of standards of labour 
welfare in 1944 204 ) had failed to prevent abuses, henceforth 
plantations would be regulated by law. 
The impact of other legislative initiatives in the post-
independence period which provided, among other things, for minimum 
wages on estates, the payment of sickness and maternity benefits, 
the compulsory~ recognition of estate trade unions by employers, 
and, most importantly, the abolition of the maistri system of 
labour contracting in the Plantation Labour Bill of 1951, lie 
outside the parameters of this study. Nevertheless, it is obvious 
that these measures taken after independence were the long term 
result of the industrial legislative goals formulated by the newly-
elected Congress Party in 1937. 
Plantations in India, op. cit., pp 132-140. 
204. U.P.A.S.I., U.P.A.S.I. Standards in Respect to the 
Welfare of Labour in South India, Madras, 1944. 
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CONCLUSION 
This localised study of an annually migrating labour force in 
the Nilgiri hills of southern India supplements the recent growth 
of a body of historical literature detailing the developffient of 
specific colonial industries in British India. Along with case 
studies of cotton milling in Bombay 1 and south India 2 , jute 
production in Bengal 3 , and coal extraction in eastern India 4 
this case study of the Nilgiri tea industry contributes to an 
empirical, historical base against which the broader issues 
relating to colonial economic development and the colonial labour 
market should be tested and assessed. In particular, the experience 
of migrating labour to Nilgiri tea plantations demonstrates that 
1. Dick Kooiman, "Rural Labour in the Bombay Textile Industry 
and the Articulation of Modes of Production", in Peter 
Robb (Ed.), Rural South Asia, London, 1983; Dick Kooiman, 
"Jobbers and the Emergence of Trade Unions in Bombay 
City", International Review of Social History, Vol.XXII, 
1977, pp 313-328; Morris David Morris, The Emergence of an 
Industrial Labour Force in India: A Study of the Bombay 
Cotton Mills, 1854-1947, Berkeley, 1965; Richard Newman, 
Workers and Unions in Bombay, 1918-1929, Canberra, 1981. 
2. Murphy, op. cit. 
3. Dipesh Chakrabarty, Rethinking Working Class History, 
Bengal 1890-1940, New Delhi, 1989; Ranajit Das Gupta, 
"Factory Labour in Eastern India: Sources of Supply, 
1855-1946, Some Preliminary Findings", op. cit. 
4. c. P. Simmons, "Recruiting and Organizing an Industrial 
Labour Force in Colonial India: The Case of the Coal 
Mining Industry .. , Indian Economic and Social History 
Review, Vol.XIII, No.4, 1976, pp 469-483. 
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coercive plantation labour practices stemmed not only from the 
legislative actions of the established capitalist, colonial state 
but also from the realm of pre-capitalist, agrarian relations. 
These twin forces acted in a complementary fashion, and are c~arly 
mirrored in the experience of Indian labour in other regions of 
plantation agriculture in South and South East Asia. The abiding 
importance of labour's underlying cultural norms in determining the 
means and the conditions under which plains labour was contracted 
and retained on Nilgiri estates puts paid to the idea that 
plantation agriculture was a universally homogeneous production 
system purely western in form. In truth, contractual relations on 
Nilgiri tea ,plantations were also customised to their specific 
cultural setting by the planters' adoption and adaption of 
constraints governing agrarian labour, particularly Tamil labour, 
and by the subsequent regularised application of these constraints 
to all plantation labour. This finding indicates that colonial 
labour laws cannot be viewed as the sole, or even overriding, 
source of coercive labour practices in the Nilgiri hills. Moreover, 
the intensity with which contracted labour was coerced in the 
Nilgiris further undermines the distinction between recruitment 
systems based on indenture, contract or kanganni suppliers. 
Migrating plantation labour on Nilgiri tea estates, whether 
contracted or not, was invariably less than free both to sell its 
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labour to the highest bidder, and to quit plantation employment. 
The establishment of plantation agriculture as the 
predominant mode of production in the Nilgiri hills plainly took 
place with the active assistance of successive colo.,.ial 
administrations. While the Madras government under sir Charles 
Trevelyan in 1859 proved unwilling to aid the planting enterprise 
lest this undermine the virtue of an economic community founded on 
the principles of laissez-faire, subsequent administrations 
provided both direct and indirect assistance to planters. Planters• 
attempts to acquire suitable land from the mid-nineteenth century 
were assisted by the Madras government's actions in allowing land 
to become a freely alienable commodity, in permitting the sale of 
prized forest land under the Waste Land Rules of 1863, in reducing 
land revenue taxes in 1869, and in conducting an accurate land 
revenue settlement of the District in 1880 since this prevented 
indigenous cultivators from utilizing lands on which they did not 
pay tax. 
While the Government of Madras had favoured planters in 
acquiring land, it was less amenable to the enactment of labour 
laws which would assist the retention of estate labour. The 
provincial administration's reluctance to present the planters' 
case to its superiors in Calcutta in 1879, the unfavourable 
interpretations placed on the Breach of Contract Act by the Madras 
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High Court in 1880, 1883 and 1884, as well as its outright 
rejection of the planters • memorial of 1892 all indicate that 
official opinion in Madras was, at least until 1894, usually 
unsympathetic to any such legislation. • 
By comparison, the Government of India • s opposition to the 
enactment of a specific labour code for southern plantat-ions was 
even more ardent than that exhibited by the Government of Madras. 
Whereas the Madras administration in 1877 had initially expressed 
concern for the planters' economic plight 5 no such concern was 
forthcoming from Calcutta. In part, this was because the southern 
planters• quest for greater legal control over a dwindling labour 
supply coincided with the Government of India's increased desire to 
rid the plantation labour market of all legal restrictions. In the 
1880s the Government of India repealed a number of laws of penal 
contract pertaining to labour in north-east India and it was 
further contemplating the eventual abolition of all labour laws 
containing penal provisions 6 Moreover, the Government of India 
had little knowledge or experience of the planting industry in 
south India. As its contact with southern planters was limited 
5. I.O.L.R., Madras Judicial Proceedings, 1877, No.1692, 
G.O.l692, 19th July, 1877. 
6. Revenue and Agriculture Department, (Emigration), Letter 
No. 77, Viceroy Lansdowne to Secretary of State, Cross, 
5th Oct., 1891, Para. 2, reprinted in U.P.A.S.I., Annual 
Proceedings, 1893, pp 76. 
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largely to the receipt of memorials requesting greater legal 
protection of their economic interests, it tended to view these 
demands in the light of its disturbing experience of the tea 
planters of Assam. In Mysore state, which ·adjoined the Nilg.i,cis, 
the Government of India remained "deeply suspicious of the British 
planter community" following the state • s rendition to princely 
rule in 1881. It feared that the new Maharajah "could not control 
the aggressive and ruthless planters ••• (who) often sought 
advantages and privileges at the expense of native Mysoreans" 7 • 
The Government of India's concern for "native Mysoreans", for other 
rnq.ian cultivators and plantation labourers also reflected the 
constant influence of the Home authorities upon Calcutta. The 
correspondence emanating from the India Office in London in the 
early 1890s was marked by the view that laws of penal contract were 
anachronistic regulations which were antithetical to labour's 
interests, incompatible with the government's obligation to protect 
industrial labour, and worthy only of repeal. The impact of the 
India Office's humanitarian opinions was simply more keenly felt in 
Calcutta than in Madras. 
Nevertheless, southern planters' appeals for. an enhanced 
labour law were clearly at variance with both the central and 
7. Moore, op. cit., p 14. 
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provincial governments' records on labour legislation. Both the 
Government of Madras, in enacting Act V of 1866, and the Government 
of India, in enacting the first Inland Emigration Act for Assam in 
1863 did so in the light of documented abuse of contr•cted 
plantation labour. Both Acta sought to balance the ·benefits which 
planters would derive from the regularised mobilisation of labour 
with clauses designed to afford legal protection to the worker. Not 
until 1879 did southern planters half-heartedly concede that their 
actions too might be made subject to legal punishment. At no stage 
did they conceive of labour laws as counterbalancing the rights of 
employees and employers. The demands of southern planters for a 
penal labour law were clearly at odds with the legislative record 
of both administrations. 
What is most surprising about the planters' campaign, is not 
that they failed to extract penal legislation from Calcutta in the 
nineteenth century, but that they managed to win it at all. This 
development is best explained by the advent of a prolonged 
depression in world markets for both tea and coffee in the 1890s 
and by the simultaneous development of a prolonged crisis in the 
Government of India's financial situation. While the influential 
Indian Tea Association in north India favoured a further. decline in 
the silver standard to alleviate planters' economic distress, this 
measure was completely unacceptable to the Government of India 
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since it would also increase the real cost of Horne Charges to the 
government for it was obliged to pay these in sterling. As 
Tomlinson has indicated, there was no broad-scale fiscal means open 
to the Government of India which would have compensated it f~r a 
further fall in the rupee's value. The imperial state could neither 
raise taxes, since high taxes were thought to be incompatible with 
peaceful imperial rule, nor impose permanent import duties, since 
these would offend British exporters 8 . However, Indian tea could 
be made more competitive on world markets, and the tea industry's 
profitability restored, by lowering the cost of production through 
the enactment of enhanced penal contract legislation. Moreover, 
laws of penal contract were economically specific in their effect: 
they bore no unpalatable financial consequences for either the 
gOvernment or for other British residents in India and this made 
their imposition all the more acceptable to government. Since 
British India was widely regarded in official circles as being 
relatively prosperous in the late nineteenth century 9 , it was no 
doubt felt that the country could a·fford to subsidise the recovery 
of the tea industry. 
8. B. R. Tomlinson, The Political Economy of the Raj 
1914-1947: The Economics of Decolonization in India, 
London, 1979, pp 27-28. 
9. Bipan Chandra, Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in 
India: Economic Policies of Indian National Leadership, 
1880-1905, New Delhi, 1966, p 14. 
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,The granting of an enquiry into plantation labour supply in 
south India and the postponement of the proposed reform of Bengal, 
Act I of 1882, fit neatly with the views held by a number of modern 
economic historians about the nature of Indian political econo~ in 
this period. B. R. Tomlinson has argued that laissez-faire· was a 
dogma which was frequently at variance with the facts since the 
government had, by the end of the nineteenth century, established 
"a broad range of public sector industries including engineering 
workshops, railway workshops, and coal :mines" 10 • Sabyasachi 
Bhattacharya has further described the government • s policy as one 
of "discriminatory interventionism" 11 , and .both Tomlinson and 
Bhattacharya have argued that the Government of India often played 
an active part in developing India's economy along capitalist 
lines. 
However, it would be wrong to argue that the Government of 
India was prepared to abandon readily the non-interventionist line 
that it had adopted with regard to the planting enterprise in south 
India. The emergence of a united planting community in 1894, its 
newly won voice in the Madras legislature and its persistent 
political lobbying were factors which, in addition to the 
10. Tomlinson, op. cit., pp 14-15. 
11. Bhattacharya, op. cit., p 15. 
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pronounced downturn in the tea industry, had all worked to convince 
the Viceroy, Lord Elgin, that southern planters' grievances should 
be examined. More importantly, while the Government of India was 
prepared to temporarily forego pending reforms in Assam, it di~ not 
intend to abrogate the principle which had governed all laws of 
penal contract since the 1860s. As a result, the enactment· of the 
Madras Planters' Labour Law was long delayed by the Government of 
India • s attempts to make this fresh legislation conform with the 
pre-existing body of plantation labour law. Even under Curzon, whom 
Bipan Chandra has cast as a "vigorous advocate" of colonial 
capitalists 12 , the Government of India's legislative impulse in 
labour matters was guided by an established philosophical 
framework. 
These developments must seriously undermine any general claim 
that the Government of India was intent on enacting labour 
legislation in the nineteenth century primarily to foster colonial 
enterprise. Initially, labour legislation governing the migration 
of tea plantation workers to the tea fields of north-east India had 
been undertaken by both the Government of India and the Government 
of Madras to prevent abuse of contracted labour. It is undeniable 
that such legislation assisted planters by establishing regularised 
12. Chandra, oo. cit., p 112. 
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procedures under which migrant labour could be obtained and a 
healthy and diligent work force maintained at minimum cost. 
However, the Government of India, guided by the polici~s of the 
India Office, clearly saw itself as acting as much, if not roo~, on 
the labourer's behalf than on the planter's. Throughout the latter 
part of the nineteenth century this balance of interests, which bad 
guided the Government of India in composing legislation pertaining 
to plantations, was tilted decidedly in favour of the labourer. By 
1888, the Government of India, encouraged by the India Office, had 
abolished special legislation incorporating penal punishment for 
breach of civil contract in regions such as Chittagong and the Hill 
Tracts where ,labour supply appeared to be assured. Moreover, the 
government had already formulated its long term objective of 
abolishing all such special legislation. Where special protection 
o_f the planters' interests remained as in Bengal Act I of 1882, 
this was regarded more as an inducement to encourage planters to 
accept reciprocal obligations towards their labourers than as a 
worthy ·policy in its own right. Clearly, by the beginning of the 
1890s the Government of India's ideal labour market was one that 
was unfettered by special legislation of any kind. 
Given this scenario it is impossible to accept the contention 
advanced by the early Indian nationalist .leadership that the 
Government of India regarded penal legislation as a vehicle for 
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fostering the growth of the tea industry at the end of the 
nineteenth century 13 Nor was the Government of India prepared 
to investigate planters• grievances simply because the grave 
economic circumstances of the early 1890s prevented the pl<enter 
from taking his profit, for Calcutta had paid little attention to 
the same argument when it had been presented by southern growers in 
1877 14 . What distinguished the two crises was not so much the 
greater severity of the economic downturn of the 1890s and hence 
producers' heightened need for government intervention to support 
their enterprise. Rather, it was the fact that the Government of 
India itself had already exacerbated the planters• plight by 
pegging the yalue of the rupee at an artificially high level. In 
these circumstances, the Government of India decision to conSider 
planters' demands for a more stringent labour law in south India, 
and the postponement of scheduled wage increases for labour in 
north India, reflects the government's willingness to compensate 
growers for the specific ill-effects of its own intervention in the 
market place. While the enactment of Act I demonstrated the triumph 
of economic concerns over the non-economic forces of constraint, it 
13. Ibid., pp 365-376. 
14. I.O.L.R., Madras Judicial Proceedings, 1879, No.3193, 
C. Bernard, Officiating Secretary to the Government of 
India, (Home, Revenue and Agriculture), to Acting Chief 
Secretary to Government, 21st Nov., 1879. 
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did not indicate that the Government of India "had shown itself 
susceptible to non-official British pressure" 15 
However, the final form of the Madras Planters' Labour Law of 
1903 indicates that the Government of Madras was less than 4!lly 
committed to the principles which had guided the Government of 
India's plantation labour legislation. The Madras Government's 
failure to emulate those provisions of Bengal Act I of 1882 (or its 
successor the Assam Labour and Emigration Act of 1901) which served 
to protect tea labour in north India, its failure to exercise its 
right to inspect plantations, and its failu-re to formulate local 
regulations which would haVe established minimum standards in 
working conditions on plantations, all permitted widespread and 
intensive abuse of labour in Madras under Act I of 1903. 
Furthermore, these omissions marked Act I as a piece of 
anachronistic legislation which failed to incorporate that balance 
of interests between labour and capital which the Government of 
India had sought from as early as 1863. In addition, the barriers 
which Act I placed in the path of a labourer who wished to 
terminate his contract, the double punishment which the Act 
inflicted on those workers who stood in default of their contracts, 
the conversion of "unlawful absence" from work into a criminal 
15. Renford, op. cit., p 73. 
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offence for which the labourer could be ~oth fined and imprisoned, 
and the annual settlement of wages which the new Act permitted, 
were conditions more characteristic of the older system of 
indenture than of contracted labour 16 These provisions Qf the 
Madras Planters • Labour Law support Ranaj it Das Gupta' a view that 
the development of colonial enterprise_ in India encouraged the 
adapt ion "of the migrant labour policy for the colonies .... into an 
inland migrant labour policy" 17 but it is also important to 
note that the model to which the Madras government turned was 
rapidly be.cQming antiquated. Indenture to Malaya, for example, was 
abolished only seven years after the passage of· Act I of 1903 and, 
in any case, was being rapidly eclipsed in practice by the 
increasingly popular kanganni recruitment system 18 
In drafting Act I the Madras government had not only failed 
to protect plantation labour but it had also enhanced the 
protection afforded to the planter to a degree that was not 
replicated in any other law of penal contract then current within 
British India. These developments bear comparison with Dipesh 
16. Tinker, op. cit., pp 185-194. 
17. Ranajit Das Gupta, "Structure of the Labour Market in 
Colonial India", Economic and Political Weekly, (Special 
No.) 16(44-46), Nov., 1981, p 1795. 
18. Ravinda K. Jain, South Indians on the Plantation Frontier 
in Malaya, New Haven, 1970, p 205. 
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Chakrabarty's explanation for the Bengal Government's failure to 
investigate and ameliorate labour conditiOns in Calcutta • s jute 
mills. Chakrabarty has noted that the Government of India's 
determination to uncover the real conditions prevailing int- jute 
factories constantly ran aground at the provincial level because 
the "government of Bengal lacked the political will necessary to 
distance itself from employers in the jute industry" 19 
Chakrabarty has seen this alliance of state and capital as "part of 
the existing political culture" 20 of the province prior to 
independence. So too in Madras Presidency the local administration 
resisted Calcutta's attempts to frame Act I according to the 
principles upheld by the Government of India in its dealings with 
plantation labour in Assam. Within the Presidency the affiliation 
between government and planters was close. Planters were 
represented in the legislature and had ready access to government 
officials, particularly as the government's summer station was 
located in Ootacamund in the Nilgiri hills. Planters presented a 
united and vociferous front to government after the' formation of 
the U.P.A.S.I. in 1894 and were in contact with other vocal 
minority interests such as the Madras business community. Finally, 
19. Chakrabarty, op. cit., p 80. 
20. Ibid. 
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the government itself had little independent knowledge of labour 
conditions in planting districts since plantations were unregulated 
and therefore not subject to periodic scrutiny by local officials~ 
This liaison between planters and provincial administrators w~ an 
important factor which assisted planters in winning a specific 
plantation labour law since their victory followed on the heels of 
persuading the Governor of Madras of their cause, his subsequent 
intercession on their behalf with the Viceroy, and the appointment 
of one Madras official and one planter to the three member South of 
India Planters' Enquiry Committee in 1896. The close association 
between planting interests and the Government of Madras helps to 
explain the passage of a plantation labour law which was plainly 
aberrant given the Government of India's more balanced regulation 
of tea estates in Assam. 
Despite the evident liaison between capital and the colonial 
state, it is important to note that at its lower echelons the 
Madras government encompassed a broad band of official attitudes 
toward colonial enterprise. Chakrabarty had found that the union of 
capitalism and officialdom in Bengal had its "fullest expression in 
the nineteenth century when the moral order of the day had been 
unashamedly procapitalist" and that this union incorporated even 
low-ranking administrators into its fold 21 No such general 
21. Ibid., pp 76-77. 
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statement can be applied to those officers who administered the law 
of penal contract in Madras Presidency. By comparison with the 
period between 1903 and 1927 in which the Madras Planters• Labour 
Law operated, the reports of British district officials• and 
judicial officers in Madras prior to 1903 are frequently critical 
of the prevailing law of penal contract, Act XIII of 1859, and of 
the whole system of binding plantation labour through a system of 
advances. Many believed that higher pay, rather than a more 
stringent law, would be a superior inducement to labour. At the 
same time other forces were evident for a number of reports are 
marked (as much as official language will permit) by an 
humanitarian cOncern, even sympathy, for the plight of the 
plantation labourer. Such concern is rarely evident in the annual 
reports of district officers who administered the new _labour law 
after 1903. One possible explanation for this change is that 
European planters and officials drew closer together as Indian 
nationalism strengthened and its political implications became 
evident in local boards, councils and finally in the provincial 
legislature. 
By 1903 southern nationalists had emerged as the most 
important opponents of the Government of Madras• legislative 
support for the planting sector. Nationalists within the Madras 
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legislature and in the press were vocal in their opposition to the 
passage of Act I, primarily on the grounds that it contravened any 
contemporary notion of judicial equity. At the same time a few 
leading nationalists such as G. Subramania Iyer recognize~, as 
Bipan Chandra has claimed 22 that the Act was clear evidence 
that the Government of Madras was prepared to advance colonial 
capitalism at the expense of the poorest Indian labourer, and 
ultimately the Indian nation. In their criticism of the Act I, 
nationalists had employed many of the humanitarian arguments 
previously voiced by both the Government of India and the India 
Office. However, these arguments were now turned to a novel 
political purpose as nationalists sought to undermine the support 
which colonial legislation lent to British enterprise in India. 
Although the nationalist position on Act I was clear cut, the 
capacity of the I.N.C. to unite all Indians in opposition to 
British rule was questionable in 1903. The debate which followed 
Act I • s presentation in the Madras legislature demonstrated that 
Congress• efforts could be undercut by fundamental political 
divisions within its own ranks. Throughout British India the I.N.C. 
drew much of its financial and political support from the 
propertied classes, while in Madras the Congress contained a 
22. Chandra, op. cit., pp 375-379. 
410 
substantial number of members who were either drawn from the 
landowning class or were sympathetic to landlords. Nationalist 
opposition to Act I within the Maq.ras legislature was inconsistent 
with the support which some Congressmen concurrently lent t• the 
demands of Tanjorean landlords for similar legislation. Although it 
was the lack of sufficient political representation in the Madras 
legislature which ultimately prevented Congress from impeding the 
passage of Act I, the inconsistency of Congress' position exposed 
it to the ridicule of official representatives in the Governor's 
Council. More significantly, it was now apparent that the Congress' 
link with landlords was proving to be a political liability. The 
I. N.C. •s connection with landlords had permitted British official 
representatives to weaken Congress' opposition to Act I by dividing 
the party's ranks. It had also allowed the British to pose as 
protectors of the poor, since they maintained that under Act I 
bonded, agrarian labour, such as that commonly employed by large 
landholders in Tanjore, was ensured of an avenue to emancipation 
through plantation employment. Moreover, the legislative debate on 
Act I demonstrated that the I.N.C. 's broader ambition to build a 
united Indian nation could not be fulfilled wherever Congressmen 
supported the sectional, economic interests of large landowners. 
Without resolution of this fundamental dilemma, the I.N.C. could 
neither win mass support nor advance the interests of those Indians 
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who were simultaneously politically and economically oppressed. 
The link between the enactment of Act I in 1903 and the 
heightened abuse of plantation labour in Nilgiri District and the 
Wynaad taluk of Malabar is undeniable. The number of ~sea 
instituted against labour for breach of contract offences rose 
dramatically under the new statute, especially on the Wynaad 
plateau where labour conditions were the least congenial and where 
corporate ownership proved more litigious. The new labour law was 
used extensively to counter periods of acute labour shortage, 
particularly as plantation earnings in the Nilgiri hills were 
insufficient to deter plains labour from either emigration abroad 
or from agricultural employment nearer the home village. Abuse and 
exploitation of labour was intensified by the Government of Madras• 
failure to afford tea workers any protection under industrial 
legislation which could have acted to establish minimum working and 
living conditions. The provincial government's failure to institute 
such specific legislation further demonstrates that the 
affiliation between the planting community and the Madras 
administration remained close throughout the period in which Act I 
operated. Planters continued to oppose such legislation not only 
because the spirit of rugged individualism persisted amongst the 
plethora of small scale, owner-operated estates in the south, or 
because a number of bills threatened to undermine the maistri 
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system that was universally employed in the region. More 
importantly, in the labour-intensive business of tea production, 
Nilgiri planters could only remain internationally competitive if 
the very cheapness of the labour they employed outweighedo the 
significant disadvantages they bore in higher freight charges in 
relation to Ceylon and Java, and in inferior quality in relation to 
Assam. Nor could planters turn to advanced technology to lower 
their costs of production. Further mechanisation of tea production 
was difficult, and in any case would have favoured the larger 
corporations rather than the under-capitalised individual planters 
who comprised the bulk of Nilgiri growers. In short, the 
U.P.A.S.I. 's consistent opposition to legislative regulation of 
tea estates was as much a rational economic choice as it was a 
policy coloured by the political or philosophical outlook of the 
planters themselves. 
Nor did any public scandal propel the Government of Madras to 
investigate conditions of labour on plantations. If, as Chakrabarty 
maintains, labour issues only warranted government#s investigation 
when they posed law and order problems or when labour abuse became 
public knowledge 23 , then there were few events or organizations 
to draw the Madras government's attention to these issues. Field 
23. Chakrabarty, op. cit., p 75. 
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labour was not unionized and flight was simpler than protest for 
workers who were given little incentive to commit ~hemselves 
permanently to estate employment and estate life. Nor did the 
government require planters to keep even the most basic statistics, 
• 
such as records of deaths and diseases, which would have revealed 
health, housing and ·sanitation problems worth probing. It is 
noteworthy that on only two occasions were labour conditions on 
plantations in south India subject to official investigation prior 
to 1937, and those investigations formed part of broader enquiries 
conducted by the Government of India 24 • As a result, conditions 
on south Indian tea estates in 1937 remained utterly unregulated by 
government. This was an extraordinary circumstance-which contrasted 
with the legislative control of colonial factories producing 
textiles and jute, and even the tea gardens of Assam. 
It is significant that the impetus to repeal Act I came 
largely from outside Madras Presidency. The eventual rescission of 
Act I was essentially a corollary of the repeal of Act XIII of 
1859. In 1920 the latter statute was subject to mounting criticism 
in the north as the I. N. c., having largely brought about the end 
of indentured emigration, proceeded to attack laws of penal 
24. Report on the conditions of Tea Garden Labour in the 
Duars of Bengal. in Madras and in Ceylon, op. cit.; 
Report of the Royal Commission on Labour in India, 
op. cit. 
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contract binding Indian labour at horne. The willingness of the 
India Office to establish a freer labour market also contributed 
heavily to the repeal of the Breach of Contract Act. It was the 
Government of India's decision to revoke Act XIII in 1923, rq.ther 
than any independent assessment of Act I by the Government of 
Madras, which provided the impetus to repeal the latter statute. 
It is worth noting that planters were less vocal in their 
opposition to the repeal of Act I than they had been clamorous in 
campaigning for the law's enactment at the end of the nineteenth 
century. While it might be argued that their relative reticence in 
the mid-1920s merely signalled their recognition that Act I was out 
of keeping with the political climate of the decade, other factors 
were also important. Firstly, in the years following 1921 the 
supply of plantation labour was more satisfactory to planters than 
it had been in the immediate post-war period. Additionally, by the 
mid-1920s labour control on estates was increasingly exercised 
through plantation maistris whose rising authority, wealth and 
status made possible alternative extra-legal measures of coercion 
and discipline. As planters became less reliant on Act I they also 
became less motivated to defend the statute against repeal. 
Despite the Act • s repeal and the election to office of a 
provincial Congress government in 1937, the coercion of migrating 
plantation labour in the Nilgiri hills was barely mitigated prior 
415 
to independence. Eamon Murphy has found the new government#s 
actions in the fi~ld of industrial relations were overwhelmingly 
inimical to the cause of organized labour 25 . By way of 
explanation, Murphy argues that the Congress le ade'>J'hip, 
particularly Rajagopalachary, was more concerned with maintaining 
industrial law and order than in alleviating labour's conditions of 
employment in industry 26 The experience of tea plantation 
labour both in the Nilgiri hills and the Anamalai supports the 
extension of Murphy • s views to the planting sector where field 
labour was rarely unionized. Specifically, Rajagopalachary's 
administration failed to extend existing legal controls, already 
applicable in other industries, to plantations. Both Murphy 27 
and Christopher Baker, in attempting to explain Congress' failure 
to take up the cause of labour, have stressed its middle-class 
origins. Baker concludes that the new Congress administration meant 
less of a political change than might be thought since in the new 
legislature, "as in the dyarchy legislatures, large landowners, 
businessmen and lawyers predominated, and there was hardly a 
25. Murphy, op. cit., pp 150-158, 187. 
26. Ibid., pp 157, 185, 187, 192. 
27. Ibid., p 151. 
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labourer, artisan or common tradesman in sight .. 28 Despite these 
findings, which may well account for the patronizing tone adopted 
by government Ministers in their contacts with plantation labour, 
it is also clear that with respect to plantations at least,. the 
installation of the new Congress administration did not simply mean 
the continuation of previous policies. A significant change of 
direction was signalled by the government in its attempts to 
establish a comprehensive, wide-reaching framework to examine 
industrial issues and to settle disputes. Nevertheless, these 
measures bore no fruit in the shOrt term. Just as the provincial 
COngress had failed to deliver immediate benefits to the industrial 
working class, its most serious failing on plantations was that it 
did -not ·attempt to break the power of the maistri system, despite 
the opportunity provided by the possible extension of the Payment 
of Wages Bill to estates. 
Laws of penal contract had plainly permitted coercion and 
exploitation of the plantation work force in the Nilgiri hills. 
Act I in particular, had proved an effective instrument whereby 
employers were simultaneously enabled to combat chronic and acute 
shortages of labour, and to lower the cost of labour power by 
curtailing the labourer's freedom to change his employer. However, 
28. Christopher Baker, "The Congress at the 1937 Elections in 
Madras", Modern Asian Studies, Vol.lO, No.4, 1976, p 585. 
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colonial labour laws were not the only the only basis for labour 
exploitation. As other studies of the colonial labour market have 
asserted, the pre-capitalist nature of Indian agriculture remained 
"and influenced the forms of exploitation existing in facto•y and 
plantation sectors" 29 The pre-existing system of agrarian 
relations bolstered the impact of laws of penal contract in 
determining relations between labour and capital on Nilgiri tea 
estates. 
Coercion and exploitation of migrating plantation labour were 
well established practices in the Nilgiri hills long before the 
introduction of an efficient labour law in 1903. Unfortunately, the 
relatively tardy development of the Nilgiri tea industry precludes 
any observation of the plantation labour market prior to the 
application of the Breach of Contract Act in 1859 in the region. 
However, it would be erroneous to cast this early Act as the 
planters' chief coercive tool prior to 1903. Tea planters were 
often prevented from utilizing Act XIII in a systematic fashion 
because of the ease with which labour could evade prosecution by 
absconding, by judicial interpretations of the Act which 
periodically prevented planters from using the Act to retain labour 
and by the difficulties the planters experienced in extracting 
29. Gail omvedt, "Migration in Colonial India; The 
Articulation of Feudalism and Capitalism by the Colonial 
state", Journal of Peasant Studies, Jan., 1980, p 203. 
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specific performance of contracts from defaulting labourers. 
Rather, planters relied more heavily on the pre-capitalist system 
of debt-bonding to mobilise, discipline and retain labour. 
In the latter half of the nineteenth century it is e'llident 
that labour suitable to estate work in the Nilgiris existed in the 
villages of Mysore state, the Tamil speaking plains and the West 
coast of Madras Presidency. In these regions and particularly in 
the Tamil areas, at the beginning of the census period and probably 
"even before the impact of British rule was felt", there was a 
sizeable group of agricultural labourers who could not for 
"economic or social reasons, hold land of their own" 30 • As local 
tribal labourers in the Nilgiri proved to be both too few to meet 
the expanding plantat'ion sector's growing demand for labour, and 
too intolerant of the conditions of labour and strict regulation of 
work on Nilgiri estates, planters turned increasingly to the 
populous lowlands to supply their labour needs. Tea planters 
specifically sought those landless labourers who ranked lowest in 
the economic and social. hierarchy of the village. As well, planters 
targeted those groups who ranked marginally higher, but whose 
economic circumstances were being eroded by poor harvests, by 
population increase in marginal areas, and by the commercialization 
30. Dharma Kumar, Land and Caste in South India, op. cit., 
pp 189-191. 
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of land which undermined their retention of small plots of 
agricultural land. The impact of these forces was particularly felt 
in Coirnbatore District. circumstances similar to these have already 
been acknowledged as providing the impetus for labour migration to 
• 
Boffibay•s cotton mills 31 , and for the in-migration of that city's 
considerable corps -of sweepers 32 Amongst the colonial ~migrant 
labour streams, whether destined for tea and rubber plantations 
overseas or for Bombay's textile mills, Calcutta's jute factories 
or for Nilgiri plantations, there were few higher caste migrants. 
Migration for unskilled work was a selective process and the 
"bottom of the industrial hierarchy was formed in the main, by 
those at the lowest rung of the traditional social order" 33 . on 
NilgirJ tea plantations, depressed class agricultural workers 
formed the core of field labour which ranked lowest in the 
plantation's occupational hierarchy. Field work was both the least 
skilled and the poorest paid employment on tea estates. In this 
respect, the existing village social hierarchy was broadly 
31. Dick Kooiman, "Rural Labour in the Bombay Textile 
Industry and the Articulation of Modes of Production", 
op. cit., p 134. 
32. Jim Masselos, "Jobs and Jobbery: The Sweeper in Bombay 
under the Raj", Indian Economic and Social History 
Review, Vol.XIX, No.2, pp 108-9. 
33. Ranajit Das Gupta, "Factory Labour in Eastern India: 
Sources of Supply, 1855-1946, Some Preliminary Findings", 
op. cit., p 326. 
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replicated in the new workplace despite capitalist transformation 
of the economy. 
While labourers suitable to estate work were available in the 
plains, they needed both the will and the means to migrate·. The 
willingness of Indians to engage in long-distance work migration is 
demonstrated both by the large numbers of indentured and cOntracted 
emigrant labourers in the nineteenth Century, and by historical 
studies of the colonial labour market 34 On the same point, 
Chatterji notes that the availability of local labour was never a 
major consideration in determining the location of factories in the 
colonial period, since labour was prepared to travel long distances 
to exploit new economic opportunities 35 • 
However, it is also apparent that the majority of labourers, 
inclUding migrating plantation labourers in south India, required 
financial assistance prior to their departure. Since planters 
preferred able...:.bodied labourers who were in the prime of their 
working lives, provision had to made for the sustenance of those 
family members left at home. Additionally, the journey of the new 
recruit had also to be funded. At the same time, many potential 
34. Morris D. Morris, "The Labor Market in India", in 
Wilbert E. Moore. and ArnoldS. Feldman, (Eds.), Labor 
Commitment and Social Change in Developing Areas, New 
York, 1960, p 199. 
35. Rakhahari Chatterji, Working Class and the Nationalist 
Movement in India, New Delhi, 1984, p 17. 
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workers were debt-bonded to local moneylenders and village 
landlords. By providing advances to cover the villager's 
obligations at home and the costs arising from his migration, the 
planter freed the labourer for alternative employment• on 
plantations. 
There can be no doubt that advances were essential to 
mobilise depressed class labour. In Coimbatore, where potential 
recru.its sometimes provided .gifts or free services to labour 
recruiters from the town's textile mills, Murphy has·concluded that 
"perhaps abject poverty inhibited mobility" amongst the very 
poorest classes 36 In contrast, the system of pre-employment 
advances used by tea planters amongst the same population gave the 
poorest the means of accepting alternative employment on tea 
eStates. However, the worker himself was not free. By providing an 
advance against work to be completed, the planter acquired a 
traditional hold over labour which was a powerful instrument of 
coercion. The labourer's debt bound him to both the plantation 
maistri who had recruited him, and to his new employment. Advances 
made under contract attracted the added advantage of legal backing, 
but in the majority of cases it is clear that planters and maistris 
relied not only on labour~ s fear of prosecution, but on labour~ s 
36. Murphy, op. cit., p 35. 
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inability to check methods of debt and earnings calculations, as 
well as the traditional responsibility which south Indian labourers 
accepted for clearing their debts. Debt-bonding, whether associated 
with a written contract or not, enabled planters to extend• the 
labourer's period of employment beyond the agreed term, to retain 
labour against its will and·to reduce the real earnings of estate 
labourers below stated wage rates by transferring part of the cost 
of recruitment onto the labourer •. Where debt-bonding was associated 
with annual wage settlements, as on most estates in the region 
prior to independence, less scrupulous planters also used the 
vagaries of the debt-bond to cheat labourers of their rightful 
earnings. 
The mechanism of debt-bonding was increasingly exercised by 
planters through their maistris. Initially, Nilgiri planters, like 
other colonial employers, used a variety of means to attract 
labour: professional labour suppliers were used on occasion while 
estate clerks were sometimes expected to possess a labour 
connection which could yield field labourers for the plantation. 
However, the maistri system was already been extensively and 
routinely utilized by coffee growers in the region and in ne.irby 
Mysore State, and it soon became the conventional means by which 
tea planters obtained the vast majority of their migrating labour. 
The origins of the maistri system are unclear. Moore asserts 
423 
that the .. old" style maistri initially existed as a spokesman for a 
gang of migrating Mysorean labourers. He was a leader, either 
elected or simply acknowledged, who led his gang in search of work, 
saw to their welfare, and mediated in the case of disputes ~ther 
between gang members or between the gang and the planter. He also 
negotiated on the gang's behalf with _the planter in such mcltters as 
the size of the advances paid, the- duration of the labourer's stay 
on the plantation, and the wage rate 37 However, the picture 
drawn by .Moore is less than a full and convincing account for a 
number of .reasons. Firstly, the source materials cited by Moore are 
circumscribed, and they have the additional disadvantage of being 
composed around a quarter of a century after the "old" maistri was 
replaced by a system of estate maistris 38 In the absence of any 
conclusive study of the origins of the maistri system and the 
dearth of information in the early records dealing with the tea 
industry, some benefit can be gained from looking at modern studies 
of migrating agrarian labour. Jan Breman' s study 39 of migrating 
37. Moore, op. cit., pp 216-217. 
38. Report of 28th Annual General Meeting of North Mysore 
Planters' Association, lOth March, 1908, reprinted in the 
Planters• Chronicle, 1908, pp 79-82; "The Labour 
Question", Prize Essay, Planting Opinion, 1st April, 
1899, p 240. 
39. Jan Breman, Of Peasants, Migrants and Paupers, Delhi, 
1985. 
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gang labour in Gujarat between the 1950s and the 1970s details 
exactly the type of system that Moore asserts early coffee growers 
penetrated in their quest for seasonal labour. This system remained 
common well into the twentieth century on small coffee and •reca 
nut gardens in Mysore state 40 , and probably further afield. 
Despite the chronological gap which separates Breman'•s, study 
from the establishment of the coffee industry in Mysore, the modern 
mukadam (gang leader) has much in common with the early maistri. 
Amongst the small-scale gangs of related households 41 which 
periodically migrated around Bardoli in search of casual 
agricultural work the mukadam's position had not been 
professionalised. He worked as a mukadam for part of the season 
onlyi and his standing as a "first amongst equals" 42 in the 
village lent credibility to his role as a gang leader. He employed 
persuasion rather than discipline in intra-gang disputes, worked 
alongside his labourers in the fields and did not charge a 
commission for his services. He was also responsible for collecting 
and distributing all the workers' earnings at the end of the season 
and he provided the only channel through which the gang and its 
40. c. Hayavadana Rao (Ed.), Mysore Gazetteer, Vol.III, 
Economic, Bangalore, 1929, p 58. 
41. Breman, op. cit., p 229. 
42. Ibid., p 237. 
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employer communicated 43 • Breman concludes that the mukadam•s 
role "is that of an agent between the parties, when he has won the 
trust of both sides" 44 . However, the unequal power of the two 
sides meant that the mukadam did not always serve labo~r·s 
interests. Breman notes that although migrants who arrived with a 
jobber appeared less vulnerable to exploitation, in fact the 
mukadam sided with the farmer in disputes, and not with the gang, 
because the employer was the stronger party 45 In some 
instances, as when th_e mukadam attempted to pass on to labourers 
the extra cost of advances which he has already pocketed, the 
question of collusion arose because labourers were unsure of 
whether it was the farmer or the mukadam who had cheated them 46 
In other ~ords, the potential for collusion between the mukadam and 
the farmer was inherent in their relationship because the mukadam 
served two parties whose power was unequal. Braman's findings 
indicate that, in the abs~nce of conclusive evidence and despite 
differences of time and geographic location, considerable caution 
should be exercised i~ casting early maistris as selflessly serving 
43. Ibid., pp 236-243. 
44. Ibid., p '236. 
45. Ibid., p 242. 
46. Ibid., p 243. 
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labour's interests alone. 
The evolution of the plantation maistri's role in the Nilgiri 
hills is paralleled by Breman's exposition of the impact of 
commercialized agriculture upon the role of the seasonal muk~am. 
In areas of commercial cash-cropping, notably of sugar cane, the 
mukadam's role became a professional one. In these are&s the 
mukadam•s position became a permanent, year-round occupation and he 
now charged a commission, rather than a flat fee, for his services. 
Nor did he continue to work beside any of the multiple teams he now 
controlled for his time was fully occupied with organizational and 
supervisory tasks 47 . These changes to the mukadam's role are 
reminiscent o~~ the changing role of the maistri on Nilgiri tea 
estates. -Maistris, particularly in the twentieth century, received 
handsome commissions for supplying numerous labour gangs often to a 
number of different estates, and as their time was increasingly 
taken up with the supervision of their subordinate cole-maistris, 
they ceased to work in the tea fields. As the professional mukadam 
examined by Breman is employed in cash cropping, there is a clear 
implication here that large-scale, commercialized agriculture 
whether of tea, sugar cane, or other crOps- encouraged the growth 
of a professional cadre of middle men specialising in the supply, 
47. Ibid., pp 236, 242-243. 
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supervision and discipline of seasonal agricultural labour. 
Increasingly, the employer's economic concerns become their own. On 
tea plantations these concerns were finally supplemented in the 
immediate pre-independence period by the maistri's indepeadent 
attempts to exploit labour by methods, such as the manipulation of 
subsidised grain rations, which did not serve to lower the cost of 
labour power to the planter. This late development indicates that 
the tea plantation maistri's role as a planter's agent was finally 
augmented by his capacity to exploit labour independently for his 
own financial gain. 
It is also important to recognize that the evolution of the 
maistri's role in the Nilgiri hills was a gradual process which is 
not .sufficiently indicated by Moore's use of the terms "old" 
maistri and "new" maistri. Significant evolutionary stages are 
indicated by the payment of a commission in addition to a pre-
existing flat fee; by the planters • appointment of loyal, 
industrious workers as estate maistris .in place of labour's 
selection of its leadership; and finally, by the transfer of many 
of the planters • traditional responsibilities, such as the 
financing of advances and travel costs, to the maistri. By the end 
of the colonial period, the position of the plantation maistri had 
been utterly transformed in south India. Maistris could no longer 
be described, as they had been in 1879 by the Secretary of the 
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Wynaad Planters' Association, as "men of straw with no property but 
the clothes they stood in" 48 'Maistris had emerged as men of 
capital and authority. Their rising status and wealth after the 
repeal of Act I was the final stage of a longer running process, 
• 
though the Act itself had forced the pace of change by affording 
maistris protection as employers of labour while simultaneously 
barring them from prosecution for failure to supply workers to an 
estate. These provisions encouraged planters to draw maistris to 
the side of capital against labour. In the older planting region of 
the Wynaad plateau these changes proceeded more slowly than in the 
more recently established planting areas of the Nilgiri hills 
proper where planters had more freedom to establish novel terms of 
engagement with their maistris, since new estates ·-lacked a pre-
existing notion of conventional industrial practice. If the period 
in which maistris and other labour-lords existed was a transitional 
stage in India's capitalist development as Newman has claimed 49 , 
then it should also be recognized that labour-lords were capable of 
adapting to a variety of changing legislative and industrial 
frameworks. 
The rapidity with which plantation relations changed was 
48. I.O.L.R., Madras Judicial Proceedings, 1879, No. 1583, 
G. L. Yonge, Secretary, Wynaad Planters' Association to 
Acting Chief Secretary to Government, 29th June, 1879. 
49. Newman, op. cit., p 5. 
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probably also heightened by the practice of converting "old" 
rnaistris into "new" maistris. This development also took place on 
the coffee estates in My sore 50 , and it bears comparison with 
Arasaratnam's study of the changing structure of the a,itish 
textile trade in the Coromandel in the late eighteenth 
century 51 • The growth of British power in the region enabled the 
British to bypass the class of independent Indian merchants whom 
they had formerly encouraged to act as middle-men in the textile 
trade 52 • Nevertheless, the British converted a number of these 
merchants into subordinate, company servants, termed dubashes and 
gumastahs. Those merchants who were unwilling to accept this new 
relationship were simply bypassed 53 • The dubashes and gumastahs, 
like "new" maistris in the twentieth century, had previously acted 
as economic agents of the British 54 • However, maistris, dubashes 
and gumastahs all discovered that British enterprise yielded 
sufficient opportunity to increase their own wealth and power, in 
50. Moore, op. cit., pp 218-219. 
51. s. Arasaratnam, "Indian Commercial Groups and European 
Traders, 1600-1800: Changing Relationships in 
Southeastern India", op. cit. 
52. Ibid., pp 47, 49. 
53. Ibid., p 52. 
54. Ibid., p 49. 
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part because they wielded the delegated authority of the foreigner, 
but also because their masters were willing to tolerate corrupt 
practices which were profitable for master and servant alike 55 • 
In both the British textile trade of the eighteenth century aQP on 
British tea plantations from the late nineteenth century, the 
exploitation of labour stemmed partly from the collaboration of 
British entrepreneurs and their Indian subordinates. Similar 
alliances have been noted in other planting 
colonial enterprises 57 
56 
regions and 
While the origins of the maistri system are worthy of more 
intensive investigation it is apparent that, irrespective of the 
form in which 'the system was introduced on the earliest coffee 
plantations in the region, British planters were able to adapt the 
system to their needs. In doing so the foreign planter had more 
than the early experience of English industrial practice or sound 
economics to shape his ideas. In the same fashion that British 
planters in Malaya brought with them many of the measures employed 
55. Ibid., p 53; s. Arasaratnam, "Weavers, Merchants and 
Company: The Handloom Industry in Southeastern India 
1750-1790", Indian Economic and Social History Review, 
Vol.XVII, No.3, 1980, p 275. 
56. Jain, op. cit., p 205. 
57. Dick Kooiman, "Rural Labour in the Bombay Textile 
Industry and the Articulation of Modes of Production", 
op. cit., p 141; Murphy, op. cit., pp 170, 174. 
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on the early slave plantations on Demerara and Mauritius 58 , so 
too· the first Nilgiri planters and assistants carried with them 
from the West Indies, by way of 59 Ceylon , long standing 
conceptions of plantation structure and organization. Just as. the 
hierarchical structure of Nilgiri tea plantations grew to replicate 
those of -their antecedents in Ceylon, so too Nilgiri planters may 
well have recognized the potential for adapting the maistri's 
original role to fit a pre-conceived, but up-dated notion, of the 
slave driver. As on slave plantatiOns, the labour force on Nilgiri 
estates was divided into gangs, each under a maistri, whose initial 
dual responsibilities to labour and capital made him as "Janus-
like" as the _slave drivers described by Tinker 60 Unfortunately, 
pioneering tea planters in the Nilgiris have left no personal 
accounts which shed light on this issue. It is nevertheless 
probable that while these ex-ceylon planters' elevation ·and 
modification ·of a minor, pre-existing Indian system of labour 
supply was motivated primarily by economics, it was also in keeping 
with their cultural inheritance which incorporated the legacy of 
slave plantations. 
58. Tinker, op. cit., pp 24-25. 
59. Ibid., p 177. 
60. Ibid., p 7. 
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Similarly, evidence suggests that racial factors remained an 
important element in plantation life. The social order on Nilgiri 
tea estates was strictly hierarchical and was formed along racial 
lines. European owners and managers occupied the upper echelon~and 
were linked to colonial rulers by a commonality of race and 
culture. Amongst plantation maistris and labourers in south India, 
European planters and their assistants were commonly referred to as 
white dorais 61 The term dorai was the south Indian equivalent 
of sahib. In the immediate pre-independence period European staff 
were .in short supply, primarily because of war service, and a 
number of British planters therefore engaged Indian supervisors. 
However, only two possible instances have been uncovered ,where 
European managers accepted employment under Indian plantation 
owners 
62 
so too the social life of British planters and their 
subordinates was exclusively European and rotated around their 
planting clubs, annual conferences and sports contests. Indian 
estate staffs comprised the middle rung of the plantation 
hierarchy. Many staffs were mission educated, Tamil Christians and 
61. P. H. Daniel, Red Tea, op. cit., passim. 
62. J. s. c. Eagan, The Nilgiri Guide and Directory, 
A Handbook of General Information upon the Nilgiris 
for Visitors and Residents, Mysore, 1911, Appendix 
entitled "'List of Planters and Estates". Since the only 
information available on these two managers is their 
surnames, it is possible that they were Eurasian rather 
than European. 
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were probably valued not only for their vocational skills but also 
for their personal qualities of sobriety and obedience 63 . on 
some estates planters prohibited the use of umbrellas and footwear 
by their Indian staffs because these habits, although symb~ic of 
rising social status amongst estate clerks and writers, were 
regarded by planters as reserved for Europeans. These developments 
indicate that not only had European planters successfully cast 
themselves as white masters on their estates, but that they took 
care to maintain the racial gap which they had created between 
themselves and their Indian employees because it assisted them in 
asserting their authority over labour. 
The maistri system of recruitment was the mechanism which, 
for plantation labour, bridged the gap between familiar employment 
arid an unknown, alien working environment. However, neither this 
nor the provision of employment for agricultural labourers was the 
primary function of the modified maistri system. Rather, the system 
was intended to mobilise, discipline and retain large numbers of 
labourers in a systematic way on plantations so as to lower labour 
costs. In order to achieve these objectives, planters relied 
increasingly on their maistris who employed both pre-capitalist and 
capitalist means to control workers. The maistri~s possession of a 
63. Kooiman explores this point in relation to estates in 
Travancore and Ceylon. (Dick Kooiman, Conversion and 
Social Equality in India, op. cit., pp 107, 143.) 
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contract form or a police warrant indicated that he wielded the 
delegated power of the colonial state. His provision of advances, 
credit, and grain rations, his assumption of a novel caste 
honorific and his new found wealth, were all indicative of a.newly 
arrived patron capable of distributing many privileges and 
commanding much loyalty. Despite the contrasting origins of these 
instruments, they proved complementary rather than contradictory in 
compelling docility amongst plantation labour. 
The rise of the plantation maistri also exemplifies the 
broader impact of colonial capitalism upon the pre-capitalist 
social order of south Indian villages. Although "new" maistris and 
common field labourers were drawn from the same low ranking castes, 
the great disparity in their plantation earnings rapidly created a 
wide economic gulf between them. The maistris' superior economic 
standing on plantations was readily transported to home villages 
where maistris channeled their newly acquired wealth into upgraded 
housing, jewellery and village land. Irrespective of how the 
maistri spent his money, his purchases were a conspicuous challenge 
to the traditional social order. This was especially the case in 
the twentieth century since rising levels of rural distress were 
most acutely felt by the same lowly castes from which maistris 
arose. As it had become commonplace for landlords to evict small-
scale tenant farmers and for outcaste agrarian labourers to be put 
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out of work, the maistris' purchases ran counter to the general 
economic trend and were material evidence of the growing importance 
of economic class in determining social status. On occasion, 
members of the higher ranking castes demonstrated their resi~ance 
to the maistris' subversion of the established social order but it 
is notable that these instances appear -to have been confined-to the 
West coast where caste distinctions were more keenly felt than in 
the dry regions of the Tamil speaking plains 64 In spite of this 
resistance, by 1947 a number of plantation maistris had converted 
themselves into a class of independent, petty capitalists by 
investing their plantation earnings in tea estates of modest 
proportions. These estates were located in the eastern region of 
the .Nilgiri hills adjacent to Coimbatore district, not only because 
"new" maistris were more commonly employed in this area, but also 
because caste was more readily eroded as the basis of social 
stratification in the inland Tamil villages than in the West coast 
districts of Malabar and South canara. 
The growth of plantation agriculture in the Nilgiri hills 
also laid the basis for the later emergence of a modern, agro-
industrial working class on tea estates. From the outset, plafiters 
64. Kooiman has noted similar instances of resistance among 
high caste villagers in Travancore. In this region 
plantation maistris and conductors were often drawn from 
the low ranking Shanar caste. (Dick Kooiman, Conversion 
and Social Eguality in India, op. cit., pp 29-31.) 
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treated field labour as a cost of production and regarded 
individual labourers as undifferentiated, interchangeble units of 
labour power. This view was encouraged by the nature of plantation 
employment since all field work was unskilled, trainin~ was 
experiential and no task contavened caste prohibitions. Nor was the 
supply of plantation labour ever sufficient to allow for caste 
clustering in specific occupations as had occurred in some Indian 
industries 65 Just as planters deployed their workers without 
regard for individual caste distinctions, so too "new" maistris 
contracted their labourers with scant regard for their familial, 
ethnic or caste origins. Although the maintenance of pre-capitalist 
forms of exploitation and bondage impaired labour's capacity to act 
as a class in the colonial period, these characteristic features of 
plantation employment operated as a counter-force which diminished 
the importance of caste in the work place and contributed to the 
later emergence of class consciousness among common field 
labourers. 
In the pre-independence period the relationship between 
maistris and their labourers is best described in pre-capitalist 
terms, despite the role played by colonial labour laws in 
determining the nature of that relationship, and the agro-
65. Newman, op. cit., pp 54-55. 
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industrial character of plantation enterprise. On Nilgiri estates 
the term patron-client can be profitably applied to these 
relations. Clearly the maistri had patronage to distribute: he 
could vary the amount advanced to any worker, supply credit, 
• 
allocate housing and grant other petty favours. By these means the 
maistri hoped to command the diligence and the loyalty of the 
labourer because any loss of labour power would reduce the 
maistri's commission and would require time and expense to replace. 
As maistris had increasingly to finance advances from their own 
resources in the twentieth century, their self-interest was at 
stake in ensuring that workers, and particularly industrious 
workers, .remained in their gangs. However, the two parties in this 
relationship cannot be considered as equals. The- maistri clearly 
had the lesser obligation in the relationship, and the "unequal 
interdependence" with which Kooiman has characterised the 
relationship between jobbers and Bombay mill 66 labour appears 
marked on Nilgiri tea estates. Nor did the repeal of Act I produce 
any mitigating effect on these relations, for this event was 
followed by the appearance o_f excess labour as rural depression 
exacerbated agrarian distress and as international voluntary 
restriction of tea production reduced the demand for estate labour. 
66. Dick Kooiman, "Rural Labour in the Bombay Textile 
Industry and the Articulation of Modes of Production", 
op. cit., p 142. 
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Throughout the period under study, and particularly after 1903, the 
patron-client relationship between maistris and labourers was 
largely confined within the boundaries of agrarian debt-bonding. 
The more intensely the labourer exercised his claims to his 
• 
maistri's patronage, the more difficult it was for him to sever the 
relationship. In this way, the labourer's ,working season was 
commonly extended beyond the contracted period. similarly, the 
maistri•s practice of distributing supplementary advances when the 
labourer was entitled to return to his village could extend 
indefinitely the period for which the labourer was obliged to work. 
While the labourer's debt was not heritable and bondage was not 
transferable to the next generation, there is no evidence that 
rnaistris ever attempted to counter these traditional beliefs of 
which they were the clear beneficiaries. In summary, these measures 
shaped maistri-labour relations in the hills so that they came to 
resemble the system of agrarian debt-boridage commonly encountered 
in the dry Tamil speaking regions of Madras Presidency. However, as 
in other regions of plantation agriculture in South Asia, colonial 
labour laws also played a significant role in retaining labour on 
Nilgiri estates. For these reasons, it is as apt to speak of 
industrial bondage as agrarian servitude when describing the 
relationship between maistris and labourers in the Nilgiri hills, 
or between sardars and labourers in Assam, or wherever coercive 
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laws of penal servitude have interplayed with traditional practices 
of debt-bondage upon migrating and migrant unskilled Indian 
67 labour . 
At the same time there can be no doubt that work practices on 
• 
the plantation were more regularised than those pertaining to 
agricultural employment. Aside from regular hours of ,work, roll 
calls were mandatory, lunch breaks were short and timed, field 
workers were closely supervised by estate conductors and estate 
managers frequently rode on horseback over their estates to ensure 
that all workers were diligently engaged. Strict discipline and 
rigid organization on tea estates owed less to the individual 
manager's disposition, or to the nature of colonial enterprise, 
than it did to the economics of tea production. This is exemplified 
by the setting of excessive tasks, by routinely long hours in the 
fields, and by strict control of plucking, since all were attempts 
to lower production costs. The tight control exercised over labour 
on Nilgiri plantations contrasts markedly with the lax discipline 
described by Morris in Bombay's cotton mills 68 • This contrast 
was largely due to the significant difference in labour costs as a 
67. See for example: Guha, op. cit., pp 11, 45; c. Kondapi, 
Indians Overseas 1838-1949, Bombay, 1951, p 32. 
68. Morris o. Morris, The Emergence of an Industrial Labour 
Force in India, op. cit., pp 112-117. 
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proportion of the total costs in the two industries. In cotton 
mills labour costs comprised only a fraction of the overall cost of 
production, whereas labour· was the_ most significant variable cost 
on· tea plantations. strict discipline was characteristic of ~ilgiri 
tea plantations because it could significantly boost planters• 
profits. 
On Nilgiri tea plantations, measures designed to lower the 
costs of production could only be successful at labour's expense. 
Exploitation of labour, in the sense that non-market forces were 
used to reduce wages, was made possible not only by colonial laws 
and the mechanism of debt-bonding, but also by the retention of 
labour's v~llage ties. Originally, coffee estate workers had. 
regarded seasonal employment on plantations as a valuable source of 
supplementary income and had retained their village ties by choice. 
However, as tea replaced coffee as the major crop in the Nilgiris, 
the payment of annual plantation wages which were insufficient for 
either familial maintenance or the reproduction of the labour 
force, created an economic imperative for labourers to retain their 
links with their ancestral villages. This imperative was most 
pronounced in the period after 1890 when economic downturn in the 
international tea trade was followed by the passage of an effective 
labour law. Particularly in the over-crowded labour market of the 
1930s, village ties remained important to those seeking work for 
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maistris commonly recruited amongst their caste folk at home. At 
the same time, these fundamental economic reasons for maintaining 
village connections were supplemented by cultural considerations. 
On Nilgiri estates the traditional south Indian practice of ~ woman 
returning home for the birth of a child was retained even after 
estates began to provide medical facilities for expectant_ mothers. 
As many plantations also paid maternity allowances, it is clear 
that in this practice at least, cultural considerations outweighed 
economic concerns. 
The widespread retention of village ties has a number of 
important ramifications in any discussion of the nature of colonial 
plantation ~griculture. Firstly, it provides a further explanation 
both ~or the ease with which traditional agrarian- features such as 
debt-bonding and relations of dominance and servitude were 
transported to tea plantations, and for the preservation of these 
features despite the legislative repeal of Act I. Similarly, in 
other industries where laws of penal contract had never been 
applied, as in the cotton textile and jute industries, the cultural 
practices and values of migrant labour has meant that "the most 
feudal system of authority can survive at the heart of the most 
modern of factories" 69 In the case of the Nilgiri tea industry, 
69. Chakrabarty, op. cit., pp xi, 11, 113-114. 
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the unfree nature of the agrarian labour market and work place was 
replicated and embellished in the recruitment and retention of 
plantation labour. 
Additionally, the retention of agrarian ties and more~across 
a broad band of colonial industries supports Claude Meillassoux • s 
argument that the notion of a dual economy should be abandoned 
because the agrarian and industrial sectors were economically 
integrated and tied together by cyclical migration and the crossing 
of various migrant streams 70 While Meillassoux•s proposition 
has proved central to a wider debate focusing on enforced 
underdevelopment in colonial India 71 it is apparent that the 
retention of village ties amongst Nilgiri labourers provided for a 
cultural and contractual continuum as well as economic 
interdependence between the two sectors. 
The sustained link between village and plantation also 
provides a number of convincing reasons for the absence of a 
vigorous trade union movement on estates in the pre-independence 
period. Where plantation labourers were ill-paid and~ dependent on 
home villages for familial sustenance it was plainly more difficult 
70. Claude Meillassoux, "From Reproduction to Production", 
Economy and Society, Vol.l, No.1, Feb., 1972, pp 102-103. 
71. Chakravarty, op. cit.; Ranajit Das Gupta, "Structure of 
the Labour Market in Colonial India, op. cit.; omvedt, 
op. cit. 
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for them to develop any strong commitment to permanent employment 
in the planting sector. The only factors encouraging commitment to 
permanent employment on Nilgiri estates were the negative 
inducements offered by high rural unemployment and high le,..,ls of 
·rural distress in the 1930s. As a result, plantation labour's 
industrial behaviour in the Nilgiris is in perfect accord with 
Morris' description of an uncommitted work force: "If workers were 
truly uncommitted and retained their fundamental loyalty to rural 
life, there would be no strikes, but only frequent flight to the 
countryside" 72 In the twentieth century, Nilgiri labourers' 
"fundamental loyalty to rural life" was reinforced by agrarian wage 
rates which exceeded those on Nilgiri tea estates, particularly at 
harvest time; by a more agreeable and healthier climate in the 
plains, and by the customary payment of harvest earnings in rice 
rather than in the inferior ragi often consumed by Tamil estate 
labour in the hills. Planters plainly provided little incentive for 
labour to permanently commit itself to plantation employment and 
this told against the growth of trade unionism. 
It is interesting to note that the only successful union on 
Nilgiri estates in the colonial period was that of estate staffs 
who regarded estate employment as a permanent career, did not 
72. Morris D. Morris, "The Labor Market in India", op. cit., 
p 193. 
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maintain their rural ties to the same degree, and were above the 
abiding hold of the maistri. While early union organizers of field 
labour targeted maistris as highly desirable recruits to fledgling 
unions at the close of the Second World War 73 the growth of 
• 
trade unionism in the Nilgiris, as in Ceylon, only gathered pace 
and intensity when the maistri' s power began to decline or was 
strictly limited by law, and when contacts with the home village 
began to wane 74 The abolition of the maistri system in 1951, 
and the growth of a resident plantation work force in the Nilgiris 
cleared the way for the rapid unionization of field labour in the 
post-independence period. 
The manner in which Nilgiri planters and maistris were 
empowered to coerce labour with authority drawn from both the pre-
capitalist and capitalist domains is paralleled in other regions of 
colonial plantation agriculture. In north-east India the components 
of coercion included the various Assam emigration Acts, the 
employment of garden sardars as recruitment agents, and the payment 
of girmit bonus 75 Estate labour in Ceylon was subject to the 
73. Interview with P. L. Perumal, General Secretary, Nilgiri 
District Estate Workers' Union, 19th Feb., 1987. 
74. v. K. Jayawardena, The Rise of the Labour Movement in 
Ceylon, Durham, 1972, pp 333 4. 
75. The girmit bonus was paid when a new worker arrived on an 
estate, or when an established worker had completed the 
term of his contract. Unlike wage payments, the girmit 
payment was usually accompanied by the taking of thumb 
445 
penal provisions of successive Ceylon Labour ordinances, and the 
rigours of recruitment by garden kanc)annis and the tundu system. 
Indenture in the Malay peninsula, bolstered by debt-bonding, 
prevailed until 1910, when it was superseded by the increas.ngly 
popular kanganni based recruitment method. Any similarity 11in the 
coercive instruments used across these regions should not De viewed 
simply as a response to the economic needs of plantation 
production, but equally as the result of the cultural beliefs and 
practices common to British planters on the one hand and those 
shared by Indian labour on the other. Where culture had proved an 
important determinant of contractual and social relations on 
plantations, as in the Nilgiri hills, plantation agriculture cannot 
be considered an homogeneous, world-wide system of agricultural 
production purely European in design. 
The rapid development of tea plantation production in the 
Nilgiri hills in the mid-nineteenth century provided the sole 
stimulus for the development of a large, anually migrating and 
greatly coerced work force in the region. However, the means by 
which plantation labour on tea estates was coerced were derived 
prints which led workers to believe that they had no 
right to leave the plantation. (Ranajit Das Gupta, "From 
Peasants and Tribesmen to Plantation Workers: Colonial 
Capitalism, Reproduction of Labour Power and 
Proletarianisation in North East India, 1850s to 1947", 
Economic and Political Weekly, (Supplement), 21 (4), 25th 
Jan., 1986, p 4.) 
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from both the legislative actions of a provincial, government 
sympathetic to colonial enterprise and, also, from the realm of 
pre-capitalist, agrarian practices. While it has been necessary to 
separate these twin forces for the purposes of analysis, ~ daily 
practice they were heavily intertwined so that the effect of one 
was compounded by the other. The complementary operation -of 
conventional practice and laws of penal contract created a spiral 
of coercion which reflected the broader encounter that took place 
between British and Indian cultures on Nilgiri plantations. The 
result was a blending of features that created a new cultural 
field, neither purely Indian nor British, but distinctly colonial. 
It is within this field that plantation social and contractual 
relations took shape. The position of tea plantation maistris in 
the twentieth century clearly exemplifies this. Although maistris 
derived their newly acquired status purely from the planting 
sphere, they continued to express that status through traditional 
channels such as the assumption of a novel caste honorific, the 
distribution of patronage and the acquisition of village land. 
These customary expressions of rising social status further 
increased the maistri's capacity to control and coerce labour. If 
the needs of colonial capitalism are seen as the sole motivation 
for the adaption of established institutions and the imposition of 
novel industrial practices, then the translocation of social 
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practices which have no economic basis in capitalism will remain 
inexplicable. The importance of pre-capitalist Indian mores in 
determining social and contractual relations in colonial enterprise 
has already been demonstrated in Dipesh Chakrabarty's study if the 
jute industry 76 , and acknowledged to a lesser degree by a number 
of other historians across a broad band of colonial 
77 industries Not to do so in the case of Nilgiri tea 
plantations would be ultimately to deprive culture of its 
flexibility, as it would be to deny the place of continuity within 
the broader framework of change. 
76. Chakrabarty, op. cit., pp 206-219. 
77. Ranajit Das.Gupta, "Structure of the Labour Market in 
Colonial India", op. cit., pp 1788-1789; Murphy, 
op. cit., p 3; Richard Newman, op. cit., p 1; 
Milton Singer, When A Great Tradition Modernizes 
An Anthropological Approach to Indian civilization, 
London, 1972, p 357-366. 
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